A critique of federal income tax incentives in the development and operation of subsidized rental housing. by Wallace, James Edward
A CRITIQUE OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX INCENTIVES
IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATION
OF SUBSIDIZED RENTAL HOUSING
by
JAMES EDWARD WALLACE
B. Mech. Engr., North Carolina State University
(1957)
M. Aero. Engr., Cornell University
(1959)
SUBMITTED IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY
June, 1972
Signature of Author
Department of Ur( Studies and Planning, May 5, 1972
Certified by
Thesis Supervisor \
Accepted by
Chairman, DepartmentA Committee on Graduate Students,
Department of Urban S dies and Planning
Rotch
06s. INST- 4
AUG 18 1972
Q9RARIE9
2ABSTRACT
A CRITIQUE OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX !NCENTIVES IN THE DEVELOPMENT
AND OPERATION OF FEDERALLY SUBSIDIZED RENTAL HOUSING
James Edward Wallace
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy.
This thesis describes and criticizes the role of tax shelter in the
workings of the subsidized rental housing program created in Section 236 of
the National Housing Act as established in the Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1968. The setting of this project subsidy approach is described in
the context of the evolution of housing policy in the U.S. and of the rele-
vant tax policies, particularly the version of tax law established by the
Tax Reform Act of 1969.
Tax shelter syndication as a primary form of organization for private
developers and investors drawn by the economic incentives to Section 236
housing is described using base cases for new construction and rehabilita-
tion. On the basis of the assumptions used in this work, the developer of
a Section 236 project can raise in capital contributions from investors
the equivalent of 20 to 30 percent of the mortgage loan amount for a re-
habilitation project and from 10 to 15 percent for a new project. Little
of the amount thus raised in exchange for future tax savings is required
to support direct costs of a typical project, because these are already
covered by a Federa-lly insured mortgage loan. A sensitivity analysis of
the base case approach shows that the conclusions are unchanged by con-
ceivable changes in key project parameters. investment risks involved on
the part of the investors in typical syndications of Section 236 projects
are found to be severe, for example, in the event of premature sale--pre-
cisely because of the dependence upon tax shelter for investment return.
A computer program used as an aid in the numerous calculations of invest-
ment analysis and of government costs is summarized in an appendix.
The costs to government in the form of foregone revenues are found
to be large. In view of the magnitude of these government costs, alterna-
tive means for providing the same economic incentives, if necessary,
through various forms of direct payment are introduced and evaluated on
the same terms as the evaluations of the present program. The tax incen-
tive approach is found to be more costly to government than any of a num-
ber of alternatives for providing the same economic incentives by direct
payment.
It is recommended that in the interests of simplifying an already.com-
plex "system" for housing production, of centralizing administrative re-
sponsibility and of reducing net costs to government, a more direct system
of fees for development and other publicly intended actions be established
in lieu of favorable tax treatment.
Thesis Supervisor: Bernard F. Frieden
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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CHAPTER I: ITRODUCT ION
This work undertakes a critique of the particular cross-section of
the U. S. housing system found in Federally subsidized, privately owned
rental housing whose development and operation is largely dependent upon
Federal tax treatment of this type of property. The primary focus is
upon the workings of the interest subsidy program for rental housing,
referred to as Section 236 (12 USC 1715Z-l), created by the Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1968 (82 Stat. 476). Special attention will be
paid to the tax shelter which Federal income tax laws create through the
depreciation allowances and capital gains treatment of Section 236 rental
housing, especially in the version of the tax laws applicable to real
estate established by the Tax Reform Act of 1969.
My interest in Section 236 housing and tax shelter derives from a
basic concern with lower-income families whose housing options are
limited basically by inadequate incomes, given competing needs. While the
Section 236 program is directed primarily to moderate-income families, it
is of interest in the question of the housing of lower-income families
because a significant portion of a Section 236 rental housing project (up
to 40 percent as of 1970) can be assigned to families obtaining additional
rental assistance through either the leasing programs of local public
housing authorities or through the Federal Rent Supplement program. Fur-
thermore, one of the implicit justifications for a program not limited to
low-income families is that the increase of supply in housing at price
and quality levels just above the low-income housing market will enable
more direct filtering as the units previously occupied by those families
entering 236 projects are vacated.
Once one begins an inquiry into the development of a 236 project,
however, the importance of the tax elements becomes clear. The favorable
depreciation allowances (especially for rehabilitation expenditures) for
Federal income tax purposes are found to provide a means for a developer
to obtain a substantial "fee" near the start of development because the
tax losses which the project will, generate have considerable value to
high-tax-bracket investors. Several questions then arise:
How large is the amount of funds which che tax allowances
enable a developer to obtain? Is it larger than neces-
sary?
Are complexities or additional actors introduced into the
housing development process as a result of the tax al-
lowances?
What sort of incentives are created both in development
and during operation of the project as a result of the
tax allowances?
How costly to government is the tax alliowance approach?
Could the same objective be attained at least as well,
at lower public costs, and possibly under better
policy control by a more direct system of financial
incentives?
How well do the supposed beneficiaries, the tenants,
fare in this system with regard to housing services
and options for control over their housing environ-
ment?
This work was undertaken in an effort to examine these questions.
While national housing policy is a conglomerate of goals and pro-
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grams, a brief examination of natiunal housing policy is in order as back-
ground for this particular study and is included in Chapter 11. An at-
tempt is made to set in perspective the project subsidy approach of which
the Section 236 program is an example.
Congressional intent with respect to the tax treatment of rental
residences has become more explicit as a result of the Tax Reform Act
of 1969 in that, while restrictions were being placed on the tax treat-
ment of all other types of structures, the tax treatment of rental hous-
ing under limited-dividend programs was preserved and a new, five-year
depreciation provision was created for certain rehabilitation expendi-
tures on rental housing. Chapter III provides some background on the
history of the Federal income tax, of depreciation treatment and of the
role of tax incentives as well as describing the portions of the Tax Re-
form Act of 1969 which are relevant to low- and moderate-income housing.
The way in which the intent of the tax incentive legislation, viz.,
capture of private capital for housing production, actually operates
turns out to be that of "syndication" or the bringing together oF those
with development and building skills with those high-tax-bracket in-
vestors who can use the tax savings offered by investment in housing de-
velopment which enjoys favorable tax treatment. Chapter IV describe's in a
general way the workings of the Section 236 rental housing program for
mortgage insurance and interest subsidy, and it also describes the way in
which the program depends upon tax shelter.
The interaction of the favorable tax treatment, the favorable mort-
gage provisions, and the virtually assured rental market resulting from
the rental subsidies is made explicit in the base case calculations of
14
Chapter V for typical new construction and rehabilitation projects. The
investment value to the developer of these projects as well as to outside
investors is explored, incl uding an eval uation of the sens i tivi ty of the
results to the particular values chosen for project parameters. The com-
putations were facilitated by a computer program developed as part of
this investigation. The program is described in the Appendix. With the
same base cases Chapter Vi explores the investment consequences of some
of the elements of risk involved.
While Federal housing programs involving direct expenditures as part
of the annual Federal budget are under continuing scrutiny, only recently
have the public costs in revenues foregone through tax incentives begun
to receive serious attention at Congressional level. Major emphasis is
given in this study to a careful consideration of the government costs
involved in 236 projects, especially Federal costs in the form of fore-
gone revenues. After developing a framework for comparison, government
costs are examined in Chapter ViI for the base cases (new construction
and rehabilitation). The costliness to the Federal government of the
current system leads to considerations of some options for alternative
tax treatment under which incentives for development and operation are
at the least preserved--and, in some cases, improved--at lower costs to
government. An even more radical possibility, outright purchase of con-
trol by the government from the developer by replacing the investment value
of the rental project with di rect Federal payments, is also explored and
the government cost compared with the cost of the present tax incentive
mechanism..
In Chapter ViII, ways are evaluated by w.hich tenants could gain more
15
direct control over their housing and housing services. The so-zalled
"rollover" incentive included in the 1969 Tax Reform Act to encourage
transfer of ownership of 236 rental housing projects to tenants is fopind
to be essentially ineffective for that purpose. Included in the discus-
sion of alternatives are: rollover changes within the tax system, direct
incentives for sale to tenants, and syndication of the project by a
tenant organization of "the original project. Chapter IX is a summary of
major observations and policy recommendations.
As a guide to the reader, some general observations about this work
may be helpful. Chapter 11 on housing policy and Chapter III on tax
policy are quite wide-ranging discussions of the background issues, con-
text and the underlying reasons for the attention given here to the Sec-
tion 236 program as a very specific example of what are termed project
subsidies. The reader who already appreciates the background and com-
plexity of Federal policy and programs in housing and income taxation
may wish only to skim Chapters 11 and III, noting only the comments on
the place of project subsidies in the scheme of housing policy in Chapter
I and the summary of the relevant portions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969
in Chapter 111. Neither of these chapters are represented as new research;
they are essentially an organization of the background materials.
Those wishing to proceed to the heart of the work should turn to
Chapter IV, where the description of the workings of the 236 rental hous-
ing program begins. Chapter V can be thought of as a description of a
typical 236 project from the point of view of the developer; Chapter VI,
the investor; Chapter VII, the Federal government; and Chapter' VIII, the
tenants.
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Others have focused on the matter of tax shelter and of 236 housing
before; my primary focus has been upon government costs and alternatives
to the present tax incentives in the 236 program. In particular, I have
(1) tested the sensitivity of the base case approach (often used for
analyzing such projects) to variations in the relative make-up of pro-
Ject cost elements, and (2) devised analytical methods, programmed them
and calculated the net revenue costs to the Federal government of typical
236 projects compared with net revenue costs of a large variety of means
for substituting direct government payments for some or all of the tax
benefits now enjoyed by this type of project.
CHAPTER II: THE PERSPECTIVE OF NATIONAL
HOUSING POLICY
The Congress hereby declares that the general welfare
and security of the Nation and the health and living
standards of its people require housing production
and related community development sufficient to remedy
the serious housing shortage, the elimination of sub-
standard and other inadeqdate housing through the
clearance of slums and blighted areas, and the reali-
zation as soon as possible of a decent home and a
suitable living environment for every American family,
thus contributing to the development and redevelopment
of communities and to the advancement of the growth,
wealth, and security of the Nation.
--Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. 1441
The Congress finds that this goal [of the Housing Act
of 1949] has not been fully realized for many of the
Nation's lower income families; that this is a matter
of grave national concern; and that there exist in the
public and private sectors of the economy the resources
and capabilities necessary to the full. realization of
this goal.
--Declaration of Policy, Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1968,
12 U.S.C.1701t
While the primary focus of this work is on subsidized rental hous-
ing projects, some perspective in the analysis can be gained from a
review of the nature of housing policy in the United States. The Con-
gressional declarations of policy quoted above suggest the nearly global
nature of potential housing policies and programs and also suggest the
tendency to equate housing programs with production of houses. However,
it would be folly to claim any one housing policy or program as the
sinale "answer" to "the" housing problem, especially given the complex
18
nature of housing itself as an intersection of social, economic and
political Forces and interests. On the other hand, it is precisely this
complexity which has made it difficult not to have a national policy
on housing, at least in recent decades.
In this chapter the motivations for public intervantion are reviewed
in the context of the multiple roles which housing serves. The cuestions
are, "What functions does housing serve?" and "Why should government
intervene in housing production and the delivery of housing services?"
and "What choices are available for public intervention?" Given the
wide array of motivations discussed here a comparably wide range of op-
tions for housing policy is possible.
This chapter ends with a review of the role in U. S. housing
policy of project subsidies, or subsidies in housing that are tied to
particular buildings. As mentioned above, there is a strong tradition
of viewing the housing problem as one of housing production. An analy-
sis of a particular project subsidy program, the Section 236 rental pro-
gram, must thus be viewed in the context of project subsidies generally;
project subsidies, in turn, must-be viewed against the more general mo-
tivations and options in housing policy.
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A. ROLES OF HOUS!NG
Housing seems to have attracted policy attent ion in the United
States because of its fundamental role in providing shelter; because of
the "bundle" of rights, opportunities and responsibilities attaching
to one's residential location and form of tenure; and because of the
relative importance of the economic dimension of housing in household
expenditures and in the national economy. While not always easy to
separate, I want to look both at the importance of housing to the indi-
vidual and to the society.
1. Shelter
Perhaps the fundamental policy aspect-of housing is that it pro-
vides shelter. Shelter concerns have been viewed in terms of the phy-
sical adequacy of the housing unit, in terms of the affordability of
adequate housing within a household's budget, and in terms of the rela-
tive quality of housing and housing services among class and income
levels.
Absolute measure of the physical quality of housing has been of-
fered by the Census Bureau's categories of sound, deteriorating and
dilapidated structure and the presence of certain minimum plumbing
facilities. One convention for defining substandard housing combines
Census categories of all dilapidated units (not safe and adequate
shelter and endangers health, safety or well-being, requiring major
structural repairs or outright replacement) plus sound or deteri-
orating units lacking plumbing facilities (hot and cold running
water; private, indoor bath and toilet facilities). As a re-
sult of serious problems of consistency in judgment by the Census
enumerators on the matter of physical quality and a shift
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to the use of mail questionnaires for the Census enumeration, only spe-
cial surveys have developed this data since the 1960 Census. (U. S
Bureau of Census, 1967) The high correlation between dilapidation and
inadequate plumbing, however, allows the use-of plumbing inadequacy as
a surrogate for substandardness. Census data summarized for the House
Subcommittee on Housing Panels by Schechter and Schlefer (1971) showed
that in absolute, physical quality the housing stock has shown steady
improvement, as indicated in Table 11-1.
TABLE 11-1: SUBSTANDARD HOUSING IN THE UNITED STATES
Percentage Percentage
Lacking Lacking
Number Percentage Plumbing PIumbing
Total Lacking Lacking Outside, Inside
Units Plumbing Plumbing SMSA's" S'SA's
46.1 mil. 16.3 mil. 35.4% 54.2% 20.6%
58.3 " 9.8 " 16.8 29.5 9.1
65.6 " 5.5 " 8.4 16.1 3.9
Pe rcen tce
Uni ts
standard
36.9%
18.2
9.4
(U. S. Census Bureau data
20)
cited in Schechter and Schlefer, 1971, pp. 19-
* SMSA refers to Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
Substandard housing is not, however, uniformly distributed across
the population. The incidence of substandard housing is three times as
great for households outside SMSA's as for those inside SMSA's and is
at least twice as great for non-white households as For white households
at all income levels. Those living in substandard housing are more
likely to be non-elderly renters or elderly owner-occupants. (See Census
Year
1950
1960
1968
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data summarized in technical studies for the President's Committee on
Urban Housing, 1967, p. 11-) Witout diminishing the importance of the
rural housing, the present work, being a study of rental housing, is
necessarily urban in focus. Relying upon the special Survey on Economic
Opportunity conducted in 1966 and 1967 by the Census Bureau, Schultze et
al. (1971) have observed that nearly one-fourth of the substandard units
are occupied by single, non-elderly persons (living chiefly in rooming
houses without separate plumbing).
The magnitude of the problem of physical adequacy of housing is, of
course, greater if additional components of housing are taken into ac-
count, such as the degree of overcrowding or the adequacy of the heating
equipment. Of the occupied "standard" units in 1960, nine percent had
more than one person per room. Over half of all rural houses and almost
one-fourth of the units in metropolitan areas lacked central heat in
1960. (Census data cited in Cochran and Rucker, 1971, p. 526)
Since the quality of housing and housing services is related to price,
the problem of substandard housing is particularly a problem of low-in-
come households, who may have to allocate high proportions of income in
order to obtain even substandard housing. Projections made for the Presi-
dent's Committee on Urban Housing (1968, p. 7) indicated that as of
1968 about 7.8 million U. S. families were unable to afford to pay the
market price for standard housing that would cost no more than 20 per-
cent of their total income. In 1960 almost one-fifth of all households
renting standard housing were spending 35 percent or more of income
for housing. (Census data cited in Cochran and Rucker, 1971, p. 526)
1The rent-income ratio as a normative standard for hous-
ing expenditures has been challenged by Aaron (1972), who ob-
serves that while the ratio of housing expenditures to income
varies widely, housing expenditures as a fraction [cont.]
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While the issue of adequate hc:sing has in the past been usually
cast in absolute, Census Bureau terms, the issue in the U. S. is in-
creasingly being viewed in relative terms and as an issue of distribu-
tion in the society. Housing has become a symbol as well as a measure
of relative deprivation by the poor and minority groups despite the
fact that in many cases the physical condition of even substandard hous-
ing in the country would be considpred quite aequate in most parts of
the world. (Glazer, 1967) As Professor Thurow :f M.I.T. recently put
it, "Our problem is not physical sufficiency but relative sufficiency.
. . . In housing the problem is not one of provid ing adequate protection
against the elements, but distributing the different qualities of
housing across the population." (Thurow,-1971, p. 439) it must be re-
membered, however, that even in absolute terms the shelter problem is
acute for segments of the U. S. population, particularly for Negro fami-
lies in the rural South, for migratory farm workers, and for Indians liv-
ing on reservations. (Cochran and Rucker, 1971, po. 527-528)
While the matter of what constitutes adequate and appropriate shelter
is obviously not settled, I cannot help leaning to the almost intuitive
position expressed by Prof. John Myer on the role of housing in the lives
of the poor:
They have so little that what they do have, such as hous-
ing', can mean much to them--for good or bad. Home is the
setting of much of creative life; it is where a person
fails or succeeds as man-husband-father, woman-wife-mother,
[cont.] of total expenditures do not. The latter ratio is observed to
be 36.5 percent for those with less than , annual income, while the
ratio is 26.9 percent for those with $15,00) -r over. Even t'hat differ-
ence is reduced when family size and age are controiled.
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provider-receiver, chil d-sibl ing, adolescent. ! t is
where we feel so sheltered that we can sleep. It is
relief from the exposure of the outside world. It is
where we cook and feed, eat and partake, make love.
It is Individual turf, territory. The physical shell
that houses these central life activities and feelings
can support them, allow them to succeed, be appropriate.
Or it can frustrate them, induce failure--and that is
very much another thing. (Myer, 1970, p. 135)
2. TheHousn Bundle
Because housing fixes a person's place of residence, a bundle of
services and opportunities (or lack of them) is associated with his hous-
ing: the socio-economic character of his neighbors, environmental
amenities, city services (streecs, water and sewer service, garbage col-
lection, for example), public schools, access to employment, and so on.
Recent debate over the appropriate Federal role in housing development
in suburban municipalities has focused on the question of the rights of
lower income persons and those in minority groups (primarily black and
Spanish-speaking) to have housing and the attendant opportunities
available versus the desire of these suburbs to minimize their tax bur-
den, not to mention protecting their racial and class barriers. (Paul
Davidoff, et al., 1970; Carnegie, 1971)
Clearly much of this bundle associated with housing could be im-
proved without directly affecting the physical structures or the housing
services per se available to households in a given neighborhood. Be-
cause these non-housing services and opportunities are associated with
housing location, though, the degree to which they are lacking becomes
part of a housing problem.
3. Housing in the National Economy
At the risk of seeming cynical, it would aopear that a very important
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fact about housing which has generated continuing national concern is
its primary role in the economy. Indeed the earliest housing legislation
in the U. S. affecting housing on any scale dealt with the problems of
homeowners, or at least mortgagors, in the Depression, when Federal in-
tervention was deemed necessary to avoid a complete collapse of the mort-
gage and credit system in the country. (See Haar, 1960; Meyerson, et
al., 1962) In a recent year mortgage debt on one-to;-four-fami1y struc-
tures totalled 220 billion dollars. (U. S. Senate, 1966) Furthermore
net mortgage investment recently has been more than five times the net
investment in corporations through bonds and stock combined. (Maisel,
1965) The economic importance of the housing construction industry was
outlined for a Harvard Business School group in a statement by HUD
Undersecretary Richard C. Van Dusen (1970):
Construction of conventional new housing units this year
will account for 21 billion dollars of business activity,
a little less than 2-1/4 percent of our gross national
product. Adding in rehabilitations, repairs and altera-
tions, mobile home production and other miscellaneous ac-
tivities gives us a total residential construction in-
dustry of about 30 billion dollars in size, or about three
percent of GNP. That's almost as large as our automobile
industry.
While the primary interest of the present work is that of the social wel-
fare aspects of housing, an appreciation of the economic role of housing
helps to explain the preoccupation with production of housing units in
housing strategies, even for the poor.
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B. POLICY RATIONALES
in any attempt to get at the issues underlying the question of pub-
lic responsibility in the housing of low-income persons, some effort must
be made to see in what ways the private welfare of the low-income con-
sumer of substandard housing is related to the public welfare involved
in changing his housing consumption. Several levels of public concern
seem to have developed:
1. Health and Social Threat -- Housing in poor physical con-
dition and without elemental plumbino and sanitation fa-
cilities (running water and indoor, nrivate toilets) is
assumed to cause higher rates of morbidity (disease and
illness), hence create a menace to the health of the
general public and an increase in other public costs.
Persons living in dwellings of quality well below the
median in the population and located in "undesirable"
neighborhoods are assumed by those more privileged to
be more likely to be "unfit" and "unproductive" -citizens
because of the associated social pathologies of low self-
esteem, distorted family relationships and resentment
and hostility directed against society as expressed in
crime, delinquency, and psychological pathologies in the
form of drug addiction, alcoholism, diminished initia-
tive and motivation, and so on.
2. Ugliness -- The appearance of slums is deemed unpleasant
by those who can afford better and who also are better
able to pay the public costs of cianging this undesirable
appearance,
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3. Homeownership -- Ownership and the attendant responsi-
bilities and control are viewed as encouraging better
dwelling maintenance, greater family stability, and
more community participation and support.
4. Market imperfections -- Private actions of housing con-
sumer's, suppliers, and lenders may lead to suboptimal
allocations of resources to housing and may also lead
to undesirable functioning of the market for housing
and housing services and require collective solution
through government action.
5. Housing as a Merit Good -- Appearance aside, suffi-
cient numbers of citizens may also be dissatisfied,
or suffer disutility, from their awareness that some
of their fellow citizens are living at a low standard
of living, of which housing consumpti.on is an important
part. Put another way, poor housing conditions become
"the shame of the Nation" and justify public expendi-
tures for remedies on the basis of national pride.
Still others have felt that a whole range of undercon-
sumption categories (as in food, clothing, medical ser-
vices, education) jointly produce the undesirable fea-
tures cited in (1) and (2), and that, as a result, the
more fundamental public policy must be one of providing
these goods and services directly at public expense.
6. Redistribution -- Others regard the existence of under-
housed persons as an example of inequitable distribution
27
of resources and feel that the fundamental solution is one
of general transfers of income to enable everyone to have
the ability to choose the socially desired level of vari-
ous goods and services.
1. Health and Social Threat of Substandard Housing
The first two arguments stated above apparently continue to have
legislative appeal, even though the underlying assumptions as to causal
connection between improved housing and health and reduced social pathology
have been borne out in research only for the most extreme circumstances.
As an isolated factor, improvement in housing conditions alone is appar-
ently not as therapeutic as the reformers bave hoped.
In his already classic monograph, Slums and Social Insecurity,
Alvin Schorr (1963) attempted to make the case for government aid in
the housing of the poor because of the importance of housing and neigh-
borhood to a person's health, well-being and self-perception. Schorr
realized that his argument was largely exhortation with little firm em-
pirical evidence to support any causal relationships between good housing
and healthy, productive citizens. Rothenberg (1970, p. 368) has summarized the
social evils slums have been alleged to generate in the form of physical,
psychological, and health hazards to inhabitants and passers-by: (1)
slum dwellings are likely to be fire traps, significantly increasing
the probability of general conflagration, (2) given overcrowding, filth,
and inadequate sanitary facilities, slum areas are likely to be a health
menace, increasing the frequency and severity of illness both to inhabi-
tants and outsiders (through contagion), (3) slums breed crime, and (4)
slums create personality and social adjustment difficulties. As Rothen-
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berg points out these relationships may seem intuitive but are most dif-
ficult to attempt to measure.
No one argues, of course, that public housing is necessarily the
most appropriate housing for the poor, but the physical conditions are,
presumably, an improvement for those moving into public housing.
The study by WiJner et al. (1962), comparing one thousand families
of similar circumstance's--some oF whom moved to public housing and some
of whom remained in slum dwellings--found some reduced morbidity among
those in public housing for those under 35 years of age and some positive
trends in social psychological adjustment but little else. Another pub-
lic housing study by Hollingshead and Rogler (1963) of forty families in
Puerto Rico found that attitudes were actually more positive in the slum
dwellers, apparently reflecting a preference for nuisances of nature
(though one could argue how natural) rather than the nuisance of the
bureaucratic rules of the public housing authority.
Aaron (1972) concludes that no study has shown both that (1) the
beneficial effects of housing are due to housing rather than adequate
income, and (2) the correlation between housing quality or tenure (home-
ownership) and socially or personally desirable characteristics are not
joint results of other psychological, sociological or economic charac-
teristics. This is not to say, of course, that no causal relations
exist.
2. Ugliness
The slum clearance aspects of the early public housing program and
of the urban renewal program seem to have had a basis partly In concern
with the ugly or embarrassing appearance of slum dwellings rather than
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primarily for- the slum dwellers themselves. Slum clearance as a housing
policy has fallen from favor on the basis of experience in U. S. cities,
which has shown that demolition of slum dwellings has served primarily
to reduce the housing supply and to displace low-income families to ad-
jacent housing. (Gans, 1965) The current locus of concern with housing
appearance would seem to lie in the conflict between private property
rights and the use of the police power (so-called) of the state to en-
force standards by the use of building and housing codes rather than in
slum clearance or subsidy mechanisms to remedy the problem.
3. Homeownership
The ideal of homeownership has been advanced both be-
cause a dweller may prefer to own his residence and because
of alleged public benefits from a home-owning citizenry.
The study by John bean (1945) on homeownership summarized the U. S. tra-
dition that homeownership is somehow in itself. a good thing: it offers
greater security (though mortgage foreclosure greatly resembles eviction),
it provides a means of forced savings in a valuable asset as the mort-
gage is paid, credit status is improved (if you keep paying the mortgage),
it offers greater control or autonomy (freedom from landlords).
Much of the discussion on homeownership has assumed a single
family dwelling. In the context of this work, however, the relevant
forms of ownership of an apartment unit are the cooperative, in which
an entire building or project is jointly owned by the cooperators, and
the condominium, in which an individual unit is owned outright and the
common areas are jointly owned (Liblit, 1964).
The primary advantages claimed for cooperative and condominium
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forms of ownership have both economic and social dimensions. In both
cases the potential benefits to the individuals seem clearer than the
public benefits derived. There are diffusc aspects of several of the
public policy objectives discussed--the broad distributional area, the
merit good aspects of the more publicly preferred form of tenure, and
the positive neighborhood effects being made possible through government
encouragement of homeownership. The private economic advantages could
include: reduced rents through avoiding the payment of profits to an
absentee owner, increasing after-tax income through the deductions al-
lowable for Federal income tax purposes of the owne. r's share of local
taxes and interest on mortgage loan (although this advantage decreases
as taxable income decreases), building up equity in the property, mini-
mizing losses from vacancies and collection difficulties often found in
rental housing, keeping maintenance costs low because of an increased
sense of responsibility on the part of the owners.2
Social benefits could accrue both to the owner-occupants and to the
society: (1) the occupants enjoy greater control over their own housing
and immediate environment than would be possible renting, (2) the coopera-
tive spirit may spill over into other aspects of urban living (coopera-
tive food supplies, child care, recreation programs, for example), (3)
pride of ownership could lead to a stable, more attractive community,
I
See the discussion on cooperative housing in the summary report of
the commission chaired by former Senator Paul H. Douglas (National Com-
mission on Urban Problems, 1968, Part 1i, Ch. 4).
2 For whatever the reasons, Sternlieb (1966 and 1970) has found cor-
relations between good physical conditions of property and the presence
of owner-occupants.
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enhacing its livability and preserving land values, (4) vandalism,
crime and delinquency could be reduced, and (5) an environment more
favorable to racial and religious integration may be achieved. The
primary disadvantages in these forms of ownership of apartment units
lie in the organization required and the risks taken. The degree of
organization required to establish them in the first place and to as-
sure a satisfactory flow of housing services compared with the rental
situation may be greater than low-income families with more immediate
problems have the time or resources to provide. Further, since some
cash payments are necessary at the outset and claim to the value of the
property builds as the mortgage is repaid, the cooperator or condominiuri
owner risks some expense or loss of his share in the value of the
property if others abuse the property, or, in the case of a cooperative,
default on their share of the mortgage payment.
At any rate, the promotion of homeownership has been a policy mat-
ter in the U. S. because of the public benefits, however diffuse, and
the increased welfare which supposedly would be derived from a citizenry
of homeowners. Most of the discussion has taken place around the idea
of ownership of single family units. Dealing mainly with this area,
Christa Carnegie (1970) has traced some of the arguments for and against
homeownership programs for the poor which have been advanced in the Con-
gressional debates and the political viscissitudes to which the home-
1
ownership ideal has been subjected in recent legislative proposals.
In all of the above dimensions of policy rationale for housing
there are elements of what the economists call neighborhood externalities.
See also the MIT thesis written by Jo Ann Newmann (1968) for her
MCP degree.
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That is, the nature of housing in cities is that the enjoyment of one's
own housing is partly influenced by the way in which one's neighbors are
housed and by the general character of the neighborhood that results.
This has financial implications in that the purchase or sale of housing
(either outright or of housing location and services through rental)
obtains not only the value of a particular dwelling but of enjoyment (or
suffering) of the whole neighborhood, as well. Housing is simply one
of those areas in which an individual's consumption makes a difference
to those around him.
There are two fundamental sources of these externalities: (1) true
economic externalities which occur when individual rationality leads
to collective irrationality, and (2) externalities which occur because
some persons are economically unable, within the limits of their incomes
and reasonable allocations thereof, to maintain the level of housing
quality which their neighbors would desire.
The "prisoner's dilemma" is often cited as an example of true
economic externality. Two adjacent property owners may find that if
both owners made improvements to their property, both would maximize
their return on investment. However, if either wiaits for the other to
improve, the laggard will reap some windfall benefits in the form of
slightly increased return without any additional investment. Thus with-
out collaboration between them the individually rational action is to
defer improvement and neither owner obtains the maximum possible return.I
Matters are not necessarily so simple. Aaron (1972) observes that the
"prisoner's dilemma" argument about externalities doesn't explain neigh-
A more elaborate example is described by Davis and Whinston (1965),
who also include a brief description of the origins of the example in
game theory, for which also see Luce and Raiffa (1957).
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borhoods which are not declining or those which are improving. But where
lack of individual action not only inhibits economic return but also
constitutes a threat of some sort to public welfare, coercive solutions
are called for and are the reasons for the exercise of zoning and hous-
ing code powers.
When these externalities have their origins in the income levels
of the residents, public action becomes necessary if the desired level
of housing quality is to be achieved. The merit good and redistribution
arguments below can be thought of as involving, in part, the overcoming
of the externalities of underconsumption of housing. In passing it seems
worth noting that some of the apparent con'fusion in the issues of "blight,"
adequate housing, and controls arises from a lack of distinction between
economic externalities and inadequate incomes.
Code enforcement programs, for example, have sometimes attempted
to overcome the undesirable externalities of poor housing by coercive
solutions without attention to the level of income of the residents in-
volved. In the case of rental housing, if the owner complies, the
results then are either reductions in the owner's return on the property
or rent increases to cover increased investment. His other alternative
is non-compliance. Unless the owner was obtaining windfall profits and
can absorb a reduction in return, the low-income renter chooses between
moving to quarters he can afford or higher rents, unless the owner re-
fuses to comply. None of these options would seem to be improvements
from the perspective of the low-income tenant.
4. Suboptimalities in the Housing Market
Except for the merit good and redistriEution arguments to be dis-
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cussed below, much of the underlying bases for public policy in nousing
could be said to involve housing market suboptimalities of one sort or
another, including the neighborhood effects mentioned above. Besides
the categories already discussed, the housing market may be inefficiant
because of information gaps, because of lags between changes in ef-
fective demand and supply response, because of "lumpiness" and location
problems in the interrelations between housing submarkets or in the
working of turnover in supplying housing for lower income persons, be-
cause of various conflicts between public interests and private
property rights (as in issues involving a public need for land where
market purchase could lead to "hold out" problems--an exploitation of
neighborhood externalities), and so on. (See Aaron, 1972, or Grigsby,
1963)
Racial discrimination is an obvious injustice and impediment for
some in the housing market. (McEntire, 1960) Housing i.s also inti-
mately related to the urban land market, which is also subject to sub-
optimalities, such as the urban "land price ratchet" phenomenon
described by Aaron (1972): a suspension in construction for whatever
reason (perhaps a credit shortage) allows the price of land to jump from
raw land prices to improved land prices, o.iing to demand pressures and
continuing infrastructure investment by government. In the present con-
text the point is that there are numerous reasons for direct interven-
tion in the housing market generally and in particular for the benefit
of low- and moderate-income persons because of the many inefficiencies
and impediments in the market.
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5. Housing as a Merit Good
The notion of merit wants is that there are certain forms of private
consumption which serve a public purpose but which must be imposed by
public policy because, within his available income, the sovereign con-
sumer's choices would result in underconsumption of that particular good
or service. (Musgrave, 1959, Ch. 1) The "merit good" in the case of
housing would be that additional duantity of housing consumption for
which the public is collectively willing to pay in order that a publicly
desired level of housing consumption be reached by all citizens. The
elements of a theory of merit wants might thus be outlined as follows:
1. A specific level of consumption of a private good
is publicly desired.
2. Some consumers, while spending an acceptable portion
of their income for this private good ("acceptable"
also requires public determination)' fail to achieve
the desired level of consumption.
3. While the potential spillover from the necessary incre-
ment in housing consumption is widely valued (has pos.i-
tive utility) for those who would have to bear the ex-
pense of the necessary subsidy, there is no market
,mechanism for providing this subsidy; no single indi-
vidual will provide his portion because there is no
way to exclude others who would derive satisfaction
from the spillover nor is this in any sense a rival good
(the potential donors do not wish to compete for the
housing).
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The merit want case is thus not a polar case of either a public or
private good but wnat Musgrave (1969) has called a mixed good. Thus,
merit wants require a subjective theory of social goods, one which at-
tempts to account for the external benefits derived from private con-
sumption and to arrive at a level of subsidy which is required to achieve
some sort of welfare maximization. Margolis (1968) has observed that
whether the issue is one of interpersonal utilities or of locating all
of the externalities of private consumption of the underprivileged
which would have value to the privileged, preferences are not revealed
through the market and must be elicited through tie political process,
though the problem by no means ends there. Marglin (1963) has presented
rigorous analysis of the interpersonal utility problem in a piece deal-
ing with the question of intergenerational transfers and the social dis-
count rate.
Consider a person. or class "R" of relatively rich persons and a
person or class "P" of relatively poor persons who consume a lower
quality of housing than that which R would be willing to subsidize in
order that P reach the higher level. The reasons may range over some
or all of those suggested in thi's chapter. It seems helpful to draw upon
the concept of Ritschl that the same individual derives utility both
from his functioning as a consumer satisfying personal needs, wants
and interests and as a citizen interested in social cohesion and de-
riving satisfaction from meeting the needs of others. (Musgrave and
Peacock, 1958) Buchanon and Tullock (1962) somewhat more narrowly ob-
serve that the same individual may evaluate some things as a profit (or
personal utility) maximizer and others as a member of a social group,
ly if organized activity can eliminate external costs or confer
benefits. The classifications of interests might thus be typi-
lowing a transfer from R to P in the form of a housing subsidy:
After
subsidy
Utility as Ccnisumer
Utility from P's increment
in housing consumption which
reduces threat of disease,
social disorder
Utility from improved ap-
pearance of the community
as a result of P's increased
housing consumption
Utility from R's own housing
Utility as Citizen
Utility from improving
lot of fellow-citizen
Utility from the degree
of redistribution achieved
through housing subsidies
Utility from improverment
in P's housing r_ se.
P Utility from R's physical -and
social health resulting from
R's own choice of adequate
housing (or can the absence
of a threat never thoucht of
as a potential any way be
considered to contribute to
P's satisfaction?)
Utility from improved appear-
ance of his own neighborhood
After
subsidy Utility from P's own housing
including the increment sub-
sidized by R
This situation seems to be one of asymmetric, reciprocal spillover
of benefits accruing from housing consumption, provided P actually does
enjoy some positive utility from R's housing consumption. However, the
fact that P derives satisfaction from his increased housing consumption
as a result- of the subsidy seems to create a sort of "free rider" ques-
tion. That concern would seem valid, however, only in the case in which
especial
external
fied fol
'A 
" 
-
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an equitable income distribution already existed before subsidy; in that
case the collective decision might be to set housing standards and rent-
income ratios so as to be compatible arid then to s imply requi re that
standard housing be consumed without subsidy, in other words to enforce
strictly a set of minimum codes. In the situation in which the income
distribution is not considered equitable, what at first appears to be
a "free rider" problem is recognized as simply a form of redistribution,
albeit inefficient when viewed strictly as a redistributive mechanism,
since P would not have chosen to allocate the entire subsidy amount to
increased housing expenditure.
6. Redistribution
A society is continually in the midst of the political process of
determining the equity of the distribution of resources in the society.
This determination may involve considerations of the welfare of citi-
zens having relatively little of the society's resources or may be con-
cerned only that all members of the society have a reasonable opportunity
to make free choices. To the extent that pure redistribution is a public
objective, unrestricted cash grants would be called for. However, the
traditional argument that cash transfers are necessarily more efficient
than commodity transfers (such as housing) in raising the social welfare
is valid on if one of the following is true: (1) the change in social
welfare is a function of the utility (satisfaction) of the recipient
alone (with no account taken of the utility of the donor), or (2) donors
are beneficially concerned with raising the general welfare or utility
levels of the recipient as perceived by the recipient but are indifferent
to the composition of the consumption of the recipient. (Aaron, 1972)
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If the distribution of resources in the society were already equitable,
we would not need to make such consideraticns. if it is considered in-
equitable, then this argument suggests that the political process of ar-
riving at the form of redistribution will involve merit good considera-
tions as long as those who will be net donors have some preferences as
to how the redistributed resources are used by the net recipients. This
may give a paternalistic slant to the questions of redistribution but
may nevertheless be a realistic one. Furthermore, the disadvantages
faced by low-income persons may be compounded by factors other than
lack of adequate income alone.
Both general redistribution and tied transfers may occur simul-
taneously, of course. Tax and income maintenance programs could be
used to achieve the desired degree of equality in the general distribu-
tion of resources while specific government programs in housing, health
care, and education, for example, could be used to achieve the desired
degree of equality in each of these areas. (Thurow, 1971) But this
leads us into the question of policy options for meeting the range of
objectives discussed thus far.
C. POLICY OPTIONS
In view of the multitude of possible policy objectives it would be
folly to attempt to describe policy options specifically suited to each
objective but only to that one. Consequently, I have regrouped the set
of objectives into four general areas for discussion: (1) redistribution,
including the special redistribution of the merit goods case,- (2) housing
market actions, (3) overcoming neighborhood external i ties, and (4) direct
supply actions. The first and last areas are given most attention be-
* -
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cause of their relevance to the issue of subsidized rental housing and the
role of Federal tax incentives in these progrars. These groupings serve
to organize the discussion without attempting to be mutually exclusive.
1. Redistribution
If we construe the term redistribution broadly, a number of policy
options can be formulated. A partial list would be:
a. general transfers
b. transfers in kind (for example,subsidies tied
to housing)
c. public expenditures in non-housing components
a. General Transfers
Redistribution achieved through tax and income maintenance programs
would achieve some politically desired level of equality without specifi-
cally restricting use of the funds received for housing. Any problems
arising from continued underconsumption (for one of the reasons intro-
duced earlier) would have to be met through other direct housing programs
of the government or through coercion, as in code enforcement programs.
It is possible that a degree of redistribution could occur, though
unintended, through the working of specific housing programs. Aaron (1972)
has argued that government subsidies encouraging the consumption of hous-
ing (or any other good more capital intensive than the average) will in
the long run raise the yield on capital relative to wages, thus being
counter to the original subsidy redistribution in all likelihood. Of
course, if the subsidy induces new construction, in the short run the con-
struction period is relatively labor intensive so that the transient ef-
fect on the growing edge of the housing market is opposite to the probable
.long-run effects. Broad government actions affecting wage and profit
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levels could also have redistributive effects, relative wage increases
tending to be redistributive downward (except to the unemployed) and
relative profit increases tending to be redistributive upward.
Recent discussion of the possibilities of a Federally funded in-
come maintenance program through a revision of the welfare system, as
in the Family Assistance Program proposed by the Nixon administration
(H.R. 4173), indicates that, while there is growing political support
for general programs of income ma-intenance, the levels of support en-
visioned are quite low--starting at a guaranteed income of $1600 per
year for a family of four, which is less than halr the 1968 poverty
budget levels set by the Social Security Administration (the "Orshansky
poverty line" of $3,335) and only a fraction of the U. S. Department
of Labor's lower budget of $8,925 for a family of four living in Massa-
chusetts. (Schottland, 1970) The President's Commission on Income
Maintenance Programs (1969) (also the Heineman commission, after the
chairman) asserted that work disincentives would not be significant,
thus challenging one of the major objections raised to general income
maintenance. The major objection remaining is simply that such a pro-
gram would cost too much--i.e., those with political power are just not
interested in significant redistribution of resources. Primary re- )
The Family Assistance Program includes a work incentive arrange-
ment similar to that proposed by the Heineman commission in that 50
cents of benefit would be withdrawn for each dollar of earned income
over $720 per year, or benefit payments would be reduced to zero when
earned income had reached $3,920 per year for a family of four. The
Heineman commission recommended a minimum guaranteed annual income of
$2,400 for a family of four with a reduction in benefits of 50 cents
for each dollar earned, so that benefits would cease when earned income
reached $4,800. Nei ther the higher Ievels recommended by the Heineman
commission nor the concepts of a universal income supplement [cont.]
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sponsibility, administratively and financially, for welfare payments re-
mains with state and local governments with support from categorical
Federal programs, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Old-
Age, Survivors Disability, and Health Insurance, Aid to the Blind, and
Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled.
Shelter for poor families is one of the items for which the welfare
payments are intended, although only in the case of "protective payments"
are the funds allocated for housing paid directly to the landlord by
the local welfare department. And housing expenditures account for
the largest single item in a household's budget. (Martin Rein, 1972)
A 1969 estimate by the Department of Healt'h, Education and Welfare
was that Public Assistance channels about 1.1 billion dollars annually
into the residential inventory. About 11 percent of all Public Assis-
tance clients residing in metropolitan areas in 1966 were in public hous-
ing (Rein, 1972). But most of the Federal housing programs are designed
only to reach the near poor. As we shall see later, public housing
rents have until recently been required to cover operating costs, thus
have been out of the reach of the poorest families. We see, however, o
that even when general transfers are made, there is continuing concern
with he housing expenditures of the welfare recipients and a hint of the
merit good considerations which are more conscious in direct housing sub-
sidy programs.
[cont.] program financed and administered by Federal government and mak-
ing payments based on income to everyone who meets the test of need ap-
pear to have generated much political support.
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b. Transfers in Kind
In-kind transfers for housing can be thought of in two general cate-
gories, housing allowances and project subJidies. In the case of hous-
ing allowances either cash or a voucher of some sort would be provided
to eligible persons with the proviso that it be spent only to purchase
housing services in some form. Project subsidies would be tied to par-
ticular buildings or groups of buildings in which family income would
determine eligibility for the subsidy; the subsidy remains attached to
the building if the family should move.
The report of the President's Committee on Urban Housing (1968)
succinctly stated the arguments for and against housing allowances.
Housing allowances would be desirable because:
1. The consumer is allowed to make his own choice in
the free market;
2. A better match is possible between supply and demand
in housing style, quality and location than is possible
with subsidies tied to particular buildings or loca-
tions;
3. Public controversy over location of subsidized projects
is avoided;
4. Administrative costs might be reduced compared with more
directly subsidized and controlled methods.
On the other hand housing allowances have drawbacks, among them:
1. Immediate adoption of a massive housing allowance in a
given community would likely inflate the cost of hous-
ing, at least in the short run, because most housing ser-
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vices would be purchased in the existing housing stock
(President's Committee on Urban Housing, 1968, p. 71);
2. In a tight housing market with few vacancies and much
substandard housing, project subsidies may be a more
direct and efficient way to promote rehabilitation and
new construction.
3. Definitions for eligibility purposes of "standard" or
"adequate" housing and of "insufficient" income would
create equity questions if the result was to exclude
low-income people already living in "adequate" housing;
if they are included in the allowance then the cost in-
creases without direct public benefit, (Grigsby, 1963,
p. 279)
4. Factors other than low income alone may be responsible
for poor housing conditions, such as. racial discrinina-
tion, landlord discrimination against or exploitation of
persons on Public Assistance (Rein, 1972), lack of ade-
quate mortgage financing for improvements (Sternleib,
1970), inadequate information about the housing market
and how to get the most out of it (Frieden, 1971).
As of this writing the HUD is in the process of setting up the ex-
perimental housing allowance program called for under Section 504 of
the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-609), the pur-
pose of which is to begin to unravel this complex of questions. There
has been little other U. S. experience relevant to the concept of housing
allowances. The limited previous experience lies in the area of welfare
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payments for housing, mentioned above, a small experiment as part of the
Model Cities program in Kansas City, Missouri (Mattox, 1971), and other
government payments related to housing, though not necessarily as a mat-
ter of insufficient income nor of substandard housing, such as military
housing allotments and relocation payments, for those displaced by public
programs. It would secm unlikely that the complex questions surrounding
housing allowances will be answered in the near future.
c. Public Expenditures in Non-housing Components of Environment
As mentioned previously, the "adequacy" of housing is affected by
the character of the neighborhood and of the services to which a house-
hold has access because of its residential location. To the extent that
public programs and expenditures provide improvements in these categories
for the less privileged but are funded by the more privileged (economi-
cally) these programs and expenditures have a redistributive element that
may contribute to the improvement of housing conditions, broadly con-
strued. Model Cities, education assistance, code enforcement, neighbor-
hood improvement, augmented city services, medical assistance, legal aid
programs--all are examples of Federal programs which may have elements
of redistribution affecting the satisfaction of lower-income persons
with their residential location. The Douglas commission identified im-
provement in urban services in areas predominantly occupied by low-income
persons as a necessity, not only as a matter of equity but of political 4
stability. (National Commission on Urban Problems, 1968, pp. 346-353)
Improvements in access to employment through improvements in the trans-
portation system may have redistributive elements related to residential
location. Programs which enable residents to gain more control over
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their own lives and to participate effectively in the local political
system, such as attempted in the Community Action Programs funded through
the Office of Economic Opportunity, might also quality. (Spiegel, 1968;
Turner, 1968) The point here is not to go into any detail in all of
these possibilities but simply to suggest the multitude of ways in
which programs with redistributive features could contribute indirectly
to housing improvement.
2. Housing Market Actions
Potential areas for Federal activity in the housing market could in-
clude assuring an even flow of mortgage funds into the residential con-
struction market, acting directly to combat racial discrimination in
housing choice, forcing or encouraging urban municipalities to allow a
wide range of housing types and quality levels within their boundaries,
and assisting in the flow of market information (especially to the less
privileged).
Of all these possibilities the primary Federal activity has been in
the area of mortgage finance. Stimulated by the crisis of the Depression
of the late 1920's and early 1930's, a series of actions were taken to
undergird savings institutions, to insure deposits of savings earmarked
for housing loans, and to insure the mortgage loans themselves at high
fractions of loan to value (the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund to cover
mortgages insured through the Federal Housing Administration). (Haar,
1960) The predominant effect of these programs has been to undergird
the market for single-family homes rather than for multifamily rental
units upon which low-income families typically depend. Only very recently
have the numbers of rental units produced under Federally insured loans
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approximated the total of single-family units. (U. S. House, Subcommit-
tee on Housing and Urban Affairs, 1970a.)
The record of Federal action on racial discrimination is not so
positive. The 1938 FHA Underwriting Manual cautioned that "If a neigh-
borhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that properties shall
continue to be occupied by the same social and racial group." Not until
two years after a 1948 U. S. Supreme Court decision did the FHA start
a policy of refusing to insure loans on property with restrictive
covenants. And as recently as 1967 the National Committee Against Dis-
crimination in Housing was charging the Federal government with a series
of policies either encouraging racial discrimination or allowing openly
segregated patterns of location and assignment in Federally assisted hous-
ing units while failing to take affirmative action to combat racial dis-
crimination. (The NCDH booklet How the Federal Government Builds
Ghettoes is the source for the above history as well.) Despite the anti-
discrimination provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968
there is not much evidence of aggressive action on the part of HUD cr
the Department of Justice in assuring non-segregationist location deci-
sions for Federally assisted housing (Carnegie, 1971) nor for initiating
actions to combat patterns of discrimination, nor even successful prose-
cution of private complaints submitted under the provisions of the Civil O
Rights Act of 1968. (Hecht, 1972)
Other Federal activities in the housing market have been marginal.
Housing information centers, tenant organization, homeownership counseling a
have tended to be private activities with minimal Federal support. For
example, Section 106 (a) cf the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968
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(P.L. 90-448) authorized the Secretary of HUD "to provide or contract
with public or private organizations to provide information, advice,
and technical assistance with respect to the construction, rehabilita-
tion, and operation by nonprofit organizations of housing for low or
moderate income families." Yet the program has never been funded, has
not been included in the presidential budget nor has funding been
actively sought by HUD. (Keyes, 1971, p. 172) While this stance par-
tially reflects the attitude that profit-oriented developers are making
a satisfactory response to the need for housing production, it may also
betray a lack of concern with the supposed beneficiaries of HUD's pro-
duction efforts, the eventual users of the housing. An even more direct
indication is that the fiscal year 1972 appropriations by the Congress
for a previously unfunded homeownership counseling program for families
of low- and moderate-income previously disqualified from mortgage
loans (Section 237 of the Housing and Development Act of 1968) were made
despite the lack of a request for any funds in the President's budget
request. (Journal of Housing, 1971a)
.3. Control of Neighborhood Externalities
Dealing only with neighborhood externalities other than those
traceable to low incomes, the primary -government role is establishing
standards and controls for development and property use. Zoning con-
trols over land use as well as building construction codes and housing
codes governing conditions of use have been a function of state and
local government in the U. S. and seem likely to remain so. (American o
Society of Planning Officials, 1968,and National Commission on Urban
Problems, 1968, Part I, Ch. 1) Federal atterots to impose or encourage
standards taking into account benefits to lav-income citizens have not
been particularly successful. The Workable Program for Community improve-
ment required of municipalities seeking Federal funds for urban renewal,
code enforcement, and housing programs has been found to be counterpro-
ductive in the case of municipalities wishing to exclude low-income
residents, since the municipality could rely upon the lack of a Workable
Program as their excuse for lack of housing for low- and moderate-income
persons. (National Commission on 'Urban Problems, 1968, pp. 177-178)
Other Federal devices have been used in attempts to encourage localities
to plan comprehensively for community development--the Community Renewal
Program and the Neighborhood Development Plan, for example. Now the
prevailing winds in the Administration and in the Congress seem to be
blowing in the direction of greater local control over these matters
with less specification being tied to the Federal funds supplied as
block grants to a municipality or to a metropolitan or regional public
authority of some kind. (Journal of Housing, .1971b)
4. Supply Pol i ci es
As a matter of housing policy, the Federal government could choose
to act directly on housing supply in one of several ways: indirectly
stimulating supply through income transfers to households (thus creating
additional effective demand for housing and housing services), direct
building by government agencies, encouraging building by private con-
tractors for public agencies, stimulation of private developers to under-
take construction or rehabilitation of housing, or encouraging homeown-
ership.
a. Increasing Effective Demand
As mentioned under the discussion on redistributive policies, the
U. S. experience with general income transfers is limited to the welfare
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system, and the impact of welfare payments to low-income families on their
hous ing or on supply response to thei r increased effective demand is ill-
understood. There appears to be some indication that the augmentation of
income is not the only component of change necessary for some families to
increase their "effective" demand. (Rein, 1972) With regard to specific
housing allowances there is the problem of demand inflation, especially
of rents, in the short-run. Allowance might be restricted to areas with
a weak, or "loose" housing market, i.e., with significant numbers of va-
cancies in the appropriate price ranges. If the political anguish of a
period of demand inflation in housing prices lasting several years could
be endured and if the funding for allowanc'es was assured for the indefi- 5
nite future, one would expect the long-run effect to be one of increased
housing supply (meaning services as well as stock) in the appropriate
price ranges. (Schechter and Schlefer, 1971) The housing allowance ex-
periment being undertaken by HUD is intended to develop information for
dealing with these questions.
b. Direct Building
(1) U. S. Experience
In principle the Federal government could undertake to build
housing directly, acting as developer and general contractor for acquir-
ing sites, building units and managing them. There seem to be serious
philosophical and political impediments, not to mention some legal ques-
tions, to such a course in the U. S. During the Depression of the 1930's
the Federal government directly sponsored the construction of housing in
an effort to shore up lagging housing production in the count-ry, to create
jobs, and to house the Depression poor. Some 21,600 units were built under
the Public Works Administration enabled by the National Industrial Recovery
0
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Act. (48 Stat. 195, 40 U.S.C. 401) Even in this case, however, the
Federal agency rarely acquired the land directly, but depended on lo-
calities to assemble the land for housing sites; and the PWA constructed
the units by contract rather than by the use of government employees.
(Abrams, 1965) Housing for war production workers under the Lanham Act
was constructed in a comparable framework in World War I (Meyerson,
1962) and in World War 11. The legislation for these programs was care-
ful to condition government action on non-interference with private
enterprise and insisted that findings be made that unaided private enter-
prise was unable to meet the particular need before production of hous-
ing by direct government action would be ailowed. There are also indi-
cations of aversion to allowing the Federal government to remain in the
role of landlord any longer than absolutely necessary. The PWA and Lan-
ham Act units, for example, were transferred to local public housing
authorities once these were established under later legislation. Table
11-2 summarizes the history of direct Federal building and the disposi-
tion of the resulting units.
The legal questions about direct Federal building programs revolve
around the questions of eminent domain and of powers reserved to the
States. While the development of war production housing under the
Congress' powers was never challenged, the PWA housing program was con-
tested in the lower courts. The lower court ruling was never reviewed
by the U. S. Supreme Court, but the background of New Deal programs
under the Roosevelt administration and the legal decisions that were made
have shaped the Federal role in housing ever since.
A more complete account of these developments can be found in Abrams
(1965, Ch. 11).
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TABLE 11-2: FEDERAL DIRECT BUILDING PROGRAMS
YEARS ORIGIN AGENCY OBJECTIVES
APPROX. NO.
UNITS PROD. LAND ACQUISITION FINANCING DISPOSITION REFERENCES
1917-18 WWI Emergency Fleet
Defense Hsg. Corp. of U.S.
Shipping Board
1917-18 WWI
1940-48 WWII
Lanham Act ('40)
extended '41 by
Temporary Shel-
ter Act
1949 Wherry Act
1951 Korean War
(Defense Hsg.
Act)
U.S. Housing Corp.
(N.Y. corp. formed
by Labor Dept.)
Federal Works Agency
(Dept. Interior)
Subsumed Feb. '42
under Nat. Hsg.
Agency
Shipyard workers & 9000 dwellings
families 6000 dorm.
War production
workers & families
Military person-
nel, civilian em-
ployees of mili-
tary, defense pro-
duction workers &
families
Military family
housing
6000 dwellings
8000 dorm-units
(1)
116,400
(80,000 permanent
or 'demountable';
balance 'tem-
porary')
86,000
By shipyard
Purchase by U.S.
Housing Corp.
Federal purchase
& development
Bought on con-
tract, rented by
EFC
Federal contract
(initially cost-
plus-fixed-fee,
later fixed
price)
Sold in 1918
for average of
37% of cost
Sold in 1918
for average of
37% of cost
Some sold to
private indiv.,
some to local
housing auth.,
some destroyed
Leased to
builder by Fed.
gov't.
HHFA
Arch. Forum
(1940a, p. 9)
Arch. Forum
(1940b, p. 78)
Meyerson et al.
(1962, Ch. 13)
Arch. Forum
(1940b, p. 78)
Meyerson et al.
(1962, CFi" 13)
NAHRO
(1942, p. 61)
J. Housing
(1962)
Kelly (1951)
J. Housing
(1952, pp.7-10)
U.S. Senate
(1951)
Defense Housing
Act of 1951
1933-38 Depression Housing Division of Low-rent housing, 21,500 Federal purchase 45% capital grants Acquired by Arch. Forum
Public Works Admin. 'pump-priming' (51 projects in or condemnation 55% gov't. loans local hsg. (1938, p. 412)
(Dept. of Interior) 36 cities - Abrams) (PWA planned & (Arch. Forum) auths. (7) Abrams
contracted (1965, Ch. 11)
houses)
1933- Depression Resettlement Admin. Gov't. city build- Greenbelt towns in ----- ----- Acquired by Abrams
(Rexford Tugwell) ing Wisconsin, Ohio, private par- (1965, Ch. 11)
'pump-priming' Md. ties (?)
1933-35 Depression Federal Subsistence Shelter & food 1000 Federal purchase Federal gov't. ----- NAHO (1935)
Homesteads Corp., (garden) for low- & development held 100% mort-
Dept. of Interior wage families gage
(1) Arch. Forum reports these numbers. Meyerson reports 15,000 dwellings plus 14,000 dormitory units in both the EFC and U.S. Housing Corp. programs.
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The central Constitutional housing issues were the validity of
Federal spending and the use of eminent domain powers for housing under
the "general welfare" clause of the U. S. Constitution (Art. 1, Sect. 8):
"Congress (has the power) to . . . collect taxes . . . to provide for . .
the general welfare of the United States." As the sequence of court rul-
ings summarized in Table 11-3 indicates, an initial favorable finding in
1934 supporting the PWA's condemnation authority for housing was quickly
nullified by a contrary ruling six months later--both in Federal District
courts. The PWA had apparently exercised emInent domain with the coopera-
tion of the states and predominantly as a device for clearing titles.
(National Association of Housing Officials, 1935) An initial appeal to
the U. S. Supreme Court was withdrawn before hearing because the Roosevelt
administration feared that an already hostile Supreme Court might render
an unfavorable opinion and wreck other programs operating under the broad
general welfare powers. Meanwhile, lower court findings in New York
established the Constitutionality of the use of eminent domain by the city
for Federally-aided public housing and even for transfer to the PWA of u
land condemned by the city.
Finally the U. S. Supreme Court in a 1937 ruling established the broad o
construction of the Federal authority under government welfare powers. The
pattern of Federal spending under general welfare powers and state (or
municipal) condemnation under doctrines of public use was established. The
"public use" doctrine has gradually been expanded in court decisions to
support not only public ownership for public use under Federal and State
programs b-ut also private ownership for non-public uses deemed to be for
the public benefit or welfare, as i the Urban Renewal p rogram. (Abrams, 1965)
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TABLE 11-3: LEGAL HISTORY RELATED TO FEDERAL ROLE IN LAND USE FOR HOUSING
July 1934
Jan. 1935
1936
1936
1937
Ohio District
Federal Court
Kentucky District
Federal Court (9
Federal Supp. 137)
Upheld in Circuit
Court of Appeals
N.Y. Supreme Ct.
N.Y. Supreme Ct.
U.S. Supreme Ct.
(301 US 548)
U.S. vs Certain Lands
in City of Cleveland
and Adv. Loan Co.
U.S. vs Certain Lands
in City of Louisville
N.Y.C. Housing Author-
ity vs Muller
Matter of City of N.Y.
(Bushwick Avenue)
Steward Machinery Co.
vs Davis
Upheld right of
government to ac-
quire land for
housing
Ruled housing not
a Federal purpose,
enjoined condemna-
tion. (Not heard by
U.S. Supreme Court.)
Upheld city use of
eminent domain for
public housing (?)
Upheld City of N.Y.
taking property for
transfer to PWA
Accorded to Federal
Gov't. primary
authority for gen-
eral welfare
NAHO (1935)
NAHO (1935)
Abrams (1965,
Ch. 11)
NAHO (1935)
Abrams (1965,
Ch. 11)
0
'i-i
j
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While the Federal government has not used eminent domain directly
for housing purposes since 1935, it has been argued that it could.
The right of the Federal government to spend for a par-
ticular purpose carries with it the right to employ
either regulation or eminent domain for the same pur-
pose. [If] the Federal government is authorized to
regulate in the general welfare, to spend for renewal
of cities, or to provide decent homes for the poor, it
may employ not only. the spending power but any power
best calculated to achieve the purpose. (Abrams, 1965,
p. 218)
National study groups on housing and urban problems chaired by Paul
Douglas and Edgar Kaiser concluded in 1968 that the Federal government
could, other avenues failing, become the "builder of last resort."
If both a locality within a State, and the State itself,
fail in their responsibilities to help meet the present
crisis in the supply of housing for low-income Americans,
the Commission believes that the Congress should authorize
an emergency low-income housing program under which the
Department of HUD would, as a direct Federal operation
equipped with the powers of eminent domain, build and
have ready for occuoancy such portion of 500,000 low-income
housing units a year as remains unmet by local and State
action. (emphasis added) (National Commission on Urban
Problems, 1968, p. 192)
The Committee recognizes that the Federal Government could
assume full responsibilities for effectively and rapidly
developing the full volume of subsidized housing needed to
- shelter millions of house-poor families. It could acquire
sufficient land by condemnation, let contracts to private
builders for housing development, and own and manage the
completed projects.
We believe that such massive Federal intervention in the
U. S. housing market and Federal pre-emption of local pre-
rogatives is both a drastic and as yet unnecessary step.
The existing system for developing Federally subsidized
housing should and must be relied upon to do the job. If
it should clearly fail in the next few years, however, we
recognize that it could well become necessary to turn to
the Federal Government as the "houser of last resort" for
the nation's lower income families. (President's Commi t-
tee on Urban Housing, 1968, p. 36)
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While the National Commission's recommendation is ambiguous as to whether
the Federal government would actually be the builder, the President's Commit-
tee makes it clear that what it has in mind is government as developer,
with private builder doing the construction -under contract. Given the
long struggle of public housing in this country the prospects of such
Federal intervention as threatened above seem unlikely.
(2) Public Housing
The public housing program established by the U. S. Housing Act
of 1937 (50 Stat. 888, 42 U.S.C. 140.1 et seq.) was shaped by the politi-
1
cal and legal history discussed above. The authority for acquisition of
land and for contracting for building lies in the hands of locally con-
stituted housing authorities. The Federal role lies primarily in the
financing of the development through an annual contributions contract
with the local housing authority to cover debt service costs on housing
authority bonds.2 Amendments to the Housing Act made in 1969 (the
See also the discussion on public housing in the report of the Na-
tional Commission on Urban Problems (1968, Pt. I, Ch. 3).
2The interest payments on bonds issued by local housing authorities
are exempt from state and Federal income taxes. While not the main bur-
den of this work, this tax exemption is another form of Federal sub-
sidy of the capital costs of public housing. Others have shown that
the net Federal costs would be reduced by removing the tax exemption
and increasing the annual contributions to housing authorities to meet
the increased debt service expense resulting from the higher interest
rates which would have to be paid in order to market the bonds. The
net Federal saving would accrue basically from cutting off the windfall
gain to those bond purchasers who were in higher income tax brackets
than the tax bracket of the marginal purchasers. That is, the authority
must set the interest rate at a level at which it can sell all of its
bonds; since the level of interest rate necessary to have a sufficiently
high after-tax return for the last buyer allows much higher returns to
purchasers in higher tax brackets who would have been willing'to buy at
a lower interest rate and still enjoy a satisfactory after-tax return.0
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"Brooke" and "Sparkman" amendments :of P.L. 91-152) and in 1970 (P.L. 91-
609) have allowed the Federal annual contributions to cover operating
and maintenance expenses as well as debt service, both to overcome
problems of rising expenses and to serve poorer families. V
The local housing authority is responsible for maiagerment of the
units, although contract management arrangements can also be made. Tenant
payments ordinarily must cover the operating costs of the project; thus
public housing is still too costly for destitute families. The maximum
admission income levels are set by local housing authorities, but 20
percent of income must be less than 80 percent of rentals of available
private housing. (Marcuse, 1969) Median family income in.public
housing as of 1970 was $2.,501 (1970 HUD Statistical Yearbook, 1971,
p. 108).
It has been found that in some cases development may proceed more
rapidly if a private developer handles all of -the development, includ-
ing land assembly, based on an agreement with a local authority as
to the basic requirements, unit types, construction quality, per unit
price, and such. Under this so-called "Turnkey" arrangement the housing
authority is not directly involved until the project is completed and
ready for rental and management by the authority.
Leasing of existing units in the private housing market was
established as an option for local housing authorities when Section 10(c)
was amended and Section 23 was added to the Housing Act in 1965.
* (79 Stat. 451) Leasing has enabled local housing authorities to expand
the number of units available while avoiding some of the problems which
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have become associated with projects in which large numbers of poor families
are concentrated. The leasing option for authorities has created a situ-
ation in between the supply-oriented project. development and the demand-
oriented housing allowance. Clearly leasing does not directly produce
housing. But there seems to be some evidence that the availability of
a guaranteed lease from the housing authority has enabled private owners
to obtain the financing necessary and the confidence in the necessary in-
come stream to undertake rehabilitation of existing units or even con- o
struction of new units. The option of authorities to allow eligible fami-
lies to locate their own housing and then arrange for a lease between the
owner and the authority does not seem to have been much used. While this
would amount to a sort of rent certificate program, authorities have ap-
parently not wanted to spend the time it would take to instruct the
family in its housing search for a qualifying building and to inspect
the units located until one was found which met authority standards.
(Bach, 1970)
c. Stimulating Private Building of Privately-owned, Subsidized
Housing
A more indirect Federal role in housing supply for low- and
moderate-income persons is possible through the creation of favorable
mortgage terms, through subsidies tied to capital costs of eligible pro-
jects and through favored tax treatment. Since much of the remainder of
this work is devoted to the issue of tax incentives, no further mention
is made here except to note that a standing Federal offer for a fee pay-
able to the developer of projects meeting certain Federal guidelines
would be an alternative to tax incentives as an encouragement to develop-
ment.
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Any action taken by the Federal government to improve the flow cf
construction funds and mortgage money into residential construction is
in some respects beneficial to low-income households to the extent
that housing supply increases. A later discussion will criticize the
"filtering" arguments attached to programs-for increasing housing sup-
ply generally without aiming the actions at low-income persons. The
specific options for directly stimulating housing development for
lower-income groups include:
1. Mortgage insurance available only for qualifying pro-
jects and guaranteeing loans at high fractions of
loan to value (thus reducing the equity or down pay-
ment requirements) and long mortgage terms (to reduce
the amounc of annual mortgage payment).
2. Direct, low-interest loans for projects limited to
eligible persons.
3. Interest subsidies tied to the mortgage amount and in-
tended to reduce rents to eligible tenants through re-
duced project debt service costs.
4. Federal payments to owners to make up the difference
between the rent-paying ability of low-income persons
and the rent required to cover expenses plus profit.
The history of Federal programs in housing includes Combinations of
all of these possibilities:
1. Mortgage insurance--in the Section 231 elderly hous-
ing program started in 1959.
2. Direct loans--in the Section 202 elderly housing pro-
gram started in 1959 and expanded in 1964 to include
handicapped persons and families.
3. Interest subsidies--in the Section 221(d)(3) program
(3 percent net interest rate) started in 1959 for fami-
lies displaced from urban renewal areas or as a result
of Government action and broadened in 1961 to include
low- and moderate-income families; in the successor
Section 236 program (net interest rate of one percent)
started in 1968.
S]
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4. Federal rent supplements--in the Rent Supplement program
(Section 101 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of
1965, 12 U.S.C. 1701s) designed for use in conjunction
with the 221(d) (3) market interest rate mortgage program.
The history of these programs to stimulate private development of
rental housing suggests that there were other public purposes
than meeting the needs of low-income famil ies alone motivating them.
In fact the Section 221(d)(3) and the successor Section 236 rental hous-
ing programs were openly programs designed not for the poor but for
those able to pay all the costs of living in newly constructed or sub-
stantially rehabilitated housing except for a portion of the mortgage pay-
ment. The Federal subsidy is in the form of payment by HUD to the pri-
vate mortgagee (mortgage holder, or lender) of the FHA mortgage insurance
premium and the difference between the mortgage payment at market in-
terest rate (within the ceiling established by law and FHA determination)
and the mortgage payment at an interest rate of one percent on a loan
guaranteed for a term of up to 40 years.
To be eligible for 236 housing a family must have an adjusted in-
come (95 percent of regular gross income of members of the family over
21 during the preceding 12 months, less $300 per minor) which ordinarily
must not exceed 135 percent of the local admission limits for public
housing. However, in units accounting for up to 20 percent of the subsidy
funds contracted for nationally the incomes of tenants at initial rent-up
may be as high as 90 percent of the local admission limits for Section
Concise descriptions of the origins and operation of these programs
are found in the Douglas commission report (National Commission on Urban
Problems, 1968), the Kaiser committee reDort (President's Committee on
Urban Housing, 1968) and in the review by Aaron (1972). The language of
the statutes is collected in Basic Laws and Authorities on Housing andUrban Development (U. S. House, 1971a).
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221 (d) (3) housing, if the lower limits would make the project not feasi-
ble. The family payment for rent must represent at least 25 percent of
adjusted gross income. As family income rises the amount of subsidy is
reduced until, eventually, the subsidy may be reduced to zero and the
full rent paid to cover the mortgage payment at market interest rates.
As of March, 1970, the-median gross annual income of families served by
the 236 program was $5,089, about double the incomes of families in pub-
lic housing or Rent Supplement projects (1970 HUD Statistical Yearbook,
1971, p. 125).
The 236 program has at least the potential for reaching lower income
families than could be served by the interest subsidy alone, if leasing
of units to the public housing authority or Rent Supplement payments are
arranged for some of the tenants in a given project. The initial 236
legislation in 1968 limited proportions of these deeper subsidy programs
to 20 percent in any one project, apparently to encourage economic inte-
gration and to avoid the stigma and problem concentration which had be-
come associated with public housing. The maximum percentage was raised
to 40 in 1969.
The Rent Supplement program reaches about the same income levels as
public housing but operates in privately owned and operated housing. Ori-
ginally proposed by HUD as a moderate-income program, it was changed by
the Senate Banking Committee to reach lower-income levels by allowing
Federal payments to make up for as much as 70 percent of the market rent
in qualifying projects. The apparent intent of the Rent Supplement pro-
gram to promote racial and economic integration has been stymied by pro-
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visions attached in the House of Representatives requiring consent of
the locality in which a rent supplement project is to be built, thus
limiting location of these projects, by and large, to central cities. c
The hope that a project would have a wide range of income levels in its
tenantry, including some who would pay the full market rent, has not been
borne out either, as developers have tended to apply for rent supplements
in all of the units in a project. This is attributed to amendments to the
program which have been added by the Congress to insure that the costs
and ameni ties of these projects were appropriately low for thei r poor
tenantry. The upshot is that very austere projects result which are pri-
marily marketable to those eligible for the maximum subsidy and least
able to seek alternatives in the conventional housing market. (President's
Committee on Urban Housing, 1968, pp. 64-65) Median family income in
Rent Supplement projects as of 1970 was $2,185. (Kummerfeld, 1971, p. 469)
d. Stimulating Private Rehabilitation
Since the addition of units to the housing stock by new construction
of all kinds, not just subsidized rental projects, amounts annually to
only about 3 percent of the existing stock, it may seem surprising that
more government attention has not been paid to the conservation and
improvement of the existing housing. While the programs mentioned above
have often permitted application to rehabilitation, only sparing use of
them has actually been made for rehabilitating the existing housing.
Rehabilitation seems to be a sort of step-child in Federal housing
policy. As an example, the President's Commission on Urban Housing
was challenged "to study this vital question: How can the resources and
talents of private industry be directed in to the rehabilitation of
urban slums?" (President's Committee on Urban Housing, 1968, p. 222).
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But the Commission produced a report of 250 pages in which only 15
were directed to the question of rehabilitation and two thick supple-
mentary volumes of technical studies dealing primarily with new con-
struction.
The only specific Federal programs seeking to deal exclusively with
rehabilitation of existing structures are the HUD grant and low-interest-
rate loan programs (known by their section numbers in the Housing Act, 115
and 312, respectively)--available in areas designated for such programs
as urban renewal, concentrated code enforcement, or the neighborhood de-
velopment program--and the 221(h) program designed to encourage nonprofit
sponsors to rehabilitate housing for homeownership by persons qualifying
for a 3 percent loan. This program has been succeeded by a feature of
the more general interest subsidy program for homeownership, the Section
235 program enacted in the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968.
e. Encouraging Homeownership
Subsidy programs can be designed to encourage ownership either of
single-family units or apartment units. The Section 235 program is the
first U. S. program for directly subsidizing ownership of single-family 9
houses for those who could not otherwise afford to own. As noted by Rein
(1972) some families, where state laws permit, have been able to undertake
purchase of a house on the strength of their welfare payments. The 235
1The income tax subsidy for homeownership, especially for those with
high incomes, arising from the deductibility of mortgage interest and real
estate taxes, has been exposed by a number of investigators. For example,
Aaron (1972) computes that in 1966 homeowners received 7 billion dollars
* in tax benefits, equivalent to almost 17 percent of the 42 billion dollars
collected from the entire personal income tax in that year.
program offers Federal insurance for virtually 100 percent loans on new
or substantially rehabilitated housing and a maximum subsidy of the dif-
ference between the mortgage payment at market rate and the payment at
one percent interest. The purchasing family must apply at least 20
percent of adjusted income for mortgage payment insurance and real
estate taxes. Utilities, maintenance and repairs are additional costs.
The maximum adjusted income levels are the same as for Section 236
housing. As of March, 1970, the median gross annual income of families
served by the 235 program was $5,632, roughly double the incomes of C)
families in public housing or Rent Supplement projects. (U. S. Senate,
1970, pp. 718-721)
For moderate income families with incomes too high to be eligible
for 235 loans, the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 (P.L. 910351)
authorized the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to obtain up to $20 per
month for up to 60 months to reduce to an affordable level the mort-
gage loan payments on conventional loans. The program was named the
Housing Opportunity Allowance Program. (U. S. Congress, 1972, p. 161)
The administrative tendency to limit such a program to "safe" new con-
struction rather than existing housing will probably limit its benefit
to higher income families who can afford, or nearly afford, to carry
mortgage loan payments on the full cost of new construction. There
seems no end to the ingenuity of the Congress in finding ways of sub-
sidizing the middle class.
Ownership in apartment buildings has been encouraged through the same
programs as those for rental housing mentioned above--202 elderly, 221(d)(3),
236 (in which cooperatives may be formed by the tenants) and 235 w.iich may
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be uzed for the condominium form for ownership of individual units in an
apartment building.
D. THE ROLE OF PROJECT SUBSIDIES
p From the preceding discussion it can be seen that U. S. policy with
respect to the housing o.' low-income persons has been oriented to solu-
tions through project subsidies. That is, the subsidy provided is at-
p tached to a particular project or building and is made available to an
eligible recipient only if that unit is occupied. The other major ob-
servation is that the subsidies provided have never been intended to as-
* sist literally destitute persons but those who could devote some personal
income to housing, specifically in the public housing program.I Further-
more the trend has been to orient the project subsidy approach to higher
* income levels. While the public housing (including leasing) and Rent
Supplement programs reach famil ies in the $1,000 to $4,000 income range,
the below-market interest rate programs tend to accommodate those with
incomes between $5,000 and $8,0004 (Kummerfeld, 1971, p. 459)
1. Equi.ty Questions
This raises obvious questions of equity or distribution. Why
should moderate income persons--and only a fraction of those eligible, at
that--receive a government subsidy for their housing before poorer fami-
lies have been served? Advocates respond that (1) building costs are so
high that those who cannot afford to buy or rent the resulting housing
within reasonable allocations of income should receive subsidy, and (2)
g 1This is not to say, of course, that no public payments have been
available; the data examined by Rein (1972) indicated that of all Public
Assistance clients residing in metropolitan areas in 1966, about Il percent
were in public housing.
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there are social advantages to having middle-income families located in
the same projects with poorer families. One objection might be that new
housing need not be assumed as the only source for adequate housing.
(Isler, 1970, 1971; Frieden, 1963) However, there are also problems of
both vertical and horizontal equity involved in the first position.
Lacking sufficient funds to meet the housing needs of all those who are
"housing poor," it seems inequitable to subsidize the relatively better
off before the needs of all the relatively poorer are met, especially
when the taxes of the poor may, in effect, be subsidizing those with
higher incomes. Furthermore, unless enough subsidized units are avail- C
able at all levels., equally eligible persons will be differently treated.
On the matter of economic and class integration in housing, at least
two responses can be made. First, the~available funds would reach more
of the poorest families if those better off paid their own way. Even in
the case of subsidies tied to p rojects, some or most of the units couldbe
rented to those who could pay the market rate; these are the persons who
can afford to live in newly constructed housing anyway. Secondly, econo-
mic integration might better be achieved if the subsidy recipients were
less identifiable than is the case when the subsidy is tied to a project
and locational choice is restricted to the location of subsidized projects.
2. The Filtering Argument
Subsidies for moderats income families tied to newly constructed
S
units might also be justified on the grounds that the so-called filtering
process can be speeded up as a result of moves into subsidized housing by
* 1Concern with these equity questions, esoecially in view of the costs
of overcoming them, is being reflected in Federal policy statements, such
as the Third Annual Report on National Housing Goals. (U. S. President,
1971, pp.. 23-24)
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families just above the low-income families, thereby releasing those
units. The argument for subsidizing moderate income families would
thus run that the same amount of funds could create effective demand for
more new construction than if it were offered directly to poor families.
Poorer families would ultimately benefit by greatly stimulated operation
of filtering.
In an extension of some work on the turnover process in housing by
Kristof (1965), the Institute for Social Research of the University of
Michigan studied the moves resulting from 1,144 new units and found that
an average of 3.5 moves result from the construction of one new unit.
(Lansing et al., 1969) The chains of inoves'-were found to be longer for
higher priced new construction and for single-family houses. New apart-
ment units renting for over $150 per month were found to generate an
average of 3.9 moves, while those renting for under $150 per month gener-
ate an average of 2.4 units. By contrast, the new single-family units
costing over $25,000 generated an average of 4.5 moves compared with 3.8
moves for those priced under $25,000. These are not unexpected results,
since higher quality levels leave more possibilities for intermediate
quality levels before an uninhabitable state is eventually reached in units
vacated as a result of the new unit and since apartment units are more
likely to end a vacancy chain as a result of undoubling (a new household
See Grigsby (1963, pp.. 84-130) for a careful treatment of filtering
concepts, and Lansing et al. (1969) and White (1971) for recent work on va-
cancy chains. assume here that successful filtering would occur when
value (price or rent) declines more rapidly than quality so that low-
income families can obtain either higher quality and more space at the
same price, or the same quality ard space at a lower price than formerly.
(Grigsby, 1963, p. 97) Note that filtering couId occur without a move,
for example, if the real price of rents declined while quality of ser-
vices remained constant. A less demanding view of filtering would simply
refer to used housing made available by turnover.
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forms leaving another still residing in the unit they "vacate"). They do
raise a question about the possible efficiency of filtering in the con-
struction of moderate-income rental housing.
The Lansing et al. study also found that almost 10 percent of the
moves in the chain from the new units included poor families (defined as
those having an annual income less than the sum of $1,000 plus $500 per
member of the household.) However, the proportion of non-white families
moving into new units comprised only 60 percent of their proportion in
the population based on income and those participating in subsequent moves
comprised only 70 percent of their share in the population based on in-
come, thus reveal ing the workings of discrImination in the turnover pro-
cess. It has been previously observed by Frieden (1968) that because
the oldest, least desirable units tend to be concentrated in central
cities, the turnover process still leaves black and poor families behind
and concentrated in the least desirable areas even when it reaches them.
Unfortunately, the study by Lansing et al. did not obtain longi-
tudinal data on prices, thus did not deal directly with the question of
filtering. They did find that in most cases the prices paid by the fami-
lies moving were higher than those for their previous quarters. Even if
vacancy chains or chains of moves reach low-income persons, filtering is
not necessarily working. The household locating housing in the used hous-
ing market presumably moves only because the new unit is an improvement
but not necessarily at a reduction in market price of the new unit. With-
out a price reduction resulting from new construction, the turnover pro-
From 1,000 new units a total of 3,545 were made, 333 of which in-
cluded poor households.
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cess is thus simply instrumental in providing the same sort of opportunity
for improvement or benefit which results from any other consumer purchase
of a market commodity.
According to economist Lester Thurow (1971) there are several reasons
to think that the filtering process won't work. For one thing, as the sup-
ply of housing increases the amount of housing demanded by middle- and upper-
income groups rises. Existing families would occupy more space per per-
son and more households would be established by children setting up house-
holds earlier and by the elderly maintaining their households longer.
These are the trends that have actually been obse-ved recently. Further,
at any income level not only does a price reduction in housing lead to an
increase in the quantity of housing demanded, but so does an increase in
real income. Thus Thurow estimates that to achieve an 8 percent reduc-
tion in the price of housing would require a 20 percent increase in the
quantity of housing, or approximately 12 million extra units over and
above what is needed to house an already increasing population. Such
a solution would obviously be very expensive, would benefit most those
already better off, and would make the distribution of housing even more
unequal than it now is. (Thurow, 1971, p. 445) In the arguments that
filtering will ultimately benefit the poor even if the privileged 're
benefited more directly, we seem to have an example of the philosophy,
"If the horses are fed, the birds will eat." (Origin unknown)
3. Employment and Location Policies
Other project subsidy arguments are that employment is stimulated and
that government retains some control over location. But many other al-
ternatives are open for stimulating employment, even within the construc-
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tion sector. In principle the Federal role in subsidizing-housing in new
or rehabilitated units should enable public policy on location and
tenant composition, for example, to be more directly controlled. There
is some evidence that, unfortunately, the intermediaries between the
origin of the subsidy and the actual implementation (in the form of Fed-
eral administration, builders, bankers, for example) may even thwart the
interests and concerns of those eligible for subsidized housing. (Frieden,
1971) Furthermore the history of implementation of the project subsidy
programs--from public housing to the 236 rental program--shows that the
actual location of units has been seriously at odds with any definition
of distribution of housing need, whether in terms of city/suburban lo-
cation, rural/urban location, or regional distribution. The facts are
that the actual distribution of units -is at great variance with the dis-
tribution of those eligible for the several programs. (Kummerfeld,
1971; von Furstenberg, 1971; Cochran and Rucker, 1971) Even a subsidy
system more oriented to those subsidized and allowing greater choice from
the total housing market rather than being restricted to subsidized units
could, of course, encounter the same problems of performance. The funda-
mental dysfunctions in the housing market for the poor and for rural
families would likely plague a more direct subsidy system as well unless
these dysfunctions were identified and corrective actions taken. Some
of these dysfunctions and possible corrective actions have been mentioned
above in the discussion on market failures.
Se
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4. The Political Context
Why then project subsidies? Several supporting reasons remain,
the chief of which is political pragmatism. In principle the quality
standards can be maintained at a reasonably.high level in subsidized
housing. Even in the complaints voiced about public housing and pri-
vately owned but subsidized rental housing no one argues that it was,
when constructed, in worse condition than the lower end of the unsubsi-
dized housing stock. There is a tendency to insist on quality levels that
will assure units that will not be a political embarrassment because of
appearance or short life. However, as Downs (1969) has argued, the
limited subsidies voted by the Congress for direct housing aid generates
fewer units under high standards than would be possible under a system
of moderate quality standards.
Political support for project subsidies generally and for moderate-
income groups in particular has, until the present, been stronger than
for more direct, people-oriented subsidies or in general income trans-
fers. Support for subsidies to moderate-income groups seems to lie in
the fact that most voters are not poor and the support for redistribution
among the non-poor is insufficient to deal directly with the problems of
poverty and housing inadequacy of the poor. Not only are some elements of
all the policy rationales mentioned earlier present in the political
basis for housing programs, but some have argued that support for pro-
grams benefiting the poor is a matter of political coalitions, interest
groups and categorical aid.
There has always been strong resistance and lack of support
for any form of shelter subsidy for low.-income groups.
This situation apoarently is part of a mcre gene ral pattern.
All ideas for public assistance, whether for better housing
0
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or other purposes, that are based on income or means criteria
alone seem to have been more widely opposed than programs in
which the benefits were tied to some other variable. Aid
for veterans, farmers, business, old people and others is
legislated with relative ease even in the face of statistics
indicating that a large proportion of the recipients in a par-
ticular group have no need for it, and in fact may be the
beneficiaries of enormous windfall profits. (Grigsby, 1963,
pp. 280-281)
Lawrence Friedman has noted that the Depression-era programs for the poor
were actually programs for the "submerged middle class" who were really
middle class in attitudes and life-style but only temporarily reduced to
low incomes. The political support for starting the public housing he
traces to this phenomenon. Friedman has observed that laws for the poor
are unlikely to be generated unless (a) the poor are a majority and are
politically represented, or (b) on balance, the legislation serves the in-
terests of a class larger and broader than the poor. (Friedman, 1968) '
Housing programs reaching the middle class thus may reach broader sup-
port than those for the poor alone. Furthermore a project subsidy ap-
proach engenders the support of the building, real estate, and banking
industries who stand to benefit. (Lilley, 1971a)
It is doubtless easier for those in Congress to feel that the hous-
ing problems of the country are being met head-on with a program directly
providing housing. Further, the System for construction of new units
seems more understandable and concrete than the complex and often obscure
set of actors and actions involved in maintenance of the existing housing
stock, in the delivery of housing services, and the workings of the market
and financing institutions in this sphere. Finally,new or substantially
rehabilitated housing units are discrete, countable evidence of government
action, important in a society oriented to production. Thus an inefficient
S
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program that provides some housing for the poor may seem better than an
efficient program that can garner no Congressional support at all.
(Downs, 1969)
5. The Future of Project Subsidies
Recent events are suggestive, though, that some flickering of support
for alternative housing strategies may be emerging, partly as a reaction
to some displeasure with the present project subsidy approaches. The set
of papers prepared for the Subcommittee on Housing Panels of the House
Banking and Currency Committee (U. S. House, 1971b), several of which
have previously been cited, underscored the shortcomings of the project
subsidy approach and laid a groundwork for regional, block grant approaches
on the one hand and housing allowances on the other. Government concern
with the mounting fixed costs of the interest subsidy programs may also
slow down the project subsidy programs. The 1971 housing goals report of
the Administration noted, "for the three fiscal years 1970 to 1972 (we)
have already obligated the federal government to subsidy payments of per-
haps $30 billion over the next 30 to 40 years. . . . By 1978 present
estimates suggest that the federal government wil be paying out at least
$7.5 billion in subsidies. . . .Clearly the public interest demands that
the federal government not stand impassively at the cash register and a
continue to pay whatever is necessary to feed runaway inflation of
housing costs." (U. S. President, 1971, p. 22)
Neither have the project subsidy programs been helped by attention
drawn to their failings. Added to the budgetary concerns are examples of
builder exploitation, widespread difficulties in the management and opera-
tion of these projects, controversy over location of projects in suburbs,
and a dim awareness that the tax losses in these projects are large.
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(Herbers, 1972) An investigation into the 235 homeownership program
conducted by Rep. Wright Patman, charrman of the House Banking and Cur-
rency Committee, revealed serious problems of exploitation of the home c
purchasers in some cases, particularly in the cases in which existing
houses with some moderate but inadequate rehabilitatioi were sold to
unwary buyers. (U. S. House, 1970b) New 235 units have had problems,
too; the Government Accounting Office recently found deficiencies in 25
percent of the units investigated. (Lilley, 1971b) In the case of the 236
rental program one dramatic exposure was the report that of the 40 pro-
jects, containing 4,300 units, in the Boston Reha'>ilitation Program (see
Keyes, 1970), every project was in default on the mortgage payments as
of early 1972. Twelve of the 40 projects were reported to be in assign-
ment (the mortgagee, or lender, has assigned the mortgage to HUD) and 3
projects were in foreclosure (HUD takes title away from the project
owner and assumes responsibility for managemert). (Hartnett, 1972) Lo-
cation of subsidized rental projects outside of central cities often re-
quires some action by the local municipality on zoning and draws the fire
of those opposed to the potential tenants on economic or racial grounds.
(Carnegie, 1971) The tax shelter attached to these projects also has a
faintly scandalous air about it. (Hartnett and Thelen, 1971) Obviously
a program which is supported because it produces highly visible results
can also suffer because its failures are highly visible as well.
What are the prospects, then, for the project subsidy programs? First
of all, the public housing program, for all its barbs and blows, continues
apace with a shift in emphasis to Turnkey construction and the leasing
program. The earlier project subsidy programs for rental housing under
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private ownership were already in the process of being phased out and re-
placed by adaptions of the Section 236 rental program. Current legisla-
tive proposals would go further toward merging programs. But even in
the face of the criticisms, the fiscal year.1972 projections for subsi-
dized housing starts (including the public housing and homeownership pro-
grams) were 700,000--up from the estimated 1971 total of 550,000.
(Lilley, 1971b) Nearly 200,000 of these units are expected to be 236
rental units. (Lilley, 1971a)
The National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) is credited by staff
members of both the House and Senate committees with having pressured to
insure that both the 235 and 236 programs Would be acceptable to NAHB.
These programs have since become a substantial source of business to NAHB
members, who will not stand idly by while these programs are dismantled.
(Lilley, 1971a, p. 439) According to a former aide to House Speaker
McCormack, as reported in the National Journal,
The curtain is going down on the old act, but you can't
predict when the new one will start. Anybody who tries
has got to keep [several] things in mind: The lobbies,
and especially the homebuilders, can really drag their
feet on any major change. There is no political mileage
in this stuff--nothing to really grab Joe Public. We
are doing what we do because we have to. You can run
an intellectually bankrupt program alrost forever, if no
one is getting hurt; all you have to do is look at the
farm program to see that. (Lilley, 1971b, p. 1543)
Because of inertia, because private business interests have a stake in
their continuation, because some answer will be needed to the criticism
that demand inflation of prices and rents will result from housing allow-
arces (if they are tried) it seems quite possible that some form of pri-
vately owned but subsidized rental housing program will be part of the
U, S. housing scene for the near future.
76
E. SUMMARY
This rather extended review of U. S. housing policy has hopefully
indicated the complex of policy objectives and program options. It would
seem necessary for there to be a mix of housing programs, some of which
better satisfy certain c5jectives and some of which satisfy others. My
argument is that whatever the need for other housing programs might be
(including general income transfers, part of which would be spent on hous-
ing) there is likely to continue to be a place for subsidies attached to
particular buildings, or project subsidies, because they satisfy some of
the policy constrainits better than more indirect or demand-oriented
strategies.
General income transfers have been seen as one means for satisfying
public objectives in housing, in that some of the income suppmleent would
almost inevitably be spent on housing. The trouble is that not all of
the income transfer would be spent on housing. Someday it may be shown
that when all of the meritorious categories of consumption are accumu-
lated (housing, food, health care, for example) the "slippage" in unin-
tended expenditures by the recipients of a general income transfer sys-
tem may be less than the accumulated administrative costs of in-kind sub-
sidies in each of these areas. In any event, to the extent that control
of housing expenditures lies in the hands of the dweller, some of the
public objectives--such as improved exterior appearance of dwellings--
may not be met.
Public actions to improve the workings of the housing market would
seem likely to produce relatively small benefits for low-income people
compared with the improvements which could be brought about more directly
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either with housing supplied directly by public action or by direct in-
come augmentation. Public actions to improve other elements of the hous-
ing bundle (such as neighborhood facilities or schools) could create im-
provements in the housing, more broadly construed, of those benefiting
from these actions. But the trouble is that the benefit to renters is
likely to be short-lived as the improved desirability of a neighborhood
contributes to increased market value, sale prices, and ultimately rents.
Housing programs which attach subsidies to improvements in specific
buildings and more particularly to either new construction or substantial
rehabilitation, such as is the case with most current U. S. housing pro-
grams, got that way because of the.production orientation of policy-
makers. Units produced are easy to count. Dwellers 'satisfied' are
not easy to count. Despite the shortcomings of these project subsidies--
p
in constraining locational choice, for example--they are likely, I be-
lieve, to remain an important component of U. S. housing policy, even if
other strategies, such as housing allowances -or general income main-
tenance programs, are implemented.
Because I believe project subsidy programs will remain an important
component in the mix of housing programs, I think it worthwhile to exa-
mine more closely the nature of the total subsidy involved in these pro-
jects when, in fact, they rely for their development upon favorable tax
treatment. In computing the cost to government of subsidized rental
projects the "subsidy" involves not only the amounts directly appropri-
ated, but also the Federal revenues foregone as a result of the favorable
tax treatment. This does not mean that subsidized rental housing is
the only kind of real estate which benefits from its treatment in the tax
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laws, but it does mean that project subsidy programs such as Section
236 rental housing do rely upon the tax advantages, as will be shown.
The particular relevance of the direct building experience described in
this chapter will be seen in Chapter VII. There, government payment of
the equity investment in replacing the tax-dependent investment value
suggests that government could be the outright owner of 236 projects at
less cost than at present.
Before getting specifically into a description of the way in which
tax benefits are used in Section 236 projects, I wish to provide some
background of tax theory and tax law which underlies the current treat-
ment. The next chapter will deal with these issues first in a general
way and then more specifically as they affect projects such as those
under Section 236.
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CHAPTER III: FEDERAL TAX POLICY IN HOUSING
Ideal principles are compromised in many ways, sometimes inadvertently
and sometimes deliberately, in the real world of public finance. Our at-
tention in this chapter is focused on the nature of non-neutrality of the
tax system as regards real estate'and subsidized rental housing in particu-
lar. This will require some review of the ideal of tax neutrality and re-
view of the principles of income taxation and depreciation allowances. A
brief history of the tax treatment of real estate will lead to a summary
of the stage reached by the provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, and
the organizational forms used to benefit from tax allowances. The chapter
ends with a brief summary of the debate about tax incentives.
A. TAX NEUTRALITY
From the point of view of economic theory, the Federal system of taxes
and public expenditures should implement public policy with respect to al-
location, distribution and stability in the national economy. (Musgrave,
1959, Ch. 1) Adjustments are required in the allocation of resources
achieved by the operation of the private market when free entry of private
actors is precluded, when there are lumpy production factors, or when
there are external economies (or diseconomies) which can only be altered by
IThe material in this section sets a framework of public finance which
relies heavily upon the stance of Richard Musgrave (1959), but which is so
greatly simplified here that it hardly qualifies as representative of his
carefully worked out ideas. The monograph, Public Finance, by Otto Eckstein
(1967) was also helpful and is a source for positions at variance with the
one assumed in this section. The compilation edited by Edmund Phelps (965)
offers a useful range of opinions on the issues of the "proper" size and
scope of government expenditures, as opposed to issues on "proper" taxation.
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public action. Public policy on distribution deals with the basic issue
of equity in economic terms; the most direct public tools for accomplishing
the politically determined "proper" degree of equity are a combination of
taxes and transfer payments. Personal incomes (and/or wealth) should be
I
taxed according to ability to pay, while those deemed, to have inadequate
incomes should receive direct payments, according to this ideal system.
Stability in the national economyis a public concern because fiscal policy
(a combination of tax and expenditure policies) and monetary policy both
affect the degree of unemployment and inflation. Except for these public
purposes, tax policies should then be neutral. That is, the tax system
should leave private production and consumption decisions unaffected by
the tax system and the allocation of resources in the private sector
should then remain undisturbed. A Treasury Department study for the Con-
gress (1969) summarized the objectives of an ideal tax system: (1) tax
burdens should be according to ability to pay, (2) the tax system should
achieve horizontal and vertical equity (i.e., equity among those of simi-
lar economic circumstances and between those of different economic circum-
stances), (3) tax simplicity, (4) economic neutrality except where specific
incentives are intended. In this chapter the concept of tax neutrality
and of departures from that concept will be particularly relevant in the
interaction between the Federal income tax and the tax rules on depreci-
ation and capital gains.
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B. INCOME TAX
1. Personal income Tax 1
Efforts in modern times to determine a "fair" system of taxation take
as a starting point the notion expressed in 1776 by Adam Smith (1937) that
one of the maxims of taxation should be equality, or contribution in pro-
portion to ability by the subjects of a state. This concept breaks into
two portions, vertical and horizontal equity. Horizontal equity is proba-
bly the easiest concept to settle, namely, that persons of similar circum-
stances should be treated equally by the tax system. (Simons, 1938) Ver-
tical equity, or the question as to what differences there should be between
the taxes paid by Those of unequal income or wealth, is not so easily set-
tled. The concept of vertical equity has in most cases relied upon Adam
Smith's assumption that general taxes -should be based on ability to pay.
John Stuart Mill (1884) took Adam Smith's concept of vertical equity to
mean equality of sacrifice, or -that the burden of the tax should fall with
equal force on all. Mill also was willing to distinguish between different
types of income as deserving different kinds of treatment, as, for example,
between profits, wages, and land rent. He also realized that even if the
inediate burden of a tax was made equal, the possibility of shifting the
burden of the tax to others made the ultimate incidence difficult to ascer-
tain. Even in the case of a tax on personal income the net burden is not
known until the distribution of benefits from public expenditures is also
known. Pigou (1949) asserted that as a practical matter, the ultimate
principle of taxation should be that of least aggregate sacrifice, implying
1
This material on the personal income tax is based largely on discus-
sions by Richard Musgrave (1959, Ch. 5), Otto Eckstein (1967, Ch. 5), and
a Joint Economic Committee report, The Federal Tax System (U. S. Congress,
1964, Ch. 2).
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that government should take what it needs from the top income levels and
work its way down. The trouble is that all of these notions require some
accepted measu rement of utility for comparisons amongst persons, which is
as yet lacking. (Musgrave, 1959, Ch. 5) Furthermore the sacrifice argu-
ments omit consideration of personal satisfaction derived from social wel-
fare.
A corresponding principle of just taxation is the benefit principle,
according to which persons should pay taxes according to benefits received.
There are two major problems with this principle: the number of cases
in which the benefits are directly measurable and attributable to indivi-
duals is very limited, and the principle assumes the equity of the pre-
existing distribution of income and wealth. This principle has its pri-
mary application when the good or service rendered can easily be charged
directly to the user, as in highway tolls or water and sewer "taxes." Since
the focus of this work is upon *income taxes and housing, the benefit prin-
ciple has no particular relevance and will not be considered further.
Most western nations have moved beyond the proportional tax (a fixed
percentage of income) thought to be just by Adam Smith to some form of
progressive tax (in which the fraction of tax paid rises as income rises).
Whether a progressive income tax imposes equivalent burdens on all tax-
payers is determined by the taxpayer's marginal utility for money (and, of
course, whatever satisfactions it can obtain) as income rises. The burden
-1
IThe rationale for progressive taxation put forth by the Report of
the Canada Royal Commission on Taxation (1967) and some criticisms of the
Commission's work by Blum (1967) can be found in a reader by Sander and
Westfall (1970, pp. 218-233). For a discussion of theoretical possibili-
ties for taxation on consumption (expenditures) advocated by Kaldor or on
broader definitions of income (including change in net worth) advanced by
Simons, see Goode (1964).
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is maintained constant if as income rises the fraction of income taxed
rises at just the rate with which marginal utility for money decreases.
If a uniform tax rate schedule as a function- of income is imposed on in-
dividuals differing in their marginal utility for money or, indeed, if a
progressive rate schedule is imposed upon individuals whose marginal utility
for money does not decrease as rapidly as the tax rises, then the burden
of the tax is unequal. (Goode, 1964) Furthermore we still lack a reliable
interpersonal measure of utility. Simons (1938) based his support of a
progressive income tax on the grounds that incentive in the upper income
ranges is largely non-economic, turning upon considerations such as power,
prestige, and self-realization. In this case the problem of interpersonal
comparisons of utility would be less crucial.
In The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation Blum and Kalven (1953)
have summarized the arguments for and against the progressive income tax.
Arguments against it include the following:
1. It complicates the positive law of taxation, because of
the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility and
distortions in economic decisions.
2. It is politically irresponsible in that it is imposed on
higher-income people by an oppressive lower-income majority
out of their own self interest.
3. It dampens economic incentives, especially by discouraging
additional work effort for lack of sufficient after-tax in-
come. (Simons' observation about non-economic incentives not
withstanding.)
Arguments for the progressive income tax include these:
1. It aids economic stability and the level of business ac-
tivity by relieving inflationary pressures in times of
rapidly rising incomes yet provides lower taxes (hence
S
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more disposable or investable income) if income levels
drop.
2. It is a logical rule for taxation if marginal utility
for money declines as income increases.
3. It is in effect an equitable form-of confiscation in that
it follows the ability-to-pay principle and satisfies
normative judgments regarding the social values of con-
sumption expenditures by those of different income levels.
4. It lessens economic inequality, increases the economic
equality and opportunity for children (who haven't had a
chance to show whether they've "earned" economic rewards),
and is a peaceful, nonrevolutionary means for redistribu-
tion of resources in society.
5. It is especially justifiable if some minimum, subsistence
amount is exempted, although there are still arguments for
the payment of some tax by everyone to ensure a sense of
participation in and stake in the society.
As Blum and Kalven observe, the lack of a means for interpersonal
utility comparisons leaves the above considerations about the progres-
sive income tax resting on the great question of social ethics: To what
extent are men responsible for their gifts and therefore deserving of re-
ward? If the wealthy and the poor are not thus entirely because of their
own efforts, but because of inheritance (or lack of it) and because of
the context of a stable society and economy undergirded and protected by
the state, then the tax system can rightly be used to reclaim some of the
wealth for the functions of the state, including a redistribution to
poorer citizens. In view of the differences in theoretical and philo-
sophical arguments about the progressive personal income tax a political
resolution is relied upon. We examine U. S. history on this question
after a brief discussion about taxation of corporate income.
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2. Corporate Income Tax
Imposition of an income tax upon corporations has been justified on
the basis of the special privileges and benefits conferred upon corpora-
tions by the state, to which a corporation owes its life, rights, and
powers. No one has suggested anything like personal utilities for money.
income on the part of corporations nor made serious arguments for progres-
sion in corporate tax rates. There have been issues raised, however,
about the equity of flat tax rates on corporate profits in that once dis-
tributed as dividends, these same profits are subject to the personal in-
come tax. Methods of integration of the corporat: profits tax and the
personal income tax have been proposed in order to restore the progres-
sivity of the income tax. The volume by Pechman (1966, Ch. 5) provides
a summary of these proposals. In this work the primary issues regarding
tax incentives will be discussed in the context of the personal income tax
because the incentives involve tax losses of most value to individual tax-
payers. Much of the discussion, however, as in the magnitude of returns
and costs to government in Chapters V through VII, is relevant for cor-
porate owners of real estate as well as for individuals, particularly if
the marginal tax bracket in which the losses are applied is at a rate of
approximately 50 percent.
3. U. S. History
In the United States the progressive income tax has not always been
supported. In fact, the country had been in existence for a century be-
fore there was any income tax at all. The following brief history com-
piled by the Joint Economic Committee (1964, pp. 14-16) serves to sketch
the development of the income tax in the U. S.:
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* 1861 -- First income tax enacted to help finance the Civil War.
1862 -- First income tax collections.
1872 -- First income tax act allowed to expire.
1894 -- Second income tax law enacted.
1895 -- Income tax law declared unconstitutional.
1909 -- Corporate excise tax levied on the net income of cor-
porations.
1913 -- Ratification of the 16th Amendment to the Constitution
established the basis for the modern income tax.
1913 -- An amendment to the Tariff Act of 1913 superseded the
1909 Corporate Excise Tax Act and provided for a tax at
progressive rates on the income of individuals. Maxi-
mum rate for the individual income tax was 7 percent;
corporate rate, I percent.
1918 -- Maximum tax rate on individual income raised to 77 per-
cent; corporate income tax rate raised to 12 percent.
1930's -- Rates raised in an attempt to Increase lagging revenues
of the Depression.
1944-45 -- Individual income tax rates raised to all-time high,
ranging from 23 to 94 percent, to finance World War 11.
The tax base was also broadened to cover most of the
working population.
1945 -- Tax rates reduced following World War II.
1948,-- Income-splitting option for married couples filing joint
returns allowed.
1950-51 -- Tax rates increased for the Korean "conflict."
1954 -- Tax rates reduced to pre-Korea levels; individual rates
ranged from 20 to 91 percent, corporate rates 30 per-
cent on the first $25,000 of net income and 52 percent
on the excess over $25,000.
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1964 -- Rates reduced: individual rates ranged 16 to 77 percent;
corporate rates became 22 percent on first $25,000 and
50 percent on the excess.
1965 -- Rates further reduced (as a result of the Revenue Act of
1964): Individual rates ranged 14 to 70 percent; corpor-
ate rates became 22 and 48 percent.
The Federal tax structure had remained substantially the same as the
version created by the Revenue Act of 1964 until the passage of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969. (H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., Public Law 91-172) This
Act made changes in the individual income tax in two key areas relevant
to this discussion:
1. A minimurm tax of 10 percent was imposed on tax sheltered
income by adding Sections 56-58 to the Internal Revenue
Code. "The minimum tax amounts to 10 percent of the sum
of an individual's or corporation's tax preference income
(i.e., income which would be taxed but which is not because
of a tax preference) to the extent it exceeds $30,000 plus
the regular income tax. . . ." (U. S. Congress, 1970b, p.
105) Items of tax preference of interest here include ac-
celerated depreciation on real property and the excluded
portion of capital gains.
2. The maximum tax on earned income was reduced from 70 percent
to 50 percent by a section added to the Internal Revenue
Code, Section 1348. (income from investment, for example,
is still taxed at a maximum rate of 70 percent.) The rea-
son for establishing this limit was said to be a concern
with the disincentive effect of high tax rates in the case
of earned income. The other major reason advanced in a
piece of "tax reform" legislation boggles the mind: "The
Congress concluded that one of the most effective ways to
prevent the use of tax avoidance devices is to reduce the
incentive for engaging in such activities by reducing the
high tax rates on earned income but only where tax avoidance
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devices generally are not used." (U. S. Congress, 1970b,
p. 225) While income in excess of $30,000 which is shel-
tered under tax preferences is not eligible for the lower
alternate maximum rate, the Congress obviously did not
take the more direct route of removing the tax avoidance
devices (relabeled "tax preferences") in the first place.
In summary, then, the Federal income tax has been in continuous ef-
fect only since 1913, has been closely associated with war financing, has
retained the intention of progressivity in rates on personal incomes,
but has steadily provided for reductions in the maximum rate since the
high of 94 percent in 1945. Tax rates on corporate profits have remained
at about 50 percent in recent decades. The nominal tax rates mentioned
thus far are not necessarily, of course, the actual effective rates of
tax. A dramatic exposition of the disparity between nominal and actual
effective rates is found in the work of Goode (1964, p. 236), who showed
that as of 1964 the maximum actual effective rates on personal income
were just over 30 percent and, in fact, declined slightly for those with
total incomes above about $100,000. The chief factor in this disparity
for those with very high incomes is the tax treatment of capital gains,
an area intimately related with that of depreciation in the case of real
estate.
C. TAX FACTORS IN REAL ESTATE
I. Depreciation
a. Neutrality
Widespread use of depreciation deductions from taxable income in real
estate is a relatively recent phenomenon. The notion of depreciation his-
torically arose in connection with capital assets of various sorts (such
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as machinery) used in production. (Meij, 1961) The fundamental idea is
that a neutral tax system whould not penalize one whose income (or a cor-
poration whose income) is derived from production depending heavily upon
capital equipment. In one sense, part of the income from a current year
should be regarded as a reserve for replacement of the machinery used (or
whatever the capital assets are) whenever the equipment is obsolete or
worn-out. Otherwise, the producer will be penalized by paying taxes on
an exaggerated definition of income for the producing years of the capital
asset, then will be forced to make a large cash outlay (or financing ob-
ligation of some sort, such as a loan or bond issue) for replacement at
the end of the productive life of the capital asset. Note that the tax
element would be biased in favor of the capital intensive producer if the
total value of the capital asset were taken as an expense in the year of
purchase (especially if purchased on borrowed funds). Such a possibility
would allow other income to be offset, or sheltered, with the expense
of the new capital asset; i.e., the full economic loss would be taken at
the outset rather than over the years as It actually occurs.
Since a rational investment analysis takes into account the timing
of cash flows, it makes a difference whether the deduction for the re-
placement cost can be made at the beginning, during the life of the pro-
ducing equipment, or only at actual time of replacement. Furthermore,
if depreciation allowances are too large or too small, then taxpayers
will be favored or punished according to their tax rates. Assuming the
objective of tax neutrality, Samuelson (1964, pp. 604-606) undertook to
define "income" so as to make the present value of all assets independent
of the tax rate to which each person is subject. He devised the follow-
ing theorem:
90
If and only if the true loss of economic value is permitted
as a tax deductible depreciation expense will the discounted
present value of a cash receipt stream be independent of the
rate of tax.
According to Samuelson, it would then follow that
1. The fruits of a loan (interest payments) and interest de-
ductions should be taxed at the same rate.
2. Appreciation in value ("capital" gain) should be taxed as
ordinary income.
3. If a property on which depreciation has been taken is sold,
the basis (value for tax purposes) of the property should
be transferred to the new owner.
4. The only definition of depreciation relevant to the mea-
surement of true money income is the putative decline in
economic value, i.e., a reasonable estimate of the income
producing ability of the particular asset.1
Tax law, however, has not consistently been made with neutrality as
a basis, nor as a practical matter of administration can fine distinctions
and individual decisions be made. In fact the primary focus in this work
has to do with criticism of the deliberately non-neutral treatment of
real estate. However, a discussion of the treatment of depreciation in
U. S. tax law requires an understanding of the terminology used.
b. Depreciation Terminology
Certain key terms used in the definition and administration of depre-
ciation allowances need to be introduced and defined at this point:
Basis -- the total value of the capital asset. 2
Samuelson concludes that for rental property the depreciation should
be a function of the net rental income before tax.
2 In the case of real estate, the portion of value which is at- [cont.]
9 1
Adjusted basis -- the depreciable basis remaining after sub-
tracting accumulated depreciation from the original
basis.
Economic life -- the productive lifetime of an asset (assum-
ing some minimum acceptable quality level of the out-
put) established at purchase. At the end of its
economic life the asset would have only salvage value.
Remaining life -- the remaining productive lifetime at some
period during ownership.
Residual value -- the salvage value, if any, at the end of
economic life.
Straight-lir.e depreciation -- a claim of loss in value of
the capital asset which is the same amount each
year (the adjusted basis would be a straight line
on a graph of adjusted basis against years of own-
ership). The constant amount of depreciation is
the original basis less salvage value all divided
by the economic- life. The annual rate of depreci-
ation is just the reciprocal of the economic life.
Declining balance depreciation -- a method of calculating
the annual depreciation which permits an initial
rate of depreciation faster than the straight-line
rate, i.e., an "accelerated" rate of depreciation.
For example, "double declining balance" (or 200
percent declining balance) depreciation would allow
a rate of twice the straight-line rate to be ap-
plied to the adjusted basis to determine the amount
of depreciation each year. Note, however, that the
rate is applied to a declining balance (the adjusted
[cont.] tributable to land is considered non-depreciable. It is common,
of course, in urban areas for the value of real estate actually to appreci-
ate in value, partly as a reflection of the increase in location value as
a metropolitan area develops.
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basis) each year, in contrast with the straight-line
method, in which the rate is applied to the original
basis. Thus the double-declining balance will pro-
duce an amount of depreciation of twice the straight-
line amount for the first year, but in subsequent
years the amount of depreciation under double-declin-
ing balance will be decreasing until, at some point,
the amount of depreciation will actually be less than
that under the straight-line method.
Sum-of-the-years-digits depreciation -- another accelerated
method of depreciation which is not quite as rapid
as double-declining balance in the very early years
but which soon provides for a larger annual amount
of depreciation than double declining balance de-
preciation. The name of the method derives from the
nature of the formula used to calculate the annual
depreciation allowance, which is computed by applying
a changing fraction to the cost of the property re-
duced by estimated salvage value. The denominator of
the fraction is the sum of the numbers representing
the successive years in the estimated life of the as-
set and the numerator is the number of years, includ-
ing the present year, remaining in its useful life.
The denominator, or sum-of-the-years-digits, can be
computed directly without actually performing the sum
as
D = (L + l)L/2
where "D" indicates denominator and "L" indicates
economic life.2
U. S. tax law, however, allows full depreciation to be claimed within
the economic life of the asset by permitting a switch to straight-line de-
preciation. After the switch the depreciation allowance is based on the
unrecovered cost of the asset and its remaining life at the time of change.
. The derivation of the formula for the sum-of-the-years-digits [cont.]
J
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c. U. S. History
In the development of tax rules in the U. S., real estate has tended
to be the beneficiary of rulings and legislation intended primarily for
capital assets used by industry.] As a matter of administrative practi-
cality it would be expected that rather broad categories of assets would
be defined for purposes of depreciation allowances rather than to attempt
to settle each case separately. The result has been a situation in which
practices developed for general application have been used by holders of
real estate, then later are found to result in favorable tax treatment of
real estate, then still later found to be "necessary" or at least desirable
incentives. A brief review of the history in the U. S. of the treatment of
[cont.] denominator is straightforward. The denominator is defined as
D = L + (L - 1) + (L - 2) + ... + 2 + 1
or
D = L + (L - 1) + (L - 2) + ... + (L - L+2) + (L - .L+) + (L - L).
Upon rearranging to separate out (L + 1) of the times which "L" occurs,
we then can rewrite the denominator
D = (L + 1)L - (1 + 2 + ... + (L - 2) + (L - 1) + L) = (L + A)L - D
or
2D = (L + 1)L; D = (L + l)L/2.
IThe U. S. is not alone in providing favorable depreciation allowances
in the tax system. According to a survey by Eckstein and Tanzi (1964, p.
230) most European countries now treat depreciation on a liberal basis.
The United Kingdom does not allow declining balance universally but had
been making use of investment allowances to create favorable deductions in
the early years of an asset. More recently the British have changed from
this investment credit system to a system of government grants for a period
of years in exchange for industrial development complying with government
policy on geographic location and type of investment. (Brannon, 1971, p.
176) In less developed countries taxation is often viewed as a device for
the public sector to influence savings and capital investment on the pre-
mise that without favorable tax treatment some desired activities would
not be undertaken. (Heller and Kauffman, 1963)
-N
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depreciation allowances may help to illustrate this sequence.
Until 1934 claims of useful lives and methods of calculation of de-
preciation were left up to the taxpayer with, the burden of disproving the
validity of lifetime and depreciation methods being the responsibility of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Agreements in 1934 between the House
Committee on Ways and Means and the Treasury provided greater authoriza-
tion to the Treasury to set allowable lifetimes of depreciable capital
assets and provided a shift for the burden of proof to the taxpayer. By
1942 the Treasury had issued Bulletin "F" Tables of Useful Lives of De-
preciable Property, which allowed a claim for use'ul life of 50 years for
apartment buildings (as distinct from related equipment) or of 40 years
for the life of a composite of apartment building and related equipment,
such as heating, plumbing and electrical fixtures. Revenue Procedure
62-21, issued in 1962, reduced the allowable useful lives of many other
assets, but not apartment buildings, although.court decisions in specific,
contested cases have allowed shorter lives to be successfully claimed
(in the range of 33 years). (Slitor, 1968, p. 132)
Legislative precedents for the special 5-year "lifetime" concept as
a means for allowing substantially accelerated depreciation as a specific
tax incentive are found in the enactment in 1940 and 1950 of special 5-year
amortization of certain defense production facilities connected with World
War I I and the Korean War. A s imilar 5-year wri te off was allowed in the
late 1950's for grain storage facilities when it was felt that these facili-
ties were in especially short supply. (U. S. Congress, 1964, p. 92)
Most of the following material, except where noted, is drawn from a
recent study of the Federal tax system by the Joint Economic Committee.(U. S. Congress, 1964, Ch. 5)
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Permissible methods for the calculation of depreciation rates (as
contrasted with rules on lifetimes) were first defined for comprehensive
categories of capital assets by the Revenue Act of 1954 and the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 which this legislation generated. In 1946, however,
the Bureau of Internal Revenue had extended by administrative action
the application of 150 percent declining balance as a depreciation method
for buildings as an effort to assist construction of apartment buildings.
The 150 percent declining balance, method had hitherto only been allowed
for group industrial equipment accounts under very specific conditions.
(Slitor, 1968, p. 43) The Internal Revenue Code rof 1954 provided for
the first time that the double declining balance and sum-of-the-years-
digits methods could be used for all newly constructed buildings, not
just apartment buildings. The 150 percent declining balance method
was made availablefor used buildings.
While housing as such had tended to be a.peripheral category in
most previous tax legislation, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 singled out
housing as a special category for favorable treatment, chiefly by retain-
ing favorable depreciation methods and recapture provisions (of which
more presently) for housing while enacting more restrictive provisions
for other types of real property.I The most dramatic real estate feature
of the Tax Reform Act was the addition to the Internal Revenue Code of
Section 167(k), which permits a 5-year amortization up to $15,000 per unit
IThe Tax Reform Act of 1969 was passed by the 91st Congress and be-
came Public Law 91-172. Additional discussion of the provisions of the
Act and reasons for change can be found in General Explanation of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 (U. S. Congress, 1970b). A helpful analysis of the
real estate provisions has been made by Ritter and Sunley (1970), and an
outline of the tax shelter advantages remaining or created by the Act isprovided in an article by Grey (1971) and in the book, Urban Land Develop-
ment, by David (1970).
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of rehabilitation expenditures, provided at least $3,000 is spent within
a two-year period and provided the units are rented to low-income fami-
lies as defined by the Secretary of the Treasury. This offers a very ac-
celerated depreciation schedule for rehabilitated housing, clearly far in
excess of any decline in real economic value of this type of property, and,
as will be seen, creates a very substantial tax incentive for investment
in rehabilitated housing. This special provision is tentative, however,
in that it applies only to rehabilitation completed before January 1975
unless extended by further legislation. For newly constructed housing
the choice of double declining balance or sum-of-the-years-digits methods
of depreciation was retained, while for other types of new buildings
the depreciation method was limited to 150 percent declining balance.
Used housing with a useful life of at least 20 years at acquisition was
reduced from 150 percent to 125 percent declining balance depreciation,
but other used property was reduced from 150 percent declining balance
to straight-line depreciation, i.e., no acceleration in depreciation at
all. Housing was thus consistently favored by the depreciation provi-
sions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969.1
An important feature of the treatment of real property by U. S. tax
law which was left unchanged by this most recent legislation is that
the tax basis of a property can include the portion of the value of the
property which is mortgaged. Since a Supreme Court decision in 1947,
the Internal Revenue Service has allowed owners of mortgaged property to
IThe "rollover" provision added as Section 1039 to the Internal
Revenue Code by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 as a means for encouraging sale
of Federally subsidized rental housing to tenant groups is discussed
separately in Chapter Vill.
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depreciate not only their equity investment but the portion of costs
covered by the mortgage loan as well.I If the real economic value (in-
come generat'ng capacity) of the property is not declining at the rate
allowed by the tax laws for depreciation, then a very substantial tax
advantage can result from this "leveraged" basis, since the entire value
of the property can be depreciated by the owner, even though the owner
has minimized his actual investment by obtaining a mortgage loan for
most of the costs of development or purchase. Since most apartment
buildings depreciate very little in market value for the first few decades
after they are constructed, or even appreciate in value in some urban lo-
cations, the possibilities of accelerated depreciation and of a tax basis
leveraged by the mortgage loan amount offer the opportunity to claim tax
losses on apartment buildings far in excess of actual losses. (Taubman
and Rasche, 1971, and McKee, 1971) We will examine the investment ad-
vantages of this situation for subsidized rental housing in a general way
in the next chapter and then in some detail in the base case analysis of
Chapter V.
Another feature of U. S. tax law favorable to housing which was left
unchanged by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 is that certain construction ex-
penses can be claimed as losses in the year incurred rather than capitalized
IThe Supreme Court decision, Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U. S. 1, has
been interpreted to mean both that the mortgage loan amount can be included
in the basis and that upon sale of the property the amount still outstand-
ing on the mortgage loan is disregarded, for tax purposes, as an expense
of sale. A suggestion of the legal attack which could be made on this
"doctrine" has been made by Adams (1966) and a recommendation that the de-
preciable basis be limited to the actual investment has been made by the
U. S. House'Committee on Ways and Means (!956) and recently by McKee -
(1971). During the operation of mortgaged property the interest portion
of mortgage payments is recognized as an expense for tax purposes, but
not the principal repayment portion.
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and depreciated over the useful life of the property. Thus an investor
who provides the necessary equity capital over and above the mortgage
loan on a property to be developed is able to claim an immediate loss for
tax purposes equal to the amounts spent during the construction period for
interest on the construction loan, for real estate taxes, and for certain
fees, such as those charged for mortgage processing. This feature of
tax law thus acts like an instantaneous depreciation of part of the
value of the building, even while it is still under construction. This
feature obviously offers still another tax advantage for investment in
new construction or in buildings with substantial rehabilitation.
2. Capital Gains Taxation2
a. Tax Equity Questions
On the other side of the coin from depreciation allowances is the
question of taxation on the gain realized from a property when it is sold.
To appreciate the handling of this tax question we shall have to consider
briefly the concepts of capital assets and of- "recapture" in the case of
recovery at sale of accelerated depreciation allowances.
The U. S. tax system, in making special consideration for capital
gains is attempting to make a conceptual distinction between so-called
"capital" gains representing increased market value of investment property
and normal income or profits from the sale of goods and services. The
basic economic problem with capital gains is that while income from
ordinary profits or wages and salaries is taxed annually as realized, gains
1See Ritter and Sunley (1970, p. 45) for a criticism of this practice.
2 am indebted for most of the material discussed in the first part
of this section to a 1964 staff study of the Joint Economic Committee, The
Federal Tax System (U. S. Congress, 1964, Ch. 4).
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on capital investments are taxable as a practical matter only when they
are realized upon sale. Thus the timing of realization, unlike ordinary
income, is subject to the discretion of the taxpayer, i.e., he can choose
when to sell the capital asset. This feature tends to encourage the hold-
ing of an appreciated asset unless (1) a better alternate investment could
be made with the net after-tax proceeds of sale, or (2) the currently held
asset is expected to decline in market value in the future by an amount
at least as much as the amount of tax which would be due upon sale. While
there is some dispute as to the importance of this inhibition in capital
mobility it is clear that the incentive to hold, rather than sell, a
capital asset will increase with the rate of tax on capital gains.
As a matter of tax equity there are arguments for and against pre-
ferential treatment of capital gains:
1. A gains tax (of any kind) is a levy on capital; the owner
of a capital asset cannot sell it and replace it with an
equally valuable asset because the proceeds of sale are
reduced by a gains tax. BUT, others would say, a tax on
appreciation in capital value is legitimate, since it is
just another form of income and since the tax is, after
all, delayed until the gain is realized and not levied as
market value changes. 1
2. With the progressive income tax, the typical lump sum nature
of proceeds from sale of a capital asset forces the tax-
payer into a temporarily higher bracket and causes him to
pay a higher tax than if the tax were paid at lower bracket
Appreciation in value of capital assets is included in classic defini-
tions of income by Haig (1921, p. 7) as "the ro'ney value of the net ac-
cretion to one's economic power between tio noints of time" and by Simons
(1938, p. 125) as "the algebraic sum of the rividual's consumption and
the change in value of his property lt during a period."
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rates as changes in markot value accrued. This argument
might be accepted, but then the calculation for tax at sale
should take into account the value to the taxpayer of the
deferral of tax which he enjoys by not having to pay the
tax as value changes.
3. Capital gains ought not to be taxed when they represent only
general increases in prices (inflation). Bur this suggests
that additional income tied to inflation should not be taxed;
no one makes such arguments for ordinary income. Furthermore
capital gains realizations are concentrated among those with
the highest income, thus preferential treatment of capital
gains subverts the ability-to-pay principle of progressive
taxation.
b. U. S. History
In the absence of a clear weight of theoretical support of preferen-
tial treatment of capital gains, the empirical question remains, "How are
capital gains treated in the U. S.?" Before 1922 capital assets were not
explicitly defined in U. S. tax law. The Revenue Act of 1921 defined
capital assets and provided that the full amount of gains and losses were
to be taken into account in computing taxable income but that the taxpayer
could elect a 12.5 percent alternate rate on capital gains. The Revenue
Act of 1934 repealed the 12.5 percent alternate rate and set up a sliding
scale from 30 to 100 percent of capital gains or losses to be taken into
account in computing taxable income, depending upon the holding period.
In 1938 depreciable property used in trade or business (like apartment
buildings) was excluded from the capital asset category, but in the
Revenue Act of 1942 special provisions were made to treat net gains on
real property as capital gains. Taxpayers were offered the choice be-
tween including one-half of long-term capital gains (those occurring more
S
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than six months after purchase) as ordinary income or of paying an alter-
nate 25 percent tax on capital gains.
"Recapture" as a matter of tax law came into being as a consequence
of the accelerated depreciation provisions of the Revenue Act of 1954.
The 1954 provisions had made it possible to own a piece of property for
a short while but write off a large fraction of its value (thereby avoid-
ing tax on inccme from the property and possibly sheltering income from
other sources with the excess losses) before sale and pay tax at capital
gains rates on the difference between the adjusted basis and the sale
price. To limit the use of this device to convert liability to ordinary
income tax into capital gains taxes, the 1964 Revenue Act included Section
1250 in the Internal Revenue Code to "recapture" the lost income tax. Under
Section 1250 all of the depreciation recovered at sale on a property
owned 12 months or less became subject to tax at ordinary income rates.
For property owned 12 to 20 months the "excessive" depreciation was taxed
at ordinary income tax rates (to the extent that it was recovered in the
sale price), where "excessive" depreciation means that taken in excess of
straight-line depreciation. For each month over 20 months the percentage
of excess depreciation taxed at ordinary income tax rates was reduced by
one percent for each month held. Thus at the end of 120 months, or 10
years, none of the excess depreciation is taxed at ordinary income; all
of the gain was treated as a capital gain. (In all these cases the excess
. depreciation was subject to recapture only if it is recovered in the pro-
ceeds of sale of the property.)
Recapture provisions were tightened for most property by the Tax Re-
form Act of 1969. Only limited dividend rental housing projects were al-
lowed to retain the 120-month recapture rule. Other residential rental
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property and rehabilitated proper ty using the 5-year write off (Section
167(k)) were restricted to a 200-month rule; i.e., relief from recapture
at a rate of 1 percent begins at the 100th month of ownership and extends
to the 200th month. All other property (non-residential) became sub-
ject to full recapture, or tax at ordinary income rates on all of the
excess depreciation recovered at sale. (Any additional gain is, of course,
subject to tax at capital gains rotes.) Thus housing was expressly
favored, even if by omission, in both the depreciation and recapture pro-
visions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969.
However, maximum capital gains taxes were raised by the Tax Reform
Act of 1969. For individuals the first $50,000 of capital gains is taxed
at the lesser of half the ordinary income tax rate or 25 percent. Capi-
tal gains over $50,000 are taxed at one-half the ordinary income tax rate,
meaning that 70 percent bracket individuals will pay an effective maximum
capital gains rate of 35 percent. Corporate capital gains are taxed at
30 percent.
For the sake of completeness it is necessary to mention here addi-
tional features of the treatment of capital gains in the U. S. tax system
which favor housing investments. Capital gains taxation can be avoided
or postponed through tax-free exchange (IRC, Section 1031), refinancing,
involuntary conversion (IRC, Section 1033), and tax-free step-up of basis
to fair market value for the heirs at the owner's death (IRC, Section
1014). (Slitor, 1968, pp. 141-144) Tax-free exchange involves exchang-
ing a given property for one of greater cost; no tax is paid at this
transaction because the gain on the first property is not realized. Or,
after a period of time, the principal repayments on the mortgage loan can
become substantial enough that the property can be refinanced with a loan
0
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representing most of the value of the property; the cash withdrawn in the
process is not taxed. Gains taxes are also avoided by reinvesting the
gain on the receipt of insurance proceeds In the case of casualty loss or
on the receipt of condemnation proceeds in the case of involuntary con-
version of the property for public use. Finally, all of the depreciation
which an owner has taken during his lifetime can be recouped by his heirs
when they are allowed to step up She basis, tax free, to the fair market
value; sibsequent sale or depreciation starts from this stepped up basis.
3. Summary of Tax Incentives in Housing
The U. S. tax. system has been seen to be anything but neutral to
housing investments. Housing is favored by accelerated depreciation al-
lowances, by the inclusion of mortgage loan amounts in the tax basis, and
by favorable capital gains treatment. These provisions mean that large
losses can be claimed early in the ownership period of a piece of property,
even though the cash income generated by the property may be steady or
even increasing. The upshot, then, is that excess losses are generated
which may be used not only to shelter from tax the income from the property
but also to offset income from other sources which would otherwise be
subject to tax--the higher the tax bracket of the owner the greater these
tax savings. The taxes thus avoidedwill at least be deferred, may, never
have to be paid at all, or at worst, will be paid at lower rates upon
sale. Tax shelter has become an integral part of housing investment, par-
ticularly for rehabilitated housing and for limited dividend housing pro-
jects.
104
4. Organizational Forms for Tax Shelter Investment
While most of the discussion in this work is addressed to the limited
partnership syndicate form of ownership, some indication should be made
of the range of possibilities for organizational forms for ownership in
property generating tax shelter for the owner. The key factor in this
type of investment is that of whether the tax losses can be applied to
income from other sources.
a. Forms Other than Partnerships
The corporate form of ownership offers limited possibilities in re-
gard to tax shelter, because the corporation itself must have sufficient
income to use the tax losses generated by the real property; the tax losses
cannot be passed through to shareholders in the corporation.2 Furthermore
the tax losses may be worth more to individuals subject to higher rates
of tax than the 48 percent of corporations. While the tax on capital
gains may be more favorable in some cases than for individuals, neverthe-
less a tax is paid (either at ordinary income rates or capital gains
rates) before corporate income is distributed. Then, in the hands of the
shareholder the distributed income is subject again to tax. But in the
case of real estate ownership, the most critical problem is the inability
of the corporate form to pass through to the shareholders the tax losses
derived from depreciation allowances.
This material is drawn largely from work by Slitor (1968, Op. 147-
154), an unpublished manuscript by Pat Clancy (1970), and the concise re-
view of the limited partnership form by Schwartz (1971).
2This does not prevent a corporation from assuming the role of general
partner in a limited partnership, especially after this mode of organiza-
tion was given explicit Congressional approval in Title IX of the Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476) regarding Na-
tional Housing Partnerships.
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A special corporate form, the Subchapter S corporation , permits all
tax consequences to be passed on to shareholders; but this option is avail-
able only if the corporation has no more than 20 percent of its gross re-
ceipts from rents and other forms of passive investment income and if it
has a maximum of 10 shareholders. The Subchapter S form of organization
tkus has little practical application for real estate investment.
Real estate investment trusts (REIT's) were made possible by the
Revenue Act of 1961 which added the "conduit" treatment for tax liability
to qualified real estate investment trusts which had previously been
limited to regulated investment companies (mutual funds). The trouble
with a REIT is thaz, while cash distributions are not taxed until re-
ceived by the shareholder (provided at least 90 percent of income is
distributed), no pass through of excess losses to shareholders can be
made. Moreover, the limitation of this form to trusts deriving at least
75 percent of income from real estate means that in most cases it would
be impossible to generate enough cash income to make full use of the
available depreciation on real property. REIT's therefore tend to rely
more on a role as lender in real estate rather than as an equity holder.
b. Limited Partnerships
The particular advantage of the partnership form of business organi-
zation for real estate is that the partnership is not itself subject to
tax and may pass through to the partners both income and the tax conse-
quences of ownership. A limited partnership is even better suited to
real estate ownership because it permits most of the partners to be passive,
limited partners who are not subject to the unlimited liability usually
associated with partnerships (as is the case of the general partner(s) in
a limited partnership). Limited partnerships are set up under state
ID
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enabling laws which generally folluw the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
and provide for one or more general partners (called a joint venture if
thereare two or more general partners) who carry unlimited liability and
are responsible for conducting the business of the partnership, while one
p
or more limited partners are primarily passive investors with liability
limited to the amount of their investment and with limited control over
the operations of the partnershipi (chiefly such matters as sale of assets
of the partnership or of partnership shares).
However, in order to enjoy the benefits of single level taxation (to
the partners only and not to the partnership as well) the partnership must
be organized and conducted so as not tobeconstrued as an association with
more attributes of a corporation than of a partnership, in which case the
partnership would be taxed as a corporation and lose the pass-through
benefit. Internal Revenue Regulations (Sections 301.7701-3(b) and
301.7701-2(a)(3)), indicate that such a partnership must have no more than
two of the characteristics of a corporation, which are considered to be:
1. Centralized management -- This is usually the case in a
limited partnership unless unusual arrangements, such as
net lease by the partnership to a management agent, are
made.
2. Continuity of life regardless of the death of individual
members -- Provided the general partner is given the power
'to dissolve the partnership in the partnership agreement,
IRS rulings have conceded that a partnership lacks con-
tinuity of life and therefore is not like a corporation
in this regard.
3. Free transferability of interests -- It is fairly easy for
a partnership to avoid having this characteristic simply
by providing for consent by the other partners to the sale
of a partnership share.
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4. Liability limited to the assets of the enterprise -- Even
though the limited partners do have limited liability, this
corporate characteristic can be avoided provided the gen-
eral partner is, in fact, liable to creditors. This means
that the general partner must have some vulnerable assets
outside the partnership and not just be acting as a "dummy"
for the limited partners. It is possible for a corporation,
to act as a general partner. In this case the IRS has made
rulings to the effect that no challenge will be made (hence
the name "safe harbor rules") of the vulnerability to credi-
tors of a corporation acting as a general partner provided
the limited partners own no more than 20 percent of the cor-
poration's stock and provided the corporation has sufficient
assets. The asset (net worth) requirement is at least 15
percent of the total partnership capital (but not over
$250,000) for a partnership in which less than $2,500,000
in capital is contributed by the partners and is at least
10 percent of the total partnership capital if the contri-
buted capital is more than $2,500,000.
While this very general description is obviously not exhaustive of
the legal possibilities and complications, it indicates that limited part-
nerships are usually able to avoid taxation at the partnership level, since
the number of corporate characteristics can be limited to two.I
Limited partnerships used to develop government assisted housing are
caught squarely between opposing government objectives regarding tax losses.
Deductions in excess of income may be disallowed by the IRS on the strength
p of IRS regulations (Sections 183 and 704 of the Internal Revenue Code) and
More complete discussions of the legal questions and court decisions
can be found in the M.I.T. Master's theses by Judelson (1971).and by
Betnun (1971) as well as in such standard reference sources as the Com-
merce Clearing House Federal Tax Reporter under Sections 183 and 704 of
the Internal Revenue Code.
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of court decisions (particularly a 1960 Supreme Court decision, Knetsch
V. U. S. 364 U.S. 361, 366), if the enterprise has as its main purpose
the avoidancc of Federal tax and is not engaged in for profit. Yet
government assisted rental housing projects usually limit the dividends
to a modest return on equity investment. However, the President's Com-
m ittee on Urban Housing (1968, pp. 80-87, 238-239) explicitly pointed out
the usefulness of the depreciation allowances in enhancing the investment
attractiveness of government assisted housing. In direct response, the
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 under Title IX "National
Housing Partnerships" (P.L. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476) specifically encouraged
the use of the limited partnership as a means of marketing tax losses.
The report of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee described the
workings of National Housing Partnerships:
This title would authorize the creation of federally char-
tered, privately funded corporations to mobilize private
investment and the application of business skills in the
job of creating low and moderate income housing in sub-
stantial volume. . . . The partnership arrangement makes
it possible to assure an adequate return to investors. . . .
Assuming the member of the partnership is in a re.latively
high income tax bracket, his share of the depreciation
losses, plus cash income from project operations would
provide an after-tax return on his investment which would
compare favorably with the return which most industrial
firms realize on their equity capital. (U. S. Senate,
1969, p. 4085) (See also an article by Edgar
Kaiser (1969), the chairman of the Resident's Committee.)
Then the Tax Reform Act of 1969 not only explicitly favored housing in
its revision of depreciation and recapture rules, but a new and explicit
tax incentive, the special five-year write off for rehabilitation expen-
ditures on housing for low-income families, was added. 1
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 also added special five-year write-off
provisions for pollution control facilities, railroad rolling stock,[cont.]
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Thus, while the tax avoidance challenge is probably not a serious
problem, it is necessary nevertheless to include at least some suggestion
of a "normal" profit motive in the partnership agreement.
A limited partnership enterprise usually distributes any dividends
to partners in the same proportions in which the tax losses are assigned
to partners. While it is possible for the limited partners to receive
100 percent of the profits and losses of the partnership, the usual ar-
rangement is for the general partner--usually the developer--to retain a
5 percent interest. The developer receives additional compensation in
the form of the excess of capital contributed by the limited partners
over and above the cash costs of the project and often receives a resi-
dual interest in the proceeds of sale. In this case the limited part-
ners are usually first returned out of the before-tax proceeds of sale
any of their original investment, if the original investment has not
yet been recovered by the aggregate of dividend distributions. Then
the developer/general partner and the limited partners divide 50-50 any
remaining proceeds of sale. (it is up to each partner to pay whatever
gains taxes may be due upon sale.) Such arrangements at least give the
appearance of economic substance to the enterprise.
The importance of the real estate owner's claim to the value of the
property covered by a mortgage loan has been mentioned previously in con-
nection with the importance of depreciation allowances for real estate.
In a limited partnership the partners share losses "to the extent of the
[cont.] and coal mine safety equipment--all of which are more likely to
be tied to a corporate enterprise than housing development.
1The way in which excess capital contributions arise is illustrated
in Chapter IV at pp. 130-132 and is computed explicitly in Chapter V at
pp. 216-222.
0
110
adjusted basis of each partner's interest in the partnership at the end
of the partnership year in which such loss occurred." (internal Revenue
Code Section 704(d)) Now a partner's basis can be increased over his pro-
portion of the capital contributed to the enterprise by his share of the
liabilities of the partnership. (IRC, Section 752(a)) The trouble is
that a mortgage loan sccured by the property itself is not really a lia-
bility of the partnership nor of the individual partners. And a mort-
gage loan secured by the property is the usual pattern, since even the
general partner(s) do not want to take on unreasonable personal liabili-
ties in connection with the project. The trick, then, is to get the
mortgage added to the basis of the limited partners as a pro rata share
of the partnership liabilities. The Treasury provides a convenient arti-
fice through a regulation allowing all partners to share a liability
in their tax basis if none are personally liable for the obligation (the
mortgage loan in this case): ". . . where none of the partners has any
personal liability with respect to a partnership liability . . . then all
partners, including limited partners, should be considered as sharing
such liability . . . in the same proportion as they share the profits."
(Treasury Reg. 1.752-1(e)) Thus loan agreements must be careful to force
the lender to accept foreclosure as the only remedy available in the event
of default on the mortgage.
One final mention of an area critical to the formation of a limited
partnership: that of regulations regarding marketing of securities.I
The marketing of limited partnership shares in a real estate syndication
Clancy (1970) and Judelson (1971, pp. 31-38) have more complete sum-
maries than the one presented here.
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(as this process is sometimes called) is treated by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) as an offering of shares of a security unless it
qualifies for a specific exemption under a section of the 1933 Securities
Act. The exemptions available include:
1. The entire issue is offered within one state only, with
none of the shares ever coming into the hands of an in-
vestor out of state. (Section 3(a)(ll))
2. The issue offered is sufficiently small. This applies
to offerings for under $50,000 or for those under
$500,000 for which a filing with the regional SEC is
required. (Section 3(b))
3. Offerings to investors not requiring the protection of
the Securities Act. This usually means that. the offer-
ing must be made to a small number (roughly 25) of
sophisticated, well-informed investors who are suffi-
ciently knowledgeable. Those who are wealthy enough to
afford tax counsel and accounting services are considered
"sufficiently knowledgeable." (Section 4(1))
g Offerings not qualifying for one of these exemptions must go through the
expensive and time-consuming procedure of registration with the SEC. In
any event a syndication offering is still vulnerable to charges of fraud
* unless the offering circular makes a full disclosure of all of the poten-
tial risks of the project. (Federal Securities Act of 1934, Section
10(b) (5)) The grim tone typical of these offering brochures resulting
from awareness of this danger is apparently not sufficient to dissuade
investors in these ventures.
- D. THE DEBATE ON TAX INCENTIVES
Both the definition of "tax incentive" and the value of tax incentives
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as an i ns t rument of publ i c pol i cy cont inue to be the s ubject of debate,
as exemplified by a 1969 symposium on the subject conducted by the Tax In-
stitute of America (1971). In that symposium Lester Thurow was quoted as
defining a tax expenditure as any provision in tax law whose primary aim
is not to achieve vertical or horizontal equity among taxpayers. (Tax In-
stitute of America, 1971, p. 3) But such tax expenditures may be made
to relieve disincentives in certain areas or may be unintended in the
sense that taxpayers find ways of taking advantage of tax rules which
were originally made for a different purpose. The term "incentive" I
would prefer to reserve to those tax expenditures which are expressly
adopted to induce private action in some area. (Surrey, 1971) The 1969
Tax Reform Act invented the term "tax preference" to refer to specified
areas of tax law which were acknowledged to give special tax benefits, but
which were not removed from the law. Bittker (1967) has indicated the
difficulties involved in defining tax incentives and in achieving a truly
comprehensive tax base which is without special privileges and benefits.
But it is not necessary for present purposes to arrive at comprehensive
definitions or principles. For one thing the Tax Reform Act of 1969 did
give express approval to the tax. favored areas in housing. For another,
this work is directed specifically to the question of government subsi-
dized rental housing and to the way in which the tax rules add to the in-
vestment value of this property--clearly a case of a tax incentive. A
brief survey of the debate over tax incentives is undertaken, however, as
part of the context of the particular questions addressed.
The following discussion draws heavily upon the work of Surrey (1970a,
1970b, and 1971) and of Slitor (1968). In fact the general thrust of this
work is in the same spirit and, in some senses, is responsive to [cont.]
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Arguments against the use of tax devices as instruments of public
policy designed to induce private action in some area include the follow-
ing:
1. Erosion of the tax base -- Allowances for the avoidance
of tax result in the necessity of rais ing tax revenues
through higher tax rates generally than if the tax base
were broader.
2. Inequity -- Since tax allowances as deductions against
income are of most value to those in the highest income
tax brackets, special tax benefits are limited to the
wealthy and subvert the ability-to-pay principle of pro-
gressive income taxation.
3. Complexity -- Tax allowances increase the complexity of
tax law, if the allowances are to be at all focused, and
even then may provide new arid unintended ways of avoiding
taxes. Economic resources which could be more productive
are devoted to tax planning on the part of taxpayers, indi-
vidual and corporate.
4. Market distortions -- To the extent that an incentive is in-
tended to shift market allocations, the market distortions
induced by a tax allowance reflect public policy. But
broad allowances may reward activities which were not in-
tended to be favored and therefore produce unintended
distortions.
5. Inefficiencies -- A windfall tax break may accrue to tax-
payers whose behavior already coincides with that intended
to be induced by the tax incentive. Furthermore, the
[cont.] suggestions by Surrey (1970b) that the specific workings of tax in-
centives and means for replacing them with direct payments be developed in
each of the.major areas enjoying special tax treatment. Many of the ob-
jections to favorable depreciation allowances as a form of tax incentive
have also been made by Eisner in a paper for the U. S. Committee on Ways
and Means (1959, pp. 793-799).
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amount of investment required of investors must be suf-
ficiently low to attract all the investment capital de-
sired and is therefore priced for investors in tax brackets
below the maximum tax bracket. Thus government revenue
losses are greater for very high tax bracket investors, since
for a given amount of investment they obtain larger tax
benefits. (Explicit examples of this are included in Chap-
ter V1i.)
6. Administrative and budgetary complication -- Both the ad-
ministration of public policy and the budgetary decisions
required to fund programs are divided between those acting
directly and those acting indirectly through the tax
mechanism, Thus in housing both the Department of Housing
and Urban Development and the Internal Revenue Service are
effectively involved in implementing housing policy, with
HUD employing funds considered and voted by Congress and
* IRS administering a system of tax allowances in housing.
Being imbedded on the revenue side of the Federal budget,
tax incentives escape the periodic examination by Congress
to which direct expenditure programs are subjected. With
k -some expenditures made directly and some through foregone
revenues, it is difficult to ascertain the priorities of
various programs and segments of the economy. Congress-
man Wilbur Mills (1967) has referred to the tax incentive
*b approach as "backdoor spending" in the sense that the
funds, being diverted from entering the Treasury, are
hidden from view. Some recent efforts have been made to
work toward a more integrated concept of the Federal
*P budget.1
See the original explanation of the tax expenditure budget concept
by the Treasury (1969), the tax expenditure estimates in Surrey (1970a,
1970b) and his several references to other work in this area. A staff
study for the Joint Economic Committee (U. S. Congress, 1972) has under-
taken a review of Federal subsidies which counts some tax expenditures
as subsidies.
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7. Neglect of other alternat.ives -- If public policy calls
for expenditure, attempting to make the allocation through
a tax device tends to inhibit the search for direct ex-
penditure methods.
8. Damage to the tax system -- Reliance upon tax devices en-
courages consideration of new ones, may result in incen-
tives remaining in law long after their original purpose
has been achieved or forgotten, and undermines taxpaying
morale because the tax ystem appears to be a conglomera-
tion of favors for other people. See Blum (1955) as well
as Surrey (1970a).
What can be said for tax incentives?
1. Beneficial market interference -- Spec'al tax allowances
are a way of introducing economic influences for public
purposes. Put another way, tax incentives provide a way
for the private sector to undertake socially desirable
activities which would otherwise be economically unfeasi-
ble. But, it is countered, this does not mean that a tax
method is necessarily preferable to-a direct expenditure
to achieve the same economic effect, unless there are those
to whom a dollar of tax avoidance is "worth" more than a
dollar earned. (Tax Institute of America, 1971)
2. Private decision-making -- Tax incentives leave business
decisions to private agents rather than having a govern-
ment bureacracy intrude. (Does this suggest that the
"public purpose" is ill-defined?) Presumably a conscious
,decision could be made to opt for minimal governmental
supervision of a directly funded program, but this may be
politically more difficult than with indirect incentives.
But where very specific public objectives are intended by
a tax incentive, substantial governmental involvement in
certification that the activity is what was intended may
be required anyway.
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3. Permanence -- Because the magnitude of revenue losses is
less obvious than that of directly budgeted expenditures
and because tax laws undergo less frequent changes than
program legislation and appropriation actions, an activity
encouraged by a tax incentive can-regard the incentive as
more certain and reliable than a direct expenditure, which
adds to business confidence and increases the likelihood
that private parties will, in fact, undertake the actions
intended.
4. Political pragmatism -- While perhaps lacking in economic
rationality and suffering some inequities and inefficiencies,
tax incentives represent a case of politics as the "art of
the possible." It may be possible to accomplish an objective
with a tax incentive that would be underfunded or rejected
entirely if the Congress were forced to vote directly on the
program and to appropriate funds for it. History shows that
tax incentives "work." With rare exceptions the testimony
on the then proposed Tax Reform Act of 1969 hammered at the
theme that the then existing tax incentives were essential
to the operation of the real estate industry, and that the
investment advantages of depreciation and capital gains
treatment of real estate had been incorporated into the real
In the compendium, Tax Incentives and Caoital Spending, edited by
Gary Fromm (1971) a number of qualifications were made on the issue of
how well the investment credit of 1962 and accelerated depreciation al-
lowances for industrial equipment 'had "worked" to increase equipment
spending. Bischoff found that the amount of equipment spending due to
the investment tax credit was larger than the amount of the revenue
losses, while both Bischoff and Coen found that for accelerated depreci-
ation the private expenditures induced were less than half the present
value of the revenue losses sustained. Arnold Harberger (Fromm, 1971,
p. 264) noted that even these benefits may have been illusory, since
their effect may have been primarily a shift of investment to tax-favored
categories of business activity rather than a net increase in investment
such as to increase overall business activity in the economy,'as intended.
In Chapter VII this work will explore these questions for subsidized
rental housing.
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estate investment. (U. S. Senate, 1969, pp. 3925-4098,
4893-4962)
The tax incentives existing in real estate in general and in subsi-
dized rental housing, in particular, are thus viewed as pragmatic ways
in which to encourage housing investment and housing construction by in-
creasing after-tax return. Arguments against replacement of the tax in-
centives by direct payments rely upon differences in assumptions about
administrative complexity and about the likelihood of direct appropriations
more than upon arguments based upon economic efficiency. Leon Keyserl ing
(1971, p. 145), a former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, ex-
pressed the argumernt this way:
At a time when the imperative priority nature of housing and
related aspects of urban rescue and rerewal are so clear,
and yet so grossly neglected, we cannot afford to mutilate
the very limited stimuli available for these purposes, await-
ing that unforeseeable future when we shall all be ready to
spend immensely more federal funds directly.
On the other hand, the argument for preserving tax incentives weakens as
the effective costs and modes of operation become better known. Slitor
(1968, p. 99) summarized it, "Greater awareness of the Congress and the
Executive Branch of the reality of tax concessions as hidden expenditures
in the budgetary picture is weakening this aspect of the old strategic-
tactical case for the tax approach.", and "It is difficult to legislate
through the tax law any reasonable exactitude in the balance between re-
muneration and effort or contribution such as is called for in a procure-
ment contract between government and business." (Slitor, 1968, p. 7)
"As one examines the problems of suitable eligibility criteria for tax
write-offs for low-income urban housing, this use of the tax system ap-
pears more and more to be essentially a complex and rather cumbersome
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substitute for direct expenditures ." (Slitor, 1968, p. 54)
In the succeeding chapters we shall examine the way in which the
tax features enter as a development incentive in the Federal program for
subsidized, privately owned rental housing (known as the 236 program
after its section number in the National Housing Act) and the government
costs involved in creating this tax incentive. The proposals for di rect
payments in Chapter VII are intended to show what advantages could result
from a system of direct payments if they could be politically supported.
E. SUMMARY
In this chapter we have seen that the Federal- tax system is any-
thing but neutral with respect to real estate. The allowance for loss in
value each year, the depreciation, is in excess of any reasonable mea-
sure of real decline in economic value. The tax that becomes due upon
sale, moreover, can be.paid at one-half the ra-te of tax on ordinary in-
come, provided the property is held long enough. All real property en-
joys these advantages, not just subsidized rental housing. We shall see
in Chapters IV and V, however, that the availability of Federally in-
* sured financing for virtually all of the direct costs of the subsidized
rental housing under Section 236 becomes a significant companion to the
tax advantage, primarily because the owner of a property can claim the
* same depreciation losses regardless of whether a mortgage loan is held
for 70 percent or for 99 percent of the value of the project.
Even at the level of the depreciation allowances, however, housing
is favored over other kinds of property as a result of the Tax Reform
Act of 1969. The priorities in depreciation allowances are as follows:
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1. Rehabilitation expenditures on units to be rented to
low-income families may be depreciated in a straight
line over 5 years--a very fast write-off, or very
substantial acceleration in depreciation.
2. New residential construction is allowed sum-of-the-
years-digits depreciation or double (200 percent) de-
clining balance depreciation.
3. New, non-residential real estate can be depreciated at
150 percent declining balance.
4. Used residential property can be depreciated at 125
percent declining balance.
5. Used, non-residential property can only be depreciated
in a straight line over the normal economic life of
the property.
The recapture rules which affect the portion of gain realized upon
sale taxed at ordinary income tax rates were modified by the Tax Reform
Act of 1969 to be more restrictive for all but Section 236 and the older
Section 221(d)(3) rental housing programs under limited dividend sponsor-
ship. That is, these projects begin to be relieved from the recapture
provision at the 20th month and are entirely free of recapture by the
120th month (10 years), while for all other property the relief begins at
the 100th month and is complete only at the 200th month (16-2/3 years).
While the debate on tax incentives reviewed in this chapter is far
from concluded, the subsidized rental housing programs do benefit from
favorable tax treatment. The underlying question of this work is whether
the investment attractiveness of subsidized rental housing projects cre-
ated by the favorable tax treatment could be replaced by more- direct pay-
ments, since so much of the financing of the project is the responsibility
a.
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of government anyway. The next chapter offers, by way of sinplfied
example, a view of the way in which government mortgage insurance, in-
terest subsidy, and tax allowances converge for a Section 236 rental
project. The high marginal tax rates of the graduated Federal income
tax make tax shelter investments such as highly leveraged (high loan-to-
value ratio) rental housing attractive to high income investors. Chap-
ter IV seeks to illustrate the process of syndication as a way in which
a developer of subsidized rental housing can literally capitalize upon
the attractiveness of this investment to high income investors. As
this chapter has shown, however, the process of syndicating such a pro-
ject by forming a limited partnership is quite complex and requires care-
ful steering through the treacherous shoals of tax law, IRS regulations,
SEC restrictions and court rulings.
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CHAPTER IV: MULTIFAMILY RENTAL HOUSING UNDER SECTION 236
When income tax allowances are intended to encourage investment for
some purpose, it is important to understand just how the capture of capi-
tal works. The tax shelter provided by accelerated depreciation allow-
ances and favorable capital gains treatment has become a primary source
for generating development funds for low- and moderate-income rental
housing, especially under the program for mortgage insurance and in-
terest subsidy established under Section 236 by the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968. The limited dividend allowed in these projects
is too small to attract investment interest. But the magnitude of the
tax losses generated (especially by qualifying rehabilitation expendi-
tures) has made it possible for developers to sell ownership claims to
these losses to high tax-bracket investors for amounts equivalent to be-
tween 15 and 25 percent of the mortgage amount, as shown in Chapter V.
This chapter will include a brief explanation of the workings of the Section
236 program, a simplified example of the way in which tax shelter works,
and discussion of the implications for the private sector and for the
government of the tax incentive device for development of housing under
Section 236. Detailed examples on tax shelter and 236 housing are left
for Chapter V.
A. MORTGAGE INSURANCE AND INTEREST SUBSIDY
The rental housing program established under Section 236 of the Na-
tional Housing Act by the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968
basically offers insurance for a mortgage covering most of the costs of
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development for either new construction or rehabilitation and also annual
payments to the lender for part of the mortgage payment for the project.
(P.L. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476, 478) Because of this Federal assistance
with the mortgage payments, the owner is required to reduce the rents com-
mensurately. Since this Federal payment can be as much as the difference
between the mortgage payment at the FHA-established market interest rate
and the mortgage payment for a 1 percent mortgage, a substantial rent re-
duction is possible and virtually assures the developer of nearly full
occupancy by eligible tenants.
The mortgage amount for which Federal insurance is available depends
upon the form of the sponsor, whether limited dividend or non-profit.
For a limited-dividend sponsor the mortgage amount is 90 percent of "total
replacement cost," where total costs include a "builder's and sponsor's
profit and risk allowance" (BSPRA) of 10 percent of all other allowable
costs (except land costs). The result is that a mortgage of approxi-
mately 99 percent of actual costs (exclusive of the BSPRA) is possible.
Costs not recognized by the Federal Housing Administration in the
mortgage calculation--such as excessive fees or construction loan interest
over the FHA market rate and the salaries and overhead expenses of the
developer/builder and his staff--often increase the effective cash invest-
ment to approximately 3 percent. The actual cash requirements may differ
from 3 percent in a particular project, of course, depending on cost over-
ILet actual total costs be denoted COST and assume land costs are 5
percent of total costs. The total replacement cost for FHA mortgage cal-
culations is COST + 0.1 (COST - .05 COST) = 1.095 COST. The mortgage is
* 90 percent of total replacement costs, or 0.9 x 1.095 COST = 0.9855 COST.
If actual costs were $1,000,000, the mortgage amount would be 90 percent
of the sum of ($1,000,000 plus a BSPRA of $95,000) or $985,500.
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runs not accepted by the FHA, organizational expenses, relocation expenses
in the case of rehabilitation, the cost of working capital, and land costs.
Furthermore, if the developer and the building contractor do not have
an "identity of interest," then the BSPRA allowed is reduced by the amount
of the builder's profit fee. In such a case, the mortgage amount is un-
affected, but the builder's profit becomes an additional cash expense to
the developer, who, in turn, claims full ownership. The examples in
this chapter consider only the identity-of-interest case for simplicity.
On the operating side of the project, a 6 percent annual dividend is
included in the rents. For purposes of computing the allowed dividend,
the owner is deemed to have an equity of 10 percent of total replacement
costs invested in the project, even though the actual investment may be
much smaller. Another area of potential profit from the project in
1
operation is the management fee, which is typically 5 percent of the rent.
This depends entirely on the scale and efficiency of the management,
however, and is considered as a fee for services, not a source of profit.
All other elements of rent must represent actual costs (or reserves for
replacement); thus the dividend, if earned, is the only remaining source
of before-tax profit. While the owner of a 236 project is allowed to
include an allowance for the dividend in setting up rents, there is no
assurance that the dividend will, in fact, be earned every year. Unless
HUD approval can be obtained for rent increases to cover increased operat-
A non-profit sponsor receives no dividend from the rents but obtains
a mortgage of 100 percent of total costs, including an allowance for spon-
sor expenses and a fee for a housing consultant. There is no sponsor's
profit and risk allowance, of course, in the mortgage computation for a
non-profit sponsor. Since non-profit sponsors pay no income taxes and are
unable to use the depreciation, attention is devoted entirely to the limited
dividend sponsor in the remaining discussion. Community-based sponsors may,
of course, also be limited dividend sponsors as discussed in Chapter Vill.
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ing expenses, portions of the rent which would have gone toward the divi-
dend may have to be used for operating expenses, especially since approved
rent increases tend to lag increases in operating expenses. Even if the
maximum dividend is actually earned every year, however, the cash dividend
is small compared with the tax savings which result from the depreciation
allowances.
B. TAX SHELTER SYNDICATION
Because the 6 percent dividend allowed in rental projects such as
those under Section 236 is not only small but not guaranteed, there would
be little development occurring under profit-motivated sponsorship except
for the tax advantages. Briefly, the advantages lie in the allowance for
accelerated depreciation deductions and for payment of tax at capital
gains rates on the gain realized at the sale of a project. The large losses
which can be claimed for tax purposes as a result of the depreciation al-
lowances have value to taxpayers in high tax brackets because the losses
can shelter some of their taxable income from tax.I Thus the tax laws permit
large paper losses (non-cash expenses) to be claimed for real property in
the form of depreciation that owner/investors can apply to offset ordinary
income on which Federal income tax would otherwise be due.2 The result
is that a large part of the after-tax return from such projects is in the
IFor property rented to low-income persons the Tax Reform Act of 1969
permits the rehabilitation expenditures to be written off (depreciated)
over a 5-year period. New construction is eligible for accelerated depre-
ciation but at rates slower than for rehabilitation. (See Chapter 1I1.)
2The term "paper loss" is used to indicate that the loss taken in de-
preciation for tax purposes is not a cash expense but a loss existing only
on paper (the tax forms).
125
form of tax savings, that is, income which would have been used to pay
Federal income tax had the owner not been able to claim the depreciation.
In order to gain an appreciation for the importance of accelerated de-
preciation in the returns available from a Section 236 rental project,
we examine a greatly simplified example. More exact computations are dis-
cussed in the next chapter.
1. Investment Criteria
Fundamental requirements for undertaking development of rental hous-
ing include: (1) marketability of the units, with respect to location,
type and level of rent, (2) sufficient net income from rents after payment
of operating expenses to cover mortgage payments and have left sufficient
after-tax profit for the owner, (3) willingness of a lender of mortgage
funds to take a mortgage for the property for a high fraction of the
actual total development costs. A 236 project suitably located would
satisfy the marketability and mortgage requirements, but the cash dividend
alone would not provide sufficient profit. A greatly simplified example
may help to illustrate the developer's perspective and to show why the
tax aspects of a 236 project are essential for its profitability to the
developer. We begin by neglecting the role of depreciation'allowances.
A typical 236 project of 100 units might have the following costs:
Total direct costs $2,020,202
Builder's and Sponsor's
Profit and Risk Allowance (10%) 202,020
Total replacement costs $2,222,222
Mortgage amount (90%) (rounded) $2,000,000
Builder/developer's cash investment (3%) $ 60,ooo
In this project the annual dividend is 6 percent of an assumed equity of
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$222,222 (10 percent of total repiacement costs) or $13,333. The upper
limit on before-tax profit, or return, is thus actually 22 percent on the
actual cash investment ($13,333/$60,000). Neglecting depreciation for
the moment and assuming the developer is in the 50 percent income tax
bracket, his after-tax return is only 11 percent. It may be less, of
course, since the dividend is not guaranteed. Since this return is not
competitive with the returns available from conventional real estate, we
b
turn now to the role of allowances for accelerated depreciation as a
device for increasing investment incentive. 2
2. Depreciation Allowances
a. Straight-line Depreciation
If, In addition to the dividend, depreciation of the value of the
building is allowed at a steady rate (straight-line depreciation) over the
economic life of the building, a paper loss for tax purposes of $100,000
per year is created. This assumes that the value of the building is
I Actually, with no depreciation, taxable income amounts to gross
rents less all cash expenses except the principal repayment portion of the
mortgage payment. The owner thus would have to pay tax on the principal
repayment as well as the cash dividend, leaving him with an after-tax
cash return of even less than 11 percent.
It could also be argued that the builder and developer could have
earned a straight fee of 10 percent for their services if they had -not
chosen toown this project. In this case their "sweat equity," or imputed
equity, would be 10 percent before tax and 5 percent after tax (for a
builder/developer in the 50 percent marginal income tax bracket). The
total equity would then be the 5 percent after-tax sweat equity plus the
cash expense, $141,111 in this example. The after-tax rate of return
from the project dividend would then be only about 4-3/4 percent--again
hardly attractive.
A study on tax considerations in multi-family housing investments
conducted for HUD by the accounting firm of Touche Ross and Co. (1971,
Vol. II) found that before-tax returns for a wide variety of multi-family
rental housing ranged from 12.5 to 20 percent, while after-tax returns
ranged from about 25 to 35 percent.
0
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$2,000,000 and that its economic life is 20 years. The taxable income
from real estate operation is the sum of the cash profit left after all
costs (including mortgage interest but not mortgage principal repayments)
and the depreciation. The $100,000 paper loss more than offsets the
taxable income from the cash dividend and mortgage principal repayments,
at least in the early years, when the mortgage payment is mostly interest,
and no income tax is due. The dividend from the rents is converted by
I
the allowance of straight-line depreciation into at least a 22 percent
after-tax return in our simplified example, and this type of investment
begins to look more attractive.
b. Accelerated Depreciation
If, in addition, the property is eligible for accelerated forms of
depreciation, which allow more annual depreciation to be taken in the
early years than the normal straight-line rate, additional paper losses
are created. (See Chapter III for a list of the available forms of ac-
celerated depreciation.) New residential construction and qualifying re-
habilitation expenditures are eligible for this favorable tax treatment.
If our example is a rehabilitation project, it is eligible for a $400,000
paper loss in the first year rather than the $100,000 straight-line de-
preciation allowance above. Since the income from the property itself
could already have been sheltered from tax under straight-line deprecia-
tion, the allowance for accelerated depreciation creates excess paper
losses which have value as a tax shelter for persons with taxable incomes
A 20-year life is typical of the economic life which might be claimed
g for a used or rehabilitated building. An economic life of 40 years for a
newly constructed building would generate only $50,000 of annual depreci-
ation in this example, but would have the same type of benefit for after-
tax return.
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from other sources. The higher the income (hence the higher the tax
bracket) of the person claiming this loss, the greater the value of the
tax savings. For example, a $50,000 paper loss used by a person with
$50,000 of income in the 50 percent tax bracket saves him $25,000 in
taxes, while for a person in the 70 percent tax bracket use of the loss
saves $35,000 in taxes. (I refer here to average marginal bracket in the
range of income sheltered; see the isample calculation at p. 169.)
3. Taxes on Gain from Sale
To the extent that the sale price (less expenses of sale) exceeds
the depreciated value of a building, the owner is subject to tax on the
gain. Because it is recognized that the allowance of accelerated de-
preciation is an inducement to investment and generates returns in the
form of tax savings, tax law provides (as discussed above at pp. 101-102).
that for a period of time the amount of gain realized that is attributable
to the excess of accelerated depreciation over. what straight-line depreci-
ation would have been is to be taxed, or recaptured, at ordinary income
rates. This obviously encourages holding the property to diminish taxes
at sale based on ordinary income tax rates.
It should be noted that even after the recapture period is over, taxes
at capital gains rates are still due on the difference between the sale
price and the depreciated value of the property. Expiration of the recap-
ture period simply means that there is no portion of the gain taxed at
ordinary income tax rates; all of the gain is taxed at capital gains rates.
The taxes at sale thus reduce the net benefit from the depreciation allow-
ances. Investment value has been enhanced in two ways, however: (1) the
tax shelter defers payment of income taxes, and (2) to the extent that
these taxes are eventually converted to capital gains taxes, the tax has
aI
I
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been not only deferred but converted to a lower value.
In the example at hand, consider the effect of the gains tax for
a sale made in the 20th operating year for a mortgage balance of
$1,660,000. Neglecting the value of the land and building shell, the
rehabilitated property has been fully depreciated and, because the
recapture period has expired, tax is due only at capital gains rate
on the full amount of the sale. That is, the taxable gain is the differ-
ence between the sale price (we assume the sale price is just the out-
standing mortgage balance) and the adjusted basis, which, in this case,
is zero. Leaving the complications of the minimum tax for the detailed
I
calculations of Chapter V, the gains tax for this example is 25 percent
of $1,660,000, or $415,000.
4. Combined Elements of a 236 Project
Developers of rental property subject to limited dividends restric-
tions (such as the Federal 236 program or some state-sponsored programs)
find that the profitability of these projects is sufficiently enhanced by
the favorable tax treatment that development is economically advantageous,
frustrations and paper-work requirements of government agencies notwith-
standing. For the developer who.is not himself in a position to use
the tax losses generated by these projects, a limited partnership is
often formed in which the developer acts as general partner, and the
limited partners are passive investors to whom the laws allow the tax
losses to be passed. This approach to organizing a real estate venture
A 20-year holding period not only increases the investment value by
deferring the time of payment of the capital gains tax but also represents
the period during which a 236 project may not be sold without HUD approval.
Choosing a sale price equal to the amount of the outstanding balance on
the mortgage loan is typical of the assumptions made in marketing invest-
ment shares in 236 projects as a conservative assumption.
IS
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is referred to as a form of syndication. The advantage for the developer
of a Section 236 project is that it allows him to raise much more money
from the limited partner investors than is required to develop the pro-
ject over and above the mortgage loan.
Now we have developed the essentials for a tax shelter investment.
A limited partner/investor (actually a group of investors, in most cases)
wishing to shelter income in the 50 percent tax bracket will typically be
willing to invest a total of $500,000 in exchange for the $400,000 loss
for each of the first five years which can be claimed as a result of
ownership of the project subject to a capital gains tax of $415,000 when
the project is sold for the mortgage balance in the 20th operating year.
The developer receiving the investment contributions of the limited part-
ners is obligated to use only as much of the capital as is required to
finance the project. The remainder he can keep.
Figure IV-l indicates schematically the elements of the tax incen-
tive for development of this simplified Section 236 rehabilitation pro-
ject. To cover costs and raise his fee, the developer relies both upon a
mortgage commitment ($2,000,000) and capital contributions from investors
($500,000) who invest in anticipation of obtaining substantial paper
losses as shelter for their income, or in this case approximately $400,000
a year in tax shelter (worth $200,000 a year in tax saving) for five
years and eventual sale in the 20th operating year. If $60,000 represents
the developer's cash costs and $100,000 the fee for the tax shelter broker,
then the developer retains a "fee" of $340,000, or an amount equivalent
to 17 percent of the mortgage (though it Is clearly in addition to mort-
gage proceeds). Outside of the administrative and mortgage insurance role
of the FHA plus the possibility of a small annual dividend, all of the in-
-. 
9 1 
- 1.--.
Promise of $200,000/year
In Tax Savings for 5 years
$500,000 investment
Promise of
$13,333 Annual
Dividend
Commitment For
$2,000,000
Mortgage Loan
100-FAMILY PROJECT
(Total Replacement Cost
$2,222,222)
$60,000 for Cash .
Expenses of Project
$100,000 Fee TAX SHELTER BROKER I
FIGURE IV-1: REHABILITATION TAX INCENTIVE FOR DEVELOPMENT'
00a
132
centive for development has come trom the promise of depreciation allowances
to create tax shelter.
Figure IV-2 indicates how the tax inceritive works during the operating
period of the property. The 50 percent bracket investors receive $200,000
a year for five years in tax savings from the Treasury and $13,333 a year
(for the life of the project) in dividends from tenant rent payments.
The tenant subsidy is approximately $100,000 per year for 40 years to
make up the difference between the tenants' payments via rents on a one
percent interest rate mortgage and an assumed market rate of 7-1/2 per-
cent.
C. POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES
As the diagrams just introduced illustrate, use of the tax incentive
device causes at least two extraneous parties to enter the system, namely
the tax shelter broker and the high bracket investors. Had the returns
from the property not been tied to tax savings, the investor need not
have become interested solely on the basis of his tax bracket. In fact
the developer might have retained ownership on the basis of operating for
profit the property in question.. On the other hand, the investors do
serve the purpose of screening the developer because they scrutinize the
capabilities and integrity of the developer before entrusting their funds
to the project. The Department of Housing and Urban Development has the
administrative responsibility for processing the application for mortgage
insurance and interest subsidy and for periodic reviews of the operating
performance of the project. But the project cannot be successfully de-
veloped and operated without the participation of the Internal Revenue
Service. The IRS may be called upon to rule privately on the tax status
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of a proposed syndication as a way to assure the investors that the pro-
spective tax losses will be allowed by the IRS when eventually claimed.
Further, the IRS may be a critical agency in the year-to-year opera-
tion of a project which has specific public policy constraints attached
to it, such as is the casi for a project claiming the special 5-year
write-off of rehabilitation expenditures. The IRS must agree that the
taxpayer's depreciation claim is, in fact, attached to "qualifying" re-
habilitation expenditures and that the unit remains eligible for the
special depreciation, which requires that it be "held for occupancy on
a rental basis by fimilies and individuals of low or moderate income,
as determined by the Secretary (of the Treasury) or his delegate in a
manner consistent with the policies of the Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1968." (Internal Revenue Code, Section 167(k))
A suggestion of the administrative difficulties of this system of
bifocal incentives is found in the efforts of the IRS to establish
regulations for the 5-year write-off for qualifying rehabilitation expendi-
tures. The tentative IRS regulations published August 4, 1970 set the
eligible income level for tenants at 150 percent of public housing ad-
mission, with the apparent intent that this would be well above the 135
percent of public housing admission income used in Section 236 housing.
(U. S. Treasury, 1970) However, HUD makes a number of adjustments in
gross income which were neglected in the proposed IRS regulation, and
the Section 236 program also allows a number of projects to rent under
"exception" income limits based on 90 percent of 221(d)(3) income limits
* for rental projects financed under Section 221(d) (3) of the National Hous-
ing Act. The upshot would be that many projects qualifying for 236 mort-
gages and interest subsidy would nevertheless have tenants with incomes
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too high for the units to be eligible for the special depreciation allow-
ance for rehabilitation expenditures. This particular issue is apparently
being resolved in favor of the HUD guidelines. (Department of the
Treasury News, 1971)
Among many other candidates for resolution by IRS, however, are such
questions as:
Must the unit actually be occupied by a low-income
tenant, or only "reserved" for such a tenant even
though vacant?
How shall project costs be allocated to units?
What happens in the case of an eviction?
The point is that the tax incentive approach is not a mechanism
obviously free of administrative problems. If the IRS makes these
determinations, then it is implicitly making housing policy. If it does
so independently of HUD, there is a danger of either mistaken judgments
being made by IRS personnel inexperienced in housing matters or of a new
housing administration bureaucracy being established within IRS. If HUD
rulings and policy are allowed to govern, then the IRS has less control
over the tax equity and revenue questions.
These questions at least suggest the complications of using a tax
incentive for a highly focused public objective. Writing at a time when
a number of elaborate proposals for tax incentives were being considered
in the Congress (U. S. Senate, 1967), Richard Slitor (19633, p. 54) antici-
pated the tangle in which the rehabilitation incentive seems to find
itself:
As the better tax plans in this field now clearly recognize,
fast tax depreciation for low-income housing in the inner
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cities (or housing access ible to the urban poor) would not
be an automatic or virtually self-administering scheme.
The standards and criteria for acceptability of projects
in terms of physical characteristics, location, financing,
and rental scales would almost certainly involve exacting
regulations, certification procedures, and bureaucratic
overhead. . . . As one examines the problems of suitable
eligibility criteria for tax writeoffs for low-income
urban housing, this use of the tax system appears more and
more to be essentially a complex and rather cumbersome
substitute for direct expenditures, having selective ap-
peal chiefly for high-income investors.
Later chapters will focus on the additional question of government
cost for the tax incentives attached to 236 housing and on the possibili-
ties for direct payment option!. However, in this chapter devoted to
the general workings of the tax incentive in 236 housing it is appropriate
to inquire further into the workings of the tax incentive as perceived by
the private actors in housing developient.
D. PRIVATE RESPONSE TO TAX INCENTIVES
1. Allocations of "Captured" Capital
In principle, the value added to a Section 236 project by virtue of
the tax savings will cause these projects to be developed only if the in-
ducement is sufficient to meet the price of the competition for each of
the major actors involved in housing development and production. What is
more likely, especially in the case of a broadly effective tax device such
as accelerated depreciation, is that more than usual profits accrue to the
scarce resources in the process and to the earliest participants. In
somewhat pure economic terms these resources can be thought of as land,
labor and capital . We might expect, therefore, that if some land (or
building shells) were located so as to be particularly well suited for
use in Section 236 projects, the price might be bid up. For new con-
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stru,.tion at least there would seem to be nothing unique about land on
which a Section 236 project could be built, compared with more conven-
tionally financed rental housing, except for such distortions as exclu-
sionary zoning. (See p. 23 above.) In the rehab il i tat ion case, it
might be that the buildings most suitable -for rehabilitation--those
needing complete rehabilitation from the walls in, thereby generating
the most expenditures for the rapid depreciation allowance and also most
likely to be empty, thereby removing the issue of relocation of tenants--
could become scarce enough to lead to price inflation of these proper-
ties. (Sunley, 1971, p. 387) Heinberg (1971) suggests that, in fact,
the amount of 236 appropriations allotted to rehabilitation may be more
of a limiting factor than the land and buildings.
Capital requirements for a 236 project, as we have seen, are met
largely through a federally insured mortgage but the funds involved must
compete for general mortgage funds otherwise. The maximum rate allowed
on FHA-insured mortgages has usually been set just at or below the market
rates for conventional, uninsured mortgages. This has meant that lenders,
in order to reduce the actual amount of the loan made to one on which
something approaching market interest rates will be paid, charge the bor-
rower discount ''points." While the FHA interest rate is paid on the
face amount of the loan, the actual amount has been reduced by the
"points" so as to yield a normal return to the lender. In principle,
some of the capital contributed for a Section 236 project by high bracket
investors because of the tax shelter might be applied by the developer
as payment for these discount "points" charged by the mortgage lender.
The discount points increase the cash equity requirements and reduce the
net amount available from the capital contributions for the developer.
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Thus, the availability of a surplus of capital contributions, i.e., more
than that required to induce the developer to create the project, provides
a "cushion" for meeting expenses imposed by -mortgage restrictions. In
practice there is minimal need for this "cushion" because the lender can
sell the mortgage loan at par to the Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA) with the assistance of the Government National Mortgage Association
(GNMA) . (Aaron, 1972, Ch. Vii)
To the extent that the total demand for construction labor and ma-
terials is increased by the availability of favorable mortgages and tax
savings, a part of the capital attracted might also be required to pay
higher prices for these factors, i.e., construction labor and materials.
The practice seems to have been that rising construction prices, for what-
ever reason, have simply pushed up the amount of total replacement cost,
hence mortgage loan amount rather than drawing off some of the attracted
capital. That is, the developer, who is in the position of collecting the
capital attracted by the tax savings, has ordinarily not depended upon the
capital contributions to pay construction costs. In some areas such
as New York City the construction costs have risen to such levels that the
statutory limits on mortgage amounts have imposed a ceiling. It is true
more generally, however, that part of the capital contributions may be held
in reserve as an emergency source of funds to guarantee completion of the
project in the event the costs over-run the original contract amount to
such an extent that the builder just walks away from the job and another
contractor must be found to complete the construction.
All the foregoing are possible resources which might stand to claim
some of the excess capital which high-bracket investors would be willing
to advance in exchange for the tax savings of a Section 236 project. But
II
I
4
the most ironic claimant of all is the tax shelter broker. While the
other areas mentioned are, at least, necessary for a housing project to
be developed and operated, the need for the function of the tax shelter
broker is created by the device chosen to attract the investment capital--
the tax shelter. Recent experience with low- and moderate-income housing
projects has been that many developer/builders either do not understand
the intricacies of the tax laws and tax planning or they regard their
primary interest and role as lodging in the development and building pro-
cess proper. There has arisen as a result the phenomenon of investment
banking firms performing the role of broker/syndicator of these projects.
These firms specialize in working out the tax implications, preparing
offering brochures, structuring the partnership agreement and guarantees
to define and protect the interests of all parties, and in finding the
investors interested in limited partnership shares in such projects. In
return the broker/syndicator retains a considerable fraction of the total
amount raised from the limited partners. Partly by assuring the investors
of a reliable and reduced risk project, the broker/syndicator is able to
command maximum investment from the limited partners, so that the net
amount to the developer/builder may be almost as great as if he had tried
to market the shares himself. The broker/syndicator's fee may be in the
range of 15 to 30 percent of the total amount of capital contributions
raised (Lane and Edson, 1971; interviews at Boston Financial Technology,
1971). The precise magnitude is not as important as the observation that
part of the tax revenues foregone end up not in increasing the capital
available to housing construction and operation but in the private costs
of administering the tax shelter--not to mention the public costs of ad-
ministration borne by IRS. The usual arguments against more direct pay-
S
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ments include assertions of increased costs of administration, but here
we see that there are, in effect, adrinistrative costs being paid, in-
directly, from public funds anyway.
2. Response of Builders and Developers
Builders and developers appear to be responding t-> the incentives
for the production of rental units under Section 236 and other programs
which enjoy some of the same benefits in financing, rent assistance, and
tax shelter. But there is some ihdication that there is only a subset
of builders and developers who appreciate the potential benefits from
this type of development. A survey of the member,, of the National Associ-
ation of Homebuilders conducted in the summer of 1969 found that of the
multi-family builders 30 percent responded "yes" to the question, "Are
you planning to build or currently building low-income housing?" (Sumi-
chrast and Frankel, 1970, p. 49) Impediments to the builders' interest
in low-income housing were found to be primari-ly (1) high land costs,
(2) government red tape, (3) too little profit, (4) zoning problems, and
(5) inadequate allocations of program funds. (Sumichrast and Frankel,
1970, pp. 49-50)
These findings were confirmed by a study undertaken for HUD by the
accounting firm Touche Ross and Co. (1971) on tax considerations in multi-
family housing investments. Their six-city study of 137 representative
investors (including 28 individuals and 89 real estate "groups") found
that the chief deterrents to investment in low- and moderate-income hous-
ing were (1) low return, (2) FHA red tape, and (3) little knowledge of
the market for this type of housing. However, of those not favoring low-
and moderate-income housing 70 percent did not recognize the tax shelter
0
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advantage of this type of investment. In the full sample 53 percent
said they didn't measure the benefits of tax shelter, even though 67
percent used some form of accelerated depreciation. Those favoring
low- and moderate-income housing as an investment were attracted by
the financing, the tax shelter opportunities, and the marketability of
the units. Of the 20 percent of investors who indicated that the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 would have some effect on their mul-ti-family housing
investments, only 5 percent indicated that they would be drawn into in-
creased investment in low- and moderate-income housing. (Touche Ross,
1971, pp. 12, 13, 63, 102, 124)
Production of units of housing under the 236 program and similar
programs has without question increased markedly in recent years. The
Third Annual Report on National Housing Goals (U. S. President, 1971,
pp. 9, 30, 31) indicated that product'on of subsidized housing units
increased from 225,840 units in calendar year 1969 to 469,750 in 1970.
The number of units from HUD programs involving at least the possibility
of tax shelter benefits under private ownership jumped from 69,050 units
in 1969 to 163,880 units in 1970. The Section 236 program for calendar
year 1970 accounted for 109,770 units--4,950 rehabilitated and 104,820
new construction. Applications for mortgage insurance and interest
subsidy allocations have consistently been so numerous that more in-
terest subsidy funds are needed than the amounts appropriated. For
example, the Second Annual Report on National Housing Goals (U. S.
President, 1970, p. 45) indicated that as of March 6, 1970, requests
ITax-shelter benefits are possible, in principle, in leased public
housing, Section 236 projects, Rent Supplement projects, state-assisted
projects, and Section 221(d) (3) Below Market Interest Rate projects.
There are no tax-shelter benefits in conventional public housing develop-
ment; there is a tax preference, however, in that interest on housing
authority bonds is tax-free.
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for $144 million of subsidy allocations under the 236 program could not
be filled for lack of funds. (I would estimate that this represents
about 140,000 to 150,000 units.) The study by Aaron (1972, Ch. ViII) or
Federal housing subsidies observed that in 1970 and 1971 the number of
units for which 236 subsidy funds were reserved on approved applications
was running about double the number of units for which actual commitments
of appropriated funds could be made. It is impossible, of course, to
credit the favored tax position of 236 housing entirely for this intense
interest on the part of the development community. For one thing, some
of these applications are from non-profit sponsors of 236 housing in
which the builder only gets a direct builder's profit, and there are no
tax shelter benefits involved. An analysis by Keyes (1971, p. 162) found
that of all low- and moderate-income housing for which both for-profit
and non-profit sponsorship is possible, for-profit developers accounted
for about 66 percent of the units being produced. Furthermore, as the
Third Annual Report on National Housing Goals (U. S. President, 1971,
p. 7) recognized, a number of other economic factors were at work:
In many instances, production under one of the various sub-
sidized housing programs was the only way a builder could
be relatively assured of finding a buyer who could afford
the monthly payments associated with a newly produced housing
unit and also finding mortgage money to finance the construc-
tion and purchase of the unit. Thus, many builders who had
long avoided involvement with Federal subsidized programs
shifted to where the action was in order to remain in business
during the overall production decline.
Interestingly, the housing goals report for 1971 included for the first
time mention of the role of tax incentives in rental housing and mention
of the loss of tax revenues as an additional cost over direct budgetary
outlays. (U. S. President, 1971, pp. 3, 37) The pertinence of these.
0
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observations is that increased reliance upon privately produced and
owned property to provide Federally assisted rental housing calls for
increased attention to the tax incentives and the accompanying revenue
losses which at least potentially attach to these structures.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter has shown the importance of distinguishing between
the developer and the investors in a typical Section 236 rental pro-
ject. The developer brings the necessary skills for assembling all the
elements of a project, while the investor is the person who, because of
high income from other sources, can benefit from the large tax savings
attached to a 236 project--provided the investor can pay the developer
a competitive price for the privilege of getting the tax savings in
future years. The amount the investor is willing to contribute to the
developer depends, not on the amount of effort of the developer, but on
the magnitude of the tax shelter created by a combination of the develop-
ment of the project and the tax law. Because the developer can obtain
a Federally insured mortgage loan for 97 to 99 percent of his direct
costs, the surplus capital contributions of the investors become a hand-
some fee received at the outset of the project.
The dividend in Section 236 projects is limited and not guaranteed,
while rents are controlled by the Federal Housing Authority. Thus the
investment value of such a project might be too small to attract de-
velopers without some added incentive, such as that provided by the tax
shelter. (It is important to note that the reduction in rent derives
primarily from the Federal assumption of part of the cost of mortgage
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loan repayment rather than the limitation on cash dividend to the
owner.) We shall explore the magnitude of the incentive for develop-
ment of a 236 project in Chapter V.
The reliance of developers of 236 projects upon the tax shelter
component means that, ir effect, the administration of this housing pro-
gram is divided between the Department of Housing and Urban Development
and the Treasury (Internal Revenue Service), especially in the case of
the rehabilitation. The special depreciation allowances for rehabili-
tation expenditures are contingent upon a set of rules for amounts spent
and persons to whom the units must be rented, which must be administered,
not by HUD but by the IRS.
Private developers appear to have responded to this complex set
of lures, so that there is a standing- backlog of project applications
for Section 236 mortgage insurance and commitments for interest subsidy
payments. This raises the question whether the tax incentive could be
reduced and still be sufficiently attractive' to induce as much develop-
ment as is covered by interest subsidy appropriations. That enticing
possibility is explored only briefly in Chapters VI and VII. Having
outlined the general configuration of 236 project financing, we turn now
to a more detailed elaboration of a base case typical of those used in
marketing tax shelter to high tax bracket investors. This groundwork is
necessary for a detailed understanding of the way the tax laws are used
now and for understanding the magnitude and distribution of revenue
losses for these projects.
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CHAPTER V: BASE CASES
A. RATIONALE
As a framework for analysis of the interaction between income tax
incentives and the Section 236 mortgage insurance and interest subsidy pro-
grams, I have chosen to use a very explicit description of current prac-
tice, using examples called "base,cases" for new construction and rehabili-
tation. The level of analysis is that of an illustrative rental project
of 100 units. The primary focus is on project firancing. A set of de-
velopment costs and operating costs are taken to be representative of
Section 236 projects, and typical financing and investment parameters
are used in the base cases.
As an analytical device the base case approach offers the advantage
of explicitness at risk of some sacrifice in g.enerality. The analysis
therefore includes tests of the sensitivity of the results to the particu-
lar values of project parameters chosen. I think the explicit, base case
approach maintains a desirable degree of concreteness for the purposes of
examining the way in which the development and operation of Section 236
rental housing actually works in conjunction with the tax laws, even at
the risk of some challenge of the specific parameters, assumptions or tax
devices used in the base cases. The base case approach also facilitates
direct computation of government costs associated with the actual opera-
tion of these programs and in comparison of government costs under al-
ternative schemes.
Finally, base cases have been used because the number of parameters
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which would be involved in a comprehensive general analysis would be quite
large. The use of base cases might be an appropriate starting point for
eliminating parameters which would be inconsequential over their usual
range for the particular questions being examined in a general analysis.
The large number of potential variables, I suspect, is a primary reason
why so much of the discussion of the relationships between real estate
and taxation is done in terms of explicit numerical examples, as in the
work of Anderson (1965), Slitor (1968) McKee (1970), Soelberg and Ste-
faniak (1970), and O'Block and Kuehn (1970).
B. DEVELOPMENT COSTS
Development costs assumed for the base cases for new construction and
rehabilitation are summarized in Tables V-1 through V-3. The cost figures
are intended to be illustrative of the build-up of costs considered by
the FHA on the developer's application for mortgage insurance and interest
subsidy allocation. Since many of the fees shown vary from place to place
and from time to time and have limits established by local FHA insuring
The costs used in this work were derived from a number of sources,
including (1) the author's work experience with a Boston rehabilitation
developer, the King-Bison Company (now HABCO), in 1969, (2) consulting in
housing development performed for the North American Development Corp. of
Boston in 1969 and 1970, for Housing Now Inc., a community housing develop-
ment group which has initiated a new construction Section 236 project in
North Adams, Mass. in 1970, and for Arthur D. Little, Inc. of Cambridge,
Mass. in 1970 and 1971, (3) case study materials in housing development
used at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Harvard School
of Business Administration in 1969 and 1970, (4) numerous other projects
(both new construction and rehabilitation) on which the author had access
to the FHA Form 2013 (used to summarize development and operating costs
for project. mortgage insurance and interest subsidy application). See
p. 205 below for a comparison with national median values in connection
with the discussion on sensitivity tests.
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offices, they can only be viewed as illustrative.
Furthermore, while FHA requires that costs shown be actual costs
and not the maximum allowable, applicants have often found devices for
using the maximum costs allowable, such as (1) including the architect
as a subsidiary enterprise which bills the maximum cost regardless of
actual costs and fees which could have been charged on a competitive arms-
length bid, (2) purchasing the land from a subsidiary enterprise at a
price well above actual cost of the land to the subsidiary. HUD/FHA of-
ficially discourages such practices as inflating acquisition costs but
nevertheless often allows it if the original purchase was six months or
more prior to the developer's application.
Table V-1 illustrates the build-up of costs for illustrative 100-
unit projects using the cost categories used by the FHA in arriving at
a Total Replacement Cost (TRC), which is the basis for the mortgage com-
putation (90 percent of TRC). Note that the TRC includes (1) an allow-
ance for a Builder's and Sponsor's Profit and Risk Allowance (BSPRA)
amounting to 10 percent of direct development costs and fees (but exclu-
sive of land and building costs and the BSPRA itself), (2) a Legal and
Organization Allowance, part of which may be needed for actual legal ex-
penses, but the remainder of which, may be used to cover expenses of the
developer. The Total Replacement Costs of the new construction and re-
habilitation project have both been set at approximately $18,100 per
unit. This is not intended to indicate that new construction and re-
habilitation projects are likely to have the same total costs, but to
establish directly comparable projects. Sensitivity calculations will
later show that the precise composition of costs is not a critical factor
11
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TABLE V-1A: ILLUSTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT COSTS,
NEW CONSTRUCTION BASE CASE
100 UNIT PROJECT
ITEM
DIRECT CONSTRUCTION
FEES
Builder's Overhead
Builder's Profit
Architect's Fee,
Design & Superv.
Bond Premium
TOTAL FEES
TOTAL IMPROVEMENTS
CARRYING CHARGES &
FINANCING
Constr. Loan Interest
Real Estate Taxes
Insurance
FHA Mortgage Ins.
Prem.
FHA Exam. Fee
FHA Insp. Fee
Financing Fee
FNMA Fee
Title & Recording
TOTAL CARRYING CHGS.
LEGAL & ORGN. ALLOW.
DEVELOPMENT COSTS
BLDRS. & SPONS. PROFIT
& RISK ALLOW. (BSPRA)
TOTAL DEV. COST
LAND
TOTAL REPLACEMENT COST
COST
$1,307,042
36,140
83,422
16,004
135,566
1,442,608
39,512
5,000
16,294
8,147
4,888
8,147
32,587
24,440
8,147
147,162
10,591
1,600,361
160,036
1,760,393
50,000
$1,810,393
COMMENTS
-Approx. 2 to 3% of direct construc-
tion
-Waived, assume identity of interest
between builder and developer
-Approx. 4 to 4-1/2% for design, 2%
for supervision on direct con-
struction costs
-Approx. 1% of construction costs
-interest for avg. of 1/2 mortgage
at 4.85%
-Assumed on land only
-Fire & Liability at 1% of mortgage
-0.5% of 'mortgage
-0.3% of mortgage
-0.5% of mortgage
-2% of mortgage
-1.5% of mortgage assuming FNMA pur-
chase
-Typically 0.5% of mortgage
-$139,014 taken as expense in con-
struction year
-0.65% of mortgage
-Sum of preceding items
-10% on direct development costs
-Used for mortgage calculation
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TABLE V-1B: ILLUSTRATiVE DEVELOPMENT COSTS,
REHABILiTAT!ON BASE CASE
100 UNIT PROJECT
ITEM
DIRECT CONSTRUCTION
COST
$1,207,597
COMMENTS
-Direct costs average 12,076 per
unit
GEN. REQ'TS.
FEES
Builder's Overhead
Builder's Profit
Architect's Fee,
Design & Superv.
Bond Premium
TOTAL FEES
TOTAL IMPROVEMENTS
CARRYING CHARGES &
FINANCING
Construction loan
interest*
Real Estate Taxes"
Insurance"
FHA Mortgage Ins.
Prem.*
FHA Exam. Fee"
FHA Insp. Fee*
Financing Fee"
FNMA Fee"
Title & Recording Fees
TOTAL CARRYING CHARGES
LEGAL & ORGN. ALLOW,
-- -FHA currently allows $300 per unit
for relocation expenses, where in-
curred.
34,152 -Approx. 2 to 3% of direct construc-
tion.
-- -if builder is distinct from de-
veloper, he is paid a fee which
diminishe the BSPRA by the same
amo in t.
77t456 -Approx. 4 to 4-1/2% for design, 2%for supervision on direct construc-
tion costs.
15,030 -Approx. 1% of direct construction
costs
111,608
1,319,204
39,581 -Assumes 4.85% on 1/2 total mortgage
loan (as an average) over 1 yr.
(typical of state housing finance
agency rates). This is equivalent
to conventional rates of 9% over
approx. 1/2 yr.
16,000
16,322 -Fire and liability ins, at 1% of mtge.
8,161 -0.5% of mortgage
4,897 -0.3% of mortgage
8,161 -0.5% of mortgage amount
32,644 -2% of mortgage
24,483 -Typically 1.5% of mortgage
8,161 -Typically 0.5% of mortgage
158,410 *All but title & record'g. taken as
expense during construction, sums
to $150,250
10,609 -0.65% of mortgage
(Continued)
U0
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TABLE V-1B (CONT.): ILLUSTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT COSTS,
REHABILITATION BASE CASE
ITEM
DEVELOPMENT COSTS
BLDRS. & SPONS. PROFIT
& RISK ALLOW. (BSPRA)
TOTAL DEV. COST
LAND & SHELL
TOTAL REPL. COST
CO ST
$1,503,255
150,325
1,653,580
160,000
$ 1,813,580
. COMMENTS
-Sum of preceding items
-10% of improvement plus carrying
charges plus legal & organ. costs
-Including BSPRA
-Land at $50,000, shell at $110,000
-Used for mortgage calculations
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in the investment and cost-to-government conclusions'.
Table V-2 compares the Total Replacement Cost involved in the appli-
cation for mortgage with the resources required for the project. The
largest portion, of course, comes from the mortgage loan. The cash equity
required, however, is seen to be much less. than the apparent equity of
10 percent of TRC. In the example described in Table V-2 the builder and
developer are assumed to have what the FHA terms an "identity of interest."
In this case the allowable BSPRA is 10 percent of actual development costs
(exclusive of land and buildings).I Because of the value of the tax shel-
ter it is quite common for the builder to agree to an identity of interest
with the developer (assuming they are distinct in the first place) and to
make some agreement about dividing the proceeds raised by selling in-
terests in the project to limited partner investors. In the event that
the builder chooses a guaranteed contractor's fee, the amount involved will
generally be lower than if the builder shares some of the risk of getting
the project in operation. In this case the builder's fee would then ap-
pear explicitly in the cost summary for the FHA and the BSPRA would be re-
duced by the amount of the builder's fee. In Table V-2 an identity of
interest is assumed. The capital contributions of the limited partners
IThe BSPRA can be viewed either as a rough measure of the increase
in value of the property created by the developer over the sum of direct
costs or as an artifice for enabling the developer to obtain a mortgage
loan in an amount greater than 90 percent of actual costs. With the limi-
tation in cash return imposed in this type of project (the annual cash
return may not exceed 6 percent of the implied equity of 10 percent of
Total Replacement Costs) and the coupling between rental market and rent
assistance in such projects it is difficult to arrive at a market evalu-
ation of this hypothetical increase in value. In fact we shall shortly
see that most of the increase in value exists because the property
creates a tax shelter rather than that it creates a shelter.
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TABLE V-2: DEVELOPMENT CO:>T AND DEPRECIATION SUMMARY
(PROJECT BASIS 'INCLUDES ONLY CASH COSTS)
NEW CONSTRUCTION
DEVELOPMENT COSTS(
plus BUILDER'S.& SPONSOR'S PROFIT
& RISK ALLOWANCE (BSPRA)
plus LAND VALUE
plus BUILDING SHELL VALUE
equals TOTAL REPLACEMENT COST
less MORTGAGE (90% of T.R.C.)
equals IMPLIED EQUITY
less BSPRA (non-cash)
equals APPARENT CASH EQUITY
plus DEVELOPER'S OVERHEAD(2)
equals ACTUAL CASH EXPENSES
$ 1,600,357
160,036
50,000
$ 1,810,393
1,629,353
$ 181,040
160,036
$ 21,004
27,876
$ 48,880
REHABILITATION
$ 1,503,255
150,325
50,000
110,000
$ 1,813,580
1,632,222
$ 181,358
150,325
$ 31,033
17,933
$ 48,966
DEPRECIABLE BASIS (Dev.
costs + Shell + Dev.
O'head OR Mortgage +
actual equity-land)
less EXPENSES CLAIMED DURING
CONSTRUCTION
equals NET DEPRECIABLE BASIS
$ i1628,232
139,014
1,489,218
less BUILDING SHELL BASIS --
equals REHAB. EXPENDITURES BASIS --
Notes: (l) Total out-of-pocket costs for 100 units
FHA except for land and shell value.
$ 1,631,188
150,250
1,480,938
110,000
$ 1,370,938
recognized by
Excess expenses not recognized by FHA for mortgage ap-
plication (such as fees in excess of allowances, cost
of working capital, office expenses) reduced by allow-
ances in excess of cost (as on land value and legal &
orgn. expense). The figures used here were found by
subtraction, actual cash expenses being assumed as
3 percent of the mortgage amount.
(2)
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are Lhus to be divided between the builder and the developer. Additional
funds for the partnership may also be derived from arrangements for the
architect and oerhaps the legal staff to be partners. In this case the
fullest allowable fees are claimed in the application for mortgage, but
the fees are waived as a cash requirement. All partners then share in the
net proceeds (including any excess of mortgage funds and the equity con-
tributions of the limited partners).
While the FHA summary of costs would suggest that an actual cash ex-
pense of close to 1 percent is possible, Table V-2 includes additional al-
lowances for development costs not acknowledged in the FHA summary. As
suggested in the table, the additional funds would typically be required
to cover administrative costs, expense of working capital during the de-
velopment period, and other costs related to the project but for which there
is no other source of funds. In principle these areas could include:
1. Costs of initial set-up of developing entity
2. Overhead costs for the developing entity
3. Relocation expenses when occupied units are acquired
for rehabilitation (FHA currently allows up to $300
per unit to be entered as a relocation cost in the
mortgage calculation.)
4. Construction cost over-runs (some of this may be re-
couped through FHA-approved change orders, but this
cannot be assured)
5. Job training programs or excessive development costs
arising from low efficiency of low skilled workmen
6. Any discounts charged either by the interim leader
for the construction loan or by the permanent lender
for the permanent loan. The magnitude of discount
15h
depends on how much above the FHA limit in market-rate
interest rates the actual market rates are.
7. Any management training programs undertaken by the de-
veloper.
Some of these costs may not be incurred, of course, in any given project.
In the example shown, overhead expenses are assumed to be partly covered
by the "organization" part of the, legal and organization allowance in the
mortgage calculation. The remaining net permanent cash requirement in ex-
cess of the mortgage proceeds is the equivalent of 3 percent of the mort-
gage amount in the example. Most developers could be expected to avoid
as much as possible any costs which are no: absolutely necessary to the
project unless a separate source of funds were available; otherwise these
expenditures subtract directly from the project profit.
As a working assumption based on conversations with those involved
in the development business, I have taken the net cash cost for the typi-
cal base case projects to be the equivalent of 3 percent of the mortgage
amount. Since the BSPRA is larger in the new construction case (there are
more development costs to which the BSPRA applies), this 3 percent as-
sumption arbitrarily forces a higher overhead to be assumed for the developer
of the new construction project. This can be kept in mind later when the
internal rate of return in cash equity is computed for the base cases; if
the cash costs are not exactly equal for both construction and rehabilita-
tion, then the internal rate of return would be affected. Small adjust-
ments in the cash equity would not have significant effects on the present
value calculations, since the only difference introduced would be in the
total value of the project (basis) for purposes of depreciation allowances.
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C. DEPRECIATION ELEMENTS
1. Treatment of Developer's "Fee"
Table V-2 also presents the depreciation summary for the situation in
which only the actual cash expenses are included in the tax basis of the
property. That is,. the amount on which depreciation can be taken is the
sum of all development costs (exclusive of any fee charged to the partner-
ship by the developer but includirhg the developer's cash overhead ex-
pense) plus building shell costs,. if any. This would be the situation if
the developer retained ownership of the project as his own investment.
If the project is syndicated the capital contributions of the limited
partner/investors in the project, of course, would exceed the actual cash
requirements of the developer/builder/general partner. Otherwise the de-
veloper would not undertake the project.
However, the treatment for tax purposes of the developer's excess
cash intake from the limited partner/investors over his cash requirements
depends upon the way in which the developer treats this excess. In some
situations developers are attempting to leave themselves a preferable tax
situation by claiming that the excess capital contributions either consti-
tute a capital gain or a return of capital. In these cases the excess
funds collected by the developer cannot be added to the total value of the
project for tax purposes and do not contribute to the basis subject to
depreciation. The depreciable basis is then the same as shown in Table V-2.
IThe developer may choose to claim the excess as a charge to the
partnership for his services, i.e., a fee, which is then taxable income
to the developer and a legitimate part of the total development costs as
far as the investors are concerned. I shall return to this case shortly.
S
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The developer's tax situation is a matter for resolution between him
and the Internal Revenue Service. If the excess capital contributions are
claimed as a c3pital gain, the developer must be able to satisfy the IRS
that this excess represents an amount by which the project value has in-
creased since he undertook the obligation of the mortgage and his own
cash costs. In this case capital gains taxes must be paid by the de-
veloper on the excess.
Or if the developer has retained a sufficient claim to ownership of
the profits and losses in the project, he might be able to claim that
out of the total funds which were committed to the project in which he
has a claim, part of the funds were returned to him as a return of capi-
tal in that they were funds belonging to him which were not required to
complete the project. The developer's basis in the project would, of
course, be decreased by the amount of capital returned. Because the
owners of a project can claim the costs actually covered by the mortgage
loan as part of their depreciable basis in the project, the developer
can arrange it so that he still has a claim to some of the value of the
project even after removing all the excess capital contributions. For
example, suppose a developer retained 10 percent ownership in a new con-
struction project having a total value (amount covered by a $1,800,000
mortgage loan plus total of capital contributions of $200,000) of
$2,000,000. The developer could claim a return of capital of 7 percent,
INote that while the reduction of the developer's basis diminishes
his claim to the capital value of the project (hence to depreciation
losses), the developer could continue to claim the portion of annual
cash distributions defined by his partnership share.
UI
I
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or $140,000, amounting to exactly the excess of capital provided by the
limited partners over the developer's cash costs of $60,000. The developer
would then be in the position of having covered all cash costs, with-
drawn $140,000 from the project, and having a claim to 3 percent of the
original value of the project to depreciate over its economic life. Little
tax shelter would result and capital gains taxes would be payable on the
difference between the developer's depreciated basis- in the project and
his portion of the sale price. The point is that he would have escaped
taxation on the original excess capital contributions of the limited part-
ners. Such claims are regarded as risky in that the Internal Revenue
Service has not established a position on them.
2. Construction Expenses
Table V-2 also shows that a number of items are claimed as an ex-
pense during the construction period and the depreciable basis is re-
duced by a corresponding amount. Construction carrying costs could, of
course, either be included in the total depreciable costs (i.e., capi-
talized) or taken as an expense in the year incurred. The major items of
construction carrying costs are the interest in the construction loan and
the real estate taxes which must be paid during the development period.
The fact that the construction expenses are chargeable as an expense
means that they are an immediate offset for other income and serve as a
tax shelter to the owner. In the syndication case they are paper losses
to the investors in the sense that they require no further outlays of
funds, yet can be claimed as a loss against other income. To the in-
vestor interested in maximizing early returns on an investment (as the
investor is assumed to be in this analysis), taking the construction
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items as an expense in the year incurred is preferable to taking them in
the form of depreciation of the same total amount but spread over a period
of years. in both cases, shelter for other ordinary income is offered,
but in the expensing case the tax savings are realized in the development
period rather than in several installments in the future.
Various fees actually paid during the development period can also be
expensed when incurred; these include insurance premiums for fire and
liability protection during development, FHA examination and inspection
fees and title and recording fees. Some developers claim the builder's
overhead payment as en expense, provided it is paid during development.
Other payments to the contractor for direct construction costs are not
eligible for a claim as an expense and must be added to the capital cost
of the project.
3.. Stepped-up Basis
Table V-3 summarizes the situation in which the developer claims the
entire amount of the capital contributions as a fee, i.e., as a direct
cost to the partnership. The developer who makes this claim is, of course,
subject to ordinary income tax on such a fee; usually he would not claim
the capital contributions as a fee unless he had excess tax shelter from
some other enterprise with which to shelter the fee from income tax. In
the case in which the developer claims the entire amount as a fee, the
limited partners can be required to contribute slightly more capital be-
cause, irony of ironies, the developer's fee can be added to the depre-
ciable cost of the project, thus creating a larger amount of depreciation,
hence more tax shelter and more investment value. In this case, then,
the total amount of capital contributions is increased as shown in Table
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TABLE V-3: COST AND DEPRECIATION SUMMARY
(PROJECT BASIS INCLUDES DEVELOPER FEE)
NEW CONSTRUCTION
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS BY
INVESTORS(1)
less ACTUAL CASH EXPENSES
(Table V-2)
equals NET PROCEEDS, DEVELOPER FEE
$ 236,023
48,880
$ 187,143
REHABI LITATION
$ 396,556
48,966
$ 347,590
DEPRECIABLE BASIS(2)
(Dev. Costs + Shell + Dev.
O'head. + Dev. Fee OR Mort-
gage + Cap. Contrib.-Land)
less EXPENSES CLAIMED DURING
CONSTRUCT ION
equals NET DEPRECIABLE BASIS
less BUILDING SHELL BASIS
less REHAB. EXPENDITURES BASIS (3)
equals EXCESS REHAB. EXPEND. BASIS
$ l,8'5,376
139 014
$ 1,676,363
$ 1,978,777
150,250
$ 1,828,527
110,000
1,500,000
$ 218,527
NOTES: (1) Sum of payments made by limited-partner investors in
exchange for cash dividends and tax losses from de-
preciation.
(2) Basis is larger than in Table V-2 because the developer
fee is assumed to be a charge to the project, thus part
of depreciable cost to the investors.
(3) Rehabilitation expenditures eligible for 5-year write-
off are limited to $15,000 per unit.
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V-3. In the section on investment analysis we shall see just how this
amount is arrived at; for now it suffices to note that it increases, or
"steps-up," the tax basis.
4. Other Refinements in Depreciation
In these examples we are concerned with a limited number of depreci-
able elements in a typical project, because I have chosen to limit this
"realistic" description to one that is no more complicated than necessary.
Actual practice is to divide the project into a number of depreciable
elements, the objective being to achieve the shortest possible (allowable)
economic life and the most accelerated form of depreciation allowed--all
in the interest of maximizing the early de'reciation and tax shelter
benefits of the project. The five elements of the basis of a project used
in this analysis are: (1) land, which is not depreciable, (2) construc-
tion expenses, which are usually expensed as discussed above, (3) the ex-
isting shell (in the case of a rehabilitation project), which is depre-
ciated at 125 percent of the straight-line rate applied to the adjusted
basis of this element each year (to simplify computations no shell depre-
ciation is taken in the development year), (4) allowable rehabilitation
expenditures (up to $15,000 per unit), (5) costs attributable to new con-
struction or to the excess over allowable rehabilitation expenditures, de-
preciated at 200 percent declining balance (twice the straight-line rate
applied to the adjusted basis of this element each year). Since acceler-
ated methods of depreciation eventually reach a point beyond which the an-
nual depreciation would be less than that for straight-line depreciation
of the adjusted basis over the remaining economic life, a switch to straight-
line depreciation is made where advantageous (see Hall and Jorgensen (1971)
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for convenient formulas for this switching point).
D. FEASIBILITY TESTS
1. Mortgage Limits
Table V-4 indicates the tests on mortgage limits which a project
must meet in order to be eligible for mortgage insurance under Section
236 and also indicates typical tests for rent feasibility. The mortgage
tests are the statutory limits defined in the Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Act of 1968 (Public Law 90-448) as modified by the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1370 (Public Law 91-609). These limits are included
here primarily to indicate that there are upper bounds on the allowable
mortgage loans for these projects. Suppose in the present examples the
project were composed of 50 two-bedroom units and 50 three-bedroom units.
The mortgage limit test would than be (for a high cost of living area)
A few caveats are in order here. While the base cases use 200
percent declining balance (or double declining balance, DDB) depreciation
for new construction or excess rehabilitation expenditures, some projects
are marketed using slightly different treatment for the depreciation: (1)
the sum-of-the-years-digits (SYD) method of depreciation, which is permis-
sible as an alternative to the DDB method for new residential construction,
yields a slightly higher present value for the tax shelter generated by
the project (see later discussion on investment results), (2) in some re-
habilitation projects the excess rehabilitation expenditures are treated
more conservatively than the present case assumptions (DDB depreciation)
and use instead the 150 percent declining balance method allowed for
new non-residential property (this apparently a conclusion reached in
view of the fact that the tax legislation treats rehabilitation as though
it were non-residential construction with respect to the recapture pro-
visions at sale), (3) some developers, as mentioned earlier, will break
down the depreciation elements quite finely so as to be able to claim very
short economic lives where permissible, as on equipment and appliances,
for example, and thereby increase the annual depreciation which can be
taken in the early years. The omission of this practice in the base case
is consistent with the omission from taxable annual income of the pay-
ments which are included in the rent as reserves for replacement of such
equipment. (See the discussion below on the determination of taxable in-
come.)
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TABLE V-4: FHA.FEASIBILITY TESTS
A. SECTION 236 MORTGAGE AMOUNT (Limits established by Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1968 as amended by Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1969)
UNIT SIZE
NON-ELEVATOR:
Efficiency
1 Bedroom
2 BR
3 BR
4 or more BR
ELEVATOR:
Efficiency
1 BR
2 BR
3 BR
4 or more BR
BASIC
MORTGAGE LIMIT
$ 9,200
12,937
15,525
19,550
22,137
10,925
15,525
18,400
23,000
26,162
MAXIMUM MORTGAGE IN HIGH COST AREAS
(45% above basic limit)
$ 13,340
18,758
22,511
28,347
32,098
15,841
22,511
26,680
33,350
37,935
B. SECTION 236 RENT LIMITS (BOSTON, MASS.)
REGULAR PUBL IC
HOUSING ADMISSION
INCOME LIMITS
$ 4,200
4,600
5,200
5,700
5,900
6,100
MAXIMUM ADJUSTED
INCOME FOR 236
ELIGIBILITY(l)
$ 5,670
6,210
7,020
7,695
7,965
8,235
MAXIMUM 236
BASIC MONTHLY
RENT(2)
$ 118
130
146
160
166
172
7 or 4 BR 6,300 8,505 177mo re
(1) Adjusted Income limit is 135% of public housing limit. Gross
income may include $300 per minor and a 5% allowance for pay-
roll withholding.
(2) Maximum basic rent at 25% of adjusted income.
FAMILY
SIZE
1
2
3
4
5
6
UNIT
SIZE
Effic.
1 BR
2 BR
2 BR
3 BR
3 BR
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50 two-bedroom units @ $22,500 maximum: $1,125,000
50 three-bedroom units @ $28,347 maximum: 1,417,350
$2,542,350
The base case examples would qualify as. being within the mortgage
limits for high-cost-of-living areas. Both because of rising construc-
tion costs and the desire on the part of the developer to maximize the
tax shelter generated by the project, there seems generally to be con-
siderable pressure to push these upper bounds.
2. Rent Levels
The other constraint is that of rent levels. Since a large portion
of the rent must be used to repay the mortgage loan for the project while
the operating costs are relatively fixed, the mortgage payment must be
kept sufficiently low that with the addition of operating costs the
rent levels are still feasible. As indicated in Table V-4 these limits
are set with reference to the local admission income limits for public
housing. Once a project has been established as feasible at these rents,
the actual project rent-up may proceed with some tenants admitted under
the rule providing that of the national allocation of 236 interest sub-
sidy funds 20 percent may be applied to tenants admitted with incomes up
to 90 percent of the locally established (by the FHA office) limits for
Section 221(d)(3) housing. Tenants with incomes higher than that eli-
gible for the basic rent set with reference to the public housing admis-
sion income limits must pay 25 percent of adjusted family income for rent
and would in most cases be eligible for less than the maximum interest
subsidy in their rents.
Table V-5 outlines a sample build-up of annual project expenses and
rent determination. While important for determining income eligibility
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TABLE V-5: ANNUAL RENT AND EXPENSE ELEMENTS FOR BASE CASE
(100 UNITS, SECTION 236, LIMITED DIVIDEND SPONSOR, NEW)
BASIC RENT
Annual Gross Income
Occupancy Rate
EFFECTIVE GROSS INCOME
ANNUAL EXPENSES
Administration
Operating
Maintenance
Rep 1 acemen ts
Real Estate Taxes
TOTAL EXPENSES & TAXES
NET INCOME BEFORE DEBT
SERVICE
MORTGAGE PAYMENT
NET INCOME FOR DIVIDEND
$ 163,800
0.95
$ 155,610
100% occupancy, $136.50 per
month (2 Bedroom)1
5% vacancies
8,190 5% of gross basic rent
37,8351
16,3801
Utilities, garbage & trash,
Janitor
Repairs, extermination, in-
surance
8,147 Reserve of 1/2 percent of
mortgage amount, assumed
as annual expense
24,570 Locally negotiated, 15 per-
cent of basic rent here
$ 95,1221
60,488
49,626 Annual payment for loan at
1 percent for 40 years2
$ 10,862 6 percent of implied equity
1These figures are low for typical high cost urban areas, where
the operating expenses are actually limited by the allowable rent for
feasibility (Table V-4).
2Total mortgage payment is $129,371 for 7 percent (plus 1/2 per-
cent mortgage insurance premium) mortgage. Difference is paid by HUD,
and is treated by IRS as additional income. In other words, from an
accounting point of view the income includes both rental income and the
interest subsidy payment; expenses include the total market rate interest
payment to the lender.
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for a project, the rent levels do not enter the investment calculations
for the simple reason that the annual cash profit is limited to 6 percent
of the implied equity (10 percent of Total Raplacement Costs). Rent
levels may eventually affect the investment character of the project in
a direct way, however, in that many developers, squeezed to qualify for
feasibility on rent levels, in their initial application show marginal al-
lowances for operating expenses iri order to qualify the project. The
hope is that once in operation the FHA will approve rent increases when
the project expenses begin to exceed the project budget. Should rent in-
creases to cover increased operating expenses be Flow in coming or denied
entirely, the cash dividend is likely to be sacrificed in combination
with some attempts to reduce costs by undermaintenance. In the base cases
it is assumed that the full allowable dividend is earned and paid for
every year of operation.
sequences of the loss of
We will subsequently examine the investment con-
the allowed dividend-in a project.
E. ANNUAL CASH FLOW AND AFTER-TAX RETURN
Remaining key parameters necessary to establish the base cases for
purposes of computing annual cash flow and after-tax return are summarized
in Table V-6. The values shown are intended to be reasonably representa-
tive of current practice especially as projects are described for purposes
of syndication. The sensitivity analysis to be described later will ex-
amine the effects of variations in these assumed values. Both the new
construction and the rehabilitation projects are assumed to be 100 units
with identical, or nearly identical, values for other project parameters
where this is not an unreasonable assumption. Both projects are assumed
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TABLE V-6: BASE CASE INVESTMENT ASSUMPTIONS
Project Size
Average cost per unit
Development period
Economic life (tax pur-
poses)
Mortgage loan interest
rate
Mortgage term
Investor's income tax
rate
Minimum tax rate on pre-
ference income
Capital gains tax rate
Investor's required rate
of return (discount
rate)
Holding period
Sale price
After-tax yield on tax
sinking fund
100 Units
$18,100
1 Tax year
40 years, new construction;
20 years, rehabilitation
7 percent plus 1/2 percent
mortgage insurance premium
40 years
50 percent (for range of in-
come sheltered or taxed)
10 percent
25 percent (50 percent on
taxable gain after exclud-
ing one half)
15 percent, new;
25 percent, rehabilitation
20 years (following one year
of development)
Outstanding mortgage balance
4 percent
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to require a development and construction period of exactly one tax year.
For the discount rate, or required rate of return (after tax), the dif-
ference between new construction (15 percent) and rehabilitation (25 per-
cent) is intended to reflect the fact that the investment market gener-
ally assumes a rehabilitation project to involve more risk and uncertainty
because of the nature of this type of construction and because of itn
likely location, viz., older sections of central cities.
Annual after-tax return from a Section 236 project for a project
investor is essentially the cash dividend less income tax. Since I am
primarily concerned here with Federal housing and tax policies, I neglect
the effect of any state and local taxes on income. As we shall see, the
primary contributor to after-tax return will be the income tax portion of
after-tax return, in that it turns out to be negative, primarily because
of depreciation allowances.
Taxable income is defined as
Taxable income = Gross rent (including interest subsidy pay-
ments made to the lender on behalf of the
tenants)
LESS Cash expenses (including all operating
expenses, fees, and property taxes but only
lin practice the 236 rent payment includes a portion for payments to
establish a reserve for replacement of major items of equipment. To the
extent these funds are not spent but accumulated they constitute resi-
dual taxable income to the project (although FHA regulations prohibit
distribution of this reserve to project owners). Then when purchases are
made out of replacement reserve they are reported as project expense in
the year made. The project income exposed to tax by the replacement re-
serve payments is usually covered by claiming depreciation deduction
using the-shortest possible economic lives for the equipment to be re-
placed. However, for purposes of the base cases I have assumed that the
amount included for replacement reserve payments in the rent is spent each
year. No special depreciation is taken for replaceable equipment.
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the total interest payments on the mortgage;
principal repayments are not considered an
expense for income tax purposes)
LESS Depreciation (a non-cash expense)
Income from a Section 236. project is treated as though the owner re-
ceived the full market rent (including the interest subsidy payment from
HUD) and then made mortgage payments at market interest rate. The in-
terest payments are deductible as an expense but principal repayments
are not. The gross rent for a project is built up from the components
allowed by FHA. Thus
Gross rent = Annual expenses (except debt service and
dividend)
PLUS Mortgage payment
PLUS Allowable annual dividend
In effect the taxable income is thus
Taxable income = Mortgage principal repayments
PLUS Dividend
LESS Depreciation
Annual Federal income tax is thus
Income tax = Income tax bracket rate TIMES Taxable
income
PLUS Minimum tax rate TIMES Amount of
preference items (excess depreciation)
After-tax return is then
After-tax return = Dividend
LESS Income tax
where "income tax" will usually actually be a tax saving on other income
owing to the tax shelter created by the depreciation allowances.
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When taxable income is negative because of the large non-cash depreci-.
ation epense allowance, the taxable "income" is actually a shelter for
ordinary taxable income from some other source. In these cases the "tax"
is in effect a tax saving generated for the investor by the project in
that he avoids having to pay taxes which, except for this project, he
would otherwise have had to pay.
The only preference income item of concern for the operation of a
236 project is the excess depreciation taken, defined as the difference
between the depreciation taken and the amount of depreciation which could
have been taken under straight-line depreciation over the economic life
of the project element. (The excluded portion of capital gains will be
considered later in the discussion on taxes at sale.)
This is probably an appropriate place to comment about the meaning
of assuming an investor to be in the 50 percent tax bracket. The term
really means that the taxpayer-investor is subject to an average tax
rate of 50 percent on the amount of taxable income which is sheltered by
the tax loss from the project. The base case computations assume that
1For example, an individual taxpayer with a taxable income of
$48,000 except for the rental project in which he shares ownership but
claiming a tax loss of $26,000 as a result of his share in the project
has his taxable income reduced by $13,000. The amount of tax avoided is
computed as follows:
Income Range ($1,000's) Tax Rate Tax
22 to 26 40% $1,600
26 to 32 45 2,700
32 to 38 50 3,000
38 to 44 55 3,300
44 to 48 60 2,400
Income sheltered, $26,000 Tax avoided, $13,000
Average tax rate in the range of income sheltered from tax,
$13,000 0
$26,000
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the investors are in the 50 percent marginal tax bracket for the range
of income sheltered (or, in later years, income taxed) throughout the
life of the project, taken to be 21 years in the base case.
The schedules of depreciation and mortgage amortization needed
for the calculation of annual cash flow and after-tax return are sum-
marized in Table V-7. The project years shown include the development
year in the numbering. Tax basis is that for the beginning of the tax
year and is the remaining depreciable basis, not including land. Mort-
gage balance in the table is the balance at the beginning of the year.
With the depreciation and mortgage amortization schedules the annual
after-tax return can be computed and rs tabulated in Table V-8.
F. GAINS TAX AT SALE
In the base cases it is assumed that the project is.sold at the end
of the 21st year (20th operating year) at a price equal to the mortgage
balance (either neglecting expenses of sale or assuming that the sale pro-
ceeds net an amount equal to the mortgage balance or assuming that the
buyer simply assumes the mortgage with no other payment to the project
owners). There is thus no cash from the sale. Federal capital gains
taxes are due, however, on the difference between the sale price and the
0 0 S U 
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TABLE V-7A: DEPRECIATION AND AMORTIZATION SCHEDULES, NEW CONSTRUCTION -- NO STEP-UP IN BASIS
DEPRECIATICN
74460.88
57616.40
44582.44
34497.04
3
E
13
18
70737.81
54735.55
42353.32
32772.19
4
9
14
19
67200.94
51998.77
40235.65
3113J.58
5
10
15
20
63840.90
49398.83
38223.87
29576.89
6
11
16
21
60648.84
46928.89
36312.67
28098.05
1489218.00
1152328.00
891648.88
689940.81
3
8
13
18
1414757.00
1094711.00
847066.44
655443.75
4
9
14
19
1344019.00
1039975.50
804713.06
622671.56
5
10
15
20
1276818.00
987976.69
764477.38
591537.94
6
11
16
21
1212977.00
938577.81
726253.50
561961.00
AMORTIZATICN
2
7
12
17
7169.69
10293.13
14777.50
21215.25
ADJUSTED MORTGAGE
1629353.00
1587707.00
1527916.00
1442079.00
3
8
13
18
1622183.00
1577413.00
1513138.00
1420863.00
4
9
14
19
1614475.00
1566347.00
1497252.00
1398056.00
5
10
15
20
1606189.00
1554451.00
1480174.00
1373539.00
6
11
16
21
1597282.00
1541663.00
1461815.00
1347183.00
0 S
2
7
12
17
BASIS
2
7
12
17
3
8
13
18
7707.44
11065.19
15885.81
22806.44
4
9
14
19
8285.56
11895.13
17077.25
24517.00
2
7
12
17
5
10
15
20
89C7.00
127E7.38
18358.13
26355.75
6
11
16
21
9575.00
13746.44
19735.06
28332.44
L-ALj w
0TABLE V-7A (CONTINUED): DEPRECIATION AND AMORTIZATION SCHEDULES,
NEW CONSTRUCTION -- DEVELOPER'S FEE ADDED TO BASIS
w w
DEPRECIATION
2 83818.13
7 64856.75
12 50184.84
17 38832.07
BASIS
1676363.00
1297135.00
1003696.88
776641.44
3
8
13
18
1592544.00
1232278.00
953512.00
737809.31
4
9
14
19
1512916.00
1170664.00
905836.38
700918.81
5
10
15
20
1437270.00
1112130.00
860544.56
665872.88
6
11
16
21
1365406.V0
1056523.00
817517.31
632579.19
AMORTIZATION
7169.69
10293.13
14777.50
21215.25
3
8
13
18
- 7707.44
11065.19
15885.81
22806.44
8285.56
11895.13
17077.25
24517.00
8907. 00
12787.38
18358. 13
26355.75
9575.00
13746.44
19735.06
28332.44
ADJUSTED MORTGAGE
1629353.00
15877C7.00
1527916.00
1442029.00
3
8
13
18
1622183.0 C
1577413.00
1513138.00
1420863.00
4
9
14
19
1614475.00
1566347.00
1497252.00
1398056.00
5
10
15
20
1606189.00
1554451.00
1480124.00
1373539.00
6
11
16
21
1597282.00
1541663.00
1461815.00
1347183.00
3
8
13
18
79627.19
61613.90
47675.59
36890.46
4
9
14
19
75645.75
58533.20
45291.81
35045.94
2
7
12
17
5
10
15
20
718E3.50
556C6.50
43027.23
33293.64
6
11
16
21
68270.25
52826.15
40875.86
31628.95
2
7
12
17
4
9
14
19
2
7
12
17
5
10
15
20
6
11
16
21
N)j
0 Cl w
Wow,
w
TABLE V-7B: DEPRECIATION AND AMORTIZATION SCHEDULES, REHABILITATION -- NO STEP-UP IN BASIS
DEPRECIATION ON REHAB EXPENDITURES
2 274187.38 3 274187.38 4 274187.38 5 2741E7.38 6 274187.38
DEPRECIATION ON STRUCTURE SHELL
2
7
12
17
6875.00
5310.77
5310.76
5310.76
DEPRECIATION
2
7
12
17
BASIS
2
7
12
17
281062.38
5310.77
5310.76
5310.76
1480937.00
79661.19
53107.29
26553.50
AMORTIZATION
2
7
12
17
7182.31
10311.31
14803.44
21252.44
ADJUSTED MORTGAGE
2
7
12
17
1632221.00
15905C1.00
15306C6.00
1444619.00
w
6445.31
5310.76
5310.76
5310.76
5664.82
5310.76
5310.76
5310.76
3
13
18
3
8
13
18
3
8
13
18
3
8
13
18
3
8
13
18
4
9
14
19
4
9
14
19
4
9
14
19
4
9
14
19
4
9
14
19
6042.48
5310.76
5310.76
5310.76
280229.81
5310.76
5310.76
5310.76
919241.31
69039.56
42485.77
15931.97
8300.06
11916.06
17107.25
24559.94
1617317.00
1569104.00
1499888.00
1400519.00
280632.69
5310.76
5310.76
5310.76
1199874.00
74350.38
47796.53
21242.73
7721.00
11084.69
15913.69
22846.44
1625038.00
1580189.00
1515802.00
1423366.00
5
10
15
20
5
10
15
20
5
10
15
20
5
10
15
20
5
10
15
20
6
11
16
21
6
11
16
21
6
11
16
21
6
11
16
21
6
11
16
21
5310.77
5310.76
5310.76
5310.76
279498.13
5310.76
5310.76
5310.76
359159.31
58418.05
31864.26
5310.45
9591.88
13770.56
19769.69
28382.06
1600'093.00
1544377.00
1464389.00
1349557.00
279852.19
5310.76
5310.76
5310.76
639011.50
63728.80
37175.02
10621.21
8922.69
12809.81
18390.38
26401.94
1609016.00
1557187.00
1482780.00
1375959.00
0 U0 w
TABLE V-7B (CONTINUED):
DEPRECIATION CN EXCESS REHAF EXPENDITURES
21852.59 3
12903.73 8
7619.52 13
7619.52 18
DEPRECIATICN CN REHAE EXPENDITURES
300CCO.00
c.0
DEPRECIATION ON STRUCTURE SHELI
6875.00
5310.77
5310.76
531 G .76
DEPRECIATICN
328727.56
18214.49
12930.27
12930.28
1828526.00
208698.50
129302.50
6465).98
3
8
13
18
326112.63
16924.11
12930.27
12930.28
3
8
13
18
1499798.00
190484.0C
116372. 19
51720.70
4
9
14
19
4
9
14
19
323743.00
15762.77
12930.27
12930.28
1173685.00
173559.88
103441.88
38790.42
5
10
15
20
321595.31
14717.57
12930.27
12930.28
5
10
15
20
849942.00
157797.06
90511.56
25860.14
6
11
16
21
319648.19
13776.88
12930.27
12930.28
6
11
16
21
528346.69
141079.44
77581.25
12929.87
DEPRECIATION AND AMORTIZATION SCHEDULES,
REHABILITATION -- DEVELOPER'S FEE ADDED TO BASIS
w
2
7
12
17
19667.34
11613.35
7619.51
7619.52
4
9
14
19
2
7
17700.59
10452.02
7619.51
7619.52
5
10
15
20
3
15930
9406
7619
7619
300000.00
.53
.81
.51
.52
6
11
16
21
4
2
7
12
17
14337.48
8466.13
7619.51
7619.52
300000.00 5
3
8
132
18
300000 .OC 6
6445.31
5310.76
5310.76
5310.76
4
9
14
19
300000.00
6042.48
5310.76
5310.76
5310.76
5
10
15
20
5664.82
5310.76
5310.76
5310.76
2
7
12
17
BASIS
2
7
12
17
6
11
16
21
5310.77
5310.76
5310.76
5310.76
~-
0l 0l
TABLE V-8A: ANNUAL AFTER-TAX RETURN, NEW CONSTRUCTION -- NO STEP-UP IN BASIS
CASH FLOW: (PROFIT=BEROF*IMPLIED EQUITY)
AMORTIZATION
0.0
7169.69
7707.44
8285.56
8907.00
9575.00
10293.13
11065.19
11895.13
12787.38
13746.44
14777.50
15885.81
17077.25
18358.13
19735.06
21215.25
22806.44
24517.00
26355.75
28332.44
DEPRECIATION
0.0
74460.88
70737.81
67200.94
63840.90
60648.84
57616.40
54735.55
51998.77
49398.83
46928.89
44582.44
42353.32
40235.65
38223.87
36312.67
34497.C4
32772.19
31133.58
29576.89
28098.05
TAXAELE INC.
0.0
-56428.79
-52167.98
-48052.98
-44071.50
-40211.45
-36460.88
-32807.96
-29241.25
-25749.05
-22320.05
-18942.54
-15605.11
-12296.00
-9003.34
-5715.21
-2419.39
896.65
4245.82
7641.26
11096.79
EXCESS DEPR.
0.0
37230.43
33507.36
2997C.49
26610.45
23418.39
20385.95
17505.10
14768.32
12168.38
9698.44
7351.99
5122.87
3005.20
993.42
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
INCOME TAX
-69507.00
-24491.35
-22733.25
-21029.44
-19374.70
-17763.88
-16191.84
-14653.47
-13143.79
-11657.69
-10190.18
-8736.07
-7290.27
-5847.48
-4402.33
-2857.61
-1209.70
448.32
2122.91
3820.63
5548.39
AFTER TAX RETURN
69507.00
35353.75
33595.65
31891.84
30237.10
28626.28
27054.24
25515.87
24006.19
22520.09
21052.58
19598.47
18152.66
16709.88
15264.73
13720.00
12072.09
10414.C7
8739.49
7041.77
5314.00
-z
YR
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
ae
9TABLE V-8A (CONTINUED):
9 p-
ANNUAL AFTER-TAX RETURN, NEW CONSTRUCTION -- DEVELOPER'S FEE ADDED TO BASIS
CASH FLOW: (FP0FIT=BEROF*IMPLIED EQUITY)
AMORTIZATION
0. c
7169.69
7707.44
8285.56
8907.00
9575.00
10293.13
11065. 19
11895.13
12787.38
137 46 .44
14777.50
15885.81
17077.25
18358. 13
19735.C6
21215.25
22806.44
24517. QC
26355.75
28332. 44
DEPRECIATICN
0.0
83818.13
79627.19
75645.75
71863.50
68270.25
64856.75
61613.90
58533.20
556C6.50
52826.15
50184.84
47675.59
45291.e
43027.23
40875.86
38832.07
36890.46
35045.94
33293.64
31628.95
TAXAELE INC.
0.0
-65786.00
-61057.35
-56497.79
-52094.10
-47E32.85
-43701.23
-39686.31
-35775.67
-31956.73
-28217.31
-24544.95
-20927.38
-17352.16
-13806.70
-10278.40
-6754.42
-3221.63
333.46
3924.51
2565.88
EXCESS DIEPP.
0.0
41909.05
37718.11
33736.68
29954.43
26361.18
22947.68
19704.82
16624.12
13697.43
10917.07
8275.77
5766.52
3382.74
1118.15
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0 . 0
INCOME TAX
-6950,7.00
-28702. 10
-26756.86
-24875.23
-23051.61
-21280.31
-19555.84
-17872.67
-16225.42
-14608.62
-13016.95
-11444.89
-9887.04
-8337.80
-6791.54
-5139.20
-3377.21
-1610.81
166.73
1962.25
3782.94
AFTER TAX RETURN
69507.00
39564.50
37b 19. 26
35737.63
33914.01
32142.71
30418.24
28735.07
27087.82
25471.02
23879.35
22307.29
20749.44
19200.20
17653.93
16C 01.60
14239.61
1247-3.21
10695.67
8900. 14
7C79.46
YR
1
2
3
4
6
7
8
9
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
c-'
/
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TABLE V-8B: ANNUAL AFTER-TAX RETURN, REHABILITATION -- NO STEP-UP IN BASIS
CASH FLOW: (PROFIT=RPROF*IMPLIED
AMORTIZATION
0.0
7182.31
7721.00
8300.06
8922.69
9591.E8
10311.31
11084.69
11916.06
12809.81
13770.56
14803.44
15913.69
17107.25
18390.38
19769.69
21252.44
22846.44
24559.94
26401.94
28382.06
LEFRECIATION
0.0
281062.38
280632.69
280229.81
279852.19
279498.13
5310.77
5310.76
5310.76
5310.76
5310.76
5310.76
5310.76
5310.76
5310.76
53 1C.76
5310.76
5310.76
5310.76
5310.76
5310.76
EQUITY)
TAXAELE INC.
0.0
-262998.5C
-262030.13
-261048.19
-260047.94
-259024.69
15882.09
16655.46
17486.84
18380.59
19341.34
20374.22
21484.47
22678.03
23961.16
25340.46
26823.21
28417.21
30130.71
31972.71
33952.84
EXCESS DEPR.
0.0
2C7015.56
206585.88
206183.00
205805.38
205640.56
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0 .0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
INCOME TAX
-75125.00
-110797.69
-110356.44
-109905.75
-109443.38
-108948.25
7941.04
8327.73
8743.42
9190.30
9670.67
10187.11
10742.23
11339.02
11980.58
12670.23
13411.61
14208.61
15065.36
15986.36
16976.42
AFTER TAX RETURN
75125.
121679.
121237.
120787.
120324.
119829.
2940.
2553.
2138.
1691.
1210.
694.
139.
-457.
-1099.
-1788.
-2530.
- 3327.
-4183.
-5104.
-6094.
00
19
94
25
88
75
50
81
12
24
87
43
30
48
04
69
07
07
82
82
88
YR
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10)
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
21
Alk
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TABLE V-8B (CONTINUED): ANNUAL AFTER-TAX RETURN, REHABILITATION -- DEVELOPER'S FEE ADDED TO BASIS
CAiSH FLCW: (FROFIT=PFROF*IMPLIED EQUITY)
YR AMORTIZATION DEFRECIATION TAXAELE INC.
1 0. 0.0 0.0
2 7182.31 328727.56 -310663.69
3 7721.CO 326112.63 -307510.06
4 8300.06 323743.00 -304561.38
5 8922.69 321595.31 -3C1791.06
6 9591.88 319648.19 -299174.75
7 10311.31 18214.49 2978.36
8 11084.69 16924.11 5042.11
9 11916.06 15762.77 7034.83
10 12809.81 14717.57 8973.78
11 13770.56 13776.88 10875.22
12 14803.44 12930.27 12754.70
13 15913.69 12930.27 13864.96
14 17107.25 12930.27 15058.52
15 18390.38 12930.27 16341.64
16 19769.69 1293C.27 17720.95
17 21252.44 12930.28 19203.70
18 22846.44 12930.28 20797.70
14 24559.94 12930.28 22511.20
2 26401.94 12930.28 24353.2C
21 28382.06 12930.28 26333.32
EXCESS PEPR.
0.0
237301.25
234686.31
232316.69
230169.00
228411.13
1977.43
687.05
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.00.0
0.0
0.0
INCOME TAX
-75125.00
-1.31601.69
-130286.38
-129049.00
-127878.56
-126746.25
1686.92
2589.76
3517.41
4486.89
5437.61
6377.35
6932.48
7529.26
8170.82
8860.48
9601.85
10398.85
11255.60
12176.60
13166.66
AFTFR TAX PETUPN
75125.00
142483. 19
141167.88
139930.50
138760.06
137627.75
9194.61
P291.77
7364.13
6394.65
5443.93
4504.19
3949.06
3352.28
2710.72
2021.Ob
1279.69
482.69
-374.06
-1295.06
-2285.12
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adjusted basis of the project (including land value). Because of the
rapid deprecietion available, especially for the rehabilitation case,
sale at the mortgage balance subjects the owners to substantial gains
taxes. This occurs because the mortgage balance drops very slowly in the
early years, while the depreciation deductions are largest in the early
years, leaving a basis for tax purposes well below the amount still due
on the mortgage loan.
For the base cases there is no recapture tax to compute in either the
new construction or rehabilitation cases because the recapture period
has expired in both cases, i.e., 120 months (plus the development year)
in the case of new construction and 200 months (plus the development year)
in the case of rehabilitation. Later, when the investment consequences
of sale at earlier times are examined, it will be necessary to consider
the recapture tax. Even in the base cases, however, it is necessary to
consider the tax on preference income in the form of the capital gains
exclusion, i.e., the one-half of capital gain that is excluded from tax
at ordinary income tax rates. The minimum tax (10 percent) must be paid
on the excluded portion of capital gain to the extent that it exceeds the
sum of the $30,000 exemption of preference items and taxes otherwise
paid. In the present cases it is assumed that we are interested in a
marginal calculation, i.e., one in which this particular investment must
stand alone and not depend on the $30,000 exemption for preference items.
The regular capital gains tax which must be paid (one-half the amount of
capital gain TIMES the ordinary income tax rate) does reduce the amount
of the excluded capital gain which is subject to the minimum tax. Table
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V-9 summarizes the capital gains calculation for the base cases as well
as for selected examples of sale in years earlier than the twenty-first.
These will be needed later)
G. TAX SINKING FUND
In cases for which the after-tax cash proceeds from sale are nega-
tive (because of the large gains taxes and zero cash proceeds after paying
off the mortgage loan balance) a conservative assumption is made: suf-
ficient after-tax returns from the latest possible years of operation of
the project are placed into a tax sinking fund such that by accumulating
at a modest after-tax rate of interest (4 percent) the value of the tax
sinking fund is exactly enough to match the cash loss at sale. in such
a case, the value of the after-tax returns of the project is computed
only for the after-tax returns remaining after the tax sinking fund is
es tabl i shed. This approach is taken because typical investors do not
want to be presented with an investment having a period of years of re-
IIn the base cases we continue to assume that the project owner/in-
vestor is in the 50 percent income tax bracket and that the effective
capital gains tax rate is thus 25 percent. Depending on the number of
ownership shares into which the project is divided, however, the amount
of capital gain subject to tax for any single investor may be so large
that he would, in the year of sale, be forced into a higher income tax
bracket. McKee (1970) makes the interesting comment that the combination
of the minimum tax on the capital gains exclusion and the provision of the
1969 Tax Reform Act that the maximum bracket rate for earned income is
50 percent means that for a high-income taxpayer forced into, let us
say, the 70 percent bracket because of capital gains upon sale of a 236
project he would be taxed on his capital gain at an effective rate of
46.5 percent. The base case assumption that the effective capital gains
tax rate is 25 percent may be a bi t optimistic. However, for a particular
investor, a sufficiently small share of the project capital gain and
tax provisions allowing income averaging over a period of several years
mean that the base case assumption is not entirely unrealistic.
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TABLE V-9A: INCOME TAX AT SALE, NEW CONSTRUCTION
ADMTGF= 1554451.00
GAINS TAX CALCULATION: (NO STEP-UP IN BASIS)
CASH FRCM SALE= 0.0
SALE PRICE, 1554451.00, LESS BASIS, 987976.69 LESS LAND,
GAIN SUBJ TO RECAPTURE, 203397.31 TIMES RECAPTURE FRACTION,
TIMES INCOME TAX RATE, 0.50 = RECAPTURE TAX, 24407.70
GAIN AS CAPITAL GAIN= 467658.88 TINES CAPITAL GAINS TAX RATE,
PREP TAX=MIN TA*(0.5*CAP GAIN -REGULAR SALE TAXES)= 9250.70
AFTER TAX GAIN FROM SALE= CASH LESS TAX= -150574.00
BASISF= 938577.81
50000.00 = TAXABLE GAIN, 516474.31
0.24 GAIN RECAPTURED, 48815.39
0.25= CAPITAL GAINS TAX,
TOTAL TAXES ON SALE=
116914.69
150573.06
ADMTGF= 1541663.00
GAINS TAX CALCULATION: (NO STEP-UP IN BASIS)
CASH PRCM SALE= 0.0
SALE PRICE, 15416* .00, LESS BASIS, 938577.81 LESS LAND,
GAIN SUBJ TO RECAPTUR 215566.19 TIMES RECAPTURE FRACTION,
TIMES INCOME TAX RATE, 0.50 = RECAPTURE TAX, 12933.99
GAIN AS CAPITAL GAIN= 527217.19 TIMES CAPITAL GAINS TAX RATE,
PREP TAX=MIN TAX*(0.5*CAP GAIN -REGULAR SALE TAXES)= 11887.02
AFTER TAX GAIN FROM SALE= CASH LESS TAX= -156626.00
EASISF= 533862.94
50000.00 = TAXABLE GAIN, 553085.19
0.12 = GAIN RECAPTURED, 25867.98
0.25= CAPITAL GAINS TAX,
TOTAL TAXES ON SALE=
131804.25
156625.19
ADMTGF= 1318850.00
GAINS TAX CALCULATION: (NO STEP-UP IN BASIS)
CASH PRCM SALE= 0.0
SALE PRICE, 1318850.00, LESS BASIS, 533862.94 LESS LAND,
GAIN SUBJ TO RECAPTURE, 210746.13 TIMES RECAPTURE FRACTION,
TIMES INCOME TAX RATE, 0.50 = RECAPTURE TAX, 0.0
GAIN AS CAPITAL GAIN= 734987.06 TIMES CAPITAL GAINS TAX RATE,
PREP TAX=MIN TAX*(O.5*CAP GAIN -REGULAR SALE TAXES)= 18374.67
AFTER TAX GAIN FROM SALE= CASH LESS TAX= -202122.00
BASISF= 6C0950.19
50000.00 TAXABLE GAIN, 734987.06
0.0 = GAIN RECAPTURED,
0.25= CAPITAL GAINS TAX,
TOTAL TAXES ON SALE=
0.0
183746.75
202121.38
ADMTGF= 1318850.00
GAINS TAX CALCULATION: (DEVELOPER'S FEE ADDED TO BASIS)
CASH FRCM SALE= 0.0
SALE PRICE, 1318850.CO, LESS BASIS, 600950.19 LESS LAND,
GAIN SUBJ TO RECAPTURE, 237231.38 TIMES RECAPTURE FRACTION,
TIMES INCOME TAX RATE, 0.50 = RECAPTURE TAX, 0.0
GAIN AS CAPITAL GAIN= 667899.81 TIMES CAPITAL GAINS TAX RATE,
PREF TAX=MIN TAX*(0.5*CAP GAIN -REGULAR SALE TAXES)= 16697.48
AFTEP TAX GAIN FROM SALE= CASH LESS TAI= -183673.00
50000.00 = TAXABLE GAIN, 667899.81
0.0 = GAIN RECAPTURED,
0.25= CAPITAL GAINS TAX,
TOTAL TAXES ON SALE=
166974.94
183672.38
0 0 0
SALE YR= 9
w
BASISF= 987976.69
SALE YR= 10
SALE YR= 21
SALE YR= 21
IV0
ADMTGF= 1557187.00
GAINS TAX CALCULATION: (NO STEP-UP)
CASH FRCM SALE= 0.0
SALE PRICE, 1557187.CO, LESS BASIS, 63728.80 LESS LAND,
GAIN SUBJ TC RECAPTURE, 824833.69 TIMES RECAPTURE FRACTION,
TIMES INCOME TAX RATE, 0.50 = RECAPTURE TAX, 412416.81
GAIN AS CAPITAL GAIN= 618624.31 TIMES CAPITAL GAINS TAX PATE,
PEFr TAX=MIN TAX*(0.5*CAP GAIN -REGULAR SALE TAXES)= 0.0
AFTER TAX GAIN FROM SALE= CASH LESS TAX= -967072.88
EASISF= 58418.05
50000.00 = TAXABLE GAIN, 1443458.00
1.00 = GAIN RECAPTURED, 824833.69
0.25= CAPITAL GAINS TAX,
TOTAL TAXES CN SALE=
154656.06
567072.88
ADMTGF= 1544377.00
GAINS TAX CALCULATION: (NO STEP-UP)
CASH FRCM SALE= 0.0
SALE PRICE, 1544377.00, LESS BASIS, 58418.05 LESS LAND,
GAIN SUBJ TO RECAPTURE, 756097.63 TIMES RECAPTURE FRACTION,
TIMES INCOME TAX RATE, 0.50 = RECAPTURE TAX, 347804.88
GAIN AS CAPITAL GAIN= 740349.19 TIMES CAPITAL GAINS TAX PATE,
PREF TAX=MIN TAX*(0.5*CAP GAIN -REGULAR SALE TAXES)= 0.0
AFTER TAX GAIN FROM SALE= CASH LESS TAX= -532892.13
BASISF= 15931.97
50000.00 TAXAPLF GAIN, 1435959.00
0.92 = GAIN RECAPTURED, 695609.81
0.25= CAPITAL GAINS TAX,
TOTAL TAXES ON SALE=
185087.25
532892.13
ADMTGF= 1400519.00
GAINS TAX CALCULATICN: (NO STEP-UP)
CASH ERCM SALE= 0.0
SALE PRICE, 1400519.00, LESS BASIS, 15931.97 LESS LAND,
GAIN SUBJ TO RECAPTURE, 206210.00 TIMES RECAPTURE FRACTICN,
TIMES TNCCME TAX RATE, 0.50 = RECAPTURE TAX, 0.0
GAIN AS CAPITAL GAIN= 1334587.00 TIMES CAPITAL GAINS TAX RATE,
PREF TAX=MIN TAX*(0.5*CAP GAIN -REGULAR SALE TAXES)= 33364.66
AFTER TAX GAIN FROM SALE= CASH LESS TAX= -367011.38
BASISF= -0.31
50000.00 = TAXABLE GAIN, 1334587.00
0.0 = GAIN RECAPTURED,
0.25= CAPITAL GAINS TAX,
TOTAL TAXES ON SALE=
0.0
333646.75
367n11.38
ADMTGF= 1321174.00
GAINS TAX CALCULATION: (WITH OR WITHOUT DEVELOPER'S FEE ADDED TO BASIS)
CASH FRCM SALE= 0.0
SALE PRICE, 1321174.C0, LESS BASIS, -0.31 LESS LAND,
GAIN SUBJ TO RECAPTURE, 1.31 TIMES RECAPTURE FRACTION,
TIMES INCOME TAX RATE, 0.50 = RECAPTURE TAX, 0.0
GAIN AS CAPITAL GAIN= 1271174.00 TIMES CAPITAL GAINS TAX RATE,
PREF TAX=MIN TAX*(0.5*CAP GAIN -REGULAR SALE TAXES)= 31779.34
AFTER TAX GAIN FROM SALE= CASH LESS TAX= -349572.81
50000.00 TAXABLE GAIN, 1271174.00
0.0 = GAIN RECAPTURED,
0.25= CAPITAL GAINS TAX,
TOTAL TAXES ON SALE=
0.0
317793.50
349572.81
4 0
TABLE V-9B: INCOME TAX AT SALE, REHABILITATION
SALE YR= 9 BASISF= 63728.80
SALE YR= 10
SALE YR= 18
SALE YR= 21
-o
rl
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turn terminated with a large loss. The tax sinking fund calculations for
the base cases are presented in Table V-10. The accumulated value of the
tax sinking fund is seen to be exactly equal to the cash required upon
sale. Discussion of the discounting of the remaining after-tax returns
and a further comment on the tax sinking fund follow in the next two sec-
tions.
H. INVESTMENT ANALYSIS
Before proceeding to discuss the investment value of the base case pro-
jects, this is an aporopriate point at which to review briefly the choices
of indices av3ilable for real estate investment analysis. My bias in this
work is for using discounted present value, but because of the tradition
of other methods--often little more than rules of thumb--I shall at least
outline them.
1. Annual Net Cash Flow before Debt Service
This parameter has been used as a way of relating the market value of
a project and its cash flow before debt service and taxes. It is a measure
of the possible before-tax return if the project were bought outright, or
conversely, can be used to estimate market value from the net cash flow
before financing and the appropriate capitalization rate, or before-tax
overall rate of return. The relationship is thus
Market Value = Net Cash Flow before Debt Service
4 Capitalization Rate
or Overall Rate of Return = Net Cash Flow
4 Purchase Price
Debt service means the annual payment on the mortgage loan.
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The deficiencies of this index are:
-- it fails to take into account the value of tax losses
available through depreciation allowances;
-- it fails to consider possible unevenness in cash flow
over time;
-- it fails to consider the holding period (investment hori-
zon) and consequences of sale;
-- it falsely assumes that the funds in a Section 236 pro-
ject which are provided as interest subsidy payments by
the Federal government are at least potentially available
to the owner as a source of return in exchange for full
equity financing of the project.
2. Annual Before-Tax Cash Return (after debt service)
This parameter, expressed as
Before-Tax Return = Net Cash after Debt Service
: Equity Investment
offers a measure of return on actual investment after obtaining a mortgage
loan. In the case of a Section 236 project it would be a maximum of 6
percent annually on an investment presumed to be 10 percent of the ori-
ginal total replacement cost. The deficiencies of this index are:
-- tax consequences are not taken into account, specifically
the fact that the portion of mortgage payment devoted to
principal repayment is subject to tax as income and that
no account is taken of the tax shelter available through
depreciation allowances;
-- unevenness of after-tax returns over time is ignored;
-- holding period and consequences of sale are ignored.
3. Annuai After-Tax Rate of Return
Tax factors are taken into account on an annual basis and the re-
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sulting after-tax return is divided by the original equity invested. There
is still the problem of changes in the after-tax rate of return over the
years the project is owned, which makes it difficult to compare the reli -
tive attractiveness of two different investments.
4. Average After-Tax Rate of Return
This index is calculated by summing all the after-tax returns, includ-
ing the consequences of sale, subtracting the equity investment (to obtain
total returns on investment), dividing by the number of years held (to ob-
tain average return), and dividing again by the equity investment (to ob-
tain the average rate of return on investment). Now everything but the
time value or opportunity cost of money has been taken into account, but
this is a major omission, unless the investor in question can see no dif-
ference between a dollar received next year and one received 20 years
from now. In this work, I shall assume that the investor knows that funds
available for investment could earn an after-tax yield elsewhere at some
rate greater than zero, so that the further in the future a return occurs
the greater it must be to warrant a given current outlay of investment
funds.
5. Payback Period
This index interrupts the neat progression to discounted cash flow as
an investment index, but it fits neatly nowhere itself. This index only
indicates the period of time which must elapse before the after-tax returns
reach asum equal to the original equity investment. It indicates a re-
covery period after which any remaining returns are considered "gravy." The
payback period, however, offers no way in which to take into account the
tax consequences beyond the payback period, such as gains taxes at sale,
nor to take into account the time value of the future returns from a project.
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6. Discounted Present Value or Discounted Cash Flow
The basic relation I shall use for the discounted present value of
the after-tax returns over the period of ownership of a project is
N = NY
PV ARET(N) GSALE NY
*21 (1 + RRATE) ( 1 + RRATE)
N = I
where ARET(N) is the after-tax return at the end of Year N,
GSALE is the net gain from sale after taxes and payment of balance
due on mortgage,
NY is the year in which the project is sold, and
RRATE is the discount rate.
When GSALE is negative and a tax sinking fund is used to exactly match the
amount of the negative value of GSALE, the value of GSALE is zero in such
a case and the after-tax returns are truncated, or cut off, at the pcint
where the tax sinking fund starts. With this index the above objections
are met once the appropriate discount rate is selected. The discount rate
is just the corresponding parameter to interest rate in a savings account
having an interest rate with a yield equal to the return on investment
elsewhere of comparable risk. For example, if the appropriate rate of re-
turn for a given type of investment is 15 percent, then an investment of-
fering to repay $1.15 one year from now is worth (has a discounted present
value of) $1.00
or PV $1.15 0
o + 0.15) $1.00
A discounted present value analysis thus regards each year's after-tax
return as the result of a mini-investment and asks, what should I be will-
ing to invest now in order to have that future return represent an interest
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rate on my funds of "X" percent? For investment purposes, then, each
element of after-tax return can be regarded as partly a return of invested
funds and partly as a return on (interest or yield from) invested funds.
With this approach one need not have an investment in which the return on
investment is received annually and the investment itself is returned at
the end of the investment period. It is possible to consider investments
with very irregular patterns of return yet be able to compare them (what
is their present value?) with alternative investments.
A further comment about the tax sinking fund is in order. Some
analysts insist upon discounting a negative return such as a net loss at
sale at the investor's discount rate. However, at the high rates of re-
turn being demanded by investors in real estate syndications--in the range
of 15 to 25 percent--using those rates to discount negative returns is the
equivalent of assuming those are the interest rates with which the tax
fund (outlined above) accumulates or, alternatively, that a small amount of
funds in addition to those given the builder/developer can be invested
at the outset elsewhere, not in this project, and compound at the same
rate as his discount rate over the entire holding period. Because either
of these assumptions are highly speculative, most of the computations shown
here assume the tax fund approach. Some results will be indicated for the
no-tax-sinking-fund case.
The tax sinking fund approach is admittedly a conservative one. If
the investors demand 15 percent after-tax return in a new project or 25 per-
cent in a more risky rehabilitation project, then these rates could be as-
sumed to represent their opportunity costs, the implication being that
the investor could always invest his money during the period of ownership
and earn these rates of return. However, this requires that investment
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opportunities equivalent to the Drojects at hand continue to be available
and that accumulated cash returns could be withdrawn from such investments
on demand in the year of sale of the project. These assumptions are ap-
parently too speculative for the average tax-shelter investor. The tax sink-
ing fund analysis is the practice used. This does not mean that the in-
vestor must actually use a sinking fund, of course. He is free to do as
he likes with his after-tax returns. Use of the tax sinking fund in the in-
vestment analysis is simply a conservative way of satisfying the investor's
concern with the eventuality of large losses in the year of sale because of
the gains taxes.
7. Internal Rate of Return
The internal rate of return of an investment with a specified equity
investment and stream of after-tax returns is just that discount rate
which will discount the stream of after-tax returns exactly to the ori-
ginal equity investment. That is, the sum of the discounted present values
of all of the after-tax returns equals the equity investment. This method
also allows comparison with alternative investments. However, in the event
the investment in question has negative cash flows at some point in the
future, these negative cash flows are discounted as heavily as the positive
cash flows. The tax sinking fund introduced above is one way of overcoming
this flaw in the internal rate of return as an investment index.
The relationship between discounted present value, after-tax returns,
and the discount rate can be thought of in the following way: (1) one can
set the discount rate (after-tax rate of return demanded by an investor) and
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compute the discounted present value of a stream of after-tax cash flows,
i.e., the amount which that investor would be willing to invest now in
return for the specified stream of returns, or (2) one may set the present
value at some level representing an actual investment and solve for the
discount rate (RRATE in the formula) which-will cause the sum of the dis-
counted cash flows to exactly equal the input investment amount. In the
latter case the discount rate found is the internal rate of return. These
two investment indices will be of primary interest in the remaining discus-
sion. The other investment indices will be considered only in a secondary
fashion.
I. INVESTMENT RESULTS
in the next few sections the following investment analysis results
will be described:
(1) investment value of a project meeting the description of
the base cases,
(2) sensitivity to the parameters assumed in the base cases
of the investment value of a project,
(3) relative advantages to the developer of selling a project
through tax shelter syndication and of holding a project
as an investment,
(4) advantages of deferred payment of capital contributions
by limited partner/investors.
Later chapters will deal with investment risks, government costs and evalu-
ation of alternative incentive devices.
Tax sinking fund calculations and after-tax return summaries for the
rehabilitation and new construction cases are shown in Table V-10. Present
values of the after-tax returns are found by discounting the after-tax re-
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TABLE V-10A: DISCOUNTED RETURNS AND TAX SINKING FUND ACCUMULATION,
NEW CONSTRUCTION -- NO STEP-UP IN BASIS
RETURNS AND TAX FUND
YR AFTER TAX RET DISC
1 69507.CO
2 35353.75
3 33595.65
4 31891.84
5 30237.10
6 28626.28
7 27054.24
8 25515.87
9 24006.19
10 14531.09
11
12
13 ACCUM. PRESENT VALUE =
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
PV/MRT =
PRES VAL
60440.89
26732.55
22089.72
18234.31
15033.23
12375.98
10170.73
8341.23
6824.10
3591.89
183834.00
0.1128
TAX SINKG FND TAX FUND N/INTEREST
7989.00
21052.58
19598.47
18152.66
16709.88
15264.73
13720.00
12072.09
10414.07
8739.49
7C41.77
E314.00
12298.62
31162.79
27894.59
24843.06
21988.96
19314.69
16692.44
14122.61
11714.40
9452.62
7323.44
5314.00
ACCUM. TAX FUND = 202122.00
C
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TABLE V-10A (CONTINUED): DISCOUNTED RETURNS AND TAX SINKING FUND ACCUMULATION,
NEW CONSTRUCTION -- DEVELOPER'S FEE ADDED TO BASIS
1 ETURNS AND TAX FUND
YR AFTEr TAX RET DISC
1 695C7.ro
2 39564.50
3 37619.26
35737.63
5 33914.C1
6 32142.71
7 30418.24
8 28735.07
9 27087.82
10 25471.02
11 23879.35
12 1502.84
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
2
21
PRES VAL
60440.89
29916.48
24735.32
20433.16
16861.31
13896.23
11435.39
9393.60
7700.C9
6296.09
5132.24
280.89
ACCUM. PRESENT VALUE = 206522.00
PV/MRT = 0.1268
TAX SINKG FND TAX FUND W/INTEPFST
2C804.45
2C749.44
19200.20
17653 .93
16001.60
14239.61
12473.21
1C695.67
8900.14
7 K1179. 46
29611.07
28 396.9
25266.05
22337.79
19468.34
16658.29
14030.65
11568.43
9256.15
7C79. 46
ACCUM. TAX FUND = 183673.00
SYNLICATICN PAYMENTS:
PA Ye DISC, PES. VAL.
1 78653.94
TTAL PV Of CAP CCNIPIB=
P AYM.
2
206522.
DISC, PPES. VAL.
6P394.75
44
PAY.
3
PAYME:NTS OF 78653.94=TOT CAP CONTRIE= 235961.91
DISC, PBES. VAL. PAYM.
59473.75
TAT CAP CONTP/MFT= 0.1448
00
0 0 0 0
TABLE V-10B: DISCOUNTED RETURNS AND TAX SINKING FUND ACCUMULATION,
REHABILITATION -- NO STEP-UP IN BASIS
iETUENS AND TAX FUND
YR APTER TAX FET DISC
1 75125.0
2 121679.19
3 121237.94
4I 120787.25
5 44398.42
6
PFES VAL
60 1 CC . 0 0
77874.63
62073.82
49474.46
14545.20
7
8 ACCUM. PRESENT VALUE = 264068.00
9
10
11
12
1 3
14
15
16
17
18
19
21
21
PV/MRT = 16.18
TAX SINKG FND TAX UND W/INTEES T
759 36.44
119829.7r,
2940.50
2553.81
2138.12
1691.24
1210.37
694.43
139. 3C
-457.48
-1099.04
-1788.69
-2530.07
-3327. 07
-4183.92
-5104.82
-6C94. 88
142226.13
215804.63
5091.95
4252.25
3423. 17
2603.57
1792.37
988. 3'A
190 .65
-602.01
-1 39C . 6 3
-2176.21
-2959.81
-3742. 49
-4525.21
- 5309. C1
-6094.88
ACCUM. TAX FUND = 349573.00
0 0 0 a a
w0 0 0 
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TABLE V-10B (CONTINUED): DISCOUNTED RETURNS AND TAX SINKING FUND ACCUMULATION,
REHABILITATION -- DEVELOPER'S FEE ADDED TO BASIS
RETURNS AND TAX FUND
YR AFTER TAX RET DISC
1 75125.00
2 142483.19
3 141167.88
4 139930.50
5 126920.25
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
PRES VAL TAX
60100.00
91189.19
72277.94
57315.53
41589.23
ACCUM. PRESENT VALUE = 322472.00
PV/MRT = 0.1976
SINKG FWD TAX FUND W/INTEREST
11839.81
137627.75
9194.61
8291.77
7364.13
6394.65
5443.93
4504.19
3949.06
3352.28
2710.72
2021.06
1279.69
482.69
-374.06
-1295.06
-2285.12
22175.44
247857.50
15921.97
13806.30
11790.12
9844.21
8058.30
6410.83
5404.54
4411.36
3429.91
2458.c3
1497.05
542.96
-404.58
-1346.86
-2285.12
ACCUM. TAX FUND = 349573.00
SYNDICATION PAYMENTS:
PAYM. DISC, PRES. VAL.
1 132160.50
TOTAL PV OF CAP CCNTRIB=
3PAYMENTS OF 132160.50=TOT
PAY!. DISC, PRES. VAL. PAYM.
2 105728.38 3
322471.56
CAP CONTRIB= 396481.5C
DISC, PRES. VAL. PAYM.
84582.69
TOT CAP CONTR/MRT= 0.2429
00 0
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turns which remain after the necessary returns are comitted to the tax
sinking fund to cover the tax liability at sale. Discount rates are 25
percent for the rehabilitation case and 15 percent for the new construction
case. The resulting sum of present values represents the amount of money
an investor in the 50 percent income tax bracket would be willing to pay to
the developer at the outset of such a project in order to enjoy the after-
tax returns offered by the project, with resulting yields of 25 pe rcent
and 15 percent respectively. Typical arrangements in such projects actually
involve a schedule of capital contributions made over a period of years in
several installments. We shall consider this at a later point in the dis-
cussion (Section L).
A developer has a financial incentive to produce a project as long as
the discounted present value (using for discount rate the developer's after-
tax rate of return on alternative investments) is sufficiently greater than
his actual costs for developing the project over and above the mortgage
amount. Passive investors (those not actively developing real estate but
having excess funds to invest) will be willing to offer for a project the
present value of the project to them at the average rate of return (after
taxes) appropriate to investments of comparable risk.
As indicated in the discussion on syndication (Chapter 111), the de-
veloper views this latter possibility as a way of obtaining immediate cash
proceeds from a project as income now (or a fee) rather than as an invest-
ment. For the case in which the investor spreads his capital contributions
over a period of time in several installments, the developer can be thought
of as receiving a spread fee for his efforts or as enjoying some investment
income on the fee foregone until it is covered by a capital payment repre-
senting fee with compound interest. For convenience I assume the developer's
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discount rate to be the same as the investors' in the case of spread pay-
ments.
We recall from the description of project costs that the cash outlay
which the developer must make is typically the equivalent of 3 percent of
the mortgage; with this in mind we turn to. the results of the present
value and internal rate of return calculations for the base cases, pre-
sented in Table V-li. The present values are shown in terms of their re-
lationship to the mortgage amount, that is, the present value is expressed
as a percentage of the mortgage amount. This helps to give the results
more generality and, in fact, represents an increasingly accepted practice
in marketing this kind of investment--with good reason, since both the
depreciation allowances (hence the tax savings of the project) and the al-
lowable project dividends are related -directly to the mortgage amount.
From the point of view that development incentives are indicated by high
present values and internal rates of return, primary observations from
Table V-11 are:
(1) Given the discount rates assumed, the present value of
both new construction and rehabilitation projects is
much greater than the 3 percent cash required to de-
velop the project over and above the mortgage and
therefore offers a substantial incentive to the de-
veloper.I
(2) The present value of the rehabilitation project is much
larger than that for the new construction project as
is the internal rate of return in the case of a project
held by the developer.
A later discussion focuses on the relationships between project
investment value and the investors rate of return.
- ~
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TABLE V-llA: BASE CASE INVESTMENT
0 0
RESULTS -- DEVELOPER HOLDS PROPERTY (1
ANNUAL
BEFORE-TAX
CASH
RETURN (2)
22%
ANNUAL
AFTER-TAX
CASH
RETURN (3)
11.0
INTERNAL
RATE
RETURN Z
106.77
PRESENT VALUE
OF AFTER-TAX
RETURNS
W/TAX FUND(5)
11.28
PRESENT VALUE
OF AFTER-TAX
RETURNS
NO TAX FUND(5)
11.98
AVERAGE ANNUAL
RETURN
(AFTER TAX-
NO TAX FUND( 6 )
23.76
REHAB I L ITAT I ON
NOTES: (1) EQUITY INVESTMENT TAKEN TO BE 3% OF MORTGAGE AMOUNT.
(2) DIVIDEND i EQUITY
(3) TAX RATE X DIVIDEND i EQUITY
(4) DISCOUNT RATE REQUIRED TO EQUATE PRESENT VALUE OF AFTER-TAX RETURNS WITH EQUITY.
(5) DISCOUNT RATE OF 15% FOR NEW, 25% FOR REHABILITATION; PV MORTGAGE.
(6) [(SUM OF ANNUAL AFTER-TAX RETURNS) + NET GAIN FROM SALE - EQUITY]
7 (EQUITY X NUMBER OF YEARS HELD)
NEW
22% 11.0 183.86 16.18 19.51 25.99
S S S 9 9 9 
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TABLE V-118: BASE CASE INVESTMENT RESULTS -- INVESTORS OWN PROPERTY~l)
BEFORE-TAX
CASH
RETURN(2)
5.26%NEW
AFTER-TAX
CASH
RETURNM(3)
2.63
INTERNAL
RATE )
RETURN
15.0
PRESENT VALUE
OF AFTER-TAX
RETURNS
W/TAX FUND(5)
12.68
PRESENT VALUE
OF AFTER-TAX
RETURNS,
NO TAX FUND(5)
13.18
AVERAGE ANNUAL
RETURN
(AFTER TAX
NO TAX FUND)6)
3.02
REHABILITATION
NOTES: (1) EQUITY IS TAKEN TO BE THE DISCOUNTED PRESENT VALUE OF AFTER-TAX RETURNS
OR OF CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS. BASIS INCLUDES CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS.
(2) DIVIDEND * EQUITY
(3) TAX RATE X DIVIDEND e EQUITY
(4) DISCOUNT RATE REQUIRED TO EQUATE PRESENT VALUE OF AFTER-TAX RETURNS WiTH EQUITY.
(5) DISCOUNT RATE OF 15% FOR NEW, 25% FOR REHABILITATION; PV MORTGAGE.
(6) [(SUM OF ANNUAL AFTER-TAX RETURNS) + NET GAIN FROM SALE - EQUITY]
* (EQUITY X NUMBER OF YEARS HELD)
3.37% 1.69 25.0 19.76 22.39 2.75
000 0qp 0 0
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(3) Internal rates of return are very high when based on the
3 percent cash equity.
(4) Development incentive (high present values and internal
rates of return) is not markedly reduced by the assump-
tion of the tax sinking fund in the case of new construc-
tion. In the case of rehabilitation, while present values
and internal rates of return are reduced, they are still
quite high.
(5) The discounted present value is higher when the project
is sold to investors because it is assumed that their
capital contributions are added to the depreciable basis
as opposed to the 3 percent cash equity in the basis for
the developer who holds the project.
For the sake of completeness Table V-li also shows the values of some of
the alternative methods of real estate investment evaluation. The average
annual rate of return is low precisely because it does not take into ac-
count the fact that the large cash outflow upon sale occurs many years
from the time at which-funds are invested. Note that without a sinking
fund the large negative after-tax proceeds of sale (cash loss) are dis-
counted at the same high rate as for the positive returns--15 percent for
new construction and 25 percent for rehabilitation. The present value is
thus much larger if the tax sinking fund is not imposed because the cash
lIt could be argued that the developer's rate of return should be cal-
culated on, the basis of a "sweat equity" or the fee foregone by not selling
the project. However, as discussed elsewhere, assuming the fee foregone to
be exactly that which the investors would be willing to pay in exchange for
project returns, the developer's rate of return is exactly the same as the
discount rate for the investors, assuming the developer is also in the 50
percent income tax bracket. I have elected not to include arbitrary inter-
mediate values of implied developer fee such as assuming it to be the
BSPRA. A later discussion addresses the question of the developer's assess-
ment of what he foregoes in the event he retains full ownership of the pro-
ject.
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loss at sale is effectively discounted at a much higher rate, hence is of
smaller present value. Table V-12 shows that investors' net investment is
always less than half the total funds eventually invested and that they are
able to recover their invested funds quite early, especially in a rehabili-
tation project. Although this is a typical presentation used to convince
potential investors in a syndication, it is a bit myopic in view of the
substantial taxes which would become due if sale (or' foreclosure) of the
project because necessary in the early years of the project.
J. SENSITIVITY RESULTS
To assess the generality of the observations made using the base
cases, some of the key parameters are examined to see what difference it
makes for the investment parameters. For purposes of this sensitivity
analysis, the "base case" is taken to be the one in which the basis for
tax purposes is taken to include only the developer's 3 percent cash
equity in addition to costs covered by the mortgage loan.I The results
of interest are the differences between the present value calculation
for this case and for the cases when the key project parameters are changed.
The same relative changes could be expected if the base were taken to be
that from the investor's point of view with his capital contributions added
to the mortgage amount to arrive at project basis. Parameters evaluated
are: holding period of the project, composition of development costs,
We have noted elsewhere that unless the developer chooses to take
the capital contributions out of the partnership as a fee, then the tax
basis for the limited partner/investors is the same as that which is des-
cribed above as representing ownership by the developer, viz., mortgage
plus 3 percent equity. In this sense the sentivity results are the same
whether the owner is regarded as being the developer or separate investors.
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TABLE V-12: PAYBACK PERIODS ON INVESTMENT
NEW CONSTRUCTIONI
AMOUNT OF
CAPITAL
CONTRIBUTED
78,653.94
78,653.94
78,653.94
- 0 -
ACCUMULATED
INVESTMENT 2
78,653.94
157,307.88
235,961.82
AFTER-TAX
RETURN
- 0 -
69,507.00
39,564.50
37,619.26
35,737.63
33,914.01
32,142.71
etc.3 s
ACCUMULATED
RETURNS
- 0 -
69,507.00
109,071.50
146,690.76
182,428.39
216,342.40
248,485.11
etc.
NET
INVESTMENT
78,653.94
87,800.88
126,890.32
89,271.06
53,533.43
19,619.42
(12,523.29)
etc.
REHABILITATION1
AMOUNT OF
CAPITAL
CONTRIBUTED
132,160.50
132,160.50
132,160.50
- 0 -
ACCUMULATED
INVESTMENT 2
132,160.50
264,321.00
396,481.50
AFTER-TAX
RETURN
- 0 -
75,125.00
142,483.19
141,167.88
139,930.50
etc. 3
ACCUMULATED
RETURNS
75,125.00
217,608.19
358,776.07
498,706.57
etc.
NET
INVESTMENT
132,160.50
89,196.00
178,873.31
37,705.43
(102,225.07)
etc.
Both cases assume the developer's fee (excess capital contribution)
is added to the tax basis of the project.
2No discounting.
3 See Table V-8 for after-tax returns.
YEAR
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
YEAR
0
1
2
3
4
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economic life, and discount rates. A later section will examine the ef-
fects on investment value of sale at prices other than the mortgage bal-
ance.
1. Sensitivity to Holding Period
Figure V-1 presents the present value as a function of the holding
period for the base cases. The results of the present value calculations
are presented as a percentage of the mortgage amount. This should not be
taken to mean that the investment amount is a part of the mortgage. Quite
the contrary; for example, in a syndication the present value can be
thought of as the present value of the capital contributions made by the
limited partners to the partnership. Dividing the present value by the mort-
gage amount is simply a convenient way of scaling it to the magnitude of
the costs of the project. As will be seen, these results are only slightly
dependent upon the details of the per unit cost figures; thus such a curve
is actually broadly
The primary curve is
as an investment and
contributions are ta
developer. That is,
by the mortgage loan
possible excess capi
the syndication case
a "1step up" in basis
representative of this type of investment generally.
appropriate both for a developer holding the property
for a syndicated project in which the excess capital
ken as a capital gain or as a return of capital by the
the basis is assumed to include only the costs covered
plus the 3 percent cash costs but not including any
tal contributions. A dashed curve shows the results for
in which the developer's fee can be added to the basis--
in the language of the trade.
The ratios of present value to the mortgage amount, shown in Table
V-ll, are the final points on the base case curves of Figure V-1. The re-
maining points required to plot that curve of investment value against year
9FULL RECAPTURE
(REHAB.)
9
RECAPTURE RELIEF
(REHAB.)
NO RECAPTURE
(REHAB.)
REHABILITATION
7-
/
PRESENT VALUE x 100%
MORTGAGE
DEVELOPMENT
5
0
NEW CONSTRUCTION
BASE CASES
- - BASE CASES WITH FULL CAPITAL CONTRI-
BUTIONS INCLUDED IN DEPRECIABLE BASIS
DISCOUNT RATES: 15% NEW, 25% REHABILITATION
RECAPTURE RELIEF NO RECAPTURE .
(NEW) (NEW)
5 10 15
HOLDING PERIOD (YEAR OF SALE)
20 25
r'J
FIGURE V-i: INVESTMENT VALUE DEPENDENCE ON HOLDING PERIOD, BASE CASES
0
20
15
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of sale were obtained by calculations like those illustrated. For all of
the cases shown, it is assumed that the present value is computed only after
sufficient funds from the annual after-tax returns have been set aside in
a tax sinking fund to cover the cash requirements of sale. The basic sale
price is taken to be the mortgage balance outstanding at the time of sale.
Thus no cash is generated at sale to cover the income tax due on the gain
realized for tax purposes (difference between the sale price and the ad-
justed basis, or original cost less depreciation taken). Additional re-
sults for other sale prices will follow.
For both new construction and rehabilitation the obvious incentive
is to retain ownership of the project, other things being equal, for 15 or
20 years, especially in the case of rehabilitation, since the present value
of the investment continues to rise for increasingly long holding periods.
One is immediately struck by the effect of the tax penalty upon sale in the
rehabilitation case: even though there is little return left from the
project beyond the sixth project year, the value of deferring the tax pay-
ment is clearly indicated by the substantial rise in present value between
the sixth and twenty-first years. This means that a developer promising an
investor a holding period of 21 years could demand more than twice the
capital contribution for the project compared with a project with a holding
period of only six years. The incentive to hold the property in the new
construction case is somewhat less extreme, as can be seen in the curve of
investment value as a function of year of sale in Figure V-l. For the
new construction case, the investment value increases with holding period
both because after-tax returns continue to be positive for all 21 years
(see Table V-8 of cash flow for base cases), even though some income tax
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is due starting in year 18, and because capital gains taxes can be deferred
until the year of sale.
Recapture of excess depreciation (that in excess of normal straight-
line depreciation) at ordinary income tax rates is, of course, also di-
minished with increased holding period. The breaks or abrupt changes in
slope of the basic curves in Figure V-1 (except for the sharp break when
the 5-year write-off period ends for rehabilitation) reflect the influ-
ence of this recapture. In the new construction case reduction in the
percentage of recapture begins at the twentieth month after the project
is placed in service (assumed to be one year in the present case) and has
been eliminated by the end of the tenth operating year (eleventh project
year in this case); subsequently all gain is taxed as capital gain. Breaks
in the curve of present value of the rehabilitation case occur at the end
of five years of operation (when the special 5-year amortization has been
completed), at the end of nine years of operation (reduction in recapture
percentage starts at the 100th operating month, or 8-1/3 years), and at
the end of the 17th operating year (18th project year), when recapture
has been eliminated (after the 200th operating month, or 16-2/3 years).
While the investment value of new construction is comparable with re-
habilitation for very short holding periods, for holding periods longer
than about eight years a significant gap develops between the two cases,
the discounted present value for rehabilitation reaching a present value
of 16.18 percent of the mortgage at 21 years compared with a present value
of 11.28 percent of the mortgage amount for the new construction case,
given the assumptions used.1 A question might be raised about the
1These comparisons assume that the tax basis includes only the [cont.]
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generality of these results; one might anticipate that some differences
might occur depending on the variations in size of project or composition
of elements in project value.
2. Sensitivity to Composition of Development Costs
Table V-13 indicates the ranges over which some important project
variables were varied to observe their influence on project investment
value.1  These variations were found to result in a change of less than
two percentage points in the ratio of present value of the investment to
the mortgage amount for new construction and less than one percentage point
for rehabilitation. Ranges of present values as a function of holding
period for these variations are shown in Figure V-2. The relatively small
impact on present value resulting from these variations should, perhaps,
not be too surprising, since the mortgage amount is the key parameter in
establishing the two primary sources of return--the depreciable basis for
tax purposes (mortgage loan amount plus equity investment) and the annual
dividend allowable (6 percent on an assumed equity of 10 percent of total
replacement costs--the 10 percent remaining after a mortgage loan of 90
percent of total replacement costs). The tax shelter available in the re-
habilitation case is so large that it tends to predominate in after-tax
return, resulting in less sensitivity of after-tax return to other project
parameters.
[cont.] amounts covered by the mortgage loan plus cash expenses but not
the excess capital contributions to the developer in the syndication case.
IFor comparison, the 1970 HUD Statistical Yearbook indicates that for
Section 236 projects processed in 1970 the median project size was 98.6
units (Table 257); the median mortgage amount allocable to dwelling units
was $14,975 (Table 257); the median land cost was $830 per unit, represent-
ing 5.1 percent of total replacement costs (Table 258). (U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development, 1971, p. 244)
00 p S S 
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TABLE V-13: SENSITIVITY OF INVESTMENT VALUE TO PROJECT PARAMETERS
NEW CONSTRUCTION:
(1)1 CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS
INCLUDED IN BASIS
(4) BASE CASE
(DDB DEPRECIATION)
(3) SUM-OF-THE-YEARS'
DIGITS DEPRECIATION
(5) HIGH LAND COST
(2) HIGH CONSTRUCTION
LOAN INTEREST
REHABILITATION:
(6) CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS
INCLUDED IN BASIS
(8) BASE CASE
(20-YR. ECON. LIFE)
(7) HIGH CONSTRUCTION
LOAN INTEREST
(9) LOW SHELL COST
(8) LOW TOTAL COSTS
(9) HIGH SHELL COSTS
(9) HIGH LAND COSTS
(10) ECONOMIC LIFE 40 YRS.
TOTAL
REPLACEMENT
COST (TRC)
$I ,810,393
1'810,393
1,810,393
1,811,654
1,832,126
1,813,580
1,813,580
1,813,580
1,812,906
928,122
1,815,208
1,813,580
1,813,580
LAND
COST
(% TRC)
2.8
2.8
2.8
8.3
2.8
2.8
2.8
2.8
2.8
5.4
2.8
5.5
2.8
SHELL
COST
(% TRC)
6.1
6.1
6.1
2.8
5.4
28.0
3.3
6.1
CONSTRUCTION
COST (% TRC)
72
72
72
67
72
66
66
66
70
65
47
66
66
CONSTRUCTION
LOAN
INTEREST 2
4.85%
4.85
4.85
4.85
10.0
4.85
4.85
10.0
4.85
4.85
4.85
4.85
4.85
INumbers correspond to those on Figure V-2 of Sensitivity Results, where numbers appear in order.
2 The base case interest rate is typical of construction financing through a state housing finance
agency; conventional financing would require approximately 10%.
0
ON
PRES.VAL.
MORTGAGE
12.68%
11.28
11.91
11.14
12.08
19.76
16.18
16.73
16.40
15.99
16.51
16.02
15.40
mwnwo)
00 0 0
--- 6
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In the case of new construction, because of the smaller depreciation
allowances (compared with rehabilitation), investment value tends to be
somewhat sensitive to variations in initial carrying costs which can be
expensed in the year incurred (variations due, for example, to differences
in interest rate on the construction loan or in real estate tax treatment
during the construction period). However, the influences on investment
value from these possible variations are not such as* to overcome the dif-
ferences in investment value between new construction and rehabilitation nor
to obscure the observations drawn later about government costs involved in
these projects.
3. Sensitivity to Economic Life
With respect to economic life, the rehabilitation case is found to
shift downward slightly (less than one percentage point) in investment
value if an economic life for tax purposes of 40 years, rather than 20
years, is used; i.e., the discounted present value drops from 16.18 to
15.4 percent of the mortgage amount (see Table V-13 and Figure V-2). This
is clearly an extreme case, since IRS Revenue Procedure 62-21, Depreciation
Guidelines and Rules (U. S. Treasury Dept., 1962) requires no more than 40
years as the economic life of new rental housing. On the other hand, an
economic life of less than 20 years might be very difficult to support on
a rehabilitation project, since even used property is allowed its modest
acceleration in depreciation (125 percent of straight-line rate) only if
the structure has at least.20 years of useful life remaining. It is
apparently possible for a developer of a rehabilitation project to argue
Tax Reform Act of 1969, IRS Code, Section 167 (k).
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that the life of the project is in excess of 40 years for mortgage purposes,
but no more than 20 years for tax purposes.
The straight-line economic life is primarily important in the reha-
bilitation case in the definition of excess depreciation, where excess de-
preciation is the difference between the actual depreciation taken (includ-
ing the 5-year write-off on rehabilitation expenditures) and the depreci-
ation that would have been taken at the normal straight-line rate. The
excess depreciation is subject to the minimum tax provisions each year and
increases the amount of gain recovered upon sale which is subject to re-
capture at ordinary income tax rates (at least until the expiration of the
recapture period--16-2/3 years). However, because of the magnitude of
the tax shelter available in a rehabilitation project, even considering
this interaction of the minimum tax and the economic life, the difference
in rehabilitation investment value created by an investor's being forced to
use an economic life longer than 20 years is seen to be of small consequence.
On newly constructed apartment buildings the Treasury guideline nor-
mally allows an economic life of 40 years. It is possible, however, to
separately depreciate some components, such as elevators (10 years) or
land improvements such as landscaping, paving, drainage facilities and
the like (20 years) and thereby lower the effective economic life of the
composite. (U. S. Treasury Dept., 1962) Furthermore, the courts have, in
specific cases, ruled that shorter lives than those required generally by
the Treasury may be justified. (Casey, 1959) Some developers are ap-
parently able to use an effective economic life for new projects of 33
As mentioned before, the omission of replacement reserves from the
calculation of taxable income in the base cases essentially offsets the de-
preciation or expensing of replacements when they do occur.
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years, which would improve slIghtly the investment value in the new con-
struction case.
While some variations in investment value are thus created as the
project parameters are varied, the computations presented in Table V-13
and Figure V-2 have shown that the sensitivities are not great, compared
with the magnitude of the discounted present value, and that the investment
value in the rehabilitation case is substantially la-rger than the new con-
struction case, assuming a long enough holding period or project life.
4. Sensitivity to Discount Rate
The discounted present value of a stream of future returns is also
clearly a function of the discount rate used. At this point, we are sti'l
considering the situation of a project having only a 3 percent cash equity
included in the basis, either because the project is held by the original
developer or, if syndicated, the developer chooses not to declare the capi-
tal contributions in excess of the 3 percent cash as a fee. The discounted
present value in this situation is a measure used by the developer to as-
sess the relative investment attractiveness of different projects. To the
investor the present value indicates the amount he must offer. It is as-
sumed that rehabilitation projects require the use of higher discount
rates than new construction because of the greater risk involved with these
projects. To evaluate the significance of a range of possible discount
rates, computations with the base cases were made with discount rates for
rehabilitation of 20, 25 and 30 percent and for new construction of 15, 20
and 25 percent. In practice, of course, market conditions help to establish
the offering price for tax shelter investment based on a number of factors
when such a project is offered to the investment market. The results, pre-
sented in Figure V-3, show that the rehabilitation case offers a larger
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present value. (relative to the mortgage amount) as an investment even at
very high discount rates. It should be noted, however, that with increas-
ingly high discount rates the importance for investment purposes of the
expensible carrying costs during construction increases (because they
occur in the first year), while the importance of taxes payable at sale
diminishes. Substantial changes from the base cases in the proportion of
total development costs represented by expensible costs could make notice-
able differences in investment value. However, to reduce significantly
the difference between rehabilitation and new construction it would be neces-
sary for expensible costs for new construction to be a much higher pro-
portion of development costs than for the rehabilitation case.
Before turning to the question of investment value when the developer's
fee is added to the tax basis, a final look is taken at the value of a
project to the original developer.
K. INCENTIVE FOR DEVELOPER TO -HOLD PROJECT
As discussed in the description of the Section 236 mortgage arrange-
ments and of the base cases, the net cash required to develop a project,
either new or rehabilitated, under this program can be quite low--in prin-
ciple as low as one percent of the total amount and typically as little
as the equivalent of three percent of the mortgage amount. Computations
were performed for the internal rate of return (IROR) in both base cases
assuming a three percent (of the mortgage amount) cash investment by the
developer and assuming that the developer is in the 50 percent income tax
bracket and remains in this bracket over the time the project is owned.
Figure V-4 presents the IROR results as a function of the holding period.
Because the equity assumed is so low (although realistically so), the in-
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ternal rate of return is astronomial, approaching 190 percent in the re-
habilitation case and 100 percent in the new construction case for holding
periods longer than approximately 12 years..
Indeed, when the developer holds full ownership in the property on such
a low equity amount, one might think of his after-tax return spread over the
years of ownership as more in the nature of a fee for his services in es-
tablishing the project paid in ingrements over the years. Or one could
argue that the developer foregoes a fee in order to claim the value of the
investment created by his development activity. A measure of the fee fore-
gone might be the fee obtained by developers of other non-tax-favored
rental housing. But for new housing the depreciation allowances and economic
life permitted are the same; only the recapture provisions differ, and for
holding periods longer than 17 years the recapture provisions no longer
apply. Since returns are not controlled on non-limited dividend housing,
however, such housing might even have an additional increment in the fee to
reflect the possibility of higher cash earnings. This possibility could be
offset by less favorable financing arrangements in which the mortgage loan
would not cover such a high fraction of development costs. In any event it
is hard to isolate a reference case for the developer fee which is Foregone
on a Section 236 project in the situation in which he continues to hold the
property.
As another way of thinking about the developer's choices, the dis-
counted present value computations already presented in Table V-10 indicate
the amount which investors would be willing to pay in order to claim the
after-tax returns of the projects described. Now, if the developer con-
siders the fee foregone to be the difference between the amount he could
raise from limited partner investors and the actual cash requirements of
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the project (in addition to the mortgage loan funds), he would be indif-
ferent between keeping the project and selling it, because the present
value to the developer (net of his cash costs) is exactly the same PRO-
VIDED that the developer can expect sufficient ordinary income over the life
of the project that he, too, could claim the value of the tax shel ter on
his ordinary income at an average rate of 50 percent AND the developer has
the same discount rate (expected rate of return, after tax) as the po-
tential investors. If the foregone fee is thought of in this light, the
developer's rate of return on the sum of funds expended (cash require-
ments) and fees foregone is exactly the same as the investors', viz.,
equal to the discount rate used in the present value calculation.
There is a catch, though; what about the Federal taxes to which the
developer is liable as a result of collecting capital contributions in
excess of cash costs in the project? In the most favorable case the de-
veloper could argue that the excess funds are not really excess but a
return of capital (since his tax basis can include costs actually covered
by the project mortgage loan), hence not subject to any tax, although a
capital gains claim will eventually occur at sale of the project by the
partnership. If this possible capital gains tax is small enough and in
the distant future (hence of very small present value), we might st'ill con-
clude that the developer would be indifferent between holding the property
and syndicating it, because the present values net of cash costs would still
be equivalent in the two cases. Perhaps a more likely tax situation, though,
is that the developer would be subject to some tax on the excess capital
contributions, either at capital gains rates, if such an argument can be
supported, or at ordinary income tax rates. In these cases, the developer
would appear to be better off holding the property as an investment than
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syndicating it, since the income after tax on the capital contributions from
syndication would clearly be less than the present value of the project as
an investment.
Yet many developers choose to sell ownership claims in such projects.
Why? The primary reasons seem to be a combination of the following:
(1) their marginal income tax bracket is lower than the income tax bracket
of the marginal investor in this type of investment, i.e., the developer
has less ordinary income than the investors, (2) they already have shel-
tered the income which would be otherwise subject to high tax rates by
projects in which some or all cf the ownership is retained (in a way a
variant of the first reason), (3) the developer thinks of himself as a
businessman more than as an investor and prefers to have the cash row as
income or as capital for further ventuies, or (4) the developer has in
effect convinced himself that his average after-tax rate of return is much
higher than the rates anticipated by investors, so that the present value
to the developer of the project as an investment is much less than the pre-
sent value of the project to an investor.
L. DEFERRED PAYMENT OF CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS
Now, as discussed in the section on syndication, the tax shelter value
of a project can actually be increased if the developer sells ownership (or
claims to profits and losses) to passive investors and takes the excess
of capital contributions over cash costs as a fee charged to the partner-
ship. The reason, again, is that as far as the investor is concerned, his
tax basis (value) in the property is the sum of his contribution to cash
expenses of the project (his total capital contributions if the developer
217
takez all of the excess as a fee from the partnership) and his proportionate
share in the mortgage loan (as determined by his basis in the partnership,
or share of :;nership). Thus, while a developer holding full ownership
would claim as the tax basis only the sum of the mortgage loan and his
actual cash outlay (for example, 3 percent- of the mortgage amount), the
investor (assume for the moment there is only one or a collective one) can
claim as tax basis the sum of the mortgage balance and his actual cash in-
vestment, which may be in the vicinity of 10 to 15 percent of the mort-
gage amount for a new project and 20 to 30 percent for a rehabilitation
project, rather thar 3 percent. The amount of depreciation which can be
taken is thus increased, hence increases the investment value of the project.
In a typical syndication the investment value is also increased by al-
lowing for the capital contributions 0'f the limited partners to be spread outs
in several payments. This serves as both a protection to the investor should
the project fail in the early stages and as a means for the developer to
increase his total receipts from the project, since investors are willing
to contribute more in the future than atpresent. In the calculations
for total capital contributions in this study it has been assumed that the
present value of all of the capital contributions is equal to the present
value of the after-tax returns (including consequences of sale) using the
same discount rate in both cases. It should be admitted at this point
that this procedure is at variance with the arguments made for using the
tax sinking fund to cover the net after-tax cash requirements upon sale (be-
cause of gains taxes). There, it was argued that the investor does not
wish to be forced to achieve a high rate of return on reinvested funds in
order to offset the net cash requirements from sale, and that he therefore
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prefers to regard these requirements as being met by a fund of returns from
the project accumulating at a modest after-tax rate of return. Since the
payment of capital contributions also may represent net cash outlays, it
could be argued that the discounting of future capital contributions
should also be at a more modest rate than the after-tax rate of return de-
manded from the positive returns from the project, since the investor may
not be able to achieve a high rate of return on funds reserved for invest-
ment in this project. I have nevertheless used the same discount rate for
after-tax returns and capital contributions because (1) the timing of these
payments is often such that after the initial payment most, if not
all, of the capital required is generated from the after-tax returns of the
project, so that there is littie or no net cash outlay at the time the
capital payments (after the first) become due; (2) this practice seems to
be the accepted one in presenting such investments to prospective in-
vestors; and (3) investment of the funds reserved for later investment in
this project could, in principle, yield an equivalent after-tax return in
a comparable, equally risky, investment.
As an example of the calculation of deferred capital contributions,
consider the base case for new construction. We found that the present
value of all of the after-tax returns from the project was 12.68 percent
of the mortgage amount. The formula for relating the required present value
of the investment (PV) to the amount (ACAPN) and number of payments (NCAP)
to be made is just a version of the annuity formula, if the payments are
all of equal amount and are paid annually,
.ACAPN (PV/MRT) x RRATE
MRT I + RRATE-
(+ RRATE)(NCAP-l)
'MRT" is the mortgage loan amount.
219
For the new construction base case with capital contributions to be
made in three equal annual payments, starting with one payment at the out-
set of the project, the arithmetic is as follows:
ACAPN 0.12675 x 0.15
MRT 1 + 0.15 - L
(1.15)2
= 0.048272
AMOUNT
(% of MTGE.)
0.048272
0.048272
0.048272
DISC. FACTOR
1.0
0.86957
0.756i4
PRES. VAL.
(% of MTGE.)
0.048272
0.041976
0.036500
TOTAL AMOUNT OF
CAP. CONTR. = 0.14482 PRES. VAL. = 0.12675
*.
The discount factor is 1/(1 +
count rate--15 percent for the
is the year of payment.
RRATE)N, where RRATE is the dis-
new construction case-- and N
Using the base cases, computations relating total capital contri-
butions and the investors' discount rate (or internal rate of return on
the discounted present value of the capital contributions) have been
made and are plotted in Figure V-5. Once again, the substantial differ-
ence in investment value between rehabilitation and new construction is
shown. Total capital contributions for a rehabilitation project are in
the range of 20 to 30 percent of the mortgage amount, for reasonable rates
of return, and are in the range of 10 to 15 percent of the mortgage amount
for new construction. The values shown represent a situation in which
100 percent of the project is marketed to investors (even though a more
typical syndication arrangement is for the developer, or general partner,
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to retain a 5. percent ownership) a..d the full amount of the capital con-
tributions is added to the mortgage amount to arrive at the tax basis of
the project. it should be kept in mind for perspective that capital con-
tributions amounting to the equivalent of 20 percent of a mortgage amount
of $1,600,000 for a representative 100-unit project represent an ab-
solute amount of investment of $320,000 paid to the developer. Of course,
from this must come expenses connected with the project (approximately
$48,000 in this case) which remain after disbursing the mortgage funds, as
previously discussed, but a rather handsome fee for the developer's ser-
vices remains, even allowing for some erosion, for example, from claims
by the agent marketing the tax shelter for the developer. The role of
brokers and marketing consultants in tax shelter syndication and the fees
involved are discussed above in Chapter IV at pp. 138-140.
An alternative interpretation of Figure V-5 is that for comparable
amounts of investment (total capital contributions) the rate of return
for the investor would be much higher for a rehabilitation project than
for a new project--higher, in fact, than the range actually computed as
representative of the market for this kind of investment. For example,
as of the writing of this work, the National Housing Partnership has
evidenced little interest in rehabilitation projects because theirof-
ferings for rehabilitation projects have been comparable with those for
new projects. The upshot is that most rehabilitation developers refuse to
IAuthority to establish a private National Housing Partnership Cor-
poration was established by the Housing and Urban Development Act of
1968 (Public Law 90-448) with the intention of encouraging the use of
tax shelter investment in low- and moderate-income housing.
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agree to NHP purchase, because the developer can obtain much higner
amounts of money elsewhere. The NHP situation with respect to rehabili-
tation would offer windfall returns to investors rather than to project
developers. But developers, being in control, are under no compulsion to
make such a trade.
M. SUMMARY
For the illustrative cases described in this chapter, a newly con-
structed 236 project has an investment value of the equivalent of about
13 percent of the mortgage loan amount, while for a rehabilitation project
the investment value is about 20 to 22 percent of the mortgage loan
amount. This means that the investors should be willing to exchange an
investment of that magnitude in return for a claim to the future tax
savings and dividends which these projects offer. Since most of the ac-
tual development costs are covered by the mortgage loan, the developer
can keep most of the investors' contributions as a profit or "fee" for
himself.
Using the illustrative cases, it has been shown that the investment
results--hence the opportunity for profit for the developer--are not
significantly affected by typical variations in the make-up of project
costs. It does make a difference how long the project is owned before
sale; the optimum holding period is approximately 20 years.
Developers can maximize the total amount of capital contributions
from investors by phasing the payments over a period of several years.
The total capital contributions were found not to depend heavily upon the
investor's required after-tax rate of return within reasonable ranges.
223
For example, the capital contributions (as a percentage of the mortgage
loan amount) vary by only 3 to 5 percentage points as the investor's
rate of return (discount rate) ranges from i5 to 25 percent for the in-
vestor in a new project or from 20 to 30 percent for an investor in a
rehabilitation project. The magnitude of the excess funds over actual
cash requirements thus collected by the developer would seem to be more
than sufficient to elicit a desireid response from developers.
Now we turn to the question of the investor's risk in such projects
and some examination of the investment value of such projects if the in-
vestment picture were to be altered by changes in the tax treatment of
236 projects.
0
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CHAPTER VI: INVESTMENT RISK AND
ALTERNATIVE TAX INCENTIVES
Having looked primarily at the development incentives from the point
of view of the developer, we now turn to examine in more detail the per-
spective of the limited partner/investor in a typical Section 236 project.
Areas of interest include the impact of possible departures from the as-
sumptions of the base cases under present tax laws and the investment con-
sequences of changes in the tax treatment of these projects. I shall
use this occasion to indicate also the position of the investor who, while
in the 70 percent tax bracket, is only required to make the same capital
contributions as the 50 percent bracket investor.
A. DEPARTURES FROM THE BASE CASES
The analysis of the base cases has indicated that for a 50 percent
tax bracket investor the typical capital contributions he makes are such
as to result in an after-tax rate of return on investment of 15 percent
for new construction and 25 percent for rehabilitation, assuming the
base case conditions hold. The important assumptions are: (1) the in-
vestor is in the 50 percent tax bracket, 1 (2) a 21-year holding period,
(3) the allowable dividend is earned and distributed to the investors
every operating year of the projects, and (4) the project is sold for
the outstanding mortgage balance.
IActually, as indicated above at p. 169, this refers to the average
tax bracket.in the range of income generated by or sheltered by the pro-
ject.
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While investors can expect an internal rate of return on investment
of 15 percent in a new project and 25 percent in a rehabilitation project
in the representative base cases, the question remains, "What if the as-
sumptions made in the investment analysis of this project do not hold?"
The primary departures of concern would be the following:
1. The investor is actually in the 70 percent tax bracket
over the life of the project. From my investigations
it appears that the marginal investor in a typical tax-
shelter syndication is in the 50 percent income-tax
bracket. This means that the developer (or whoever
markets shares on behalf of the developer) finds that
the price, or amount of capital contributions demanded,
must be set so as to be attractive to investors in the
50 percent tax bracket. Thus investors who are in
higher tax brackets will find the tax shelter to be of
greater value to them, since their capital contri-
butions are the same as the 50 percent bracket investor's.
Many tax shelter investors are in tax brackets higher than the
50 percent bracket. (U. S. House Ways and Means Committee, 1969;
Judelson, 1971) For investors lacking full information about investment
opportunities or for situations in which the particular high-bracket in-
vestors have a degree of confidence in a particular developer or broker,
it may be possible for the price demanded to reflect the higher after-
tax returns which can be obtained by a 70 percent bracket investor. In
principle, though, the price is set not by the buyer who has most to gain
(the 70 percent bracket buyer) nor by the average buyer but by the mar-
ginal buyer. My assumption that the 50 percent bracket investor repre-
sents the marginal one was greatly influenced by the observation that the
offering circular or brochure typically used in a tax shelter syndication
uses a 50 percent bracket investor as the typical case. (Kuehn, 1971;
Frosh, Lane and Edson, 1971; Judelson, 1971; Boston Financial Technology,
1971) Using the 50 percent bracket makes the results also applicable to
a corporation,for which the marginal tax rate is 48 percent.
2. Other conditions hold, but the project has to be sold
prior to the end of the intended holding period, al-
though the sale price is the mortgage balance, as as-
sumed.
3. Not only is sale of the project forced to be earlier
than intended, but the project never earns the allowed
dividend. For sale in the early years thi-s case can
be regarded as representing the foreclosure of a really
unsuccessful project. If the project is sufficiently
behind in payments on mortgage interest and principal,
the mortgage holder (mortgagee) may assign the mortgage
to the FHA in return for the outstanding balance due on
the mortgage. The FHA might reassign the mortgage, if
it can find a taker, or foreclose and reclaim the pro-
perty for future disposition. In the event of a fore-
closure, the investors would be relieved of the burden
of the mortgage but would, for Federal income tax pur-
poses, be deemed to have sold the project at the mort-
gage balance (value of liability transferred), just as
the mortgage loan amount may be claimed as part of the
tax basis at the outset. The investor would thus be
subject to gains taxes upon foreclosure based on the
difference between the adjusted basis for tax purposes
and the mortgage balance, just as though a sale at the
mortgage balance had occurred. (Adams, 1970; U. S.
It might be thought that abandonment of a bad project might
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[cont.]
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Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, 1964)
If a project gets into difficulty because expenses
cannot be met with rents, the first candidate for
sacrifice is likely to be the allowable project
dividend, unless the developer or general partner
in the project has guaranteed the limited partner
investors a dividend. Next candidates for a
sacrifice by project owner unable to meet expenses
would be the payments into the reserve for major
equipment replacements, then principal payments on
the. mortgage loan (in effect an extension in the term
of the mortgage), and finally interest payments
(whereupon the FHA has to make up the difference
to the mortgagee and may, therefore, declare the
project to be in technical default).
[cont.] be a device for claiming a loss for tax purposes. However, aban-
donment can result in a loss only if (a) the property was actually worth-
less at the time (liens against the property exceeded the market value),(b) the property was in fact abandoned through some objective act, (c)
the mortgagor (owners abandoning the project) received nothing upon aban-
donment, (d) if abandonment is followed by foreclosure, these must be in-
dependent events. (Anderson, 1965)
1Any such explicit arrangement would suffer from the provision in the
Tax Reform Act of 1969 that property subject to a net lease (i.e., guaran-
teed income) will expose the investors to the minimum tax on the amount of
project interest expense in excess of income. (IRC, Section 163)
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4. Dividends are earned but early saie occurs and at a
price declining in a straight line from the original
total replacement cost to the land value at the end of
the economic life of the project. This price is more
than the mortgage balance for the first 6 years but
subsequently represents a price below the outstanding
mortgage balance, hence a net cash loss before tax
(taxes upon sale, of course, adding to the loss).
Such a situation might arise, I suppose, with particu-
larly conscientious owners who would prefer to take
a larger loss than that imposed by the gains taxes in
order to preserve their opportunity to do further
business with FHA mortgage insurance and subsidy pro-
grams. The psychology here is a bit curious: it has
become standard to think in terms of accepting a loss
at sale as a result of taxes (inevitable), but few
would be willing to accept with equanimity a loss in-
duced by selling below the mortgage balance.
5. The project is sold at a price equal to the sum of
the mortgage balance and the Federal income taxes the
investor will owe as a result of the sale. While un-
likely, such a result is possible under Federal law re-
lating to Section 236 projects. It is unlikely be-
cause it assumes unrealistically high sale prices in
Section 236(j)(3), P.L. 90-448, 12 U.S.C. 1701u et seq.
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order to allow the investor to break even at sale and
thereby to retain all of the annual after-tax returns
of the project.
In the evaluation of the consequences of these alternative operating
and sale possibilities it is assumed that a 50 percent tax bracket in-
vestor has made the full investment required to obtain the anticipated
after-tax rate of return (15 percent for new construction and 25 percent
for rehabilitation) provided the "base case" conditions hold (full divi-
dends earned, tax sinking fund established, sale at the mortgage balance
after a 21-year holding period). This means that in the case of new con-
struction 12.68 percent of the mortgage is invested, while for rehabili-
tation 19.76 percent of the mortgage is invested. The computations made
for these off-base-case conditions still employ the use of a tax sinking
fund as though the investor anticipated the time and price of sale, hence
of taxes due at sale.
1. New Construction
Figure VI-l presents as a percentage of the mortgage amount the
present values, discounted at 15 percent, of a new construction project
as an investment under the various off-base-case assumptions listed above.
Except for the break-even-at-sale ,case (price including taxes due at sale),
ITo simplify the computations the investment is assumed to be the
discounted present value of the capital contributions (taken to be three
annual payments), using as discount rates 15 percent for the new con-
struction case and 25 percent for the rehabilitation case. For the dis-
counted present value computations of off-base-case situations this as-
sumption is of no consequence. As noted later, however, the use of the
discounted present value of the capital contributions as the -investment
value for the internal rate of return computations introduces some
slight inconsistency.
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early sale forces premature payment- of gains taxes at sale and thus re-
duces the present value of the project relative to the present value of
the capital contributions made at the outset of the project. Another way
of viewing these results is that the investor, had he known of the pro-
ject's future, would have offered a lower amount for the project than the
amount offered when making base case assumptions. Note that the 70 per-
cent bracket investor reaps a windfall in that the discounted present
value of the project reaches 16.5 percent of the mortgage amount com-
pared with 12.7 percent for the 50 percent investor. If the investor
could be assured of a sale price large enough to include the taxes due at
sale, Fi gure VI-1 indicates that he would te will ing to settle for a hold-
ing period one-half as long (about 10 years) as in the base case; that
is, the present values would be equivalent. Because the straight-line
declining price is.not scaled to the mortgage balance, as are the other
assumed sale prices, the present value of the project turns out to be
much more nearly constant than in the other cases; it is roughly equiva-
lent to the other cases in the early years but drops about 30 percent
below the base case by the end of a 21-year holding period.
Loss of annual project dividends naturally diminishes the investment
value of the project. In the example used here the investment value is
approximately 1.81 percentage points below the base case by the end of
the antici'pated holding period--a reduction of 14 percent from the base
case value of 12.7 percent of the mortgage.
Another way of looking at the issue of investor risk is to determine
what the actual internal rate of return becomes under the off-sale assump-
tions and loss of dividends, assuming the investor contributed the full
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amount required under "base-case" assumptions. Those calculations have
been performed using the present value of the actual capital contributions
discounted at 15 percent as the initial equity investment and determining
the appropriate internal rate of return as that interest rate which yields
a total discounted present value for all of the after-tax annual returns
equal to the equity investment. The results, presented in Figure VI-2,
indicate that the initial equity investment is not recovered in the early
years, as indicated by negative internal rates of return. These indicate
that funds compounding at the corresponding positive internal rate of
return would have to be added to the initial equity just to offset the
loss of initial equity over the years. The break-even points, that is,
holding periods long enough to recover just the initial investment (at
zero interest rate) are:
6 years for case (1), 70 percent bracket investor only, sale
at mortgage balance
6 years for case (5), sale at mortgage p-lus taxes
8 years for case (2) , sale at mortgage balance
11 years for case (3), loss of dividends
20 years for case (4), straight-line declining sale price
These results begin to develop some justification for the discount rate
of 15 percent used in the new construction base case; the consequences of
failure of the project, especially in the sense of premature sale or loss
ITechnically the same discount rate should be used in discounting re-
turns and in discounting capital contributions. For internal rates of
return lower than 15 percent the resulting present value of the actual in-
vestment would be larger than the one used (assuming a 15 percent dis-
count rate) and the solution for internal rate of return would be an even
smaller value than the one calculated here.
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of project dividends, are quite severe. We note, however, that a 70 per-
cent bracket investor might obtain an internal rate of return as high as
25 percent under the same base case assumptions for which the internal
rate of return is 15 percent for the 50 percent tax-bracket investor.
2. Rehabilitation
For the rehabilitation case we now consider the same situations as
just observed for the new construction case. Again we assume that the
full capital contribution has been made in anticipation of achieving all
of the base case investment assumptions and examine the investment effects
from the investor's point of view in the event of sale in years prior
to the twenty-first project year at various sale prices:
1. Sale at the mortgage balance by a 70 percent bracket
investor.
2. Sale at the mortgage balance outstanding at the time
of sale.
3. Failure of the project to pay cash dividends through-
out project life and sale at the mortgage balance.
4. Sale at a price declining in a straight line from the
original replacement cost to the land value at the
end of the economic life of the project (taken to be
the same value as that used for tax purposes); divi-
dends assumed to be earned and paid every year.
5. Sale at mortgage balance plus sufficient cash to pay -
all Federal taxes on the proceeds of sale (dividends
earned and paid every operating year).
The results of the computations are presented in Figure VI-3. In
0 0
BASE CASE
70% INVESTOR
SALE AT MORTGAGE BALANCE
PLUS TAXES DUE
BASE CASE
NO DIVIDEND PAYMENTS
PRESENT VALUE x 100%
MORTGAGE
10
5-
SALE AT STRAIGHT-LINE
DECLINING PRICE
I . . . , I........................................I
10 15
YEAR OF SALE
20
FIGURE VI-3: DEPENDENCE OF INVESTMENT VALUE ON BASE CASE ASSUMPTIONS, REHABILITATION
0 S 0
25
20
15
0 5 25
r~')
U,
--- - ---------
I
236
contrast with the new construction case we note that for rehabilitation,
getting the taxes out of the sale price assures essentially the full,
base-case present value for the project as soon as the 5-year amortiza-
tion of rehabilitation expenditures has been taken. In all the other
cases the rise in present value of the project is quite sharp with in-
creased holding period. The present value of the project for a 70 per-
cent investor turns out to be 28 percent of the mortgage amount for a
21-year holding period in contrast with 20 percent for the 50 percent
bracket investor. While early sale for the new construction case dimin-
ishes the present value both because of early payment of capital gains
taxes and because of the loss of some potential after-tax returns through
continuing depreciation losses, in the rehabilitation case most of the
depreciation has been taken after five operating years and the primary con-
cern in premature sale is that of the taxes which must be paid at sale.
Because the depreciation amounts, hence the tax savings, are so large in
the rehabilitation case, the loss of dividends in the project is seen to
be less significant as a percentage change in present value of the pro-
ject than in the new construction case. The straight-line-declining price
case is catastrophic in that the present value of the project never rises
above about one-third of the base case present value.
IThis case is not likely in reality to occur in the early years of a
project because the sum of mortgage balance and taxes due is so large. For
example, for the base case project (with an original total replacement cost
of $1,829,000) the sale price in the sixth project year would have to be
$2,450,000 in order to be large enough to cover the mortgage balance of
$1,610,000 plus taxes of $840,000. By year 21 the sale price is more rea-
sonable; $1, 800,000--roughly the original total replacement cost--is needed
to cover a mortgage balance of $1,318,000 plus taxes of $482,000.
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For the rehabilitation case we also examine the effect of the off-
sale conditions and loss of dividends in terms of their effect on the
rate of return from the project. Again the "equity" used is the dis-
counted present value of the project, or viewed differently, the present
value of the investor's capital contributions, discounced at 25 percent.
From the results, presented in Figure VI-4, we can see that the case in
which sufficient cash is recouped at sale to cover taxes on sale proceeds
(however unrealistic in the early years of the project) obtains a rate
of return of approximately 30 percent for any holding period past the
5-year amortization period. In the case of sale at mortgage balance,
either with or without the project dividene being paid, the project
breaks even at about the tenth year. That is, the internal rate of re-
turn on the project has just reached zero, or the undiscounted after-tax
returns have just summed to the initial investment. The bonanza falling
to the 70 percent bracket investor in the rehabilitation project is seen
in Figure IV-4; the internal rate of return reaches 42 percent for the
base case assumptions for capital contributions, holding period (21 years),
and sale price (mortgage balance), in contrast with the 25 percent rate of
return for the 50 percent tax-bracket investor. The 70 percent bracket
investor also reaches the break-even point sooner--about about seven years.
B. COMMENTS ON CURRENT TAX TREATMENT
From the preceding observations we have gained some awareness of the
types of uncertainty and risk of loss (or prospect of gain) for departures
from the base case assumptions used to describe conventional investment
assumptions (hopes?) in this type of investment--tax shelter syndication
in rental projects with Federal mortgage insurance and interest subsidy.
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We have also seen in the previous chapter the magnitude of the effective
"fee" accruing to the developer of such projects primarily as a -result of
the favorable depreciation allowances provided in Federal tax law,
especially for rehabilitation.
It is perhaps too early to draw conclusions about the efficacy of
these tax incentives in attracting the necessary actors required to pro-
duce rental housing for the subsidy programs, especially for rehabilita-
tion, since the provision for 5-year amortization of rehabilitation ex-
penditures has only been in effect since 1969.1 As noted in Chap-
ter IV, there is some evidence, however, that developers of new rental
housing have become aware of the potential benefits of developing and
syndicating Section 221(d)(3) and now Section 236 projects, especially
stimulated by the tight money market of 1968 to 1970 for conventionally
financed rental housing. Developers have been increasingly willing to suf-
fer the complications and bureaucratic delay of dealing with a Federal
agency (HUD, and, in particular, the FHA) in return for the handsome
financial benefits attaching to a particular project through the depreci-
ation allowances to which claim can be made on very little cash equity,
thanks to the Federally insured Section 236 mortgage. This is attested
by the fact that applications for Section 221(d)(3) and Section 236 pro-
jects by limited dividend sponsors have exceeded the interest subsidy al-
locations 'made possible by appropriation levels under these programs and,
for the last several years, have resulted in a full "pipeline" of p,roject
In fact, while some developers have proceeded to develop and syndi-
cate rehabilitation projects, the Internal Revenue Service had not, as
of December, 1971, issued regulations to implement the legislation of the
Tax Reform Act of 1969.
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applications which have met the FHA feasibility tests, but for which funds
are not available to commit the necessary interest subsidy allocation.
Assuming the desirability of incentives to developers and other neces-
sary actors for producing rental housing for the subsidy programs, some
questions remain. Is the financial incentive created by tax treatment
larger than would be necessary to stimulate the desired rate of production
of subsidized rental housing? Does this incentive have favorable or un-
favorable side incentives? Is the tax incentive method wasteful of
government funds or could the same objectives be accomplished with
greater economic efficiency by more direct payment? It is possible that
the financial inducements created by the tax treatment of subsidized
rental housing might yet be larger than required to achieve the rate of
production desired. If subsidy allocations are actually the controlling
factor, then any more expenditure of public funds (or loss of tax reven-
ues, in the present cases) than is necessary to induce just a rate of ap-
plication matching the amount of subsidy funds available is wasteful of
public resources.
Whether the tax incentive encourages not only production but also re-
sponsible operation and desirable ownership patterns has yet to be de-
termined. For example, an alternative interpretation can be made of the
earlier observations regarding the length of time a project is held. If
a builder/developer of a particularly risky rehabilitation project were
John Heinberg (1971) and Emil Sunley (1971) have both commented
that the rehabilitation tax incentive may not have increased the number
of rehabilitations being undertaken above that made possible by a shift
in the proportion of 236 subsidy funds allotted to rehabilitation as
opposed to new construction. Also see the discussion in ChaDter IV at
pp. 140-142 on builder response to the 236 program.
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satisfied with a net fee derived from capital contributions which would
be equivalent to that which could be obtained from a new construction
project, the developer could offer the investor the prospect of getting
out of the project within about seven or eight years, intending to ar-
range for a tenant group to assume the mortgage or to allow the FHA to
foreclose. In the event that the project was held for longer than seven
or eight years the investors would reap additional value from the pro-
ject, chiefly from deferring until later the payment of capital gains
taxes. From the point of view of public policy the transfer to tenants
might be desirable, provided it was not simply a matter of the owner
getting rid of a basically unsound project,, while the foreclosure pos-
sibility would not be desirable. We must also keep in mind that the
largest component of after-tax returns in these projects flows inexorably
from the depreciation allowances, quite apart from the quality of hous-
ing services being rendered from year to year. Some grounds for chal-
lenge of the tax incentive approach to the development of low- and mod-
erate-income housing thus appear in relation to their correlative impact
on operating incentives. We return to this matter later in a further dis-
cussion on operating incentives and tenant ownership.
Assuming for the time being that the tax incentive device is to
be used but that it might be larger than necessary, we shall examine the
investment impact of some likely candidates for revision in the deprecia-
tion allowances and tax laws. Later discussions will focus on (1) costs
to government of the present system, (2) ways in which the present in-
centives could be replaced with direct payments to compensate for tax
incentives, (3) possible alternative depreciation and tax treatment with
compensating government payment.
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C. ALTERNATIVE DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCES
How much would the discounted present value of the base case pro-
jects be altered if the depreciation allowances and other tax treatment
were altered? We consider the following possibilities:
(1) Straight-line depreciation only
(2) No depreciation allowances whatever (keep con-
struction losses and taxable dividend)
(3) No depreciation allowances, no taxes, i.e., a
tax-free dividend
In all of these cases sale is assumed to be at the mortgage balance, but
the computations are performed for a range of holding periods--from 5 to
21 years. The tax basis for the straight-line depreciation case includes
only the 3 percent cash equity of the-base cases. (The other cases as-
sume no depreciation whatever.) The objective of the computations is
again to find the discounted present value-of the project for investment
purposes, assuming discount rates of 15 percent for the new construction
cases and 25 percent for rehabilitation. Where applicable the loss at
sale is again covered by the use of a tax sinking fund.
1. New Construction
For new construction projects the discounted present values are
presented in Figure VI-5 as a percentage of the mortgage amount against
the holding period. Compared with the base case, restriction to straight-
line depreciation drops the present value from approximately 11 percent
of the mortgage amount to approximately 9 percent for a 21-year holding
period. The financial incentive to hold the project for a long period
is not as marked as in the base case in that the present value doesn't
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rise as rapidly with increasingly long holding periods. in the case in
which no depreciation at all is allowed the present value drops to only
4 percent, while the tax-free dividend case yields a present value of
only 3 percent. Thus the value of the tax savings from being allowed to
claim construction losses more than offsets the tax liability on the
p'roject dividend. These latter cases represent just about the cash amount
required to develop such a project; attributing no foregone fee to the
developer, we would conclude that under these circumstances the developer
would achieve roughly a 15 percent return on his cash investment. How-
ever, given the vulnerability of project dividends to operating cost pres-
sures, it would notL seem likely that developers would undertake such a
risky development--they cannot extract an immediate fee by syndication
and the prospective returns are probat-ly too speculative to be evaluated
with a 15 percent discount rate. In the section on government costs we
shall examine the government costs which would be involved to compensate
for the reduced present value of these depreciation and tax revisions
and compare these combined costs with the present system.
2. Rehabilitation
Corresponding results for the rehabilitation case are presented in
Figure VI-6. The present value in the case in which depreciation is
limited to straight line is roughly competitive with the base case for
short holding periods--less than 8 years, but with longer holding periods
yields a significantly lower present value than the base case--approxi-
mately 40 percent lower at 21 years. This would be competitive with the
base case for the present treatment of new construction largely because
the use of double-declining balance for a new construction project with
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a 4 0-year i fe makes i t roughl y ccipa rabIe w i th 20-year s t rai ght- l i ne de-
preciation. The no-depreciation and tax-free-dividend cases are, of
course, comparable with the new construct ion results but lower because of
the higher discount rate assumed for the rehabilitation project. The
no-depreciation comparison is quite vulnerable to differences in the rela-
tive amounts of construction period expenses which could be claimed as
a tax loss--much more so than in phe base cases. With respect to the no-
depreciation and tax-free-dividend cases, it would again appear that
there would be little financial incentive for development.
Figure VI-6 also shows the effects of imposirg a 40-year economic
life requirement on a rehabilitation project. Such a requirement might
be imposed to reconcile the treatment of the project for mortgage pur-
poses and for tax purposes, especially in cases involving such substantial
rehabilitation in a sound building shell that the economic life should
approximate new construction. Requiring a 40-year economic life would
have the effect of reducing the project present value by about I percent
for a 21-year holding period, with larger differences for shorter hold-
ing periods.
D. ALTERNATIVE TAX TREATMENT
Depreciation changes are, of course, changes in tax treatment; other
types of change in tax treatment might also be of interest. Again de-
pending on comparisons with the base cases, the following categories of
changes in tax treatment are considered:
(1) Recapture provisions--What if new 236 construction
were also subject to the 200-month recapture rule
(as rehabilitation expenditures now are)?
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(2) Minimum tax on preference income--What is .the impact
of the minimum tax on investment value? How much
larger would the investment value have been without
the imposition of the minimum tax?
(3) Capital gains exclusion--The inclusion of the treat-
ment of capitai gains as one of the items of tax pre-
ference income made subject to the minimum tax sug-
gests that the Congress has some questions about the
equity, or at least the necessity, of the exclusion
of one-half of capital gains from taxation at ordinary
income tax rates. What if the capital gains exclusion
were withdrawn and capital gains were fully taxed at
ordinary income tax rates?
Once again new construction and rehabilitation are examined separately.
I. New Construction
Results of the computations for new construction are presented in
Figure VI-7. Imposition of the 200-month recapture rule for new con-
struction makes little difference compared with the base case, even dur-
ing the 200-month period when it would apply. Of course, a 200-month re-
capture rule would make no difference in investment value for a project
operated for longer than the 200-month period. Relief from the minimum
tax provision increases the investment value of a new construction pro-
ject by only about 1 percentage point over the base case. Subjecting
capital gains to ordinary income tax cases reduces the present value to
about 9 percent of the mortgage amount for a project held 21 years, or
about a 20 percent reduction from the base case. The holding incentive,
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i.e., the steepness of the present value curve with holding period, is.
about the same as in the base case.
2. Rehabilitation
Figure VI-8 summarizes the investment impact of the changes in tax
rules for a rehabilitation project. The minimum tax has a very sizable
effect on the magnitude of the present value; present value would be
higher by about 25 percent if the minimum tax were not imposed.1  The
minimum tax is important in the rehabilitation case because it affects
both the rather large excess depreciation (the difference between the
5-year amortization depreciation and ordinary straight-line depreciation)
and the sizable capital gain at sale.
Removal of the capital gains exclusion for rehabi-litation would re-
duce the present value of such projects by about 25 to 30 percent for
holding periods approaching 20 years--approximately the same degree of
reduction in present value that the present value would be increased by
removal of the minimum tax. Holding period incentives are apparently
not greatly changed by a switch from 20 to 40-year economic life, such as
discussed above.
E. SUMMARY
By looking at the relative risks to the investors should the base
case assumptions not hold, we have gained some appreciation for the high
discount rates typically used in evaluating the investment value of
Section 236 projects such as those described in the base cases of the
1The observation about the effect of the minimum tax on rehabilita-
tion is not included here as an argument for removing it; just the con-
trary. Such a change would only increase an apparently ample investment
incentive.
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preceding chapter. The unnecessary windfall accruing to the 70 percent
tax-bracket investor has also been shown--a 70 percent bracket investor
obtains an internal rate of return of 42 percent for providing exactly
the same amount of capital to the rehabilitation project as the 50 percent
bracket investor, yet the 50 percent bracket investor obtains an internal
rate of return of 25 percent. As will be noted in the following chapter
on government costs, the net revenue costs-also increase in the case of
the 70 percent investor even though no greater development incentives
are created.
Noting that the tax incentives may be greater than would be required
to induce developers to produce projects in sufficient numbers to use up
all of the appropriated subsidy funds, we have looked at ways in which
the tax treatment of these projects might be modified. Restriction to
straight-line depreciation is found to have a much larger effect on the
rehabilitation project than on the new construction project. Removing
the depreciation allowances entirely results in reductions in investment
value so great as to preclude development activity. The returns available
from the tax savings in expensing construction carrying charges and from
the project dividend are just barely great enough to warrant the neces-
sary cash expenditures of the developer, even if the project earns the
full allowable dividend every year of operation--a very speculative pos-
sibility. The minimum tax and capital gains exclusion provisions in the
tax laws have just about equal and opposite effects in the case of .re-
habilitation, while for new construction the removal of the capital
gains exclusion would cause a much greater reduction in investment value
of the project than the increase which would result from removal of the
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minimum tax on preference income items.
Thus the adjustment of tax devices to trim incentives to fit the
private responses desired is seen to be cumbersome and inexact, even
before examining the cost to government of this form of incentive. After
examining in the next chapter the magnitude of the net revenue losses
associated with the present tax treatment of such projects, we turn to
(1) the possibility of outright government payments as a substitution
for the investors' capital contributions to the developer, and (2)
several possible combinations of altered tax treatment combined with
supplementary government payments.
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CHAPTER VII: COST TO GOVERNMENT OF TAX INCENTIVES
A. RATIONALE
Having examined in some detail the private financial incentives for
development and operation created by tax treatment of subsidized rental
housing, we turn to the question, "What is the effective cost to the
Federal government of the revenue losses generated by such projects?" In
this analysis we shall consider the project life to be the 21-year in-
vestment horizon described for the base cases and examine the government
costs in this same framework, including the consequences of sale, just a3
has already been done for the private investor.
There are a number of ways in which government costs could be viewed.
One question is the relative or differential cost, comparing present tax
treatment to that, say, prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1969 or comparing
current treatment of non-residential new construction with residential new
construction or comparing new residential construction with rehabili-
tation. If the primary question of this work had to do with the adequacy
of the present tax incentives, these comparisons would be relevant. We
have assumed here, however, that the incentives for development are suf-
ficiently high, although the comparison between new construction and re-
habilitation is of interest. The approach for this analysis then will be
to look at the total costs to government of the tax treatment of subsi-
dized rental housing.
Another natural temptation is to look only at the accelerated por-
tion of the depreciation allowance as the "incentive" portion. However,
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this is a valid assumption only if the real economic depreciation is
straight-line. Otherwise the allowance of depreciation in excess of actual
decline in economic value amounts to an interest-free loan by the govern-
ment to the owner of the project, which loan is partially forgiven at
maturity; that is, the owner not only is allowed to defer income taxes
bbt is allowed eventually to convert at least part of the tax liability
into liability at a lower tax rate as a result of the capital gains ex-
clusion. Another temptation is to examine only the present value to
the government of the taxes lost as a result of depreciation allowances
without considering the consequences of sale, viz., that some capital
gains (and, possibly, recapture) taxes will be collected by the govern-
ment. Including taxes upon sale, of course, requires some assumptions about
the time of sale and price at sale, but then the sophisticated investor
makes judgments on these factors in evaluating investment value to him of
a potential project. The approach for this analysis will thus be to
evaluate the net revenue losses and gains for the base cases using the
same sale price assumption as in the base cases, viz., the mortgage bal-
ance outstanding at the time of sale.
We will compare the investment value of the base case projects with
the government costs of the same projects. I do not propose to undertake
a full-blown benefit-cost analysis, including measures of the value of job
creation and tenant satisfaction in these projects, for example, and seek
to conclude whether such a project should be supported from a publ i.c
policy perspective.I My assumption here is that the social need (or po-
An incisive piece of work along this line, using the techniques of
welfare economics analysis, has been completed recently by Arthur Solomon
(1971), who performed comparisons of Rent Supplement, conventional [cont.]
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litical justification) for projects such as those described by the base
cases has been established. I then evaluate government costs under the
present system and the costs which would be incurred under alternative
means for providing the necessary incentives to develop and operate the
project. Whether or not such projects, now or in the future, are deemed
to be socially desirable, I believe the analysis of costs under alterna-
tive incentive schemes is applicable more generally to the use of tax
devices to encourage development of real estate.
For both base cases, then, I obtain the present value of the taxes
and tax losses generated by each type of project, discounted at 6 percent.
For purposes of this analysis of government costs the base cases used are
those with the developer's fee (excess of capital contributions which can
be demanded of investors over the actual cash costs of the project exclu-
sive of those covered by the mortgage loan) included in the tax basis of
the project. This approach maximizes the depreciation allowances and
amount of capital contributions which the developer can demand from in-
vestors; it maximizes revenue losses as well. As far as tax costs are
concerned, then, the project is taken to be owned completely by limited
partner/investors and the government revenue calculations deal only with
the tax savings or payments of the investors.
[cont.] public housing, and leased public housing in terms of private and
social benefit and public costs. The overview of housing programs by
Aaron (1972) provides a political-economic comparison of the full range of
current Federally-supported housing programs, how they work, what their ob-
jectives might be in terms of public policy, what improvements might be made.
ISome discussion of the choice of discount rate for government and
sensitivity of the results to discount rate is included below at pp. 266-
272.
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I do not, however, include in government revenues any income tax which
a developer might have to pay on such income from the project. As dis-
cussed previously, a developer is likely to claim the income from syndi-
cating a project only if he has sufficient unused tax shelter from some
other source that the income from the project is covered. In one sense, I
should include tax on developer's income from syndication as part of the
revenue picture for the project at hand. However, a developer would at
least attempt to minimize the tax impact by income averaging; more likely
he would seek to avoid tax or at least defer it by claiming the syndica-
tion income as a capital gain or, possibly, as a return of capital, as dis-
cussed previously. In these latter cases, the government costs which will
be presented are slightly higher than they would have been should the extra
basis (syndication income, or developer's fee) have been omitted from the
tax basis of the projects, because the depreciation amounts taken would be
slightly smaller. While there might be a mild inconsistency in adding
the developer's syndication income to the project tax basis but not con-
sidering the developer's income tax on syndication income, this treatment
seems a not unreasonable cut-off point for the multiplier question. That
is, this project also generates employment and therefore taxable income for
construction workers, lawyers, accountants, architects, for example, during
the development period and bank employees, management and custodial workers,
for example, during operation; their expenditures yield additional taxable
incomes for others and so on. We do not attempt to trace the income tax
revenues on these incomes as a government benefit arising from this project,
but assume that in a full employment economy the developer as well as
these other parties would have obtained taxable incomes elsewhere from
their pursuits. In any event, an attempt to include the developer's income
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tax payments on syndication income would require either calculation of a
multitude of possible combinations of tax factors or excessively con-
straining assumptions about his tax status. Government costs are thus
computed for the base cases for the isolated projects in somewhat the
same manner as the investment analysis assumed for the private investor,
who is assumed to regarc. the project as having to stand alone as an
investment.
Government costs of primary interest are the net revenue losses to
the investor/owners of the base case projects from the point of view of
the Federal government, i.e., the U. S. Treasury. Local government costs
in the form of sper.ial tax arrangements and the Federal interest subsidy
payments are, of course, additional government costs, although primarily
directed toward achieving affordable rents for eligible tenants once the
necessary incentive to develop and operate a project has been achieved.
The Federal revenue losses are.regarded as.base costs against which
several comparisons are of interest:
(1) Comparison of base costs against those which would be
associated with restriction to a straight-line 
-de-
preciation allowance.
(2) Effect of sale price upon government costs. This is
the computation for the government which parallels the
assessment by investors of the risk that the project
will differ from the assumptions used in the syndica-
tion.
(3) Sensitivity of base costs to the government discount
rate assumed. Base costs will be presented for dis-
count rates of 4, 6, 8, and 10 percent.
(4) Total public costs. The sum of Federal costs through
tax losses from a project plus the Federal cost of
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interest subsidy payments plus local government costs in
the form of property tax abatement is compared with the
total project cost.
(5) Use of a direct fee to replace the investment value of
a project, i.e., government payment of the capital con-
tributions to the developer. Both outright payment and
payment by means of an increased mortgage amount with a
matching annual payment to cover the increment in mort-
gage payment will be considered.
(6) Altered tax rules, such as reduced depreciation allowances,
with direct government payments provided to compensate for
the reduced investment value of a project compared to that
of projects under present tax laws.
B. BASE CASE COSTS
The computation of government costs for base cases uses exactly the
same techniques as were used for computing the discounted present values
of after-tax returns for an investor. Now, however, we are interested in
the tax returns (or losses) generated by a project and the discount rate
used is not 15 or 25 percent but 6 percent. The irregular flow of funds in
such projects requires some more sophisticated method of evaluating costs
than simply initial annual costs or an arithmetic average for yearly costs,
although considerations of annual costs or the other extreme of simply
totalling revenue losses may be as far as legislative considerations of
tax legislation intended to create incentives have gone. Discounting the
stream of revenues and revenue losses provides a means for evaluati'ng dif-
ferent government programs or tax incentives in terms of their equivalent
present costs, even though the Congress has shown a distaste for actually
paying for programs in this way, commitments to spend in the future being
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favored over current spending. To the extent that political discount
rates for revenues or expenditures occurring five or six years hence are
so high as to cause these future revenues or expenditures to be disre-
garded entirely, rational analysis offers no hope nor help. I assume
here that the issue is not whether such a rational analysis should be at-
tempted but what is the proper discount rate for relating future expendi-
tures or revenues to the present. Some reasons for choosing the 6 per-
cent discount rate chosen here are offered shortly; the upshot, however,
will be that the basic observations and conclusions are unaffected within
the range of justifiable discount rates. Six percent is representative.
1. Base Case Results
Table VII-1 illustrates the calculation of the discounted present
value of government costs for the base--cases. Tax revenues are treated
as positive cash flows from the government point of view and the tax sav-
ings portion of the after-tax return of the investor becomes a negative
cash flow for government. The results indicate that the discounted
present value of government costs for the new construction case is the
equivalent of 11 percent of the mortgage amount, while the discounted
present value in the rehabilitation case is nearly 27 percent of the mort-
gage amount.
In the case of a project entirely owned by a taxpayer in the 70 per-
cent income tax bracket, Table VII-1 indicates that the discounted present
lFor example, in the revenue estimates relating to the Tax Reform Act
of 1969 made by the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation (1969),
the only figures developed for the consideration of the Congress seem to
be annual p.rojections of revenue effects for a few years, not total pro-
gram costs and not using a discounted present value analysis.
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TABLE VII-lA: FEDERAL REVENUE LOSSES, NEW CONSTRUCTION
50% BRACKET INVESTORS 70% BRACKET INVESTORS
YEAR INCOME TAX
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
DISC. VALUE
65,572.63
27,077.46
23,813.55
20,885.77
18,259.10
15,901.95
13,786.18
11,886.42
10,180.11
8,646.89
7,268.66
6,029.09
4,913.61
3,909.14
3,003.95
2,144.44
1,329.45
598.21
- 58.41
- 648.56
-1,179.56
YEAR INCOME TAX
-69,507.00
-28,702.10
-26,756.86
-24,875.23
-23,051.61
-21,280.31
-19,555.84
-17,872.67
-16,225.42
-14,608.62
-13,016.95
-11,444.89
- 9,887.04
- 8,337.80
- 6,791.54
- 5,139.20
- 3,377.21
- 1,610.81
166.73
1,962.25
3,782.94
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
DISC. VALUE
91,801.75
39,489.92
34,681.73
30,373.11
26,511.81
23,050.68
19,947.74
17,165.18
14,669.36
12,429.95
10,419.97
8,615.11
6,993.69
5,536.23
4,225.30
3,002.21
1,861.23
837.49
- 81.78
- 907.99
-1,651.39
RECOVERED AT SALE:
AMOUNT 183,672.38
DISC.VAL. 57,271.04
DISC.VAL. AT START 54,029.31
243,783.31
76,014.25
71,711.56
NET REVENUE COST TO FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
TAX LOSS LESS TAXES AT SALE, DISCOUNTED TO START OF DEVELOPMENT
ACTUAL TOTAL = 179,229.19 262,702.38
RATIO TO MTG.= 0.1100 0.1612
-97,309.81
-41 ,859.29
-38,968.33
-36,174.78
-33,470.43
-30,846.88
-28,296.09
-25,809.93
-23,380.55
-20,999.96
-18,660.41
-16,353.88
-14,072.51
-11,808.23
- 9,552.88
- 7,194.88
- 4,728.09
- 2,255.14
233.42
2,747.16
5,296.12
TAXES
TAX:
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TABLE VII-iB: FEDERAL REVENUE LOSSES, REHABILITATION
50% BRACKET INVESTORS 70% BRACKET INVESTORS
YEAR
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
TAXES
TAX:
INCOME TAX
- 75,125.00
-131,601.69
-130,286.38
-129,049.00
-127,878.56
-126,746.25
1,686.92
2,589.76
3,517.41
4,486.89
5,437.61
6,377.35
6,932.48
7,529.26
8,170.82
8,860.48
9,601.85
10,398.85
11,255.60
12,176.60
13,166.66
YEAR INCOME TAXDISC. VALUE
70,872.63
124,152.56
115,954.56
108,352.25
101,292.13
94,712.56
- 1,189.22
- 1,722.35
- 2,206.89
- 2,655.81
- 3,036.36
- 3,359.54
- 3,445.27
- 3,530.05
- 3,614.01
- 3,697.22
- 3,779.79
- 3,861.82
- 3,943.40
- 4,024.60
- 4,105.50
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
-105,174.94
-193,734.44'
-191,788.3
-189,961.25
-188,236.75
-186,581.19
2,282.59
3,598.18
4,924.38
6,281.64
7,612.65
8,928.29
9,705.47
10,540.96
11,439.15
.12,404.66
13,442.59
14,558.39
15,757.84
17,047.24
18,433.32
RECOVERED AT SALE:
AMOUNT
DI SC. VAL.
349,572.81
109 ,000.56
463,978.38
144,673.50
136,484.50DISC.VAL. AT START 102,830.75
NET REVENUE COST TO FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
TAX LOSS LESS TAXES AT SALE, DISCOUNTED TO START OF DEVELOPMENT
ACTUAL TOTAL = 436,241.88 655,298.56
RATIO TO MTG.= 0.2673 0.4015
DISC. VALUE
99,221.69
182,768.38
170,691.25
159,495.44
149,101.69
139,424.88
- 1,609.15
- 2,393.01
- 3,089.64
- 3,718.13
- 4,250.90
- 4,703.36
- 4,823.38
- 4,942.07
- 5,059.62
- 5,176.11
- 5,291.71
- 5,406.55
- 5,520.75
- 5,634.43
- 5,747.71
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value of the Federal revenue losses amounts to 16 percent of the mort-.
gage for new construction and 40 percent for rehabilitation, obviously a
result of the larger tax savings enjoyed by the 70 percent bracket investor.
It should be kept in mind in the ensuing discussion that the comparisons
are made for the case of a 50 percent bracket owner. -or the cases in
which an alternative means of achieving the development and operating in-
centives reduces government costs below the present costs with 50 percent
bracket owners, clearly the reduction in government costs would be even
larger in the case of 70 percent owners. The results can therefore be
viewed as representing a conservative evaluation; the cost reductions shown
are the minimum ones which could be achieved.
Table VII-2 compares these results with the valuation placed on these
same projects by private investors. We see that the discounted present
value of the new construction project is roughly comparable for both govern-
ment and private investor. This result occurs despite the use of a 6 per-
cent discount rate for government contrasted with the 15 percent discount
rate assumed for the investor because the present value of the large capi-
tal gains tax upon sale is larger from the government perspective than
from the perspective of the private investor. In the rehabilitation case,
however, the present value of government costs is seen to be much larger
than the present value of the project to a private investor, for whom the
present value amounts to less than 20 percent of the mortgage amount. We
shall presently see, moreover, that in both cases government could ,reduce
net costs, while accomplishing the same results, either by direct payment
to the developer or by augmentation (through direct payments to the de-
veloper) of options for tax treatment with lower government cost, such as
WTABLE VII-2: COMPARISON OF GOVERNMENT COSTS AND INVESTOR VALUATION OF ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION
P.V. IF ONLY
P.V. UNDER
EXISTING TAX LAW
NEW CONSTRUCTION
GOVERNMENT
PRIVATE INVESTOR 3
REHABILITATION
GOVERNMENT
PRIVATE INVESTOR
11.00%2
12.68
26.73
19.76
STRAIGHT-LINE
DEPRECIATION ALLOWED
7.13%
9.80
17.46
11.37
CHANGE IN P.V.
3.87 percentage points
2.88 percentage points
9.27 percentage points
8.39 percentage points
IAll revenues and losses discounted at >% for government.
2Present values expressed as a percentage of the mortgage amount.
3All after-tax returns discounted at 15% for new construction and 25% for rehabilitation,
assuming a tax sinking fund has been established, if necessary.
0\
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reduced depreciation allowances. But that gets a little ahead of the
story. For the moment Table VI1-2 simply illustrates the relative in-
creases in present value of the present depreciation treatment compared
with straight-line depreciation. It is clear that with accelerated
depreciation allowed the project increases in value to the private investor
less than the government costs increase. This is an indication of the ap-
parent inefficiency of-accelerated depreciation as a tax incentive to in-
duce development and operation of this type of project.
2. Effect of Sale Price
At an earlier point the importance of sale price to the investor was
assessed. This is a good point at which to examine the changes in govern-
ment costs which would be connected with sale prices other than the one as-
sumed in the base cases, viz., the outstanding mortage balance at the time
of sale. Table VII-3 presents comparisons of government costs and private
investment value for both base cases under the assumptions that the pro-
ject is sold at the end of the 21st project year for (1) the mortgage
balance, (2) the mortgage balance plus an amount equal to the taxes due
at sale, (3) a price declining in a straight-line from the original total
replacement cost to the land value over the economic life of the project
(in the case of the rehabilitation project, this is just the value of the
land, because we have assumed an economic life of 20 years from completion
of construction), (4) the original total replacement cost. Since the
taxes at sale vary directly with the sale price, naturally both government
and the private investor are affected in the same direction; a higher
sale price provides more net after-tax income for the investor, but also
increases the tax revenue at sale of the government. What is clear from
- 90 -"ONM
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TABLE VII-3: COMPARISON OF GOVERNMENT COSTS AND INVESTOR EVALUATION OF SALE PRICE
SALE PRICE (YR. 21)
Base Case - Mort-
gage Balance.
Sale at Mortgage
Balance plus
Taxes Due
Sale at Straight-
Line Declining
Price (Owner
Pays Mortgage)
NEW CONST R UC T10N R E H AB I L I TAT10N
PRESENT PRESENT VALUE PRESENT PRESENT VALUE
VALUE TO OF GOV'T. COST2  % CHANGE VALUE TO OF GOV'T. COST % CHANGE
INVESTORS (% MTG.) FROM BASE CASE INVESTORS3  (% MTG.) FROM BASE CASE
11.00%
12.68 (10.43 for 40-yr. -- 19.76% 26.73% --
holding period)
15.89
9.30
10.06
12.93
down 8.57%
up 17.48
22.59
6.94
24.34
33.03
down 8.96%
up 23.54
Investor Discount Rate of 15% for New Construction
2Government Discount Rate of 6%
3lnvestor Discount Rate of 25% for Rehabilitation
4Government Costs are 10.43% of Mortgage Amount for a 40-Year Holding Period
a'j
0 40 41 V
.............. V
----------
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Table VII-3, however, is that even at the higher discount rates of the pri-
vate investor (compared with governnent discount rates) the relative in-
crease or decrease in present value attributable to differences in sale
price is greater for the private investor than for government because
government only shares in approximately 25 to 30 percent of the change in
gain at sale. In all the cases the total government <..ost (discounted
present value, that is) of the rehabilitation project is approximately
three times that of the new construction project.
If these types of projects are considered to be public means for pro-
viding housing for families in a selected income range, however, one might
well question the wisdom of examining only tax revenues in the case in
which the project is sold at a profit. If the sale is. to the tenants,
they will have had to pay a premium over the mortgage amount in cash or
ultimately in rents unless they are able to refinance for the full amount
at terms which make possible repayment with the same annual mortgage pay-
ment. If the project could be refinanced for the original mortgage terms
and amount, the principal repayment of approximately 17 percent of the
original mortgage could be recovered. If the project is sold on the open
market for a price substantially above the mortgage amount, the conse-
quences to the tenants are similar--the rents are likely to be increased
both in order to carry the higher mortgage payment and to yield a higher
before-tax cash return on the increased "value" of the project. (See
also the computations on sale amount in the discussion on investor risks
in Chapter VI at pp. 225-237.
3. Choice of Discount Rate
Before going further some discussion of the choice of discount rate
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for evaluating the public costs of these projects is in order. We have
been using a discount rate of 6 percent, but it is important to know why
this was chosen and what difference it would make if other values were
used for the government discount rate. The question is that of the appro-
priate relationship between time and money from the government perspective
when the issue at hand is that of the present value of tax revenues fore-
gone in the future. This question is the inverse of the one usually
asked in benefit-cost analyses of potential public investment, where the
government outlay is in the present and the benefits to accrue from a
project are to occur in the future. In these cases the decision to under-
take a public investment depends on whether the present value of the futare
benefits, discounted at an appropriate rate of return, exceed the oppor-
tunity cost of the consumption stream foregone because the funds involved
are not available for private investment. (Musgrave, 1969)
Hearings in 1968 before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of
the U. S. Congress Joint Economic Committee produced a degree of consensus
on discount rates for public investments: the minimum rate should be ap-
proximately 5 percent, based on the Federal Bureau of the Budget (now Of-
fice of Management and Budget) and Water Resources Council procedures,
which, in turn, rely on running averages of the yield on long-term, es-
sentially riskless, government securities. In establishing the upper
bound on discount rates the Subcommittee concluded that the appropriate
interest rate concept is the opportunity cost of the private spending or
investment displaced by the public demand on resources through a public
investment. Three possible rules were stipulated: (1) use the before-
tax rate of return on private investments (of comparable risk, presumably),
(2) for tax-financed investments the opportunity cost involves both a
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reduction in private consumption and a reduction in private saving (and
therefore investment), thus the discount rate should be related only
partially to private interest rates, and (3) for debt-financed public
investments the opportunity costs must be traced back through the conse-
quences in the capital market of competition for investment funds. The
upshot of the Subcommittee's observations was a conclusion that (as of
1968) the upper range of discount rates should be in the range of from 8
to 10 percent. (U. S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee (1968))
In the case of tax incentives, however, we are talking about en-
couraging a reallocation of private investment to favor housing by pro-
mising future government payments in the form of tax savings. In this
case, it is not so clear how the correct social discount rate should be
determined, except by considering how it is used in this analysis. I
will shortly be comparing the discounted present value of the present
tax treatment of subsidized rental housing with the discounted present
value of alternative schemes for more direct government payment. One in-
volves immediate payment, presumably out of tax revenues (since that is
the predominant means of meeting the housing program payments included
in the Federal Budget, even in a year of some budget deficit). The other
scheme will assume that the Federal costs of direct payment are borne
through annual payments on an increment in a project mortgage, again paid
out of current revenue. In the first scheme private consumption and
savings are assumed to be affected by the increase in taxes required to
meet the direct payments. The private opportunity cost for the displaced
funds might thus approach the 8 to 10 percent range. In the .second scheme
the increased mortgage amount reduces the capital resources available to
the private sector and imposes an annual revenue requirement to meet the
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obligation on the mortgage incremen1t. Since this is a form of debt
financing, a lower bound for the discount rate would be the yield on long-
term government securities, or approximately 4 to 6 percent. Consequently
the basic calculations are done using a 6 percent discount rate, but the
fundamental comparisons between costs of the present tax arrangement and the
proposed alternatives are made using a range of discount rates as low as
4 percent and as high as 10 percept.
The discounted present values of government costs for the base cases
as well as for the alternative direct payment schemes are shown in Table
VII-4 for discount rates of 4, 6, 8, and 10 percent. (The direct payment
schemes included in Table VI -4 are discussed shortly.) Government costs
under present tax treatment are seen to vary only slightly over this range
of discount rates. The new construction base case has a discounted present
value of government costs equivalent to between 10.6 and 11.0 percent of
the mortgage amount, while the rehabilitation case ranges from 25.2 to
27.2 percent of the mortgage amount. The calculation of government cost
is thus relatively insensitive to discount rate over the range of discount
rates of interest. 2  After presenting the results on total public costs,
Average yields on long-term U. S. Treasury bonds were approximately
4 percent for the period 1960 to 1965, leveled at about 5.2 percent during
1968, reached a peak of 7 percent in mid-1970 and then declined to approxi-
mately 5.5 percent by the end of 1971. For comparison, the average yields
on new corporate bonds (Moody's Aa) were 4.5 percent in the early sixties,
rose to about 6.8 percent by 1968, peaked at 9.6 percent in mid-1970 and
had declined to 7.8 percent by the end of 1971. (See U. S. Treasury Dept.,
Treasury Bulletin, November 1971.) -
2 If the Federal revenues and revenue losses are simply summed, i.e.,
a discount rate of zero percent is used, then the "present value" of Federal
costs is found to be 8.13 percent of the mortgage amount for new construc-
tion and 15.86 percent for rehabilitation. While unrealistic in terms of
public investment analysis, such computations--simply obtaining the [cont.]
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TABLE VII-4A: SENSITIVITY OF GOVERNMENT COSTS TO DISCOUNT RATE, NEW CONSTRUCTION (DDB DEPRECIATION)
GOV'T. DISCOUNT
RATE = 0%
P.V. OF ? CHANGE
GOV'T. COST FROM
(% MTG.) BASE COST P.V. CHANGE
6%
P.V CHANGE
8%
P.V CHANGE
10%
P.V. CHANGE
DEVELOPER/INVESTOR OWNED
1. Base Case
(Dividends Earned)
2. No Dividends
3. No Dividends and
Project Foreclosed
in Year 21
GOV'T. OBTAINS OWNER-
SHIP BY PAYING FEE
TO DEVELOPER
1. Outright Payment:
a. Dividends Applied
b. Dividends Lost
c. Dividends Lost
and Project Lost
in Year 21
2. Payment from Mort-
gage with Increased
Annual Subsidy:
a. Dividends Applied
b. Dividends Lost
c. Dividends Lost
and Project Lost
in Year 21
8.13%
14.8
97.5
1.15
14.48
97.2
15.11
28.48
111.0
-- 10.77%
Up Up
82.0 15.13 40.43
-- 11.00%
14.61
-- 10.89%
Up
32.79 13.92
-- 10.59%
Up
27.83
Up Up Up Up
1099.0 50.65 370.14 38.42 249.24 30.0 175.52
Down
85.9
Up
Down . Down
5.22 51.54 6.46 41.24
Up
Down
7.38 32.26
Up
76.8 13.93 29.32 13.68 24.34 13.44
Up Up Up
1095.0 49.45 359.02 37.48 240.80
Up
85.9
Up
250.0
Down
9.86 8.47
Up
18.57 72.39
8.18
15.39
Down
25.68
Up
39.90
Up Up Up
1268.0 54.09 402.09 39.20 256.35
Up
23.40
Up
29.52 171.09
6.88
12.94
Down
32.26
Up
18.85
Up
29.02 166.53
13.17
Up
24.36
Up
24.11 127.67
Down
8.05 24.02
13.21
Up
24.71
Up
24.15 128.02
Down
5.87 44.58
11.03
Up
4.14
U I
21.97 107.45
C~3
e e06
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TABLE VII-4B: SENSITIVITY OF GOVERNMENT COSTS TO DISCOUNT RATE, REHABILITATION (5-YR. DEPRECIATION)
GOV'T. DISCOUNT
RATE = 0%
P.V. OF
GOV'T. COST
DEVELOPER/INVESTOR OWNED
1. Base Case
(Dividends Earned)
2. No Dividends
3. No Dividends and
Project Foreclosed
in Year 21
GOV'T. OBTAINS OWNER-
SHIP BY PAYING FEE
TO DEVELOPER
1. Outright Payment:
a. Dividends Applied
b. Dividends Lost
c. Dividends Lost
and Project Lost
in Year 21
2. Payment from Mort-
gage with Increased
Annual Subsidy:
a. Dividends Applied
b. Dividends Lost
c. Dividends Lost
and Project Lost
in Year 21
% CHANGE
FROM
(% MTG.) BASE COST
15.86%
22.5
105.1
10.95
24.29
106.9
34.38
47.65
130.4
4%
P.V. CHANGE
6%
P.V. CHANGE
-- 26.73%
30.34
8%
P.V. CHANGE
-- 27.19%
Up Up
13.50 30.22 11.15
Up
54.15 102.56
15.73
22.94
46.75
18.60
25.81
49.62
Down
41.15
Down
14. 16
Up
74.88
Down
30.41
Down
3.42
Up
85.62
46.30
Up
70.43
Down
16.48 39.40
22.54
38.62
15.64
21.70
37.78
Down
17.10
Up
42.16
Down
42.46
Down
20.16
Up
39.10
Up,
41.9
Up
563.0
Up
201.1
Up
721.0
Up
29.55 17.29
Up
65.07 158.28
Down Down
30.91 14.66 41.82
Up 
-
53.15
Up
573.0
Down
23.37 7.24
Down
58.89 133.31
Up Down
116.7 22.44 10.92
Up
31.15 23.66
Up
66.67 164.65
10%
P.V. CHANGE
-- 26.99%
29.57
40.51
16.99
22.15
33.09
13.34
18.50
29.44
Up
9.56
Up
50.10
Down
37,04
Down
17.92
Up
22.61
Down
50.58
Down
31.46
Up
9.08
-- 25.19%
0 4110 9 4000
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most of the remaining discussion on government costs will assume a govern-
ment discount rate of 6 percent. As it turns out, the government costs
are at a maximum in the range of discount rates from 6 to 8 percent for
these base case computations.
Table VII-4 also shows the impact on government costs of loss of
dividends in a project and of foreclosure on the project mortgage at the
end of the twenty-first year. These are elements of government "risk"
comparable to the investor risk for these same situations we have previ-
ously evaluated. The changes in government cost will be of particular in-
terest when we consider the direct payment schemes and consider the im-
pact of loss of dividends or foreclosure under government ownership ver-
sus ownership by private investors. The revenue loss for the Federal
government connected with loss of dividends in a project results in a
marked increase in government costs for the new construction case--an
increase of 25 to 40 percent, depending on the discount rate used--but
for rehabilitation cases a smaller increase in costs--in the range of
10 to 18 percent--because of the relatively larger revenue losses as-
sociated with the depreciation allowances in the case of rehabilitation.
In the event of foreclosure, of course, government costs rise very
markedly, even when it occurs as late as the twenty-first project year.
I assume that the project is a total loss as the most extreme possibility.
The results in the event of foreclosure are also quite sensitive to the
[cont.] sum of all costs without regard for timing--are nevertheless
occasionally used in assessing tax implications by the Congress. I
do not regard undiscounted sums as a valid method for determining
government costs for this work, but these results are also given for
selected cases.
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discount rate, because the magnitudes of loss required to cover the
mortgage amount are quite large (83 percent of the original mortgage
amount), yet are taken to occur in the distant future. Comparing
government risk in these cases (using a 6 percent discount rate)
with investor risk for the same circumstances (compare Table Vll-4
with Figures VI-1 and VI-3), we see that for the loss of dividends
case the present value of government costs increases by 3.6 percent of
the mortgage amount compared with a reduction in present value of the
project to the investor by 2.2 percent of the mortgage amount for a
new project (15 percent discount rate) or by 2.0 percent of the mort-
gage amount for a rehabilitation project (25 percent discount rate).1
In the case of loss of dividends and project foreclosure, the
present value of government costs increases by the equivalent of 40 per-
cent of the mortgage amount while the investor's assessment of present
value in those circumstances is no different from the case of losing divi-
dends only, since a foreclosure is regarded by the IRS, hence by the in-
vestor, as having the same after-tax consequences as a sale at the
mortgage balance. Even though the loss in a foreclosure on an FHA-in-
sured loan is borne by an insurance fund, I make the conservative assump-
tion that this loss should be regarded as a public cost in the cost
comparisons for government.
Recall that we are examining here the present values of government
and investors, i.e., their respective assessments now of hypothetical
future occurrances.
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4. Total Public Costs
Only the net Federal revenue costs of rental projects have been
examined thus far; it is of interest before proceeding to note the sum of
publicly borne costs in such projects from three sources: (1) net revenue
costs for the Federal government, (2) Federal interest subsidy payments,
(3) local real estate taxes foregone. The Federal interest subsidy pay-
ment is that required to make up the difference between the annual amount
the mortgage holder (mortgagee) would receive at market interest rates
(within the FHA interest rate ceiling plus the one-half percent mortgage
insurance premium) and the amount required to amortize a loan over the
same period at an interest rate of one percent. This is, of course, the
maximum amount of the annual Federal interest subsidy payment. In the
event that tenant incomes rose above the maximum level qualifying for the
maximum interest subsidy, the tenant rent would be increased (within
the limit of the rent required to pay the full market rate interest rate)
so as to pay 25 percent of adjusted income for rent. The required annual
Federal subsidy would then be diminished. Two cases are thus examined
for the interest subsidy calculations: (1) assuming the maximum Federal
interest subsidy payment over the life of the project (we are concerned
here about only the 20-year investment horizon of the base cases for con-
sistency), and (2) assuming tenant incomes rise over a period of 10 years
at such a 'rate that by the end of the 10-year period everyone in the
project is paying the full market rent without Federal subsidy.
That the 10-year phase-out of subsidy payments is plausible can be
seen by reference to the base case. There we have a basic rent (fully in-
terest subsidized) of $136.50 per month, or $1,638 per year. For this
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rent to represent 25 percent of adjusted income the maximum eligible ad-
justed income would be $6,552. The adjustments are $300 per minor de-
pendent (two assumed in this case) and an allowance of 5 percent of gross
income for payroll withholding. The resulting eligible gross income is
$7,521. The question is, how much could this income rise before the family
would no longer be eligible for interest subsidy? The maximum interest
subsidy available is $797.45 per year. Assuming no change in dependents,
the family income could rise by an increment such that 25 percent of
the increment (after the 5 percent allowance for payroll withholding)
matches the interest subsidy. The allowable increment is thus $797.45/
(0.25 x 0.95) or $3,357. An increase in annual income of $3,357 repre-
sents an annual rate of increase of 3.75 percent over a 10-year period,
starting from $7,521. A family's income would have to increas'e this much
just to keep abreast of inflation. Thus the 10-year phase-out of interest
subsidy payments is even conservative. On the other hand it is unlikely
that all of the original tenants will remain in the project for even 10
years. Replacement households might well be admitted with incomes quali-
fying for the full subsidy. Using the 20-year payment period for the
subsidy thus covers the other extreme in which all of the tenants in the
project continue to qualify for the full subsidy.
As tabulated in Table VII-5, the discounted present value of the
full, 20-year interest subsidy payments is seen to be quite large in com-
parison with the discounted present value of the foregone revenues,.
roughly 4 to 6 times as large for new construction and better than twice
as large for rehabilitation. For the 10-year phase-out case the present
value of the interest subsidy payments is still larger than the tax costs
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TABLE VII-5: TOTAL PUBLIC COSTS -- DISCOUNTED PRESENT VALUE
AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE MORTGAGE AMOUNT
GOV'T. DISCOUNT RATE =
4% 6% 8% 10%
NEW CONSTRUCTION
FEDERAL INCOME TAX LOSS
FEDERAL INTEREST SUBSIDY
- 20-YR. PAYMENT
- 10 YR. PHASEOUT
LOCAL REAL ESTATE TAX ABATEMENT
TOTAL PUBLIC COSTS
- 20-YR. PAYMENT
- 10-YR. PHASEOUT
10.77% 11.00% 10.89% 10.59%
63.96
22.23
10.91
85.64
43.91
52.96
20.32
9.03
72.99
40.35
REHABILITAT ION
FEDERAL INCOME TAX LOSS
FEDERAL INTEREST SUBSIDY
- 20-YR. PAYMENT
- 10-YR PHASEOUT
LOCAL REAL ESTATE TAX ABATEMENT
TOTAL PUBLIC COSTS
- 20-YR. PAYMENT
- 10-YR. PHASEOUT
25.19 26.73
63.96
22.23
10.91
109.04
58.32
52.96
20.32
9.03
88.72
56.07
44.49
18.64
7.59
62.97
37.12
37.88
17.15
6.46
54.93
34.20
27.19
44.49
18.64
7.59
79.27
53.41
26.99
37.88
17.15
6.46
71.32
50.60
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by a factor of as much as two for new construction, but for rehabilita-
tion the present value of the interest subsidy payments is about one-half
to one-third as large as the tax costs.
The amounts shown for local government revenues foregone are only a
rough approximation. Typical practices for real estate assessment of non-
subsidized rental property are to set the assessment on a new structure
such that at the tax rate of the local municipality (or other local tax-
ing authority) the annual property taxes will amount to 15 to 25 percent
of gross rent. (Touche Ross, 1971) Developers of projects under Section
236 are often able to arrange for an assessment that will impose an an-
nual property tax of 15 percent of the total basic rent (that is, the
fully subsidized rent) or approximately 10 percent of the full market
rent. At the very least, therefore, the effective contribution of the
local taxing authority is the difference in taxes or about 10 percent of
basic rent. This assumes, of course, that the tax generated by the parcel
of land and improvements (buildings) where a Section 236 project is lo-
cated would have produced tax revenues equal to 25 percent of total basic
rent of a Section 236 project if some other use were made of the land.
While some Section 236 projects might arguably have been located on land
which had been left vacant (or buildings which had been left unrehabili-
tated) because the market for housing could not support any improvement,
one could argue for other locations of 236 projects that conventionally
financed, market-rate rental units and could have yielded tax revenues
even greater than the equivalent of 25 percent of basic rents for the puta-
tive Section 236 project, because project rents would have been even
higher than 236 basic rents. In other cases, some commercial or indus-
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trial use might have produced higher property tax revenues stil'. It
is impossible to resolve these questions in the framework of an analysis
of "typical" projects, but it does not seem unreasonable to assert that
a tax loss for local government is generated by a typical Section 236
project in an amount equal to 10 percent of basic rents.
Table VIl-5 indicates that for the base cases the present value of
this estimate of local'government cost (discounted at the same rates as
the Federal costs) lies in the range of 8 to 13 percent, depending on the
discount rate used (between 10 and 4 percent). These costs are roughly
comparable to the Federal tax costs of a new project and about one-half
to one-third of the Federal tax costs of a, rehabilitation project. The
role of the tax abatement by local government is comparable to the inter-
est subsidy by the Federal government: it enables a lower rent to be
charged to the tenants. This contrasts with the role of the Federal
depreciation allowances, which do not reduce rents but increase the
profitability of the project.
When the Federal costs (tax losses plus interest subsidy payments)
are added to the estimated local revenue losses, the results may be a
bit surprising. The most extreme case is that of rehabilitation with
full interest subsidy payment over the 20-year project life and using a
government discount rate of 4 percent.1 In that case the discounted
present value of the government costs associated with the project is
equivalent to the entire cost of the project! Such a result immediately
Four percent is admittedly on the low side, since even long-term
government securities have not consistently been as low as 4 percent
since 1963. (Treasury Bulletin, U. S. Treasury Dept., 1971)
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leads to speculation on the possibility of outright government ownership
of such a project with rents required only to cover operating costs but
not repayment of debt, i.e., the same depth of tenant subsidy as in the
public housing program, where Federal payments cover the annual costs of
debt service on local housing authority capital bonds, but at government
costs equal to the moderate-income Section 236 program. Even for higher
government discount rates the totgl public costs associated with a re-
habilitation project have a present value representing a major fraction
of actual project costs. The new construction examples are lower than the
rehabilitation ones simply by the difference in Federal revenue costs,
since the interest subsidy payments and real estate tax abatements are
taken to be the same in both cases. I have already hinted at the possi-
bility of outright payment by government of all project costs as an al-
ternative in the rehabilitation case which might be no more costly to
government than the combined government costs of revenue losses (Federal
and local) and interest subsidy payments. A less extreme option might be
a direct payment of the developer's fee with the remainder of project
finances continuing as at present--mortgage loan covering other capital
costs, interest subsidy for providing reduced rents to tenants, tenant
rents covering operating costs and (reduced) debt service. I shall, now
explore the direct payment options in some detail.
C. DIRECT PAYMENT OF DEVELOPER FEE
In the discussion to this point we have seen that in the case of a
typical developer of Section 236 projects the investment value in these
projects created by the favorable depreciation allowances and mortgage
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loan terms is captured in the very early life of the project by ::he de-
veloper through syndication. That is, by establishing a limited partner-
ship with the developer as a (sometimes the) general partner, high-tax
bracket investors can be induced to contribute funds to the partnership
in return for a share in the tax shelter which the project can provide
for the investor's other ordinary income. The excess of these capital
contributions by the limited partner/investors over the actual cash
costs to the developer of the project amount to a fee paid to the developer
for his services in developing the project and assuring the investor
that the project will remain sound and operating successfully over the in-
vestment horizon of, typically, 20 years. We have seen that because of
the risk inherent in these projects, the investors demand a relatively
high rate of return on their invested funds, i.e., the after-tax returns
of the project are heavily discounted (in the range of 15 to 25 percent).
The government, however, which is providing the greater part of the after-
tax return in the form of foregone revenues, can afford to use a much
lower discount rate (in the range of 4 to 10 percent) for assessing the
importance to government of the revenues which will be foregone (or col-
lected) in the future. As we have seen, the upshot is that, while the
developer is able to extract an adequate fee by this process, the govern-
ment costs may at least equal or, in the case of rehabilitation, greatly
exceed the effective investment value to the private investor. Viewed
in this perspective the role of the Federal tax incentive is seen largely
as a very complex and cumbersome way of getting the developer a fee for
his services.
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1. Outright Replacement of Investors' Capital Contributions
Since the present result of accelerated depreciation allowances is
to provide a mechanism for the developer to extract a development fee,
the direct approach would be to pay this fee outright and avoid the pas-
sive (and remote) investors as well as the legal and administrative ex-
penses of syndication. HUD could administer direct fees to the developer
just as it now administers the interest subsidy on behalf of the tenants.
Fee schedules could be negotiated with individual developers or set by
regional offices and could reflect the more risky nature of central city
rehabilitation by allowing higher fees there. Similarly, fees for new
construction projects could be set higher in those areas where the local
HUD office determines there is the greatest need, not just where there is
open land or little opposition, as is often the present case.
While a flexible fee schedule would seem reasonable if the govern-
ment were to pay the developer fee directly, a fair comparison of al-
ternatives should match the alternative scheme and the present one. Using
the base case examples I assume that direct government payments are used
to replace the capital contributions of the limited/partner investors.
I assume that project costs are otherwise held constant and that the
"required" fee for the developer is exactly the same as in the base cases
for which the tax basis was maximized by including the developer's fee.
The government payment to be made is thus assumed to be the same as that
which would have been made to the developer by limited partner/investors
and is assumed to be paid in the same schedule, viz., three annual install-
ments beginning with the inception of development (at the outset of the
project, before construction begins). But the Congress might be reluctant
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to appropriate funds to replace the capital contributions at the time
when they are required for paymcnt to the developer.
Alternatively, development fees could be included in the mortgage
of a subsidized low- and moderate-income housing project. Little admini-
strative cost would be added to the mortgage insurance mechanisms by
allowing the HUD area office or FHA insuring office to set fees for de-
velopment at rates required in each local area, just as is now done in
categories such as architect's fees, legal fees, builder's overhead al-
lowance and so on. If it is acknowledged that the government is actually
paying a developer fee (in addition to insuring the mortgage) through
the costly and clumsy method of offering tax savings to investors, then
there is no reason why the BSPRA could not be increased from 10 percent
to 20 percent or whatever local experience showed was necessary to induce
development in the absence of the tax incentive. The developer's fee
would then come from the mortgage p roceeds at completion of construction.
A proposal to finance developer fees out. of mortgage proceeds is
admittedly reminiscent of the scandalized Section 608 program of Federally
ISome thinking about flexible profit and risk allowances on the part
of HUD is already evident, as for example the administration bill intro-
duced in 1970 (H.R. 16643), which in Section 506(c) (2) allows the amount
of profit included in a mortgage application to be administratively de-
termined rather than limited by a statutory ceiling. In the House testi-
money on the bill Mr. Barrett of the National Corporation for Housing
Partnerships expressed concern that this might mean even lower allow-
ances than the 10 percent Builder's and Sponsor's Profit and Risk Al low-
ance of the Section 236 program. (U. S. Congress, House, 1970) My con-
cern with flexible allowances would be that the mortgage amounts could be
increased to provide a developer fee without action being taken concur-
rently on tax treatment of these projects to remove the fee available
from the savings. Concurrent action would be necessary so that neither
double windfalls nor complete discouragement of development through both
reduced mortgage amounts and reduced tax allowances occurred.
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insured apartment building construction. Some 469,000 units of housing
were built or rehabilitated under the 608 program between its enactment
in 1942 and its demise in 1954. (U. S. Senate, 1970) The program al-
lowed mortgage loans in excess of direct project costs to be insured.
In The City Is the Frontier Charles Abrams (1965) pointed out that in
Senator Capehart's investigation of the 608 program in 1954 it was found
that 80 percent of the mortgages issued covered more than the project
costs. Because of excesses and the general revulsion of the public to
the notion of windfalls to builders, the program was terminated and strict
cost certification requirements were instituted on subsequent FHA pro-
grams. (See House and Home (1954) for a description of the scandal.)
Tax allowances are, of course, now being used for the same purpose as the
inflated loans of the 608 program--to induce development. Perhaps public
opinion would not be so harsh on a well-regulated program of direct pay-
ments to developers., much like contractors for government procurements
of other sorts, in a more sophisticated age. If direct payments were
found to be politically unacceptable even now, then serious questions
should be raised about performing exactly the same function through spe-
cial tax benefits.
Even assuming political feasibility such a scheme of direct payments
out of mortgage proceeds is conceivable, of course, only under a system
of Federally insured loans for housing. Otherwise mortgage lenders
would be uninterested in loaning funds in excess of those required di-
rectly for the project. Conventional lenders might be persuaded to
make loans at high loan-to-value ratios if the lender were convinced that
the projected cash flow from a project was quite high and that a high
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market value could therefore be justified on the basis of the capitalized
income expected from the project. The usual approach for developers of
commercial property is just this; create a project such that the prospec-
tive cash flow justifies a market value well above the sum of input
costs in the project and obtain a mortgage -loan that covers all of the
direct costs of the project, even at loan-to-value ratios of 75 to 80
percent. But, as discussed previously, Section 236 projects with limited
cash income do not have a high capitalized value. In principle the re-
quired funds for the developer payments could come from another lending
source (also with Federal guarantees); in the examples to be computed the
effect of an alternate lender for the developer fee would be exactly the
same as long as the interest rate was thesame.
What if larger developer fees were allowed in the mortgage calcula-
tion, so that the mortgage payment for the project was 15 percent higher,
for example, than is presently the case? Without additional mortgage
loan subsidy, of course, this would raise the required rent and eligible
incomes. It would be necessary, therefore, to make up the difference by
additional government payments to the mortgage lender. For comparisons
between base case costs and direct payment via increased mortgage loan,
it is assumed that the mortgage.amount is sufficiently increased to pro-
vide just the amount of additional funds required for the three payments
to the developer and that the Federal government makes a commitment to
augment the payments which would otherwise have been paid to the mortgage
lender on the tenant's behalf by an amount sufficient to amortize the in-
crement added to the mortgage without altering the effective rent to the
tenant.
The amortization period of this increment should be the.mortgage term,
if government discount rates are above the interest rate, but the amorti-
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zation period should be minimized if discount rates are below the mort-
gage interest rate.
Table VII-6 illustrates the computation of the discounted present
value to government of direct payments in lieu of the investors' capi-
tal contributions, both assuming outright payment (as from current
revenues) and assuming the mortgage loan is increased by an amount suf-
ficient to cover the payments to the developer. Comparisons are made
shortly (in Table Vii-4) between the present value of government costs
in the base cases and under the assumed fee replacement schemes. First,
some questions are raised concerning project ownership.
If the total costs for all resources, including the developer/build-
er's services, are covered by a combination of the mortgage loan and
direct payments by government of the capital contributions normally con-
tributed by investors (Derhaps through the mortgage also, as suggested
above), then one could argue that the title to the property should belong
to government, subject to a mortgage which is fully guaranteed by the
Federal government. It is but a short step to the notion that the Federal
government could offer the project to a tenant cooperative at no cost.
Furthermore, the government would then have claim to the annual dividend
which the project rents are supposed to generate, assuming that the rents
stay at eactly same level as they were in the base case under owne-rship
of the limited dividend sponsor, i.e., the limited partnership of the de-
veloper and the limited partner investors. Thus the government could ap-
ply the dividends in several possible ways: (1) use them to reduce the
annual costs of interest subsidy payments and the cost of having paid the
equivalent of the investors' capital contributions, (2) use them to en-
large the annual management fee to provide a bonus to the managing agent for
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TABLE VII-6A: GOVERNMENT COSTS FOR DIRECT PAYMENT
OF DEVELOPER -- NEW CONSTRUCTION
OUTRIGHT PAYMENT:
CAP I TAL
YR. CONTRIBUTION
0 $ 78,653.94
1 78,653.94
2 78,653.94
TOTAL PRESENT VALUE =
DISCOUNTED
PRESENT VALUE
$ 78,653.94
74,201.83
70,001.73
$222,857.50
PAYMENT FROM MORTGAGE:
Mortgage Increase (at end of development year) - $236,228.88
Annual Payment
Present Value at 6%
End of Dev.
At Start
P.V. as % Mortgage
REPAYMENT OVER REPAYMENT OVER
20 YRS. AT 7-1/2% 40 YRS. AT 7-1/2%
$ 23,172.26 $ 18,756.57
$265,781.56
$250,737.44
15.39%
$282,216.92
$266,242.37
16.34%
VALUE OF ANNUAL DIVIDEND TO GOVERNMENT:
Amount of Annual Dividend
Present Value at 6% of 20 Yrs.
Present Value at Start of Dev.
P.V. as % Mortgage
$ 10,862.40
$124,589.69
$117,537.50
7.21%
1Assumes government payment of capital contributions to developer,
financed by an increased mortgage amount and increased annual subsidy
to amortize the increase.
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TABLE ViJ-6B: GOVERNMENT COSTS FOR DIRECT PAYMENT
OF DEVELOPER -- REHABILITATION
OUTRIGHT PAYMENT:
CAPITAL
YR. CONTRIBUTION
0 $ 132,160.50
1 132,160.50
2 132,160.50
TOTAL PRESENT VALUE =
DISCOUNTED
PRESENT VALUE
$ 132,160.50
124,679.72
117,622.37
$ 374,462.59
PAYMENT FROM MORTGAGE:
Mortgage Increase (at end of development year) - $ 396,930.38
Annual Payment
Present Value at 6%
End of Dev.
At Start
P.V. as % Mortgage
REPAYMENT OVER
20 YRS. AT 7-1/2%
$ 38,935.86
$ 446,587.13
$ 421,308.81
25.81%
REPAYMENT OVER
40 YRS. AT 7-1/2.
$ 31,516.39
$ 474,204.96
$ 447,363.17
27.41%
VALUE OF DIVIDEND TO GOVERNMENT:
Amount of Annual Dividend
Present Value at 6% of 20 Yrs.
Present Value at Start of Dev.
P.V. as % Mortgage
$ 10,881.54
$ 124,809.10
$ 117,774.56
7.2%
1Assumes government payment of capital contributions to developer,
financed by an increased mortgage amount and increased annual subsidy to
amortize the increase.
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especially satisfactory operation of the property,1 (3) use them as a
cushion out of which to absorb increases in operating costs before any
rent increases are necessary, (4) apply them to social service programs
for the residents, (5) immediately use them to reduce project rents by
the amount of the dividerd. For purposes of evaluating the impact on
g9vernment costs of these options, the second, third and fourth possibili-
ties are regarded as equivalent. That is, -the dividends are assumed to
be "lost" for purposes of Federal revenues or annual expense reductions
either because they have been applied as a tax-free bonus for management
or have immediately been used up in project operating expenses. For pur-
poses of comparison with the base cases the fifth option is inappropriate
to consider, since we are holding the tenants' position fixed in these
comparisons with alternate means of pr.oviding development and operating
incentives, i.e., the tenant subsidy is held constant in the comparisons.
Table Vii-4 summarizes the impact on government costs of the direct
payment schemes, including cases in which the- project dividend is applied
to reduce net government costs, cases in which the dividend is "lost" in
the sense that it is used for some purpose other than government revenue,
and cases in which the project cannot support itself and is forced into
foreclosure by the twenty-first year. Both the direct fee-payment possi-
bility and the payment of fee directly but out of increased mortgage pro-
IAn annual fee for the management agent for a project is included,
of course, as an element in the rent of a Section 236 project anyway.
The amount usually is approximately 5 percent of gross rents, although
in some areas the FHA allows management fees in the rents to be as high
as 7 percent. If the project cash dividend were available as a bonus to
encourage superlative management, the total possible management fee would
be over twice the current amount; in the base cases the dividend is
$10,862 compared with a management fee of $8,190 (see Table V-5).
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ceedc amortized over a 20-year period are considered. in each
case the discounted present value of net government costs is compared with
the situation in which the developer and limited partner investors retain
ownership and control of the project as at present, including cases in
which the project dividends are lost to the developer and in which the
pi'oject suffers foreclosure. "Foreclosure" is taken to be in the most
extreme form, viz. that the project is completely worthless and the mort-
gagee must be completely reimbursed for the amount of the outstanding
mortgage balance.
Consider first the comparisons between base case costs and the direct
payment case. For the case in which the government pays the developer a
fee directly and applies the project dividends to reduce net government
costs, government costs are reduced by'25 to 50 percent from the base
case, depending on the discount rate assumed for new construction. In
the rehabilitation case the discounted present value of government costs
would decrease by 40 percent from the base case costs, essentially inde-
pendent of the discount rate used. Even when the annual dividend is
"lost," net government costs are still reduced in the direct payment case,
markedly so for the rehabilitation project. In the foreciosure cases as
well the discounted present value of net government costs is less for the
direct payment method than in the base case calculations with the developer/
investors retaining ownership and using the tax allowances.1
IIf government costs are not discounted, but simply summed, the fol-
lowing observations can be made: (1) if government costs are reduced by
applying the dividend after outright direct purchase of ownership rights
from the developer, substantial savings in government costs over the pres-
ent situation are possible--costs are reduced by 86 percent for new con-
struction and by 31 percent for rehabilitation, (2) if government Lcolnt.]
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Advantages of using the mortgage as a device for obtaining the funds
with which to replace the investors' capital contributions are seen in
Table VI1-4 to be less than the direct payment case when the discount rate
used is lower than the interest rate assumed (7-1/2 percent). Conversely,
when the discount rate used for assessing the present value of government
costs is higher than the mortgage interest rate, the advantage lies with
postponing government payment by obtaining the capital contribution re-
placement out of mortgage proceeds and amortizing the increment over
the life of the mortgage. From the government point of view, then, the
rational choice between direct payment and payment by means of proceeds
from an increased mortgage amount hinges upon the conclusion reached about
[cont.] obtains ownership by direct payments but no dividends are earned
or if, in addition, the mortgagee has to be completely reimbursed at the
end of 20 years of operation, the government costs are about the same as
if these same circumstances occurred under the present system of owner-
ship by private investors combined with tax incentives, (3) the direct-
payment-through-mortgage-increase case makes no sense (costs much more
than the current system) because we take government costs to have a dis-
count rate of zero but pay the going interest rate (7-1/2 percent) on the
amount by which the mortgage is increased to cover the developer payments.
In the comparisons made in Table VI1-4 a 20-year amortization
period is assumed for the mortgage increment used to pay the developer.
As mentioned previously, the choice of repayment period depends upon the
relative values of the government discount rate and the mortgage interest
rate. Since the relative magnitudes of the mortgage increment and of
the present value of the annual repayment cross at the point where the
government discount rate equals the mortgage interest rate, a 20-year
amortization period has been chosen as a compromise. This choice also
has the advantage that all of the government costs for the project are
included within the period of time for which the discounted present
values have been computed, rather than having some of the costs neglected,
as would be the case if a 4 0-year repayment period were chosen but present
values computed only for the first 20 years of project operation. It
should be noted that the neglect of the project dividends past the 21st
year makes the net government costs slightly larger than if they were
included. But the present value of the dividend for the 21st to 4 1st
project years would only amount to 0.014 percent of the project mort-
gage amount.
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the effective discount rate for evaluating future government expendi-
tures and whether this discount rate is above or below the mortgage in-
terest rate.
It will help to give a note of reality to all of this complicated
play with numbers to cast the preceding observations in the form of a
cash flow statement for the Federal government (the Treasury) for a typi-
cal situation and for one of the many possible direct payment schemes
outlined here. Table VII-7 is such a cash flow statement. We assume
that at the beginning of year one a commitment is made to support
100,000 units of rental housing under Section 236. The annual interest
subsidy required to reduce the rent to tenants is assumed to begin upon
completion of these 100,000 units at the beginning of year two. For
purposes of this illustration the interest subsidy payments are assumed
to phase out over a 10-year period as tenant incomes rise. If the pay-
ment were steady for the entire duration of the project, it would not
make any difference for this illustration, since I will assume that the
interest subsidy payments are the same whether the project is owned by
investors or is, in effect, owned by the Federal government after the
government has assumed the payments to the developer in lieu of the in-
vestors. For both new construction and rehabilitation cases, we sum up,
in each year of the operation of the projects, the net cash flow for
the Treasury. Interest subsidy payments are an outflow, as are annual
payments required to finance the payments to the developer through the
TABLE VII-7: COMPARISON OF CURRENT GOVERNMENT COSTS AND A DIRECT PAYMENT SCHEME
Assumptions: 100,000 units committed at beginning of year 1, completed at beginning of year 2, sold by owner at end of year 21.
Average mortgage loan amount, $16,300 per mit; Annual payment to finance payments to developer through mortgage,
$232 per unit (new), $389 per unit (rehabilitation).
Annual cash dividend, $108.75 per unit.
Interest subsidy, $800 per unit phased out in 10 years.
Owner is in 50% marginal tax bracket every year and is subject to minimum tax on preference income.
PROJECT YEAR
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
NEW CONSTRUCTION
Interest Subsidy
Federal Revenue
Net Cost of Current Program
Net Cost with Full Replacement
of Eguity through Mortgage
Loan4
REHABILITATION
Federal Revenue
Net Cost of Current Program'
Net Cost with Full Replace-
ment of Equit through
Mortgage Loan
0
(70)
70
80
(29)
109
72
(27)
99
64
(25)
89
56
(23)
79
48
(21)
69
40
(20)
60
32
(18)
50
24
(16)
40
24
(15)
39
16
(13)
29
8
(11)
19
0
(10)
10
0
(8)
8
0
(7)
7
0
(5)
5
0
(3)
3
0
(2)
2
0 102 99 86 78 70 66 54 48 46 38 30 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
(75) (132) (130) (129) (128) (127)
75 212 202 193 184 175
2
38
3
29
4
20
4
20
5
11
6
2
7 8 8 9 10 10 11 12 362
(7) (8) (8) (9) (10) (10) (11) (12) (362)
0 108 100 92 84 76 68 60 52 52 44 36 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
IRevenue Loss PLUS Interest Subsidy.
2
Mortgage Loan Payment for Payments to Developer PLUS Interest Subsidy LESS Project Dividend.
4P 0
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
188
188
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mortgage loan. ! have assumed that the payments to the developer are
financed through the mortgage on the assumption that this device for
leveling out the appropriations required would be most palatable politi-
cally. Revenues are regarded as outflows if there is a net tax saving
for the investor/owners and as inflows if taxes are actually collected.
In the case in which the government has replaced the role of the in-
vestor/owners by making the same capital contributions, the government
lays claim to the annual dividends; in the case shown the annual payments
for amortizing the developer payments through the mortgage loan can then
be reduced by the amount of the project dividends. The results of
Table VI1-7 show that this particular direct payment scheme levels out
the net cash flows from the Treasury, compared with the current system,
and substantially reduces the net outflow from the Treasury in the early
years, especially for the rehabilitation case. As we noted in Table
Vili-4, this particular scheme for direct payments results in a net sav-
ing for government of 41 percent for both new construction and rehabili-
tation if the government costs are capitalized, or converted to present
values, using a discount rate of 6 percent. The comparison with other
discount rates is made in Table VII-4. Each of the other figures in
Table VI --4 is the result of comparisons similar to those outlined in
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Table VI1-7, which is intended to be illustrative of only one of
numerous options for direct payment which are described in this
chapter.
2. Comments on Outright Replacement of Investors' Capital Contributions
Once freed of the constraint of tax allowances as a means for pro-
viding the development fee for low- and moderate-income housing, the
same mechanisms for providing a development fee could be used both for
profit-motivated developers and for a housing development group in a
metropolitan area which acts as the developer for local community groups
or for tenant cooperatives. Payment of a development fee to community
housing development groups could provide them with not only the admini-
strative costs of development and front money requirements, but would pro-
vide them with some additional resources with which to undertake related
social programs and services in the areas where housing was being developed.
Assuming continued ownership by a nonprofit community group or tenant
cooperative, there would presumably be no requirement for including divi-
dend payments in the rents to promote stable operation.
The proposal made here for a direct fee in subsidized housing is not
a new one. In fact, a form of it has been found quite successful in de-
veloping new units for public ownership under the public housing Turnkey
program. In that program, of course, the developer is not expected to
own or to operate the property, but he does get his fee in a lump sum as
part of the overall contract. What is being proposed is that for a pri-
vately developed and privately owned subsidized rental housing, a develop-
ment fee could replace the tax incentive. The arrangement for payment of
the fee could conceivably take several forms other than a replica of
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the current system:
(1) "Turnkey" development for ownership by a nonprofit
group or tenant cooperative, in which case the fee
would be paid at completion. This is already pos-
sible for a nonprofit group, which can include a
builder's profit in the 100 percent mortgage. What
is needed is an additional source of funds for ad-
ministrative costs of the developer entity and for
project set-up costs (such as training in tenant
management).
(2) Development for short-range owinership (one- to five
years), in which case part of the fee would be paid
at completion and part at the end of each year of
successful operation, with "success" measured in
terms of the quality of housing services delivered
(physical state of buildings and tenant satisfaction)
and in terms of efforts made by the developer/owner
to establish a capability for a tenant group or
other local entity to manage and/or own the units.
A possible form here would allow for a bonus paid
to the owner when sale to the tenant group occurred;
this would constitute an alternative to the "roll-
over" tax incentive to be discussed in the next
chapter.
(3) Long-term ownership and operation, in which case
the developer would receive an initial fee (as in
public housing Turnkey) and an annual bonus for
successful operation administered by HUD. This
would be quite analogous to the present option for
contracted management by a private party of units
owned by the local public housing authority.
Advantages car be seen in terms of administering housing policy nore
directly for the direct fee payment approach. As has been shown, the
net drain on the Treasury of direct incentives could be smaller than the
losses of revenue through the depreciation device. For this net saving
to be achieved, however, it could be argued that one would have to be as-
sured that the revenue otherwise foregone was actually collected and not
simply lost through one of the many other tax shelters available (such as
oil or railroad rolling stock investment). Several rebuttals to this
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argument are available. We have seen that as far as investors are con-
cerned their after-tax return tends to be consistent with the after-tax
return on other, non-tax favored investments of comparable risk. Any
windfalls in the syndication system tend to fall to the developer and
syndicators, not to the investors. A similar situation presumably exists
in other tax-favored activities. Thus the full range of investment oppor-
tunities can be considered by an investor who finds -that tax sheltered in-
vestments in housing no longer exist. There would not, therefore, be a
direct shift of all housing investments into other tax-sheltered invest-
ments, though there would be some. Investors in very high brackets might
tend to stay with tax favored investments if they are in considerably
higher brackets than the marginal investor for whom the prices of invest-
ments are set. Even here it would be a mistake to regard the shifted in-
vestment capital as "lost" to other tax shelter devices. if investment
in these other areas (oil or railroad rolling stock, for example) serves
public purposes worth the revenue losses, then the tax dollars are "lost"
only in the same sense that they are now "lost" in housing. If they do
not serve a public purpose they should be discontinued. Otherwise the
system may be inefficient but not artibrary. One would expect that con-
clusions paralleling those drawn here with respect to tax incentives in
housing could be drawn for these other areas, in which case direct pay-
ments might be more efficient there as well, though perhaps even more
difficult to justify in terms of social or economic policy.
3. Alternative Tax Rules
Conceivably there could be either political opposition to outright
government purchase or situations in which public or tenant ownership
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would be impractical. What alternatives could be considered for reducing
net government costs, retaining, if necessary, the current incentives for
development and operation? Assuming that the ownership of the project is
left in the hands of a developer or developer/investor combination, we
consider the relative advantages of altering the present tax treatment
of real estate while preserving the investment value at present levels
by direct payments to the developer. Privste investors and those in-
volved in marketing tax shelter may once again be involved in the develop-
ment process. Both outright payment and payment from increased mortgage
proceeds with annual payments to amortize the increase in mortgage amount
are considered as before. We consider the following possibilities:
(I) Straight-line depreciation--with 40-year life for
new construction, 20-year life for rehabilitation
(2) Mandatory 40-year life in the case of rehabilitation
(3) No depreciation whateyer
(4) Removal of minimum tax (on excess depreciation and
capital gains)
(5) Removal of capital gains exclusion--full tax at.
ordinary rates (this is more severe than full re-
capture because the recapture provisions only ap-
ply to recovery of excess depreciation, not to
the full amount of gain realized at sale).
(6) No taxes whatever, i.e., allow a tax-free dividend
(7) Allow taxable dividend only; no other taxes or tax
losses
In each of these cases it is of interest to examine first the conse-
quences of making the indicated change without compensating government pay-
ments for the developer/builder. !n this situation we consider several
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measures of investment: (1) the internal rate of return for the developer/
builder on an assumed cash equity of 3 percent of the mortgage amount
(without consideration for "sweat equity"), (2) the present value of the
project to an investor with discount rates the same as those used in the
base case, and (3) the average annual return on the investors' investment
if the investors make capital contributions having the same discounted
present value as the after-tax returns of the project. Government costs
are considered for three situations: (1) altered tax policy without
compensating government payments, (2) altered tax policy with direct com-
pensating payments to developer to make the project equally as lucrative
as under present tax policy, (3) altered tax policy with the compensating
government payments made out of the proceeds of an increased mortgage,
with the increased amount amortized over the life of the mortgage by
government payments.
Table Vii-8 presents the results of these calculations for the de-
preciation changes. Restriction to straight-line depreciation causes
the investors' assessment of discounted present value of the project to
drop to comparable levels for new construction and rehabilitation, both
around 10 percent of the mortgage amount. Since I have assumed cash
costs of 3 percent of the mortgage amount, these levels of value for in-
vestors would leave the developer/builder with a net fee of roughly 7 or
8 percent; depending on the long-term responsibilities of the developer,
this level of net fee might be adequate to induce his activity in the case
of relatively straightforward projects.
In such cases government costs would obviously be reduced, as re-
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TABLE VII-8: COMPARISON OF-INVESTMENT VALUE AND GOVERNMENT COSTS
00
WITHOUT PAYMENTS
NEW CONSTRUCTION
-BASE CASE
-STRAIGHT-LINE DEPREC.
(40-YR. ECON. LIFE)
-NO DEPRECIATION
REHABILITATION
-BASE CASE
(5-YR. DEPREC.,
20-YR. LIFE)
-STRAIGHT-LINE DEPREC.
(20-YR. ECON. LIFE)
-NO DEPRECIATION
-5-YR. DEPRECIATION,
40-YR. ECON. LIFE
INTERNAL
RATE OF
RETURN (%)
TO DEVELOPER
ON 3% EQUITY
106.77
88.63
47.33
183.86
119.45
58.07
180.31
PRESENT
VALUE TO
INVESTOR'
(% MTG.)
12.68
9.80
TO MATCH BASE CASE
AVG. ANNUAL
RATE OF PRESENT
RETURN ON VALUE OF
INVESTORS' GOV'T. COSTS2
EQUITY (%) (% MTG.)
3.02
3.58
3.81 0.83
19.76
11.37
2.75
6.90
3.81 0.70
18.12 2.61
WITH GOV'T. PAYMENTS
DIRECT PAYMENT
P.V. OF ADDED % CHANGE
GOV'T. COSTS FROM BASE
(% MTG.) CASE COSTS
TO MATCH BASE CASE
PAYMENT FROM
MTG. PLUS SUBSIDY
P.V. OF ADDED % CHANGE
GOV'T. COSTS FROM BASE
(% MTG.) CASE COSTS
11.00
7.13
(2.97)3
3.10
9.54
down 6.99 3.49
down 40.30 10.73
down 3.46
down 29.44
26.73
17.46
(2.69)3
23.67
9.75
18.52
up 1.77 10.97
down 40.78 20.83
1.91 down 4.34 2.15
up 6.33
down 32.12
down 3.45
0
UNDER ALTERNATE DEPRECIATION POLICIES
lDiscount rates of 15% for new, 25% for rehabilitated housing.
2Government discount rate = 6%.
3Government derives net gain in present value of revenue gains and losses from project (negative loss).
'.0
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flected in Table Vii-8. However, if compensating government payments.
were required, the results for new construction and rehabilitation dif-
fer. Discounted government costs drop from base case costs for new con-
struction even when the method used is that of payment through increased
mortgage. In the rehabilitation case, however, discounited government
costs are slightly increased over the base case; government losses from
revenue losses with a 20-year straight-line depreciation schedule and
conversion of those deferred taxes to capital gains are sufficiently
large that a requirement to match the investment value of the base case
(current 5-year depreciation of rehabilitation expenditures) results in
total discounted government costs in excess of the base case. In passing
we note that a requirement to use a 4 0-year economic life for the rehabili-
tation project would make no significant difference to either investors
or the government,. although the percentage reduction in government costs
would be greater than the reduction in investment value.
With no depreciation allowances we begin to approach the complete
replacement case once again.2 In this situation the carrying costs in-
curred during construction are assumed to be claimed as losses in the
construction year; the resulting tax saving constitutes a primary source
Only a 6 percent discount rate for government costs is used in these
examples.
2
The notion of a direct payment to replace the investors' evaluation
of the tax shelter value of such projects has been suggested in similar
terms by others. For example, Prof. Charles Haar, now of Harvard Law
School and formerly Assistant Secretary for Metropolitan Development in
the U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, suggested in an
M.I.T. housing seminar in January, 1971, that HUD "buy" the depreciation.
Possibly Professor Haar had such a possibility in mind as the one sug-
gested here.
I 1
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of investment return. While the internal rate of return is high, it
now depends heavily upon the annual dividend. The discounted present
value of the after-tax returns drops to under four percent of the mort-
gage amount--hardly enough over cash costs of 3 percent to induce develop-
ment of these projects. As we would expect from the results for the com-
plete replacement of capital contributions, government payment to compen-
sate for the reduced investment value of the no depreciation case re-
duces discounted government costs markedly--by 40 percent for outright
payment and by 30 percent for payment through an increased mortgage.
These are roughly the same levcls of reduction in discounted government
costs as in the complete replacement cases previously discussed.
The average annual rates of return on investors' equity are small
in all of the cases discussed. This s-uggests that even the base case pro-
jects could not be marketed on this basis and that a reasonably sophisti-
cated discounted present value analysis is necessary to establish the in-
vestment value. The internal rates of return for the developer are high
in all cases, but are, of course, more sensitive to the risk of losing
annual dividends in the straight-line and no depreciation cases.
Calculations of investment value and discounted government costs for
the alternative tax possibilities dealing with the minimum tax, the capi-
tal gains exclusion tax-free dividend and taxable dividend only are sum-
marized in Table VII-9. In the earlier discussion on investment value
of Section 236 projects we noted that removal of the minimum tax would
increase the investors' assessment of the present value by approximately
10 percent for new construction and 20 percent for rehabilitation.
Table VIl-8 shows that the corresponding increases in government costs
0 0
TABLE VII-9A: COMPARISON OF INVESTMENT VALUE AND GOVERNMENT COSTS UNDER ALTERNATE TAX POLICIES, NEW CONSTRUCTION
WITHOUT PAYMENTS TO MATCH BASE CASE WITH GOV'T. PAYMENTS TO MATCH BASE CASE
INTERNAL
RATE OF
RETURN (%)
TO DEVELOPER
ON 3% EQUITY
-BASE CASE
-NO MINIMUM TAX
-NO CAPITAL GAINS
EXCLUS ION
-NO TAXES
(TAX-FREE DIVIDEND)
-TAXABLE DIVIDEND
ONLY
106.77
110.84
105.68
18.13
8.10
PRESENT
VALUE TO
INVESTOR'
(% MTG.)
12.68
13.77
10.79
AVG. ANNUAL
RATE OF
RETURN ON
INVESTORS'
EQUITY (%)2
3.02
3.26
1.78
3.63 10.55
1.81 5.27
PRESENT
VALUE OF
GOV'T. COSTS
3
(% MTG.)
11.00
12.78
7.78
- 0 -
(3.61)4
DIRECT PAYMENT
P.V. OF ADDED % CHANGE
GOV'T. COSTS FROM BASE
(% MTG.) CASE COSTS
PAYMENT FROM
MTG. PLUS SUBSIDY
P.V. OF ADDED % CHANGE
GOV'T. COSTS FROM BASE
(% MTG.) CASE COSTS
NOT APPLICABLE--DEVELOPER GETS MORE THAN IN BASE CASE
2.04
9.76
11.72
down 10.77 2.29
down 11.25 10.98
down 26.25 13.19
down 8.46
down 0.15
down 12.92
1Discount rates of 15% new and 25% rehabilitation.
2 Investor assumed to make three capital contributions (total equity) having present value of previous column; tax sinking fund assumed.
3Government discount rate = 6%.
4Net gain in present value (negative loss).
0
.1
0 0 0 0 0
TABLE VII-98: COMPARISON OF INVESTMENT VALUE AND GOVERNMENT COSTS UNDER ALTERNATE TAX POLICIES, REHABILITATED HOUSING
WITHOUT PAYMENTS TO MATCH BASE CASE
-BASE CASE
-NO MINIMUM TAX
-NO CAPITAL GAINS
EXCLUS ION
-NO TAXES
(TAX-FREE DIVIDEND)
-TAXABLE DIVIDEND
ONLY
INTERNAL
RATE OF
RETURN (%)
TO DEVELOPER
ON 3% EQUITY
183.86
197,51
177.00
18.13
8.10
PRESENT
VALUE TO
INVESTORI
(% MTG.)
19.76
23.95
12.67
AVG. ANNUAL
RATE OF
RETURN ON
INVESTORS'
EQUITY (%)2
2.75
3.12
1.92
2.11 19.73
1.05 19.73
WITH GOV'T. PAYMENTS TO MATCH BASE CASE
PRESENT
VALUE OF
GOV'T. COSTS
3
(% MTG.)
26.73
34.56
20.16
- 0 -
(3.61)4
DIRECT PAYMENT
P.V. OF ADDED % CHANGE
GOV'T. COSTS FROM BASE
(% MTG.) CASE COSTS
PAYMENT FROM
MTG. PLUS SUBSIDY
P.V. OF ADDED % CHANGE
GOV'T. COSTS FROM BASE
(% MTG.) CASE COSTS
NOT APPLICABLE--DEVELOPER GETS MORE THAN IN BASE CASE
4.67
20.49
21.72
down 7.11 5.26
down 23.32 23.06
down 32.24 24.43
down 4.93
down 13.73
down 22.07
1
Discount rates of 15% new and 25% rehabilitation.
2lnvestor assumed to make three capital contributions (total equity) having present value of previous column; tax sinking fund assumed.
3Government discount rate = 6%.
4Net gain in present value (negative loss).
0
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relative to the base cases would be 15 percent and 30 percent, respec-
tively. In these cases there is no question of compensating government
payment, because the investment value is already greater than for the
base cases.
Elimination of the capital gains exclusion would have greater impact
on rehabilitation than on new construction. The resulting changes in
discounted present value for both investor and government costs are com-
parable to those for the restriction to straight-line depreciation; gov-
ernment costs are greatly reduced and investment value is reduced to 10
to 12 percent. Again, these levels provide a fee margin for the developer
of 7 to 9 percent, which in some cases might be adequate incentive for
the developer/builder. Substantial government savings are again possible
even when compensating payments are made to match the base case investment
value to the developer.
The proposition of granting a tax-free status to dividends from
projects of this type is admittedly a bit speculative as a means of re-
placing the incentives created through depreciation allowances. To the
extent that the dividend serves as an incentive to successful operation
of the project, it could be argued that some annual incentive of this
type should be left in the project, even if the primary development in-
centive is shifted from depreciation allowances to direct government pay-
ments to the developer. That some additional development incentive would
be required is clear from Table VII-9, where the investment incentive of
the dividend alone (whether taxable or not) would be inadequate; for ex-
ample, the present value of the tax-free-dividend project would only be
under 4 percent of the mortgage amount for the new construction case and
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just over 2 percent for the rehabilitation case--too low in the rehabili-
tation case even to cover the cash: requirement of 3 percent of the mort-
gage amount. Provision of direct government payments to compensate for
the difference between investment value of the project dividends (either
taxable or tax-free) and the investment value of the base cases once
again results in lower discounted government costs then in the base
cases. Discounted government costs are reduced through outright govern-
ment payment to compensate for original investment value by over 25 per-
cent in the new construction case and over 32 percent in the rehabilita-
tion.
Once the notion of direct payment is entertAined as a replacement
for tax incentives, other possibilities than those already mentioned would
begin to appear feasible, For example, government payments higher than
the present annual dividend could be promised for profit-motivated owners
whose projects were operated such as to satisfy Federal guidelines for
quality of housing services, racial balance in tenantry, or acceptance of
deep subsidy households (such as through the leased housing program or
Rent Supplements), for example. It is hard to know at present how many
developers syndicate their projects to sell tax shelter to high tax-
bracket investors, but it is not unreasonable to surmise that many more
would be willing to retain direct ownership if the economic incentives
were in the form of direct payments rather than through tax losses which
many developers are unable to use or to use fully. There would be less
tendency for the developer to attempt to extract the financial reward for
the project entirely at the outset of the project if ownership generated
annual cash returns rather than tax losses. Presumably the magnitude of
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these cash returns would have to be set such that the present vaflue of
the returns was competitive with non-subsidized real estate having no
control other than the rental market on the annual cash return. Again,
one would anticipate that the discounted present value of these payments
by government would be less than that now incurred for the tax incentive
app roach.
D. SUMMARY
The upshot of all these detailed observations about government costs
is that there are indeed lower cost approaches to encouraging development
and operation of low- and moderate-income ,rental housing than by use of
special tax allowances to investors in this type of property. We have
seen that the greatest reductions in discounted government costs can be
achieved through outright replacement of the investors' role by direct
government payments to the developer to replace the capital contributions
which are now made by the limited partner investors in a typical syndica-
tion. These payments can be spread by government for the same reason
they are now spread in private operation--to offer incentive to complete
major stages of the project successfully before the financial rewards
can be achieved. Government costs can be shifted to an annual basis,
even though the government replacement of capital contributions is made
in the early stages of a project, by increasing the mortgage amount and
providing annual government payments sufficient to amortize the additional
increment in the mortgage. Whether this approach yields greater or
lesser savings in discounted government costs depends basically on whether
the government discount rate is larger or smaller than the mortgage in-
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terest rate. In either case the financial inducement to the developer
is at least as great as at present, even if administrative costs for gov-
ernment equalled the amounts presently paid out of the cpaital contri-
butions to those involved in the syndication process--brokers, accountants,
attorneys, for example. Furthermore, if the Department of Housing and
Urban Development were to administer the direct payments, a single public
agency would have the responsibility for aligning financial inducements--
payments to developers, mortgage insurance, mortgage payment subsidy, pub-
lic housing leasing, rent supplement payments--with public policy on
housing and urban development in such matters as location, racial and
economic integration, project unit distribution and size, construction,
supporting programs of social services, for example. Finally, to the ex-
tent that development could be induced with capital contributions to the
developer smaller than those made possible through the present depreci-
ation allowances, the direct government payments could be lower than
those assumed in this chapter, and the resulting savings in government
costs would be even larger than those described.
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CHAPTER VIII: TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP TO TENANT OR COMMUNITY GROUPS
In the preceding discussions we have examined in some detail the
236 rental housing program from the perspective of the private developer
ahd investor and from the perspective of the government. In this chap-
ter the primary focus is on the interests of the tenants in 236 projects,
the way in which the form of ownership affects them, and their options
for more direct control of their housing. For purposes of the present
discussion, it is assumed that the weight of arguments about ownership
of one's own housing presented in Chapter I come out, on balance, favor-
ing the homeownership ideal. In the case of the apartment buildings to
which the 236 program applies "homeownership" means either cooperative
ownership, condominium ownership or control of a corporation owning the
building even though tenants may not be the primary investors in the
project. In the process of exploring ownership options we examine the
"rollover" incentive established in the Tax Reform Act of 1969.
A. OPERATING INCENTIVES IN THE ABSENCE OF TENANT CONTROL
Before exploring the ownership options it may be instructive to look
first at the particular features of operating incentives in a 236 project
under absentee ownership. The landlord-tenant relationship has seldom
Particular attention has been paid to tax shelter aspects of the
choices faced by community-oriented development in a Master's thesis
(M.I.T.) by Betnun (1971). Another Master's thesis (M.I.T.) by Judelson
(1-971) focused specifically on the ways to take advantage of tax shelter
in the development of a rehabilitation project under tenant control.
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been a comfortable one, especially so in the case of tenant families at
the lower-income levels and with consequent limits on their housing op-
tions. The usual tenant-landlord conflict-, have been compounded in
236 projects located in areas in which the rent ceilings allowed are
marginal. When operating costs (chiefly utilities, repairs, and, some-
times, real estate taxes) rise, the owner is faced with either a cutback
in services or applying to FHA for a rent increase. Neither option
will be viewed favorably by the tenants. Although some owners choose
to forego the dividend as an additional source of operating funds, this
only provides a small margin. Eventually repairs may be deferred, and
in some cases, owners defer principal payments on the mortgage for lack
of funds.
We note at this point that the tax benefits in a 236 project con-
tinue to accrue to -the owner, regardless of the condition of the buildings
or of the adequacy of the services being provided, as long as he remains
the owner and does not suffer a foreclosure on the mortgage. The owner
will, of course, wish to avoid foreclosure both to protect his stream of
tax savings in the early years and to avoid the large gains taxes that
would result from a foreclosure. (See Chapter VI at pp. 226-227.)
While there is no tax incentive for superior housing services, there is
some incentive to maintain a minimum level of quality in most buildings
to avoid the possibility of foreclosure and to preserve the possibility
of appreciation in value over the years which eventually could be rea-
lized in a voluntary sale.
In practice, the FHA has become reluctant to foreclose on these mort-
gages, whether the mortgage payments have been deferred to cover operating
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expenses or whether they have been deferred to cover excessive vacancies,
because it has no desire to become a real estate operator and because as-
signments to new owners often can be accomplished only with a lower mort-
gage amount than the one foreclosed. We thus see a mixed set of incen-
tives from tax treatment during the operating period.
From the tenants' side, it is often felt that rental property could
be operated more to their satisfaction if they were in more direct con-
trol, either through direct ownership or through ownership by a community-
based entity acting on their behalf. Local control of a project might
also reduce operating problems by coupling ownership and tenancy more
closely. Local cortrol might also enable design orientation to user needs
in contrast with the present, developer-oriented system in which user needs
are secondary because the tenants are .captured" by the project subsidy.
Two possibilities are examined below: (1) development directly by
a community-based group or tenant cooperative, and (2) development by
a private developer with a "rollover" sale to the community group or
tenant cooperative after a short period.
B. SYNDICATION BY SUBSIDIARIES OF COMMUNITY-BASED SPONSORS
While nonprofit sponsors of low- and moderate-income housing are
eligible for 100 percent mortgages, the costs covered do not make ade-
quate allowance for the resources and energies required of the sponsor
to get the project together, despite the allowance for paying a housing
consultant and the "allowance to make project operational," supposedly
intended to cover any necessary costs not covered in the basic build-up
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of costs.
Sponsoring groups are thus experimenting with arrangements in which
a for-profit subsidiary is set up purely for the purpose of syndicating
the project and obtaining investment money from high income-tax bracket
individuals who can use the tax shelter. The M.I.T. thesis by Judelson
(1971) treats this tactic in some detail. Unfortunately, the investment
objective of the limited partners is likely to encourage long holding
periods, while the community development group seeks early control of the
buildings as well as the operating policies. Adding a party to the
general partner entity who is responsive to the investors' interests--for
example, the builder--may be required of the sporsor by the investors
as a balance to the interests of the sponsoring community group. The
device of the tax incentive for producing a development fee is leading to
complex ownership arrangements with conflicting internal objectives,
heavily influenced and shaped by Internal Revenue Service rulings or
attitudes on investment for tax shelter.
C. ROLLOVER
1. The Rollover Concept
We have seen in the examples of Chapters V and VI that the tax treat-
ment of real estate encourages an extended period of ownership, largely
HUD contracts with groups providing "front money" loans to non-
profit sponsors under Section 106(b) of the HUD Act of 1968 have not proved
adequate to filling these gaps, partly because of the low level of fund-
ing. Fiscal year 1971 funds of approximately $5.4 million assisted a
total of 135 projects. (Budget of the U. S. Government, FY 1972, Appendix,
pp. 497-498) Section 106 (a) for providing outright grant assistance to
these groups has not been funded thus far.
1
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to defer the gains taxes which would become payable upon sale. In an ef-
fort to remedy this negative incentive for those cases in which the owner
of a Section 236 or 221(d) (3) project might otherwise be interested in
selling to a tenant group, a new section(Section 1039) was added to the
Internal Revenue Code as a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. The
official explanation of the reasons for introducing the "rollover" pro-
visions is:
In the case of federally assisted housing projects (where the
return to the investor is limited to approximately 6 percent),
the Government is interested in encouraging the sale of these
Government-assisted housing projects to the low- or middle-
income occupant or to a non-profit organization which manages
the property on their behalf (such as cooperatives). The
maximum sales price permitted under these programs under
present law is the amount the individual has invested in the
property, an amount necessary to retire the outstanding mort-
gage liability, and the taxes payable as a result of the
sale. By providing that no gain is to be recognized in
these cases, it would be possible to decrease the sales
price to the occupants or tax-exempt organizations managing
these properties. This should enable them to make purchases
they otherwise could not make. (U. S. Congress, 1970, p.
248)
Section 1039 provides that if (1) such a sale is approved by the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development AND (2) the owner reinvests
(within a period of a year before or after the sale) in another 236 pro-
ject, THEN the only gain subject to tax is the net amount not reinvested.
These taxes at sale would otherwise be quite large, especially in the
This portion of Section 1039 was apparently inspired by the provision
in the tax law which allows an individual selling his personal residence
to avoid gains taxes at sale to the extent that the proceeds are reinvested
in a second residence. (U. S. Congress, 1970, p. 248) Amendments to Sec-
tion 1250(d) of the Internal Revenue Code were made by the Tax Reform Act
of 1969 to the effect that reinvestment less than the net amount realized
is subject to normal capital gains tax and also to allow a carry over of
the holding period for purposes of calculating recapture when the second
project is sold. (See the discussion on recapture in Chapter III at pp.
101-102.
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case of rehabilitation, so that this possibility of deferring taxes at
sale would appear to be a great incentive to accomplish such a qualifying
"rollover." Further, in the case of an eligible rehabilitation project
virtually all of the depreciation benefits have been. exhausted at the end
of the 5-year write-off period.
However, the inducement of reduced taxes in the transfer is substan-
tially compromised by the.requirement that the tax basis (depreciable
value) of the new property be reduced by the amount of gain not recognized
on the preceding property. The value of the second property as a genera-
tor of tax shelter is therefore substantially diminished. In a typical
case, the depreciation will generate little additional tax shelter; tax
benefits accrue only from the tax loss which can be taken from the expensi-
ble costs incurred in the development of the second project (primarily con-
struction loan interest and real estate taxes). The investment value of
the second project is thus greatly reduced if it is used as a "rollover"
project. Moreover, gains taxes are not forgiven in a "rollover." They
are deferred. The owner of the initial project obviously has another
way of deferring the payment of taxes at sale--holding the property
longer and not selling for a few more years.
2. Rollover Incentives
The fundamental problem with the "rollover" section is that it fails
to recognize that the developer will expect some new reward for the new
effort required to develop the second project. The developer of a project
The reduction in basis required by Section 1039 is borrowed from pre-
vious provisions in the Internal Revenue Code dealing with involuntary con-
versions of property and with "like-kind" exchanges. In those cases the
basis must also be reduced by the gain not recognized. (U. S. Congress,
1970, p. 248)
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always has the choice of offering a newly developed project as An invest-
ment to new investors. The prospective "rollover" project doesn't offer
the investors in an original project as much investment value (because
of the reduced tax basis) as it offers to investors who are not using
the second project as a "rollover" candidate.
An appreciation of this problem requires an analysis of the posi-
tions of the major parties involved. The major part.ies would seem to be
the tenants, the Federal government, investors in the original project,
and the developer.
From the tenants' point of view the relevant questions would seem to
be: Do we want ownership and control? What price will we have to pay?
Could we hope to get the project by simply assuming the existing mort-
gage? If not, how much cash might we have to produce? How might we
raise it? By refinancing under 236? If so, for what terms--comparable
with the original mortgage or for higher rates and for a shorter period?
From the Federal government position, rollover is an option to cur-
rent owners of eligible projects only if 236 (or any successor) mortgage
insurance is still being granted and 236 interest subsidy money is being
provided. HUD also has the responsibility of determining whether a par-
ticular sale should be made, presumably on the basis of an assessment of
the viability of the tenant group as an operating and managing agent of
the project and a judgment that they are not paying an unfair price for
the project. This latter is probably largely controlled by HUD/FHA
policy on refinancing. The current administrative ruling that the sale
price (new mortgage) cannot exceed the sum of the outstanding-mortgage
plus original implied equity plus taxes due at sale would seem to assure
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a reasonable rollover price, since there would be no taxes on sale if the
net amount realized by the owners is re-invested. It would also seem to
assure that few outright, non-rollover sales are likely to take place in
the early years, at least in the rehabilitation case, because of the
very large amount which would be added if the owner insisted upon re-
covering enough to cover taxes due at sale.
Understanding the.viewpoints of the investor and developer requires
a more detailed description of their options. This seems best done with
some specific examples. We begin with an example involving a rehabilita-
tion project which the investor wants to roll over to another rehabili-
tation project. After looking at this case in some detail a number of
other possibilities are summarized.
a. Rehabilitation Example
Consider an example for rehabilitation with approximately the same
project costs as in the earlier investment analysis. Then make the
following assumptions:
1. The investor considers rolling over to a second re-
habilitation project at the end of the sixth year of
the first project.
2. The full amount of the investor's capital contribu-
tions is included in the cost basis of the project,
in both cases.
3. The sale prices of both projects recover the implied
equity of 10 percent as well as covering the out-
standing balance on the mortgage loan.
The investor in Project I (as the original project will be called) already
has an investment which continues to produce a small return even past
project year 6. Furthermore, he can defer taxes not only by electing a
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rollover to a new project but also by simply holding project I longer,
that is, just not selling at all. If the investor is conservative, however,
by the sixth year he will consider that he already has had to reserve most
of the return from that year to begin accumulating funds for payment of
gains taxes and will have to earmark all the remaining returns for the
fund in order to have the funds necessary to cover the gains tax in the
anticipated sale of Project I in the year 21. Even though the gains tax
would continue to be a concern in the event of a rollover election, con-
struction expenses to be taken again as a tax loss on Project 11 and a more
favorable amortization schedule on the new mortgage of Project 11 would
be of interest to the investor.
Table VIII-1 summarizes a calculation relevant to the investor's
decision whether to "roll over" from one rehabilitation project to another.
It shows that by holding Project I for a number of years, he can again
defer the payment of gains taxes and exchange the small return of Project
I for the immediate tax shelter from construction expenses in Project It.
The rollover option looks attractive: prior returns from Project I which
had been considered obligated to the tax sinking fund for Project I pro-
vide more funds than necessary for the gains tax on Project II. Together
with the tax free cash from the sale of Project I, Project 11 appears to
offer the investor a bonus.
But the rollover option is not an option, even if all the above par-
ties would like it unless someone is willing to develop Project II. Assum-
ing the availability of 236 interest subsidy funds and favorable mortgage
possibilities (either through state housing banks or through 236 insurance)
and that a developer wished to start another rehabilitation project with
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TABLE VIII-1: ILLUSTRATIVE ROLLOVER CALCULATION
WITH STEP-UP IN BASIS
Rehabilitation project sold at end of sixth year, proceeds reinvested
in another rehabilitation project.
Sale prices in both cases assumed to be mortgage balance plus implied
equity (10% of FHA total replacement cost).
Basis in both cases incl-ides developer's fee from capital contributions
of limited partners.
(1)
(2)
Sale price of Project I
Cost of Project I I
(3) Cash realized from Sale of I
(4) Basis of Proj. I at Sale
(5) Gain not recognized, (l)-(4)
(6) Adjusted basis of II, (2)-(5)
(7) Expensible construction costs
(8) Land
(9) Net depreciable basis of II, (6)-
(7)-(8)
(10) Present Value of net returns of
Proj. II, discounted at 25%,
after establishing gains tax
sinking fund
(11) Tax sinking fund released from I
(12) Total cash from I , (3)+(11)
(13) Investment required for I1
(14) Net investment for rollover
$17,724.39
19,695.74 [Mortgage loan
plus capital
contributions]
1,810.00 [No tax since
(2) exceeds (1)]
1,738.88
15,985.51
3,710.23
1,500.00
500.00
1,710.23
518.00
1,164.03
2,974.03
3,412.48
438.45 [Compare with
value of Proj.
II, item (10)]
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exactly the same costs as the original project, would he be interested
in offering it as a rollover candidate? As shown in line 13 of Table
Vill-1, the developer can obtain from syndicating Project i (on exactly
the same basis as Project I) a gross fee having a present value equivalent
1
to 18 percent of the mortgage amount. (This example assumes a sale
price in both projects nigh enough to recover the implied 10 percent equity;
the present value of the investments reflect this added value.) The roll-
over option must offer him more than what he can obtain by considering Pro-
ject I as completely unrelated to Project I and selling interests in
Project II to a new set of investors. The choice facing the developer
is: Shall I start this new project afresh and reap the net profits of
syndication by selling interests in the project to new limited partners?
Or shall I offer the investors in my original project the opportunity
to roll over their investment to a second project? The developer in
this example will only do the latter if it is more lucrative to him
or, if the original project is a disaster, the developer feels obligated
to rescue his investors from that project. Except for this "bail-out"
possibility, the developer would be expected to demand as much invest-
ment for the second project as he could get by selling it to a new set
of investors.
Now we are forced to examine what the investor and the tenants
of Project I have to offer. The investor (conservative that he is) con-
ITo avoid making an already complex illustration completely incom-
prehensible, I have used only the cash values at the time of rollover for
these comparisons. This means, for example, that I have assumed that
the developer is to be paid the capital contribution for the second pro-
ject in one lump sum, or, alternatively, that the comparisons discount
any future payments to their present value.
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siders Project I a dead project for investment purposes which he continues
to hold only to defer taxes and from which the remaining returns are al-
ready committed to the tax sinking fund. One possibility, therefore, is
that he will elect the rollover and exchange whatever additional return
there is from Project II for some additional capital contributions. The
reduced basis of Project I diminish the tax shelter value of the pro-
ject. But the tax sinking fund from Project I can be released if the
gains tax problem can be shifted to Project II. Table VIII-1 shows that
these two sources of funds--the released funds from the tax sinking fund
of Project I and the additional investment value of Project Il--are not
sufficient to satisfy the competitive capital contributions which the
developer can demand from new investors.
Finally, we see that the investor must rely upon some cash proceeds
from the sale of Project I to the tenants in order to have enough funds
to accomplish the rollover. Our example assumes that the sale price
is the maximum which could in principle be refinanced by a new 236
mortgage, i.e., one including a recovery of the original implied equity
of 10 percent. The other alternative would be for the tenants to assume
the mortgage and produce the additional cash themselves.
Table VI II-l summarizes the situation: the cash requi red by the
developer must come from a combination of new investment, a left-over
tax sinking fund, and cash proceeds of sale. Even then the cooperation
of HUD is required to approve the rollover, and, if necessary, refinance
the mortgage to generate the additional cash required. The tenants are
left either with the necessity of making an equity investment or, pos-
sibly of increasing their monthly housing expense to cover the increased
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mortgage.
We see from this example that a high degree of cooperation is re-
quired on the part of at least four distinct parties with very different
interests: the tenants, the investor in Project I, the developer of
Project 11, and HUD/FHA. As if this were not speculative enough, we
shall see below that in many conceivable cases, even this degree of co-
operation would not suffice to make rollover feasible.
b. Other Rollover Examples
The combinations of cases which could be tried in exploring the
possibilities for rollover of 236 projects seem almost endless, once you
begin looking for them.2 Some of the interesting possibilities which
occur are:
1. Choosing either new or rehabilitation projects for either
the original project or the rollover candidate. (Four
possibilities.)
2. Considering the sale price of the projects to be either
the outstanding mortgage loan balance or that plus an
amount to "recover" the original implied equity of 10
percent.
Whether there is an actual increase would depend upon the degree to
which the project had been generating a clear cash dividend under the
for-profit owner. If so, the dividend could be applied to increased mort-
gage payments. In fact, the Section 236 legislation and administrative
regulations imply that any refinancing should be supportable on just such
a basis. (FHA Regulations, Section 236. 40(c)) If HUD/FHA were cooperating
with the owner wishing to roll over Project I , however, the cash dividend
might be considered as available for debt service even though it actually
was required for operating expenses.
2
The thesis by Betnun (1971, pp. 49-54) turns up several cases other
than the ones discussed here, including variations in tax bracket and in
prices of the second project. But Betnun arrives at the same general
conclusions about rollover as this work, viz. that rollover is beneficial
to investors only in projects which look like they will fail or in pro-
jects where refinancing is allowed.
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3. Considering whether or not the developer's fee is added
to the cost basis of the projects.
4. Considering a cost basis of the second project suffi-
ciently high that the full construction expenses can
be taken as a loss on the second project without creat-
ing a negative basis.
Computations for these combinations have been made and the results
compiled in Table VIII-2. In every case it is assumed that the investor
in the original project (Project i) must try to match the developer's
required capital contribution for the rollover project (Project II)
from a combination of: (1) after-tax proceeds of sale of Project I,
(2) surplus from the tax sinking fund of Project I, (3) the investment
value of Project i to the investor after its depreciable basis has
been reduced as a result of the rollover. The results in Table VIII-2
indicate that in the most cases the investor in Project I would be unable
to justify a rollover to Project i on an investment basis. In every
case for which rollover appears to be a live option from an investment
point of view, a necessary condition is that the sale price recover the
original implied equity of 10 percent of the FHA total replacement cost.
With this net cash from the sale of Project I the investor is barely
able to match the developer's requirement for capital contributions in
Project I in the following cases:
1. New rolling over to either new or rehabilitation,
with or without stepped up basis (by adding the
developer's fee to the cost basis).
2. Rehabilitation rolling over to new with or without
stepped-up basis.
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TABLE VIIt-2: ROLLOVER OPTIONS
PROJECT 'PROJECT
I I I SALE PRICES COST OF I COST OF ||
REHAB REHAB MORTG. BAL. MORTG. + CASH SAME AS I
INVESTMENT
VALUE OF
II AFTER
ROLLOVER
(6.82%)1
AFTER-TAX
CASH FROM
SALE OF I
0
NEW
REHAB MORTG. BAL. +
IMPLIED EQUITY
NEW
COST OF I
PLUS 7% TO
MEET REINV.
AND ALLOW
CONSTR. EXP.
REHAB MORTG. BAL. MORTG. + CAP.
CONTRI B.
SAME AS I
(6.96)
(2.45)
(2.45)
(2.73)
(2.73)
(5.73)
(3.50)
0
8.21
8.21
10.55
10.55
0
0
6.16% (0.66%) 16.18%
6.16 (0.82) 11.28
6.16 11.92 18.06
6.16 11.92 12.81
5.85 13.68 18.06
5.85 13.68 2
7.15
7.15
12.99
1.42 19.76
3.68 12.68
REHAB MORTG. BAL. +
IMPLIED EQUITY
NEW
lValues are given as a percentage of the mortgage amount.
2Underlined cases are the only live options.
3.18
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11.11
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TABLE VIII-2 (CONTINUED): ROLLOVER OPTIONS
INVESTMENT
PROJECT PROJECT -
I II SALE PRICES
NEW
REHAB
NEW
REHAB
NEW
MORTG. BAL.
COST OF I
MORTG. + CASH
MORTG. BAL. +
IMPLIED EQUITY
MORTG. BAL. MORTG. + CAP.
CONTR IB.
REHAB
NEW MORTG. BAL. +
IMPLIED EQUITY
REHAB
COST OF 11
VALUE OF
II AFTER
ROLLOVER
AFTER-TAX
CASH FROM
SALE OF I
SAME AS I 6.241 0
9.35
8.99
12.28
10.80
18.06
8.39
18.19
0
8.29
8.29
0
0
11.11
11.11
SINKING
FUND
FROM I
TOTAL
FUNDS
AVA I L.
0 6.24
0 9.35
0 17.272
0 20.56
0 10.80
0 18.06
0 19.50
0 29.28
ven as a percentage of the mortgage amount.
2 Underlined cases are the only live options.
0 0
NEW
TOTAL
FUNDS
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11.28
16.18
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a
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3. Rehabilitation rolling "ver to rehabilitation only in
the case of stepped-up basis for both projects.
4. Rehabilitation rolling over to new with increased cost
in the new project.
While this set of computations is not exhaustive of the possibilities, I
believe it serves to illustrate the complexity and the limitations of
rollover. It clearly does not provide the broad incentive for transfer
of ownership to tenants that was apparently intended. It should be re-
iterated that these conclusions assume that the rollover process must
make investment sense both to the developer and to the investors.I Of
course, if the original project is in serious difficulty and the investors
are likely to be faced with a failing project, a foreclosure, and immedi-
ate liability to capital. gains taxes, then the investors may be willing
to provide some additional capital for a "bail-out" project and/or the
developer may be willing to take less than the full market value of the
capital contributions on the second project as a favor or business obli-
gation to the investors.
The upshot then is that the rollover would appear to be a live option
in only two basic situations:
(1) the tenants in the project are willing and able to
pay a price (for the project in which they live)
well above the amount of the outstanding mortgage
balance, so that net proceeds from sale to tenants
The rollover election is complicated in the case of a project owned
by a partnership, because the proposed Treasury regulation would require
that the partnership must make the election, not just the individual in-
vestor. (IRS Regulation 1.1039-1, proposed 11/24/71)
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of the first project can be added to the amounts the in-
vestors in the first project will be willing to offer to
the developer for the "rollover" into a second project,
OR
(2) the developer of a second project is willing to sacrifice
maximum profits (which could be obtained by selling in-
terests in the second project to new investors) in order
that he might offer the second project as 'a "rollover"
candidate for the investors in his first project gone
1sour. 1
These options hardly seem to be in the best interests of the tenants
as apparently intended by the inclusion of, Section 1039 in the tax law.
The tenants have the choice of paying a premium price for gaining control
of their own housing or of being convinced to buy a project considered un-
desirable and in trouble both by the original investors in the project
and by the original developer willing to assume the financial sacrifice
of rescuing them.
D. ALTERNATIVES TO THE ROLLOVER CONCEPT
The set of computations on rollover options summarized in the preceding
section is not exhaustive of the possibilities, but I believe they serve
to illustrate the complexity and the limitations of the rollover incentive
as it now stands. It clearly does not provide the broad incentive for
transfer of ownership to tenants that was apparently intended by the
legislation. In fact, it could be conjectured that one outcome of the
Section 1039 rollover incentive will be that of encouraging investors to
unload a failing project on the tenants--an incentive exactly counter to
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the one intended. Tied as it is to the already complex tangle of tax
law and regulation, an attempt to modify further the tax system to create
more lucrative rollover incentives seems certain of frustration. For
example, if the gains taxes were simply forgiven outright upon a sale of
a Section 236 project to the tenants, a substantial windfall would ac-
grue to the taxpayer. tis initial investment cannot be predicated upon
such tax forgiveness, thus does not take into account the possibility of
forgiveness of gains taxes when computing capital contributions he would
be willing to make in exchange for the investment value of the project.
We would simply have another case in which an arbitrary tax expenditure
is made without suiting the amount to the purpose.
The revisions in tax treatment of Section 236 projects suggested in
Chapter VII (at pp. 281-296) have already anticipated direct payment
as an alternative to the Section 1039 rollover incentive to transfer
project ownership to tenants. . For example., if direct payments were made,
the normal development process could be followed by an incubation period
during which a tenant cooperative was formed and cash payments made to
the owner upon transfer of the project to the tenant cooperative.
The next chapter includes a further discussion of the tenant's per-
spective (at pp. 331-333) in the context of an overall review of this
work.
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CHAPTER iX: SUMM.ARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The complex nature of public objectives in housing has been ob-
served to underlie a policy mix in housing rather than a single strategy
or limited range of housing programs. The project subsidy approach,
whereby rental subsidies attach to particular buildings in which eligible
persons can enjoy the benefits of the subsidy, is therefore judged to be
likely to continue as an element of public policy in housing, even though
objectives more oriented to the welfare of those considered deserving
of subsidy might call for more direct subsidies to the people involved.
In a review of U. S. tax policy on depreciation and income taxation,
we have seen that the consistent pattern has been to allow depreciation
allowances in excess of the decline in true economic value of real pro-
perty. Coupled with a progressive rate structure in the personal in-
come tax, this tax treatment of depreciation leads to a situation in
which income, either from the property in question or from other sources,
can be sheltered from income tax because of the paper losses created.
While real estate in general and housing in particular had been almost
accidental beneficiaries of depreciation allowances, the Tax Reform
Act of 1969 explicitly ranked the treatment of housing as a preferred
area, thus admitting the tax incentive in housing as a matter of public
policy. While preserving the earlier tax treatment of newly constructed
rental housing, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 created a new incentive for
rehabilitated housing in the form of a special 5-year write-off period.
While the returns in the form of tax savings offered by depreciation
allowances could be attractive to investors in many real estate situations,
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the area of subsidized rental housing currently exemplified by the
Section 236 program is a special case because of the involvement of
government in providing not only tax benefits, but also in providing in-
sured loans covering essentially all of the costs of a typical project
and in providing an interest subsidy which lowers the rents to eligible
tenants so as to provide a practically certain market for the developed
units. This work has undertaken, then, to-pattern an analysis of the
operation of tax incentives in the Section 236 program as closely as pos-
sible after the actual practices of the development community.
A computer program has been used as an aid in describing the finan-
cial nature oF typical projects, their investment character and the govern-
ment costs involved. While the "base case" approach has often been used
in real estate analysis, ! have attemp-ted hereto generalize the results
by examining the sensitivity of the base case to variations in the rela-
tive costs of project components. The general observations on the invest-
ment attractiveness of typical Section 236 projects are found to be rela-
tively insensitive to project cost variations over normal ranges. Hav-
ing established base cases of typical 236 projects for new construction
and rehabilitation, the computer analysis has been used to examine the po-
s itions (1) of the developer of these projects, (2) of the investors (as
limited partners) in these projects, (3) of the eventual tenants in these
projects, and (4) of the Federal government.
In the case of the developer, the complexity of the tax system and
its interpretation, not to mention the bureaucratic requirements of mort-
gage and interest subsidy applications, seems to have limited the use of
the 236 program to those who understand how to put all these elements to-
gether, in many cases including the use of expensive services for packaging
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and marketing the tax shelter investment to limited partners. To those
developers who do understand how to use the tax benefits, the typical
pattern is for the developer to extract large capital contributions from
the limited partner/investors at the outset of the project in exchange for
their claim to future tax savings. Since little cash is required in ad-
dition to the mortgage loan amount for the actual costs of construction
and other direct project costs, the developer typically extracts what
amounts to a rather handsome fee at the outset of the project in the form
of the excess capital contributions. The incentive to develop these pro-
jects has thus been so great that there has been a backlog of project ap-
plications.
The magnitude of this fee depends upon the assessment of the limited
partners (or of their investment counsel) of the degree of risk involved
in these projects. In my investigations, the assessment of risk at the
time of observation (1969 to 1971) was such that the investors typically
looked for a 15 percent after-tax rate of return on new construction and
25 percent on rehabilitation. Conceivably, as word of dramatic project
failures gets out, investors will become more cautious and demand higher
after-tax rates of return in view of their perception of increased risk.
The consequence would be to reduce the amount of money the developer could
raise from the investors and thus to reduce the amount of his "fee." In
fact, this factor is probably already at work in terms of the locations
which developers choose, since more investment capital can be raised for
projects located in safer, more stable areas. To some extent this may
encourage developers eventually to fight the struggles necessary for lo-
cations outside the central cities in areas where these projects are
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often opposed. It is likely at least to encourage developers to stay
away from central city areas in which the housing stock is in disrepair
and regarded as declining, whether or not development in these areas is
considered desirable as a matter of public policy.
This work has shown, however, that the amount of capital contribu-
tions which can be raised, primarily as a result of the tax treatment, is
not very sensitive to the after-tax rate of return demanded by investors.
For example, even if investors in new construction were to demand a 25
percent after-tax rate of return, the developer could collect the equiva-
lent of almost 12 percent of the mortgage loan amount. In the rehabili-
tation case investcrs would obtain a 30 percent return after making capital
contributions the equivalent of 22 percent of the mortgage loan amount.
As another way of looking at the influence of risk on investment, the
base case calculations show that even if projects were marketed assuming
a 10-year holding period rather than the more typical 20-year peciod,
investors would be willing to contribute capital equivalent to 10 percent
of the mortgage loan amount for new construction and 15 percent for re-
habilitation and still receive a 15 percent after-tax return on new con-
struction and a 25 percent after-tax return on rehabilitation. In either
case these amounts would seem to provide sufficient development incentive.
My assessment of this situation, therefore, is that the tax incentive is
not likely to "dry up" as a consequence of perceptions of increased risk
in these projects on the part of investors.
On the other hand the tax incentive is exposed for its arbitrariness,
in that the amount which the developer can raise is primarily a function of
the tax laws and not of the amount which he could demand for his services
in a competitive situation. The investors have been seen primarily as an
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indirect conduit for Federal tax dollars, in that they provide immediate
capital to the developer in exchange for claims to the tax savings generated
in the future by a project. This process is inefficient from the govern-
ment perspective for at least three reasons. First, the investors discount
the tax savings more heavily than would government and as a consequence
attribute a smaller present value to them than does the government.
Second, the complexity of the tax mechanism results in significant frac-
tions of the capital contributed by the investors being used to pay the
professionals necessary for interpreting the rules for investors (and de-
velopers) and for locating the potential investors, all of whom must be
in high income tax brackets to make effective use of the tax shelter.
Finally, the investors in tax brackets higher than that of the marginal
investors reap windfall returns, since they pay the same capital contri-
butions to the developer at the outset but enjoy larger tax savings over
the life of the project, hence generate larger revenue losses for the
government but without increasing development- incentive.
The perspective of the tenants in 236 projects is a bit difficult
to assess in an analysis heavily oriented to matters of economics and
finance. The primary tenant benefit, rent reduction, is achieved (quite
independently of the tax incentive mechanism) in the form of- interest sub-
sidy on the project mortgage loan repayment. Incentives for the project
owners to provide satisfactory housing services over the period of owner-
ship appear to be very weak. The primary investment incentive is the
tax savings, and they flow without regard to the quality of housing ser-
vices delivered as long as the buildings continue to operate well enough
to sustain the repayment of the mortgage loan. The investors are inter-
ested in avoiding an early sale, especially in the case of rehabilitation,
because of the large capital gains taxes which would have to be paid and
which could severely reduce the net after-tax return of the project.
This is a weak incentive to do anything more than keep the project from
being foreclosed. Moreover, the party actually responsible for the
operation of the project on behalf of the inactive, limited partner/
investors is the developer, who is usually the general partner but who
has little or none of his funds ipvested in the project. Except for the
developer's desire to maintain credibility and a favorable reputation in
the investment community and with HUD/FHA for future Section 236 projects,
he has little incentive even to keep the project operating, much less to
provide superior housing services, since the economic benefits have been
extracted at the outset of the project.
Such a system obviously has little dweller orientation. The tenant
is locked into a p-articular building as the only way in which the rent
subsidy can be obtained. Furthermore, conditions in a project can de-
teriorate markedly before the quality of housing services in the subsi-
dized project is reduced to that of competitive non-subsidized housing in
the private market. The project owners thus would seem to have little
incentive to no more than keep the project from deteriorating to the point
that vacancies become a serious problem.
Some community-based housing sponsors are attempting to make the best
of this complex world by taking on at least some of the roles of the de-
veloper in order to capture some of the tax benefits. While such an ap-
proach does have the potential for tapping additional resources for sus-
taining high quality housing services in a project and for other tenant-
oriented services, the cost is high in terms of the effort required and
of the obscurity of this process to all but the sponsor's professional
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advisors.
A review of the incentives created in the so-called "rollover" option
for owners of Section 236 projects simply reveals the futility of continuing
to try to achieve highly focused public objectives in housing by tinkering
with an already complex and indirect tax system. It would appear that
the conditions under which Section 236 project owners would be interested
in selling a project to a tenant group would be (1) if the tenant group
could pay a price well in excess of the outstanding mortgage balance, and
probably well in excess of any amount which could be refinanced, or (2) if
the developer is willing to obtain less than his maximurm profit from a
second project by offering it as a bail-out investment for his partners
in a first project which has become impossible to operate for some reason.
No dweller orientation there, despite the apparent intentions of the Con-
gress. It is hard within the same tax system to encourage at the same
time long holding periods by imposing recapture taxes on recovered de-
preciation at sale and to encourage early transfer of a project to a
tenant group by further manipulation of the tax treatment.
From the perspective of the Federal government, the current tax treat-
ment creates large revenue losses in the operating years of a 236 project,
especially a rehabilitation project. In conjunction with the reduced tax
rate on the capital gain when the project is sold, the net effect is to
create large net government revenue losses from these projects. These
losses are the government cost for the development incentive which is
created. In the event of real losses on a project, the government is a
helpless partner. Additional tax revenues are collected from high sale
prices but diminish if the value of the project has diminished markedly by
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the time of sale. Furthermore, although one of the advantages of tax in-
centives is supposed to be low administrative costs, we have seen that a
substantial cost is paid in the form of the capital captured by the tax
shelter broker in a typical syndication.
The substantial costs in lost revenues lead to a consideration of out-
right replacement of the investors by government. The primary actor is
the developer; the investors are essentially in a passive role other than
screening the developer for credibility. The economic waste involved in the
tax incentive approach is revealed in the comparison of the present govern-
ment costs and the costs which would be insured if direct government pay-
ments were made to the developer in place of the capital contributions of
the investors. Depending on the rate of discount used, the present value
of government costs would be reduced by 25 to 50 percent on new construction
projects and by approximately 50 percent on rehabilitation projects. But
these figures assume that the present payments by the investors must be
exactly matched. The tax benefits are not closely tuned, however, to
provide just the incentive required. In fact, the standing backlog of ap-
plications for these projects suggests that the development incentive is
more than ample. Direct payments would enable the amounts offered to
developers to be just sufficient to induce the volume of production which
has been set as a matter of public policy. This volume is now set in ef-
fect by theamount of funds appropriated for interest subsidy. Direct pay-
ments would thus not only reduce government costs just by being direct,
but would also make it possible to reduce costs even further by avoiding un-
necessarily large development incentives. The net svings in total public
expenditures on these projects could, of course, be used to take into ac-
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count the multitude of policy objectives besides simply production of
units and could provide additional funds for management, maintenance,
social services, and deeper rent subsidies.
While the direct payment approach may seem extreme, it is clear that
an even more direct role has in the past been taken by the Federal govern-
ment in housing development, as outlined in Chapter I]. A direct payment
scheme would also bear some resemblance to the present public housing
"Turnkey" approach for the development of publ ic housing units. Wh i I e
continued public ownership of a Section 236 project might not be desirable,
the government could control ownership through the direct payment approach,
and it would be possible for government to assign ownership to a local
agency, to a private owner, or to a tenant association at costs lower
than those of the current system. Suh an approach would obviate the need
for a rollover incentive for transferring ownership to tenants; in fact
the amount of funds required to induce development might well be reduced
on any project in which the developer had only a short-term responsibility.
Direct payment would thus have the following advantages over the cur-
rent system:
1. Reduced government costs.
2. Matching of payments to developers to provide just
the incentive needed to produce the planned number
of housing units.
3. Focusing of all of the primary economic incentives
for development and operation of housing in the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development, rather
than leaving a major component to be administered by
the Internal Revenue Service.
4. Creating more options for the form of ownership.
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Attempts to achieve some of these objectives through further adjust-
ments in the tax have been explored in this work. The changes in invest-
ment incentive which can be achieved tend to occur in jumps, however,
and not in a way which could be at all finely tuned. The tax system is
just too cumbersome and indirect an instrument for focused incentives.
It would be possible, however, to reduce the tax benefits and combine
these reductions with direct payments to assure the inducement of the de-
sired development response. From the analyses presented here it is clear
that this approach would still incur some unnecessary revenue losses com-
pared with outright replacement of the investment incentive through direct
payments. Reduced tax benefits combined with some direct payments would
capture some of the benefits of direct payment, increasingly so as the
tax benefits are reduced and replaced by direct payments.
All of the above observations on government costs have been found to
hold over a wide range of plausible rates of discount for computing the
present value of losses and gains for government. Payments in lieu of
tax benefits which are financed through the mortgage loan have been con-
sidered for all of the options discussed; financing of direct payments
through the mortgage loan would reduce the present value of government
costs when the government discount rate is higher than the mortgage loan
interest rate, and conversely.
The area of government costs from revenue losses in the subsidized
rental housing program has been of particular interest because of the
direct involvement of government in the program at present, except for
the development incentive. Similar work on other types of real estate
development would very likely reach similar conclusions about government
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costs and the cost efficiency of direct payments. What is more likely is
that an honest appraisal of the effective government costs in favorable
depreciation allowances in non-subsidized housing and in non-residential
real estate would generate pressures to reduce these apparently arbi-
trary benefits. In the case of non-subsidized housing, for example,
this would mean that the investment value of housing would have to be
supported by the rental payments of the tenants rather than by means of
a general subsidy through the tax system. The revenues regained as a
result could then be applied to more direct rental subsidies (as, for
example, in a national housing allowance) for the benefit of those who
need the subsidy and not for the entire population of rental housing
tenants. One way of beginning to move toward a direct payment system in
programs such as the Section 236 rental housing program would be to leg is-
late a general tightening of the depreciation rules on all real estate
while offering developers of 236 housing to elect a direct payment scheme
in lieu of the tax benefits along the lines of one of the many options
which have been considered in this work. Any direct payment scheme would
begin to align the administration of housing policy and the administration
of the economic incentives for the development and operation of privately
owned subsidized housing.
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APPENDIX: COMPUTER PROGRAM FOR ANALYSIS OF INVESTMENT
AND GOVERNMENT COSTS
The computer program, TAXCST, used as an analytical tool in this
work is outlined in this appendix. TAXCST is written in FORTRAN IV and
was used on the Cambridge Monitor System, an MIT time-sharing system
operating with an IBM System 360, Model 67 computer. A complete listing
of the program is included at the end of this appendix.
TAXCST is basically an accounting computation which operates upon
input quantities to provide the desired output quantities in accordance
with certain tax and investment analysis rules. The program accepts in-
put quantities for those variables which were of interest in computing in-
vestment value and government costs in typical rental projects, both new
construction and rehabilitation, under the Section 236 interest subsidy
and mortgage insurance program. Certain variables are assigned values
internally by the program which might be rearranged as input quantities
if different questions were being examined with the program. No attempt
is made to optimize, although some values must be found by iteration.
TAXCST was originally intended to be a general program for real estate
investment analysis including conventionally financed and non-profit de-
velopment as well as limited dividend sponsorship. Although this flexi-
bility could, in principle, be restored by reading in the value of the
parameter ICSUB, only the limited dividend case (ICSUB=1) has been
thoroughly debugged.
The main program of TAXCST calls a number of subroutines, depending
upon the type of computation required by control parameters accepted as
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input values. The primary functions of TAXCST and its subroutines are
as follows:
TAXCST -- writes at terminal the labels for values needed
and reads in the values provided; controls subroutines
called; writes summary values at completion of execu-
tion.
CSTEQ -- computes build-up of project costs from land, struc-
ture, direct construction; computes FHA total replacement
costs, mortgage loan amount and cash equity required;
computes expensible car rying costs of development period.
OPCST -- computes annual mortgage payment, operating costs,
and rents.
TAXES -- computes annual depreciation, income tax, and mort-
gage amortization; for rehabilitation computes separate
depreciation for old structure, rehabilitation expendi-
tures and excess rehabilitation expenditures (see rules
in Chapter 1i1).
SALE -- computes sale prices, taxes at sale (internal sub-
routine, RECAP, computes recapture rules), net gain
from sale (see rules in Chapter 111).
IRATE -- computes annual after-tax return, tax sinking fund
and accumulated interest at time of sale, present value
of after-tax returns, internal rate'of return on equity;
step-up in basis resulting from excess capital contri-
butions of limited partners; computes phased payments of
capital contributions (see descriptions in Chapter V).
COSTG -- computes present value of Federal revenue losses and
gains, local real estate tax abatement, interest subsidy,
annual dividend, Federal revenue losses and gains from
accelerated depreciation, and Federal costs for matching
investor payments (see description in Chapter ViI).
The basic flow of the computations is diagrammed in Figure A-].
The parameter TST1 is a switch used for computing the step-up in basis
in a tax shelter syndication, which is called for by setting ISYND=2.
The value of TST1 is changed in the course of the computations in ac-
cordance with the following scheme: when TSTI is positive, no step-up
is computed because the computation has not reached the last sale year;
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Read Inpu*
ICSTEQ = 1
= 2
TST1 = NYF - NY = 0 Write Depreciation and Amortization Tables
# 0
Call SALE 
-
- Write Sale Taxes
Call IRAT -1-SYND = 1
= 2 (Syndicat
: Write Investment Indices
Write Cash Flow (final
sale year)
END o ~e"fSuboutne IRATE
TST 0 I _ _ _
= 0 Compute Ini-
tial Step-up
Est.
< 01 NLAP __ S TCTI = TCT1 - 1
ISYND = 2 -. Yes: Set TST1 = < 6 -- Se
and TST1 = 0 TSTp - 1, and Comp
f Repeat from Com
No TAXES Conv
ISYND = 2-a-Set TST1 = -1 Y
-1 and Call TAXES N
Write Depreci-
ation and Amor-
ICSTG = 2-+- Call CSTG ti zation for
1 Stepped-up Basis
Write Government Costs
Write Output Summary
END
t
t TST1 = TST1 + 1
ute Capital Contributions
erge on Basis?
es: Set TST1 = TST1 - 1
o: ST1 / 0
= 0 END of Sub-
routine
IRATE
FIGURE A-1: SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS FOR PROGRAM TAXCST
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when TST1 is zero, the computation continues to recycle with updated
values of depreciable basis; when TSTI is negative, recycling is ter-
minated and the program completed, either because the step-up has con-
verged (change in depreciable basis is less than 0.1 percent) or because
the calculation has recycled six times (NLOOP greater than 6).
Several tables are included to summarize key program variables and
program operation. Table A-1 indicates the parameters which can be provided
as input. Tables A-2 through A-8 summarize the variable names used by
program and the values set internally in the program. Table A-9 is a
sample input sheet from the time-sharing computer terminal. Table A-10
is a sample output generated by the sample case called for in Table A-9.
A complete listing of the program is included at the end of the appendix.
Since the program is replete with comients on the operations being per-
formed, no effort has been made to include a complete list of variables.
Variable names are generally obvious from the context and accompanying
comments. Generally variables beginning with "R" are rates, those with
"I" are integer indicators or switches, and those with "N" are integers
to denote the number of an item.
The program TAXCST should (with luck) work in a batch processing en-
vironment with the following changes: (1) supply the proper unit number
as "IN" or in the "READ" statements, (2) provide the necessary input data
(see Table A-i) in the format called for in the listing on punched cards
(at the end of a compiled object deck), (3) specify IOUT as the unit num-
ber for the system printer, and (4) specify IGO as 1. The program occu-
pies 42,390 bytes of storage and requires approximately 2 seconds of
Central Processor Unit time on the IBM System 360 Model 67 for cases such
as the one shown in Tables A-9 and A-10.
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TABLE A-1: iNPUT PARAMETERS
RELEQ Real equity, or cash costs. May be entered directly or computed
internally (see subroutine CSTEQ in program listing).
LND Cost of land
BCSTR Cost of original structure before rehabilitation
TDEV Development period in years
DYRS Depreciation period, or economic life, in years -- used for all
elements
RRATE Developer's or investors' discount rate, or after-tax rate of
return demanded on equity invested
RYTAX Marginal bracket rate for Federal income tax
RKTAX Capital gains tax rate
RYTXM Rate of minimum tax on preference income
RBFE Builder's profit rate as a percentage of direct construction costs,
entered as zero if builder and developer have identity of interest
RIMRT Interest rate for mortgage loan (market rate, including mortgage
insurance premium)
RFUND Interest rate (after-tax) for tax sinking fund
RPROF Annual cash profit, or dividend, specified as a fraction of EQUTY,
the difference between total replacement costs as allowed by FHA
and the mortgage loan amount
ICSTQ Integer which either (1) selects CSTEQ subroutine or (2) allows
key development paramete-rs to be input directly
1: Input BCSTC Construction costs
RIFIN Rate of interest for interim, or con-
struction, financing
ACAPI Amount of total capital contributions
2: Input MRT Mortgage amount
BCCST Carrying costs to be expenses during
development
BRPLC Total replacement costs
BSRA Amount of Builder's and Sponsor's Profit
and Risk Allowance
ACAPI Amount of total capital contributions
(Continued)
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TABLE A-1 (Cont.): INPUT PARAMETERS
ICSTG integer to (1) skip subroutine COSTG or (2) call COSTG
2: Input ACAPM Annual payment to match by govern-
ment, if known
CSTGM Government revenue costs to match,
if known
RDG Rate of discount for government
INUR Integer for choice of depreciation method
1: Double declining balance (new construction)
2: 125 percent declining balance (used housing)
3: Rehabilitation (program assigns 125 percent DB to shell,
5-year amortization to rehabilitation expenditures, and
DDB to excess rehabilitation expenditures)
4: Straight-line depreciation
5: No depreciation allowance whatever
6: Sum-of-the-year:s-digits depreciation (alternate for new)
NU Number of units in project
ISYND Integer for step-up in basis for last sale year
1: Not stepped up; cash costs only are included
2: Stepped up and recycled; total capital contributions in-
cluded in basis
NCAP Number of annual capital contributions
NRCPR Month in which relief from recapture'begins
NPSAL Number of option chosen for sale price computation
1: Mortgage balance at time of sale
2: Value of capitalized rent stream
3: Price decreasing to zero in straight-line over economic
life
4: Price decreasing to zero in parabola--no change at start,
twice the straight-line rate at the end of economic life
5: Original total replacement cost
6: Price appreciating from original total replacement cost
at 2-1/2 percent per year
7: Price appreciating at 5 percent per year
8: Price specified in input as PSALE
9: Mortgage balance plus implied equity, EQUTY
10: Mortgage balance plus taxes due at sale
NYI, NYF Initial and final years of sale. Consequences of sale com-
puted for each year in this range
1OUT Integer to specify type of unit to be used for printing output
(Continued)
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TABLE A-1 (Cont.): !NPUT PARAMETERS
IGO Integer to (01) execute, (02) repeat all input, or (03) exit
(The following variables are not accepted as input but could be for
greater program flexibility:)
I/CC Integer for treatment of carrying costs
1: Capitalize carrying costs into depreciable value of building
2: Take carrying costs as an expense during development (current
value in program)
ICSUB Indicator for type of ownership
1: Limited dividend (current value in program)
2: Conventional
3: Nonprofit
IFUND Tax sinking fund selector
1: No tax sinking fund
2: Fund established out of returns to pay taxes on sale (cur-
rent value in program)
345
TABLE A-2: SUBROUTINE CSTEQ, DEVELOPMENT COSTS
INTERNALLY SPECIFIED PARAMETERS (IN ORDER OF APPEARANCE)
RMTIN Mortgage insurance premium on mortgage (0.005)
RFHEX FHA examination fee with loan application (0.003)
RFHIN FHA inspection fee, on mortgage (0.005)
RAMP FHA fee for accelerated multi-family processing (0.0)
RFNMA Fee for Federal National Mortgage Association purchase of
mortgage loan (0.015)
RTAR Title and recording fees, on mortgage (0.005)
RLAO Legal and organizational fees, on mortgage (0.0065)
RCMT Commitment fee for conventional mortgage loan (0.0)
RIFNO Fraction of interim (or construction) loan assumed outstanding
over the development period (0.5)
RINSL Rate of liability insurance, during construction on fraction
RIFNO of mortgage amount (0.01)
RINSF Rate of fire insurance during construction (0.01)
BCSTD Demolition costs (0.0)
RLND Fraction of land cost separately financed (0.0)
RILND Interest rate on loan for land (0.10)
RBSRA Rate for Builder's and Sponsor's Profit and Risk Allowance,
on FHA allowable costs except for land and building shell in
total replacement cost (0.10)
RARCHS Rate of architect's supervision fee, on direct construction
costs (0.02)
RIWC interest rate for working capital loan during development
period (0.10)
RWC Working capital required as a percentage of mortgage amount (0.02)
RFIN Financing fee (0.02)
RBOND Rate on construction bond premium, on direct construction costs
(0.0124)
(Continued)
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TABLE A-2 (Cont.): SUBROUTINE CSTEQ, DEVELOPMENT COSTS
SUBROUTINE VARIABLES
A Excess interest (over FHA market rate) during construction
BCCST Carrying costs during construction to be claimed as an expense
for tax purposes
SCSTS Cost of land and shell
BRPLC Total replacement cost as defined by FHA
BTCST Total construction costs, including fees
EQUTY Apparent equity (replacement cost less mortgage)
EXCES Financing costs not coiered by FHA-insured mortgage loan
MRT Mortgage loan amount
RELEQ Cash required over mortgage loan amount
RETXD Real estate taxes during development, on land and shell
RIFHA FHA market interest rate
RIFN Limiting construction interest rate for FHA calculation, the
lower of the interim financing rate, .RIFIN, or the FHA rate,
RIFHA
RBO Builder's overhead rate, on direct construction costs
RMRT Fraction of total replacement cost financed by mortgage
(set at 0.9 for limited dividend cases)
RRETD Rate of real estate taxes during development on land and
shell (currently set at 0.1 in the program)
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TABLE A-3: SUBROUTINE OPCST, OPERATING COSTS
INTERNALLY SPECIFIED VARIABLES (ORDER OF APPEARANCE)
RCMG Rate of management fee on annual rent (0.05)
RCRM Repairs and maintenance as a fraction of rent (0.08)
RCRR Replacement reserve as a fraction of rent (0.005)
RCMI Miscellaneous annual operating costs, per room, such as in-
surance and utilities ($50)
RRET Real estate tax rate as a fraction of annual gross basic
rent (0.15)
RVAC Vacancy rat. (0.05)
NRMS Number of rooms (4.5)
RISUB Interest rate of subsidized mortgage loan (0.01)
NMTGP Number of mortgage payments per year (1)
SUBROUTINE VARIABLES
CNPYS Mortgage constant at subsidized interest rate, RISUB, assuming
NMTGP payments per year for TMTG years
CRNTM Monthly rent at market interest rate, "market" rent
CRNTB Monthly rent at subsidized interest rate, "basic" rent
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TABLE A-4: SUBROUTINE TAXES
PROGRAM VARIABLES
ADEPR(N) Amount of depreciation taken in year N
ADMTGF Final mortgage balance at the end of year NY, a year of sale
ADMTG(N) Mortgage balance at beginning of year N
AINT(N) Amount of interest at market rate paid in year N
AMORT(N) Mortgage amortization (principal repayment) in year N
ATAX(N) Amount of income tax paid in year N
BASISF Final basis at sale (not including land)
BASISI Initial depreciable basis (not including land)
NLOOP Number of iterations for matching investor's constributions
with depreciable basis
SXDPR Sum of excess depreciation (over straight-line)
XDEPR Excess depreciation
XTAX(N) Income subject to tax in year N
ZDEPR Straight-line depreciation (for any year)
349
TABLE A-5: SUBROUTINE SALE
SPECIFIED VARIABLE
CAPRT Capitalization rate (0.10)
PROGRAM VARIABLES
CASH Before tax cash proceeds of sale
CPTR Gain taxed as ordinary income, recaptured
CTPX Recapture tax
GAIN Gain subject to tax at capital gain rates
GAINR Gain subject to recapture
GANTX Capital gain tax
GSALE After-tax gain from sale
PRFTX Tax on preference income (the excluded portion of capital
gain)
TSALE Total taxes at sale
YSALE Taxable income from sale
TABLE A-6: SUBROUTINE RECAP (PROGRAM VARIABLES)
ITD Nymber of months held
RCPTR Fraction of excess depreciation which is to be taxed at
ordinary income rates (recaptured)
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TABLE A-7: SUBROUTINE IRATE
PROGRAM VARIABLES
ACAPI Total capital contributions, input
ACAPN Amount of annual capital contribution
ACAPS Present value of capital contributions
ACAPT Total amount of capital contributions, computed
ARET(N) After-tax return in year , after setting aside tax fund
ARETN(N) After-tax return in year N, without tax fund
BNPV Present value, no tax fund
BPV Present value with tax fund
BASIS0 Original depreciable basis before adding excess capital con-
tributions
BASIST Test basis after addition of excess capital contributions. As
an initial estimate the program uses the expression for the sum
of the inf.inite series formed when the additions to basis are
computed iteratively with a fixed tax sinking fund; without the
sinking fund the initial estimate would be exact for the re-
habilitation case. In the rehabilitation case the ratio of capi-
tal contributions to basis is assumed constant and given by
ACAPT/BASISI = NCAP x FCAP x FRET x FTAX,
where FTAX operates on a change in basis to get the increment in
annual return, FRET operates on annual return to get present
value, FCAP operates on present value to get annual capital con-
tribution, and NCAP is the multiple of annual contributions to
arrive at ACAPT. For new construction, ACAPT/BASISI is jupt
taken from the last calculation for present value before the
step-up calculation,
or,
ACAPT/BASISI = NCAP x FCAP x BPV
FDVPV Net present value to developer, after cash expenses
FDVT Net total capital contributions to developer, after cash expenses
RTNAF Average rate of return, after eliminating tax sinking fund and loss
in year of sale
RTNAV Average rate of return, no tax sinking fund
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TABLE A-8: SUBROUTINE COSTG
INTERNALLY SPECIFIED VARIABLES
NSUB Number of years for phase-out of interest subsidy payments (10)
RRETF Full real estate tax rate without abatement, as a fraction of
gross basic rent (0.25)
NTGP Number of mortgcge payments per year (1)
PROGRAM VARIABLES
AIS Annual interest subsidy
ACAPGS Present value to government of capital contributions paid to
developer in lieu of contributions by private investors
AMFEE Amount to add to mortgage for replacement of capital contri-
butions by private investors (not the sum of capital contri-
butions but their present value at the time of issuance of the
permanent mortgage, i.e., at the end of the development period)
CDPSAV Reduction in present value of government cost for direct payment
of capital contributions
CDPPSV Reduction in present value of government cost for direct payment
of capital contributions, government gets dividends
CMFSAV Reduction in present value of government cost for replacement
through mortgage of private capital contributions
CMGPSV Reduction in present value of government cost for replacement
through mortgage of private capital contributions, government
gets dividends
CNFED Present value of annual payments to amortize AMFEE over holding
period at mortgage interest rate
CSTG Present value of government costs, or revenue losses less taxes
at sale
CSTGM Present value of government costs to match from a reference case
(Continued)
Only illustrative variables are listed here. The suffix "D" gener-
ally indicates discounting to the end of the development period (start of
project operation), while the suffix "F" indicates discounting to the
start of development, all at the government rate of discount. Both values
are computed in the program although only one is shown in this variable
list.
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TABLE A-8 (Cont.): SUBROUTINE COSTG
CSTGMG Present value of government cost for replacement through mortgage
of private capital contributions, government gets dividends
CSTGPD Present value of government cost for replacement of private capi-
tal contributions except for value of tax-free dividends (saving
is CPDSV)
CSTGPM Present value of government cost for replacement through mortgage
of private capital contributions except for value of tax-free
dividends (saving is CPMSV)
CSTPXD Present value of government cost for direct replacement of private
capital contributions, except for value of after-tax dividends
(saving in present value is CPXDSV)
CSTPXM Present value of government cost for replacement through mortgage
of private capital contributions, except for value of after-tax
dividends (saving in present value is CPXMSV)
DCAPGS Present value of increment added to private capital contributions
to match a reference case for total capital contributions
DCNFDF Present value of cost of annual payment to amortize matching in-
crement in capital contributions to meet reference case
DCSTG Difference in present value of government costs for reference
case and case computed'
DDPSAV Reduction in present value of government cost for direct payment
to match reference capital contributions
TCTLD Present value of revenue loss from construction losses
TDTLD Present value of revenue losses from depreciation
TEDLD Present value of revenue losses from excess depreciation
TISD Present value of annual interest subsidy over holding period
TOSD Present value of actual tax on sale with current depreciation
TOSSLD Present value of tax on sale with straight-line depreciation
TPISD Present value of interest subsidy phased out over NSUB years
TPROFD Present value of dividends over holding period (TPRFDF discounted
to start of development)
(Continued)
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TABLE A-8 (Cont.): SUBROUTINE COSTG
TPRFDF Present value of revenue from dividends over holding period
TSLTLD Present value of revenue loss for straight-line depreciation
TTAXD Present value of actual revenue losses, current depreciation
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TA3LE A-9: SAMPLE INPUT FOR REHABILITATION CASE
$ taxcst
EXECUTION BEGINS .. .
INPUT FORMAT: REAL N(F12.X); INTEGER AS SHOWN, XXX
INPUT DATA DIRECTLY UNDER LABELS:
REAL EQUITY, LAND COST ,STRCTR COST,DEVEL T IME, ECON. L IFE
48966.63 50000. 110000. 1. 20.
DISCNT RATE, INC TX RATECAPGAIHRATEIlN TX RATE, BLDR PROF RATE
.25 .5 .25 .1 .0
MRTG INTRSTTX FND RATEDIVID. RATE
.075 .04 .06
ICSTQ=1 FOR COMPUTE, =2 FOR INPUT DEV. COSTS
2
MORTG AMT,CARRYG CSTSTOT REPLCST, BSPRATOT CAP CONT
1632221. 150250. 1813580. 150325. 396555.94
COMPUTE CSTS TO GOVT: 1 FOR NO, 2 FOR YES
2
ANN PAYM TO MATCH BY GOVT, COMPARISON! GOVT COST, GOVT DISC RATE
ACAPM,___CSTGM__, GVT DSC RATE
132185.31 456354.31 .06
NEWUSED, REHAB, SL DEPR, NO DEPR, SYD: ENTER 1,2,3,4,5,6
3
NO OF UNITS: XXX
100
SYND STEP-UP FOR LAST YR: 1 FOR NO, 2 FOR YES
1
NO OF CAP CONTRIB, UP TO 9
3
MONTH IN WHICH RELIEF FROM RECAPT STARTS: XXX
100
SALE PRICE: 01 MTG BAL, 02 CAP VAL, 03 STR L DEP, 04 PARAB DEP,
05 TOT REPL CST, 06 2.5 P.C. APPREC, 07 5 P.C. APPREC, 08 INPUT
09 MTG BAL+10 P.C. REPL CST, 10 MTG BAL +TAXES DUE, 11 MTG+TAX+10
01
INITIAL YR OF SALE: XX
20
FINAL YR OF SALE: XX
20
lOUT: 06 AT TERM., 08 CREATES DISK FILE
08
IGO: 01 TO EXECUTE, 02 TO REPEAT INPUT, 03 TO EXIT
01
OUTPUT IN FILE FT08FOO1. OFFLINE PRINTCC FILE FT08FOO
R; T=2.04/4.10 15.20.28
0TABLE A-10: SAMPLE OUTPUT FOR REHABILITATION CASE
INVESTMENT ANALYSIS FOR SUBSIDIZED HOUSING
COPYRIGHT 1972, JAMES E. WALLACE
TIME ZERO IS START OF DEVELOPMENT
PROJECT TIME IS DEVELOPMENT TIME PLUS OPERATING TIME
MORTGAGE CONSTANT PAYMENT, MARKET RATE= 129598.81
SALE YR= 21 BASISF= -0.41
AT SUBSIDIZED RATE= 49713.18
ADMTGF= 1321174.00
DEPRECIATION ON EXCESS REHAB EXPENDITURES
2
7
12
17
21852.59
12903.73
7619.52
7619.52
3
8
13
18
19667.34
11613.35
7619.51
7619.52
4
9
14
19
17700.59
10452.02
7619.51
7619.52
5
10
15
20
DEPRECIATION ON REHAB EXPENDITURES
2 300000.00 3
7 0.0
300000.00 4 300000.00 5 300000.00 6 300000.00
DEPRECIATION ON STRUCTURE SHELL
2
7
12
17
6875.00
5310.77
5310.76
5310.76
DEPRECIATION
2
, 7
12
17
BASIS
2
7
12
17
328727.56
18214.49
12930.27
12930.28
1828526.00
208698.50
129302.50
64650.98
3
8
13
18
3
8
13
18
3
8
13
18
6445.31
5310.76
5310.76
5310.76
326112.63
16924.11
12930.27
12930.28
1499798.00
190484.00
116372.19
51720.70
4
9
14
19
4
9
14
19
4
9
14
19
6042.48
5310.76
5310.76
5310.76
323743.00
15762.77
12930.27
12930.28
1173685.00
173559.88
103441.88
38790.42
5
10
15
20
5
10
15
20
5
10
15
20
5664.82
5310.76
5310.76
5310.76
321595.31
14717.57
12930.27
12930.28
849942.00
157797.06
90511.56
25860.14
6
11
16
21
6
11
16
21
6
11
16
21
5310.77
5310.76
5310.76
5310.76
319648.19
13776.88
12930.27
12930.28
528346.69
143079.44
77581.25
12929.87
S
I- I . 11 1 db--, -- I-
15930.53
9406.81
7619.51
7619.52
6
11
16
21
14337.48
8466.13
7619.51
7619.52
S 0
wdi
AMORTIZATION
2
7
12
17
7182.31
10311.31
14803.44
21252.44
ADJUSTED MORTGAGE
2
7
12
17
1632221.00
1590501.00
1530606.00
1444619.00
GAINS TAX CALCULATION:
CASH FROM SALE- 0.0
SALE PRICE, 1321174.00, LESS BASIS, -0.41 LESS LAND,
GAIN SUBJ TO RECAPTURE, 1.41 TIMES RECAPTURE FRACTION,
TIMES INCOME TAX RATE, 0.50 = RECAPTURE TAX, 0.0
GAIN AS CAPITAL GAIN- 1271174.00 TIMES CAPITAL GAINS TAX RATE,
PREF TAX-MIN TAX*(0.5*CAP GAIN -REGULAR SALE TAXES)= 31779.34
AFTER TAX GAIN FROM SALE- CASH LESS TAX= -349572.81
50000.00 = TAXABLE GAIN, 1271174.00
0.0 = GAIN RECAPTURED,
0.25- CAPITAL GAINS TAX,
TOTAL TAXES ON SALE-
317793.50
349572.81
PAYBACK PERIOD 1 ITER NUM 10 RATE 1.9777 RESID XNPV 0.01
PV (NO FUND)- 365489.56 PV/MRT (NO FUND)= 0.2239
CONTRIB. TO RED RETN. TO RRATE; W/O TAX FUND= 159734.63
STEPPED-UP BASIS- 1828526.00 PV OF DEVELOPER FEE- 273505.13
PV AT RRATE- 322471.81
W/TAX FUND- 138025.50
PV OF DEVELOPER FEE/MRT-0.1676
PV/MRT- 0.1976
TAX FUND STARTED IN YR 5
TAX FUND INTEREST RATE- 0.04
RETURN NOT REQD FOR FUND IN FIRST YEAR OF TAX FUND- 126920.25
PV OF RETN NOT REQD 1ST YR- 41589.23
ACCUM VAL,TAX FND
22175.44
11790.12
5404.54
1497.05
-2285.12
6 247857.50
10 9844.21
14 4411.36
18 542.96
7 15921.97
11 8058.30
15 3429.91
19 -404.58
8 13806.30
12 6410.83
16 2458.93
20 -1346.86
3
8
13
18
3
8
13
18
8300.06
11916.06
17107.25
24559.94
7721.00
11084.69
15913.69
22846.44
1625038.00
1580189.00
1515802.00
1423366.00
4
9
14
19
4
9
14
19
5
10
15
20
5
10
15
20
8922.69
12809.81
18390.38
26401.94
1609016.00
1557187.00
1482780.00
1375959.00
1617317.00
1569104.00
1499888.00
1400519.00
6
11
16
21
6
11
16
21
9591.88
13770.56
19769.69
28382.06
1600093.00
1544377.00
1464389.00
1349557.00
YR
5
9
13
17
21
w~
0.0
0 6 '0
FLOW: (PROFI
AMORTIZATION
0.0
7182.31
7721.00
8300.06
8922.69
9591.88
10311.31
11084.69
11916.06
12809.81
13770.56
14803.44
15913.69
17107.25
18390.38
19769.69
21252.44
22846.44
24559.94
26401.94
28382.06
T=RPROF*IMPLIED EQUITY)
DEPRECIATION
0.0
328727.56
326112.63
323743.00
321595.31
319648.19
18214.49
16924.11
15762.77
14717.57
13776.88
12930.27
12930.27
12930.27
12930.27
12930.27
12930.28
12930.28
12930.28
12930.28
12930.28
TAXABLE INC.
0.0
-310663.69
-307510.06
-304561.38
-301791.06
-299174.75
2978.36
5042.11
7034.83
8973.78
10875.22
12754.70
13864.96
15058.52
16341.64
17720.95
19203.70
20797.70
22511.20
24353.20
26333.32
EXCESS DEPR.
0.0
237301.25
234686.31
232316.69
230169.00
228411.13
1977.43
687.05
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
INCOME TAX AFTER TAX RETURN
-75125.00
-131601.69
-130286.38
-129049.00
-127878.56
-126746.25
1686.92
2589.76
3517.41
4486.89
5437.61
6377.35
6932.48
7529.26
8170.82
8860.48
9601.85
10398.85
11255.60
12176.60
13166.66
RETURNS AND TAX FUND
YR AFTER TAX RET DISC
1 75125.00
2 142483.19
3 141167.88
4 139930.50
5 126920.25
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
PRES VAL
60100.00
91189.19
72277.94
57315.53
41589.23
TAX SINKG FND TAX FUND W/INTEREST
11839.81
137627.75
9194.61
8291.77
7364.13
6394.65
5443.93
4504.19
3949.06
3352.28
2710.72
2021.06
1279.69
482.69
-374.06
-1295.06
-2285.12
22175.44
247857.50
15921.97
13806.30
11790.12
9844.21
8058.30
6410.83
5404.54
4411.36
3429.91
2458.93
1497.05
542.96
-404.58
-1346.86
-2285.12
SYNDICATION PAYMENTS:
PAYM. DISC, PRES. VAL. PAYM. DISC, PRES. VAL. PAYM. DISC, PRES. VAL.84582 69
PAYM. DISC, PRES. VAL.
1 132160.50 2 10572.3 3
TOTAL PV OF CAP CONTRIB= 322471.56
3PAYMENTS OF 132160.50=TOT CAP CONTRIB= 3q6481.50 TOT CAP CONTR/MRT= 0.2429
TOTAL DEV FEE=TOT CAP CONTRIB-RELEQ= 347514.81 TOT DEV FEE/MRT=0.2129
NO OF STEP UP LOOPS CALCULATED= 1
V v0
CASH
YR
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
75125.00
142483.19
141167.88
139930.50
138760.06
137627.75
9194.61
8291.77
7364.13
6394.65
5443.93
4504.19
3949.06
3352.28
2710.72
2021.06
1279.69
482.69
-374.06
-1295.06
-2285.12
9 *
COSTS TO GOVERNMENT--REVENUE LOSSES AND GAINSI DISCOUNT RATE=0.0600
YR TAX LOSS DISC VALUE
1 75125.00 70872.63
TOTAL DISCOUNTED VALUE= 70872.63
DEPRECIATION LOSSES
YR ACT TAX LOSS DISC VALUE SL
132673.25
124232.75
116404.88
109135.63
102362.06
6280.88
5582.09
4944.91
4355.69
3846.51
3405.79
3213.01
3031.14
2859.57
2697.71
2545.02
2400.96
2265.06
2136.85
2015.90
VALUE OF LOSSES AT
TAX LOSS
45713.13
45713.13
45713.13
45713.13
45713.13
45713.13
45713.13
45713.13
45713.13
45713.13
45713.13
45713.13
45713.13
45713.13
45713.13
45713.13
45713.13
45713.13
45713.13
45713.13
START OF
636389.31STR LINE LOSS=
LOSSES DISCOUNTED TO START OF DEVELOPMENT:
ACTUAL LOSS= 600367.56STR LINE LOSS=
TAXES RECOVERED AT SALE:
TAX: CAPITAL GAINS RECAPTU
AMOUNT 317793.50
DISC VAL 99091.44
DISC VAL AT START 93482.50
DISC VALUE EXCES
43125.61 94
40684.59 93
38381.71 92
36209.21 92
34159.66 91
32226.14 -36
30402.02 -37
28681.20 -37
27057.76 -38
25526.21 -38
24081.35 -39
22718.29 -39
21432.36 -39
20219.24 -391
19074.76 -39
17995.08 -39
16976.50 -39
16015.59 -39
15109.05 -39
14253.85 -39
OPERATION:
524329.69EXCESS LOSS=
494650.88EXCESS LOSS=
RE TAX PREFERENCE TAX
0.0
0.0
0.0
NET REVENUE COST TO FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
TAX LOSS LESS TAXES AT SALE, DISCOUNTED TO START
ACTUAL TOTAL = 436241.88
PRESENT COST FOR DIRECT PAYMENT= 374462.81
NET SAVING FROM DIRECT PAYMENT= 61779.06
S LOSS
920.50
874.56
926.69
067.56
269.81
803.63
319.78
831.74
354.34
824.68
247.99
247.99
247.99
247.99
247.99
247.99
247.99
247.99
247.99
247.99
DISC VALUE
89547.63
83548.13
78023.19
72926.38
68202.38
-25945.26
-24819.93
-23736.28
-22702.07
-21679.71
-20675.56
-19505.28
-18401.21
-17359.67
-16377.04
-15450.07
-14575.54
-13750.53
-12972.20
-12237.95
DISC ACT TAX
124152.56
115954.56
108352.25
101292.13
94712.56
-1189.22
-1722.35
-2206.89
-2655.81
-3036.36
-3359.54
-3445.27
-3530.05
-3614.01
-3697.22
-3779.79
-3861.82
-3943.40
-4024.60
-4105.50
112058.88
105715.94
TOTAL TAX SL CAP GAIN TAX
31779.34 349572.81 317793.50
9909.14 109000.56 99091.44
9348.25 102830.75 93482.50
OF DEVELOPMENT
RATIO TO MTG=0.2673
RATIO TO MTG=0.2294
RATIO TO ORIG CST=0.1416
MORTGAGE INCREASE TO PAY DE
PRESENT COST FOR MTG FEE SU
NET SAVING FROM PAYM VIA MC
SUBSIDY AVAIL FROM PROF=
DISCOUNTED TOTAL SUBSID=
DISCOUNTED VAL AT START=
VALUE OF PROF TO INVSTR=
DISCOUNTED VAL AT START-
DISCTD VALUE AFTER TAX =
CAPITAL CONTR FOR PROF =
CHANGE IN GOVT COST TO EXCH
VFEE= 396930.38 ANN SUBS TO COVER= 38935.86
BS- 421308.81 RATIO TO MTG= 0.2581
RTG = 14933.06 RATIO TO ORIG COST=
10881.54
124809.19
117744.56 DISC VAL OF TAX= 58872.28
43024.33
34419.46
17209.73
7053.16
PROF FOR CAP CONTRIB DIRECTLY= 19984.38
THRU MTG= 22484.46
DISC COST= 446587.13
0.0342
It0 v A v.
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
TOTAL
140633.63
139587.69
138639.81
137780.69
136982.94
8909.50
8393.35
7881.39
7358.79
6888.44
6465.14
6465.13
6465.13
6465.13
6465.14
6465.14
6465.14
6465.14
6465.14
6465.14
DISCOUNTED
ACTUAL LOSS=
Awl ip
0COSTS TO GOVT CONSIDERING DIVIDEND:
GOVT KEEPS DIV, FULL REPL, DIR PAYM
RED FROM ORIG COST
RATIO TO ORIG COST
THRU MORTG
RED FROM ORIG COST
RATIO TO ORIG COST
DIV AFT TAX TO OWNER, BAL DIR PAYM
RED FROM ORIG COST
RATIO TO ORIG COST
THRU MORTG
RED FROM ORIG COST
RATIO TO ORIG COST
TAX-FREE DIV TO OWNR, BAL DIR PAYM
RED FROM ORIG COST
RATIO TO ORIG COST
THRU MORTG
RED FROM ORIG COST
RATIO TO ORIG COST
0 0
256718.25
179523.63
0.4115
303564.25
132677.63
0.3041
295606.06
140635.81
0.3224
339952.00
962R9.88
0.2207
334494.00
101747.88
0.2332
376339.88
59902.00
0.1373
GOVT COST IN COMPARISON CASE- 436354.25
GOVT PAYM TO MAKE UP DIFF BETWEEN COMPARISON
ANN PAYM MATCHED- 132185.25ANN INCREM PA!
PRESENT COST FOR DIRECT PAYMENT- 70.13
NET SAVING FROM DIRECT PAYMENT = 42.25
MORTGAGE INCREASE TO PAY FEEINC- 74.33
PRESENT COST FOR MTG FEE INCR- 78.90
NET SAVING FOR INCR VIA MTG- 33.48
COST DIFF= 112.38
CASE AND PRESENT:
0= 24.75
RATIO TO MTG=0.0000
RATIO TO COMP COST-0.0C
ANN SUBS TO COVER= 7.
RATIO TO MTG-0.0000
RATIO TO COMP COST-0.00(
RATIO TO COMP COSTS=0.0003
DISC COST= 83.63
FEDERAL INTEREST SUBSIDY
ANNUAL INTEREST SUBSIDY- 79885.63
DISCOUNTED TOTAL SUBSID= 916273.63
DISCOUNTED VAL AT START- 864409.50
INTEREST SUBSIDY PHASED OUT OVER 10 YEARS:
ANNUAL INTEREST SUBSIDY
YR ANNUAL SUBSID DISC VALUE
2 79885.63 75363.81
3 71897.06 63988.23
4 63908.50 53658.93
5 55919.94 44294.00
6 47931.38 35817.27
7 39942.81 28158.28
8 31954.25 21251.53
9 23965.69 15036.48
10 15977.13 9456.91
11 7988.56 4460.81
TOTAL DISC VALUE= 351485.94
DISC VAL AT START- 331590.63
REAL ESTATE TAX ABATEMENT
FULL RATE-0.2500,ACTUAL RATE-0.1500
ANNUAL ABATEMENT- 13620.27
DISCOUNTED VALUE- 156221.94 DisC VAL AT START= 147379.25
0
olommomp- alown- I nmmLvmmowm-l - No Ink,
w
v 
' a 0
SPECIFIED VARIABLES
SHELL COST DEV. PER.
110000.00 1.00
0
0.060 0.075 40.00
PROJECT INDICATORS
LAND
50000.00
REAL EQUITY MORTGAGE PROFIT MARKET RENT
48966.63 1632221.00 10881.54 180.07
TOTAL REPL COST= 1813580.00 EXCESS FINANCG AND LAND HOLDGFEES=
COST OF WKG CAP- 0.0 BSRA= 150325.00 BLDRS PROF=
NO. OF ROOMS= 4.50 VACANCY RATE= 0.05 NO OF UNITS= 100
BASIC RENT SALE PRICE
113.50 1321174.00
0.0
0.0 CARRYING COSTS=
BEFORE TAX RETURN
AFTER TAXES PRESENT RATES OF RETURN
VALUE AVERAGE WITH FUND
322471.81 0.0096 0.0275
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN 1.9777 FOR RESIDUAL PV OF
DEVELOPER
DISCN DISCOUNT RATE
6.5855 0.2500
0.01
INCOME TAX RATE- 0.50 CAPITAL GAINS TAX RATE- 0.25
MINIMUM TAX ON INCOME FROM EXCESS DEPREC.= 0.10
ECONOMIC LIFE FOR TAX PURPOSES (YRS)= 20.
ANNUAL RETURN AND RATE, BY YEAR
RETURN
75125.00
138760.06
7364.13
3949.06
1279.69
-2285.12
RATE
1.534
2.834
0.150
0.081
0.026
-0.047
DISC. PRESENT VALUE
60100.00
45468.89
988.40
217.10
28.82
-21.08
YR
2
6
10
14
18
YR
2
6
10
14
18
RETURN
142483.19
137627.75
6394.65
3352.28
482.69
DISC. PRESENT
91189.19
36078.29
686.62
147.43
8.70
RATE
2.910
2.811
0.131
0.068
0.010
VALUE
YR
3
7
11
15
19
YR
3
7
11
15
19
RETURN
141167.88
9194.61
5443.93
2710.72
-374.06
DISC. PRESENT
72277.94
1928.25
467.63
95.37
-5.39
RATE
2.883
0.188
0.111
0.055
-0.008
VALUE
YR
4
8
12
16
20
YR
4
8
12
16
20
RETURN
139930.50
8291.77
4504.19
2021.06
-1295.06
RATE
2.858
0.169
0.092
0.041
-0.026
DISC. PRESENT VALUE
57315.53
1391.13
309.53
56.89
-14.93
MODEL TYPE LIMI lED DIVIDENDS
REHAEILITATED HOUSING
PROF. RATE MORTGAGE INT. PERIOD
0.2222
YR
21
150250.00
YR
1
5
9
13
17
21
YR
1
5
9
13
17
21
w
0 1 NO MIN
361
LISTING OF PROGRAM TAXCST
CC COPYRIGHT 1972, JAMES E. WALLACE JIMOOOlO
COMMON BCSTC,TDEVRIFIN,RRETD,RMRT,RPBOF,RRET,RIMTG,TMTG,RBFE, JI500020
1NY,RELEQ,MRT,PRFIT,TACST,CTRM,PSALE,BTRN,ABTBN,ARETN(60),RRTN(60),JI500030
2RTNAV,RTNAF,BNPV,AVDRN,ICSTG,ACAPM,CSTGM,ACAPI,ICSUB JIM00040
3,RRIT,FXNPV,CNPAY,BRPLC,BCSTS,EQUTY,BDCST,LND,BCSTR,INUR,NRCPR JIM00050
4,RRATE,NYF,ARET(60),BSRAEXCES,NPSAL,WC,BWC,BCCST,NU,BPV,TRET(60) JIM00060
5,BFE,ICC,NDV,NYA,IFUND,CNPYS,CTRMS,CRNTM,CRNTB,ICUT,DYRS,RFUND JIM00070
6,RYTAX,RKTAXRYTXM,SIZE,VAC,ISYND,DPV(60),DPVF(60),SRETN,SRET,NCAPJIM00080
DATA BCSTD/0.0/ JI500090
31500100
REAL nRT,LND JI500110
DIMENSION ATAX(60),ADEPR(60),AMORT(60),XTAX(60),XDEPR(60) JIM00120
C SET UP FOR INPUT ON TIME-SHARING CCNSOLE JI500130
IN=5 J1500140
ITYPI=5 JIM00150
ITYPO=6 JI500160
100 WRITE(6,101) JI500170
101 FORMAT(' ','INPUT FORMAT: REAL N(F12.X); INTEGER AS SHOWN, XXX'/ JIM00180
1' ','INPUT DATA EIRECTLY UNDER LABELS:'/ JI500190
2' ','REAL EQUITY,LAND COST ,STRCTR COST,DEVEL TIME,ECON. LIFE'JIM00200
3) J1500210
READ(IN,102)RELEQ,LND,BCSTR,TDEV,DYRS J1500220
102 FORMAT(5(F12.2)) JIM00230
WRITE(6,103) J1500240
103 FORMAT(# ','DISCNT RATE,INC TX RATE,CAPGAINRATE,MIN TX RATE,' JI500250
1'BLDR PROF RATE') JIM00260
READ(IN,102)RRATE,RYTAX,RKTAX,RYTXM,RBFE JIM00270
WRITE(6,104) JI500280
104 FORMAT(# ','MRTG INTRST,TX FND RATE,DIVID. RATE') JI500290
READ(IN,105)RIMTG,RFUND,RPROF JI500300
105 FORMAT(3(F12.4)) JI500310
WRITE(6,106) JI500320
106 FORMAT(' ','ICSTQ=1 FOR COMPUTE, =2 FOR INPUT DEV. COSTS') JI500330
READ (IN,6) ICSTQ JIM00340
GO TO (107,110),ICSTQ JIM00350
107 WRITE(6,108) JIM00360
108 FORMAT(' ','CONSTR COST,CONSTR RATE,TOT CAP CONT(0. FOR RELEQ IN BJIM00370
1ASIS)') JI500380
READ(IN,109)BCSTC,RIFIN,ACAPI JI500390
109 FORMAT(F12.2,F12.4,F12.2) J1500400
GO TO 129 JIM00410
110 WRITE(6,111) JIM00420
111 FORMAT(' ','MORTG AMT,CARRYG CSTS,TOT REPLCST, BSPRA,TOT CAJIM00430
1P CCNT(0. FOR RELEQ IN BASIS)') JIM00440
READ(IN,102)MRT,BCCST,BRPLC,BSRA,ACAPI J1500450
129 WRITE(6,130) JIM00460
130 FORMAT(' ','COMPUTE CSTS TO GOVT: 1 FOR NO, 2 FOR YES') JIM00470
READ(IN,6)ICSTG JIM00480
IF(ICSTG.NE.2)GO TO 113 JIM00490
WRITE(6,135) JI500500
135 FORMAT(' ','ANN PAYM TO MATCH BY GOVT, COMPARISCN GOVT COST, GOVT JI500510
1DISC RATE'/' ','__ACAPM_ _,__CSTGM___,GVT USC RATE') J1500520
READ(IN,112)ACAPM,CSTGM,RDG JIM00530
112 FORMAT(2F12.2,F12.4) JI500540
113 WRITE(6,114) JIM00550
362
FILE: TAXCST FORTRAN P1 MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
114 FORMAT(' ','NEW,USED,REHAB,SL DEPR,NO DEPR,SYD: ENTER 1,2,3,4,5,6J1N00560
1') J1M00570
READ (IN,6) INUR JIM00580
WRITE (6, 121) JIOO590
121 FORMAT(' ','NO OF UNITS: XXX') JIM00600
READ(IN,7)NU JIM00610
WRITE(6,115) J1M00620
115 FORMAT(' ','SYND STEP-UP FOR LAST YR: 1 FOR NO, 2 FOR YES') JIM00630
READ(IN,6)ISYND J100640
WRITE(6,125) JIM00650
125 FORMAT(' ','NO OF CAP CONTRIB, UP TO 9') JIM00660
READ (IN,6) NCAP JIM00670
WRITE (6,116) JIM00680
116 FORMAT(' ','MONTH IN WHICH RELIEF FROM RECAPT STARTS: XXX') JIM00690
READ (IN, 7) NRCPR JIM00700
WRITE(6,117) JIM00710
117 FORMAT(' ','SALE PRICE: 01 MTG BAL, 02 CAP VAL, 03 STR L DEP, 04 J100720
1PARAB DEP,'/ JIM00730
2' ','05 TOT REPL CST, 06 2.5 P.C. APPREC, 07 5 P.C. APPREC, 08 INPJIM00740
3UT'/ JIM00750
4' ','09 MTG BAL+10 P.C. REPL CST, 10 MTG BAL +TAXES DUE' J1M00760
5', 11 MTG+TAX+10') JIM00770
READ (IN,8) NPSAL JIM00780
IF(NPSAL.NE.8)GO TO 118 JIM00790
READ (IN, 105) PSALE JIMOO800
118 WRITE(6,119) JIM00810
119 FORMAT(' ','INITIAL YR OF SALE: XX') JIM00820
READ (IN, 8) NYI JIM00830
WRITE (6, 120) JIM00840
120 FORMAT(' ','FINAL YR OF SALE: XX') JIM00850
READ(IN,8)NYF JIM00860
WRITE(6,122) JIM00870
122 FORMAT(' ','IOUT: 06 AT TERM., 08 CREATES DISK FILE') JI100880
READ(IN,8)IOUT JIM0C890
WRITE(6,123) JIM00900
123 FORMAT(' ','IGO: 01 TO EXECUTE, 02 TO REPEAT INPUT, 03 TO EXIT') JI00910
READ(IN,8)IGO JIM00920
ITYPO=IOUT JIM00930
C IOUT=06 PRINTS OUTPUT ON TERMINAL, =08 CREATES DISK FILE FTO8FOO1. JI00940
GO TO (9,100,9999),IGO JIM00950
6 FORMAT(I1) JIMC0960
7 FORMAT(13) JIC0970
8 FORMAT(I2) JI00980
9 NYA=NYI JI100990
NYI=NYI+TDEV JI101000
NYF=NYF+TDEV JI101010
NDV=TDEV+1 JIM01020
C TO REGAIN PROGRAM FLEXIBILITY, MOVE ICSUB, IFUND, ICC JIM01030
C INTEGER INDICES UP AS READ STATEMENTS. JI01040
ICSUB=1 JI01050
IFUND=2 JI01060
ICC=2 J1M01070
NLOOP=1 JIM01080
WRITE(IOUT,150) JI01090
150 FORMAT(/l','INVESTMENT ANALYSIS FOR SUBSIDIZED HOUSING'/$ COPYRIGJIM01100
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FILE: TAXCST FORTRAN P1 MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
1HT 1972, JAMES E. WALLACE'/' TIME ZERO IS START OF DEVELOPMENT'/' JIM01110
2PROJECT TIME IS DEVELOPMENT TIME PLUS OPERATING TIME') JIM01120
GO TO (500,600,600),ICSTQ JIM01130
500 CALL CSTEQ JIM01140
600 EQUTY=BRPLC-MRT JIM01150
BFE=RBFE*(BCSTD+BCSTC) JIM01160
CALL OPCST JIM01170
10 DO 71 NY=NYI,NYF JIl01180
C JIM01190
C TST1 IS A SWITCH FOR THE SYNDICATION STEP UP IN BASIS. JIM01200
C WHEN POSITIVE, NO STEP UP BECAUSE NOT IN LAST YEAR. JIM01210
C WHEN ZERO CONTINUE TO ITERATE FOR LAST YEAR STEP UP. JIM01220
C WHEN NEGATIVE EXIT BECAUSE EITHER STEP UP HAS CCNVERGED OR NLOOP>6 JIM01230
TST1=NYF-NY JIM01240
GO TO 450 JIM01250
400 TST1=TST1-1. JIM01260
GO TO (70,450),ISYND JIM01270
C THIS ASSURES THAT YOU ONLY LOOP BACK WITH STEPPED UP BASIS AT NY=NYF JIM01280
450 CONTINUE JIM01290
CALL TAXES(ADMTGF,BASISI,BASISF,AMORT,ATAX,SXDPR,ADEPR, JIM01300
1TST1,XTAX,XDEPR,NLOOP) JIM01310
CALL SALE(BASISF,ADMTGF,SXDPR,GSALE,TSALE,GANTX,CPTX,PRFTX) JIM01320
GO TO (65,65,70),ICSUB J101330
65 CALL IRATE(BASISIGSALE,AMORT,ATAXTST1,NLOOP,ADEPR,XTAX,XDEPR, JIM01340
1BASISO,ACAPN) JIN01350
IF(ISYND.EQ.2.AND.TST1.EQ.0.0)GO TO 400 JIM01360
70 NYA=NYA+1 JIM01370
71 CONTINUE JIM01380
IF(ISYND.EQ.1)GO TO 700 JIM01390
TST1=-1. JIM01400
NLOOP=10 JIM01410
CALL TAXES(ADMTGF,BASISO,BASISF,AMORT,ATAX,SXDPR,ADEPR, JIM01420
1TST1,XTAX,XDEPR,NLOOP) JIM01430
700 IF(ICSTG.NE.2)GO TO 710 JIM01440
CALL COSTG(RDG,ADEPR,XDEPR,BASISO,TSALEGANTX,CPTX,PRFTX,ACAPN,ATAJIM01450
iX) JIM01460
C SUMMARY OUTPUT JIM01470
710 GO TO(1,2,3),ICSUB JIM01480
1 WRITE(IOUT,11) JIM01490
11 FORMAT('1',///,36X'MODEL TYPE LIMITED DIVIDENDS') JIM01500
GO TO 20 JIM01510
2 WRITE(IOUT,12) JIM01520
12 FORMAT(*1',///,40X'MODEL TYPE CONVENTIONAL') JIM01530
GO TO 20 JIM01540
3 WRITE(IOUT,13) JIM01550
13 FORMAT('1',///,40X'MODEL TYPE NCN-PROFIT') JIM01560
20 CONTINUE J1M01570
GO TO (1000,2000,3000,3002,3004,3006), INUR JIM01580
1000 WRITE (IOUT, 1001) JIM01590
1001 FORMAT(' ',40X'NEW CONSTRUCTION'/' ',36X'DOUBLE DECLINING BALANCE'JIM01600
1) JIM01610
GO TO 3009 JIM01620
2000 WRITE (IOUT,2001) JIM01630
2001 FORMAT (' ',40X'USED HOUSING') JIM01640
GO TO 3009 JIM01650
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WRITE(IOUT,52) (N,ARETN(N),RRTN(N),N=1,NY) JIM02210
52 FORMAT(4(2X,I2,1X,F11.2,1X,F7.3,1X)) JIM02220
WRITE(IOUT,54) JIM02230
54 FORMAT(//4(2X,'YR'2X'DISC. PRESENT VALUE')) JIM02240
WRITE(IOUT,55) (N,DPV (N) ,N=1,NY) JI02250
55 FORMAT(4(2X,I2,F12.2,9X)) JI102260
24 CONTINUE JIM02270
GO TO (9 9 9 9 ,9 9 9 9 ,9 9 9 9 ,9 999,9999,9999,9999,9997),IOUT JIM02280
9997 WRITE(6,9998) JIM02290
9998 FORMAT(' ','OUTPUT IN FILE FT08FOO1. OFFLINE PRINTCC FILE FT08F001JIM02300
1') JI02310
9999 CONTINUE JIM02320
CALL EXIT JIM02330
END JI02340
J1M02350
JI02360
SUBROUTINE CSTEQ JIM02370
JIM02380
C TO CALCULATE EEVELOPMENT COSTS AND EQUITY JIM02390
COMMON BCSTC,TDEVRIFIN,RRETD,RMRT,RPROF,RRET,RIMTG,TMTG,RBFE, J1M02400
1NYRELEC,MRTPRFIT,TACSTCTRM,PSALEBTRNABTRN,ARETN(60),RRTN(60),J102410
2RTNAVRTNAFBNPVAVDRN,GTSCT,GDCST,CSTGMACAPIICSUB,DUM1,DUM2 J1M02420
3,CNPAY,BBPLCBCSTSEQUTY,BDCST,LND,BCSTR,INUR,NRCPR,RRATE,NYF JIM02430
4,ARET(60),BSRAEXCES,NPSALWCBWCBCCSTNUBPVTRET(60) JIM02440
5,BFE,ICC,NDV,NYAIFUNDCNPYS,CTRMS,CRNTM,CRNTBICUT,DYRS,RFUND JIM02450
6,RYTAX,RKTAXRYTXM,SIZEVACISYNDDPV(60),DPVF(60),SRETN,SRET,NCAPJI02460
REAL LNDMRT JIM02470
DATA RMTIN/.005/,RFHEX/.003/,RFHIN/.005/,RAMP/0.0/,RFNMA/.015/,RTAJIM02480
1R/.005/,RLAO/.0065/,RCMT/0.0/,RIFNO/.50/,RINSL/.01/,RINSF/.01/, J1102490
2BCSTD/0.0/,RLND/.O/,RILND/.10/,RBSRA/.1/,RARCHS/.02/, JIM02500
3RIWC/. 10/,RWC/.02/,RFIN/.02/,RBCND/.0124/ J1M02510
EQUIVALENCE (TDEV,TLND) J1M02520
RRETD=.1 J1102530
GO TO (3,1,2),ICSUB JIM02540
C CONVENTIONAL FINANCING JIM02550
1 RIFHA=RIFIN JIM02560
RRETD=O.1 JIM02570
RMRT=0.80 JIM02580
RMTIN=O. JIM02590
RFHEX=0. J1M02600
RAMP=0. JIM02610
RFNMA=0. JIM02620
RBSRA=0. JI02630
GO TO 4 JIM02640
C NON-PROFIT JIM02650
2 CONTINUE J1M02660
RRETD=O.1 JIM02670
RIFHA=RIMTG-RMTIN JIM02680
RMRT=1. JIM02690
RBSRA=0. J1MC2700
RWC=0. J1M02710
GO TO 4 JIM02720
C LIMITED DIVIDEND JI1102730
3 RMRT=0.90 JI02740
RRETD=0.1 JIM02750
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4 RIFHA=RIMTG-RMTIN JIM02760
C DIRECT COSTS ARE CONSTRUCTION AND DEMOLITION J1M02770
BDCST=BCSTC+BCSTD J1M02780
C LAND AND SHELL CCSTS JI02790
BCSTS=LND+BCSTR JI02800
C TOTAL CONSTRUCTION COSTS JIM02810
C TYPICAL FHA ALLOWANCES FOR FEES JIM02820
RARCH=.045 JI02830
RBO=.03 JIM02840
IF(BDCST.LE.1000000.)GO TO 9 J1M02850
DCST1=BDCST-1000000. JIM02860
IF(DCST1.GT.1000000.)DCST1=1000000. JIMC2870
RARCH1=.04 JI02880
RB01=.02 JIM02890
RARCH=(RARCH*1000000.+RARCH1*DCST1)/BDCST JIM02900
RBO=(RBO*1000000.+RB01*DCST1)/BDCST J1M02910
IF(BDCST.LE.2000000.)GO TO 9 JIM02920
DCST2=BDCST-2000000. J1M02930
IF(DCST2.GT.1000000.)DCST2=1000000. JIM02940
RARCH2=.035 JIM02950
RB02=.01 JIM02960
RARCH=RARCH+ (RARCH2*DCST2) /BDCST JIM02970
RB0=RBO+(RB02*DCST2)/BDCST JI02980
IF(BDCST.LE.3000000.)GO TO 9 J1M02990
DCST3=BDCST-3000000. JIM03000
RARCH3=.03 JIM03010
RB03=.005 JIM03020
RARCH=RARCH+(RARCH3*DCST3)/BDCST J1103030
RBC=RBO+(BB03*DCST3)/BDCST JI03040
9 CONTINUE JIM03050
RARCH=RARCH+RARCHS JIM03060
BTCST=BDCST+(RARCH+RBFE+RBO+REOND)*BDCST JIM03070
C AGGREGATE FEES: MORT AND CONST. JI03080
IF(RIFIN-RIFHA) 10,11,11 JI03090
10 A=0. JIM03100
RIFN=RIFIN JI503110
GO TO 12 JI03120
11 A=TDEV*RIFNO* (RIFIN-RIFHA) JIM03130
RIFN=RIFHA JIM03140
C INSPECTION FEE(RFHIN) FOR REHAB ACTUALLY SHOULD BE BASED ON JIM03150
C CONSTRUCTION COSTS INSTEAD CF LOAN AMOUNT JI03160
12 RFEEM=RMTIN+RFHEX+RFHIN+RAMP+RFNMA+RTAR+RLAO+RFIN+RIFNO*TDEV*(RIFNJIM03170
1+RINSL+RINSF) J1103180
C REAL ESTATE TAXES DURING DEVELOPMENT JI03190
RETXD=RRETD*(LND+BCSTR)*TDEV JI03200
RFEEC=RIFNO*TDEV* (RIFN+RINSL+RINSF) JI03210
C BUILDERS FEE JIM03220
BFE=RBFE*BDCST JI03230
C FHA TOTAL REPLACEMENT COST JIM03240
BRPLC=(1./(1.-RMRT*RFEEM*(1.+RBSRA)))*(((1.+RBO+RBOND+RARCH)*BDCSTJIM03250
1+RETXD)*(1.+RBSRA)+BCSTS) JI03260
C BUILDERS/SPONSORS RISK ALLOWANCE JIM03270
BSRA=RBSRA*((1.+RBO+RBOND+RARCH)*BDCST+RETXD+RFEEM*RMRT*BRPLC)-BFEJIM03280
C MORTGAGE JIM03290
MRT=RMRT*BRPLC JIM03300
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C MISC. BOOM EXPENSES JIM03860
ACTMI=RCI*NRMS*NU+RCRR*MRT JIMC3870
C SUM OF COSTS GIVEN AS OF TOTAL ANUAL COST JIM03880
SCPTC=RCMG+RCRM+RRET+RVAC J1M03890
C JIMC3900
C TOTAL ANNUAL COST JIM03910
CNPYS=MRT*RISUB/(1.-(1.+RISUB/NMTGP)** (-TMTG*NMTGP)) JIM03920
TACST= (CNPYS+PRFIT+ACTMI)/(1.-SCPTC) JI03930
C JIM03940
C RENT/ROCM/MONTH JIM03950
C JIM03960
CTRMS=TACST/(NRMS*NU*12) JI03970
CTRM=CTRMS+(CNPAY-CNPYS)/(NRMS*NU*12) JIM03980
C MONTHLY RENT PER UNIT JIM03990
CRNTM=CTRM*NRMS 3104000
CRNTB=CTRMS*NRMS J1M04010
WRITE(IOUT,99) CNPAY,CNPYS J104020
99 FORMAT(//' ','MORTGAGE CONSTANT PAYMENT, MARKET RATE= 'F10.2,5X,'AJIM04030
1T SUBSIDIZED RATE= 'F10.2) 3104040
20 CONTINUE 3104050
RETURN JIM04060
END 3104070
JI104080
JI304090
SUBROUTINE TAXES(ADMTGF,BASISI,BASISF,AMORT,ATAX,SXDPR,ADEPR, JIM04100
1TST1,XTAX,XDEPR, NLOOP) 3104110
C COMPUTES DEPRECIATION, INCCME TAX, MORTGAGE AMORTIZATION JIM04120
DIMENSICN ATAX(60),ADEPR(60),BASTR(61) JI04130
DIMENSION ADMTG(61),AINT(60),AMORT(60),BASIS(61),XDEPR(60) J1M04140
COMMONBCSTC,TDEV,RIFIN,RRETD,RMRT,RPROFRRET,RINTG,TMTG,RBFE, JIM04150
1NY,RELEQ,PRT,PRFITTACST,CTRM,PSALE,BTRN,ABTRN,ARETN'(60),RRTN(60),JI04160
2RTNAV,RTNAF,BNPVAVDRN,ICSTG,ACAPM,CSTGM,ACAPI,ICSUB JIM04170
3,RRIT,FXNPV,CNPAY,BRPLC,BCSTS,EQUTY,BDCST,LND,BCSTR,INUR,NRCPR JIM04180
4,RRATE,NYF,ARET(60),BSRA,EXCES,NPSAL,WC,BWC,BCCST,NU,BPV,TRET(60) J1(04190
5,BFE,ICC,NDV,NYA,IFUND,CNPYS,CTRMS,CRNTM,CRNTB,ICUT,DYRS,RFUND JIM04200
6,RYTAX,RKTAX,RYTXM,SIZE,VAC,ISYND,DPV(60),DPVF(60),SRETN,SRET,NCAPJIM04210
DIMENSION BXRHB(61),DEPRX(60) ,DEPRR(60),DEPRS(60),XTAX(60) JIM04220
REAL LND,MRT JI04230
DATA RISUB/.01/ JI04240
CC THE 1969 TAX REFORM ACT IMPOSES MINIMUM TAX ON PREFERRED JIM04250
CC INCOME, SUCH AS SHELTER FROM EXCESS DEPRECIATION. WE ASSUME THE JIM04260
CC $30,000 ALLOWED HAS ALREADY BEEN USED IN OTHER PROJECTS JIM04270
CC THE MINIMUM TAX ON INCCME OTHERWISE SHELTERED BY EXCESS DEPRECIATIOJIM04280
CC N IS TEN PER CENT, IN WHICH CASE RYTIM SHOULD BE INPUT AS 0.10. JI04290
C FOR YEARS WHEN A POSITIVE TAX OCCURS (RATHER THAN A TAX SAVING) JIM04300
C THE PROGRAM SHOULD BE REVISED TO APPLY THE MINIMUM TAX TO SHELTERED JIM04310
C INCOME LESS REGULAR TAX PAID. JIM04320
RYTX1=RYTXM JIM04330
ADMTG(NDV)=MRT JIM04340
NDEV=TDEV JIM04350
IF(RELEQ)1,2,3 JIM04360
1 RELEQ=0.03*MRT JIM04370
GO TO 3 J1(04380
2 RELEQ=BRELC-BSRA-MRT JIM04390
3 CONTINUE J1104400
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DO 5 N=1,NDEV JI04410
AMORT(N)=0. JI04420
ADEPR(N)=0. JI04430
XTAX(N)=0. JI04440
5 XDEPR(N)=0. JI04450
DO 10 N=NDV,NY J1M04460
AINT (N) =ADMTG (N) *RIMTG JIM04470
AMORT(N)=CNPAY-AINT(N) JI04480
10 ADMTG (N+ 1) =ADMTG (N) -AMORT (N) JIM04490
GO TO (11,11,60),ICSUB J1M04500
11 GO TO (1CO,12),ICC JI04510
C TAX SAVING Ch CCNSTBUCTICN LOSSES, LCSSES ASSUMED PAID OUT OF EQUITY JIM04520
C OR ADVANCES ON INTERIM LCAN. JIM04530
12 DO 13 N=1,NDEV JIM04540
13 ATAX(N)=-(BCCST/TDEV)*RYTAX JIM04550
GO TO 14 JIM04560
100 DO 200 N=1,NDEV JIM04570
200 ATAX (N)=0. JIM04580
C JIM04590
C JIM04600
C DEPRECIATION WITH INUR: 1=DDB, 2=USED, 3=REHAB, 4=SL DEPR, 5=NO DEPRJIM04610
C 6=SUM OF THE YEAR'S DIGITS METHOD OF DEPRECIATICN JI04620
14 IF(TST1)210,15,15 JIM04630
210 BASIS (NDV) =BASISI JIM04640
GO TO 220 JI04650
15 IF(ACAPI.EQ.0.)ACAPI=RELEQ JIM04660
BASIS (NDV) =MRT+ACAPI-LND-BCCST* (ICC-1) J1M04670
BASISI=BASIS(NDV) JI04680
220 SXDPR=0. JIM04690
ZDEPR=BASIS(NDV)/DYRS JIM04700
GO TO (16,17,30,150,160,170), INUR JIM04710
C NEW CCNSTRUCTICN JI04720
16 DEP= 2. JIM04730
GO TO 18 JIM04740
C USED HOUSING JIM04750
17 DEP= 1.25 -JIM04760
18 CCNTINUE JIM04770
DO 25 N=NDV,NY JIM04780
ADEPR(N)=(BASIS(N)/DYRS)*DEP JI04790
C TEST FOR SWITCH TC STRAIGHT LINE JI04800
TDEPR=ADEPR (N)-BASIS (N)/ (DYRS- (N-NDV)) JIM04810
IF(TDEPR)19,19,20 JI04820
19 ADEPR(N)=BASIS (N)/(DYRS-(N-NDV)) J1M04830
XDEPR(N)=0. JIM04840
GO TO 21 JI04850
20 XDEPR (N) =ADEPR (N) -ZDEPR J1M04860
IF (XDEPR (N) .LE.0.) XDEPR (N)=0. JI04870
21 BASIS (N+1) =BASIS(N)-ADEPR(N) JIM04880
SXDPR=BASIS (NDV) -ZDEPR* (NY-NDEV) -BASIS (N+1) JIM04890
C JI04900
XTAX (N) =PRFIT + AMORT (N) - ADEPR (N) JIM04910
24 ATAX (N) =XTAX (N) *RYTAX+XDEPR (N) *RYTXM JIM04920
RYTXM=RYTX1 JIM04930
25 CONTINUE JIM04940
GO TO 48 JIM04950
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FILE: TAXCST FORTRAN P1 MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
6 B=1.025 JIM06610
GO TO 48 J1M06620
7 B=1.05 J1M06630
48 PSALE=BRPLC* (B**NYA) JIM06640
GO TO 49 J1M06650
9 PSALE=ADMTGF+EQUTY JIM06660
GO TO 49 JIM06670
100 STEST=ADMTGF-(LND+(1.-(NY+1)/DYRS)*BASISI) JIM06680
IF(STEST)120,125,125 JI06690
C IF MTG BAL IS LESS THAN STRAIGHT LINE BASIS, WE JUST JIM067C0
C APPROXIMATE PSALE BY ADMTGF. ACTUALLY YOU SHOULD LCOK JIM06710
C SEPARATELY AT THE CASES FOR WHICH ADMTGF IS ABOVE BASISF J1M06720
C (IN WHICH CASE GO THROUGH THE RECAPTURE CALCULATION) JIM06730
C AND AT ADMTGF BELOW BASISF (EITHER ENTER LOSS OR ZERO TAX) JIM06740
120 PSALE=AD1MTGF JI06750
WRITE(IOUT,121) JIMC6760
121 FORMAT(//' MORTGAGE BALANCE IS BELOW STRAIGHT LINE J11106770
1 BASIS, PSALE ESIIMATED AS MORTGAGE BALANCE') J1M06780
GO TO 49 JIM06790
C CEOICE OF SALE PRICE OPTIONS JIM06800
125 GO TO (1, 2 , 3 ,4,5,6,7,49,9,10,11),NPSAL JI06810
C SET INDICES FOR CASES WITH TAX RECOVERY, NPSAL 10 AND 11 JIM06820
10 NPSAL1=NPSAL JI06830
GO TO 1 JIM06840
11 NPSAL2=NPSAL JIM06850
GO TO 9 JIM06860
C SALE PRICE IS THE ONE PROVIDED IN INPUT JIM06870
49 YSALE=PSALE-BASISF-LND JIM06880
IF(YSALE)70,70,50 JIM06890
50 ITD=NYA*12 J1M06900
CALL RECAP(NRCPR,ITD,RCPTR,&51,&68) JI06910
51 IF(YSALE-SXDPR)61,61,62 JIM06920
61 GAINR=YSALE JIMC6930
GO TO 69 JIM06940
62 GAINR=SXDPR JIM06950
69 CPTR=RCPTR*GAINR JIMC6960
CPTX=CPTR*RYTAX JIM06970
GAIN=YSALE-CPTR JIM06980
GANTX=GAIN*RKTAX J1M06990
C PREFERENCE TAX ON CAPITAL GAINS APPLIES TO GAIN EXCLUDED FROM JIM07000
C CRDINARY INCOME TAX LESS TAXES ORDINARILY PAID, TAXES CN GAIN HERE JIM07010
PRFTX=RYTXM*(0.5*GAIN-GANTX-CPT3) JIM07020
IF(PRFTX.LT.O.)PRFTX=0. JI07030
TSALE=CPTX+GANTX+PRFTX JIM07040
GO TO 71 JIM07050
68 TSALE=YSALE*RYTAX JIM07060
GO TO 71 JIM07070
70 GAINR=O. JIM07080
CPTR=O. JI07090
CPTX=0* JI07100
GAIN=O. JIM07110
GANTX=0. J1M07120
PRFTX=O. JI07130
TSALE=YSALE*RKTAX 3107140
71 GSALE=PSALE-TSALE-ADMTGF JIM07150
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C SET UP RECYCLE FOR CASES WHEN THE SALE PRICE IS TO INCLUDE TAXES JIM07160
JIM07170
NTEST1=NPSAL1-NPSAL JIM07180
NTEST2=NPSAL2-NPSAL JIM07190
IF(NTEST1)85,80,85 JIM07200
C THIS IN NPSAL 10 (GSALE=O) FIRST TIME THROUGH AT ADMTGF JIM07210
80 PSALE=ADMTGF+TSALE/(1.-(RKTAX+RYTXM*(0.5-RKTAX))) JIM07220
NPSAL1=NPSAL1+100 JIM07230
GO TO 49 J1M07240
85 IF(NTEST2)95,90,95 31107250
C THIS IS NPSAL 11 FIRST TIME THRU AT MTGE J1M07260
90 PSALE=ADMTGF+TSALE /(1.-(RKTAX+RYTXM*(0.5-RKTAX))) JI07270
NPSAL2=NPSAL2+100 JIM07280
GO TO 49 JIM07290
95 CONTINUE JIM07300
CASH=PSALE-ADMTGF J1M07310
WRITE(IOUT,500)CASHPSALE,BASISFLND,YSALEGAINR,RCPTR,CPTR, J1M07320
1RYTAX,CPTX,GAIN,RKTAX,GANTX,PRFTX,TSALE,GSALE JIM07330
500 FORMAT(//' ','GAINS TAX CALCULATION:'/ JI07340
1' CASH FROM SALE= 'F12.2/' SALE PRICE,'F12.2', LESS BASIS,'F12.23IM07350
2' LESS LAND,' JIM07360
3F12.2' = TAXABLE GAIN,'F12.2/' ','GAIN SUBJ TO RECAPTURE,'F12.2 JI07370
4' TIMES RECAPTURE FRACTION,'F12.2 ' = GAIN RECAPTURED,'F12.2/ JIM07380
5' ','TIMES INCOME TAX RATE,'F6.2' = RECAPTURE TAX,'F12.2/ JIM07390
6' ','GAIN AS CAPITAL GAIN= 'F12.2' TIMES CAPITAL GAINS TAX RATE,' J1107400
7F6.2'= CAPITAL GAINS TAX,'F12.2/' ','PREF TAX=MIN TAX*(0.5*CAP GAIJIM07410
XN -REGULAR SALE TAXES)='F12.2,5X'TOTAL TAXES ON SALE= 'F12.2/ JIM07420
8' ','AFTER TAX GAIN FROM SALE= CASH LESS TAX= 'F12.2) JI07430
RETURN JIM07440
END JIM07450
JIM07460
J1107470
SUBROUTINE RECAP(NRCPR,ITD,RCPTR,*,*) JIM07480
C CCMPUTES RECAPTURE FACTORS FOR SUEROUTINE SALE JIM07490
IF(ITD-12)10,10,20 JIM07500
10 RETURN 2 JI107510
C OLD RECAPTURE RULES FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION UNDER 236 OR 221.D.3 JI07520
C CTHERWISE USE RECAPTURE RELIEF ONLY AFTER 100 MONTHS J1M07530
20 IF(ITD-NRCPR)25,25,30 J1107540
25 RCPTR=1. J1107550
RETURN 1 JI07560
30 IF(ITD-(100+NRCPR)) 35,35,40 JIM07570
35 RCPTR=1.-.01*(ITD-NRCPR) JIM07580
RETURN 1 JI07590
40 RCPTR=0. JI07600
RETURN 1 JIM07610
END JIM07620
JI107630
3107640
SUBROUTINE IRATE(BASISI,GSALE,AMORT,ATAX,TST1,NLOOP,ADEPR,XTAX, J107650
1XDEPR,BASISO,ACAFN) JI07660
C COMPUTES ANNUAL AFTER-TAX RETURN, TAX SINKING FUND, INVESTM'T INDICESJIM07670
JI307680
COMMON BCSTC,TDEV,RIFIN,RRETD,RMRT,RPROF,RRET,RIMTG,TMTG,RBFE, JIM07690
1NY,RELEQ,MET,PRFIT,TACST,CTRM,PSALE,BTRN,ABTEN,ARETN(60),RRTN(60),JIM07700
oszoowir 27VS9+WOS.L=WnSX
otzsowir afiRilmoo
OEZBowir rtiloslr.E (alvs!)+wnsI) -al
ozzoowir (IN) I3Hi+wnsl=WLlSl
OLZODWIr (L -II) (amaa-t (IN) IHHv= CLO.Laul
oozeowir (L -11) -JLK=IN
06LODWIr AN'Z=ll SE Oa oc
08LBOWIr
OLLRDWIr S1710sloc (alvsg*wnsl) Ji
09LBOWIr L=11
OSLBOWIr (Am) laHv=wns;L
o#t8owir OLH) IZHV= (AN) 1391
OELBOWIr IK=,lK 6Z
OZL83wlr 6S'6S'6Z(37VS!))dI ez
OLLODWIr amnail(WOV60 01 Of)
ootgowir *O=Wnsl
0608DWIr RIVSD=L7VSD
08090wir anNIIKO:) sz
OL093wir W Nlaav= W Im
ogosomir IN'L=N GZ Oa
OS08DWIV
otoeowir amaja iv a3IS2ANl SKHfllHH TVnKKV wou aNna xv.L jo N3iivinawoo
OC09DWir aflKlINOD oz
ozosowir anxilloo OL
otogowir o t I oz I oz No a-Orra 73) ji
ooo8owir (H)Niasv+wna=wna
066LDWIr N=dK
086LOWir IN'L=H OL Oa
OL6LOWir *o=wna
096LOWir
OS6LOWir aoisai xz)vgxvd 0
0#6LDWir K**(alVHH+*0/(N)KLaav=(N)Ada LOC6LOUir AN'L=N L Oa
OZ6LOwir Oa7aH/ (N) N;LRHV= M KJMJ s
MLUIr (N) XVlV-lIaHd= W NIZHV
006Lowir AN'AaN=N S Oa
068LOWir anxiiuoo b
089LOwir DalaH/ (N) NlaHV= M NIHS EoLoLowir W XY.LV-= W NIHHV
09BLowir Aaaxlt=N c oa z
OS9LDWir Z'tl 'b (L -. 30D aI
oteLowir *o=Klaffs
ocoLowir 6RlaH1IlJHd=NHJ.G
ozoLowir 7YUNNY Ixanzaa xv.L auoaao 0
OLOLDWir
oooLowir A2aJ,=AaaH
06LLOWIV (09) ffdaaX (09) XVIX" (09) Rdaav 1 (09) IHOWV' (OZ) AcIV:)V' L
ogLLowir (oz) &aAaal (og) xvivI (00 AdNa' (OZ) AdRX 1 (00 93 1 (OZ) 9 N:)ISNaNIG
OLLLowir GKII.Law 7vad
09LLOWIr /o*o/wnsi. viva
OSLi.owirdVON '.LaHS'NL3HS' (og) jAaal (09) Adalamisi ':)VA'aZIS'WXLla"XV1)ia'XV.LXH'9
OOLLOWIV aunaH'suia'lflDI*91KHO'wiNaolswa.Lolsiamilamaji'VIK'Aag'DZ)I'ZJS'S
OELLOWir (09)IaHl'AdG Ina lisam lonaloml ivsdN'sa:)x+z I vass I (og) lauv '!IXN lalvHgt7
OZLLOWir I admm IunNlHIS:)Glam*T lis:)aa'XIBOa'SISDG'JlddR'lVdtiO'AdliXJ '.LIaH'E
oLLLowir gnsoi 'idvov'wqisoIwivov loisailmoaWAdlig 'JVNIH 'AVNJHZ
iqo7oKHoai ao ainiiismi siizsoHovssvw Ld KVHIHOJ Is.3xvjl :alia
0
06LBDW~' L t=I3VJI
O8LOOWI' SISVa do aaddais av11au ao& a1Vimsa
OLL30Ir C 109 0 s 0(coax NIx) aI
09LB0WIr Ada*dva&dT*ava N=idvov
0SL3OliIr'((-vN **(a IVHW)/L-+ J;VR)/1I~Ia=dya
0tL80WIL' L=dOOIN 009
0EL80b1iL aTVax ISVT 910a N)11110Y1V3 IV SS~d ISHIa Eaa Sl IRI11
OlL8OWir OLL 'D09'0S9 (L ISI aI 06S
OL LODWi aNISIV(OLLO6S'999) ol 09
OOLROWIr Ssm a~avinaaaa 01; aav (IN?
06981wif sRoiiO11is1Noo 1virdvo UasvHd a1fldwO 1vai isv'i allia oa3
08980w1L' Isisyg=OSISyG
OL98D~ir Adg=Idvov
09 980k1 IL''ISAd11+Adg=hd1
osgaowir IAN** (alVHU1*L )/a'xVS!='iVSAdG
ot9okloif' (N) AAdaI.Adq=Ad8 t 9
0E990D~iL m*s (alTvH~ 0L/(K) iasv=(W aAa
oz98owiP AN'L=N b9 OG
oL9oir IN** (1vHH+ '0/(LIvsD+(UN) laHV) +&aR9=AdN9 z 9
00980wiL' K* (a I YH 9+ L W / ( 1) NHTIfA d N 0=Ad N 9 09
06S80W IL NN'L=N 09 00
OOSBOWIW 0=Ad9l
OLSROI * 0=Ad N9
09SOD0r1L L -IN=N
05590w1L' afvVA INasa11d a
Ot,590W1L ZGNIIN03 085
OIseorIL 0O=ImUaIa
OLsoowiL IR=dIN
00590wir AN=IN
06t9OWiL' aflNiIN03 6S
ootiRowir 095 01 0D
0Lt130WI' *O=Nlaai 85
ogtgi8OI IIN'L=N OS 00 LS
OSt~i8OI LS'085.'085 (111) aI
Obb~ti8OIL L-LN=IIN 9s
OEt183wIl *O00NIaHY ss
Olti8OWIP XN'dIN=N ss Oa tps
Ott~i8OI 9Y tis Iti (.xUN-ali) al
OtBOwiL' *0=a1VsD
06EBDWIVL Umfl& XYVI a1QNDI 1131111 sN011v1031vo NI L 1vsD asa 0
08e80w1L aN? o=a'ivsg ias 'Hivs 1? Samo3ud 2AI1V9M a3 311Y N2XVI DNIAVH 0
OLEBOWI' L+.NdIN LSS
09E83w1L' 0-(IN)Iaa 0s
osceowif' LS 01 094
0tE0w IL' WnSX- (IN) Ia3i= (IN) 13H1
oECODWIV IN** (aJxa+ ')0/IaiiVX=AdIG
OZE8(IN) Iagy- (IN) NIav=jLNN.I
OL E83wiL' IaIvx=(IN)Ia1V 6 ti
OOE83wiL' wOlsx=L211X Bti
06192W IL 6bi 01 09
08180wiL' (L-.1)D (a NR 1 +*L )1w n sx =1 aJv x Lt1i
09180w1L' 9t7'05'7~t7 (Wnlsx) -11
A93'I3NH~al 30 31131115N1 SII2SnOI3SSVW Ld NVH11110 1SoXV1 :a'IIA
9LE
0
377
FILE: TAXCST FORTRAN P1 MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
FRET=(1.-1./(1.+RRATE)**(NY-NDEV))/(RRATE*(1.+RRATE)**TDEV)+ JI508810
1TFACT*(IFUND-1)*(1./(1.+RFUND)-1./(1.+RRATE))/(1+RRATE)**(NT-NDEV JI508820
2) JIMC8830
FTAX=0.2*RYTAX-0.2*RYTXM+RYTXM/DYRS JIM08840
C IF ACAPI WAS INPUT AS 0., THEN IT WILL HAVE BEEN SET = RELEQ IN SUBR J1508850
C TAXES, THUS BASIS(1) INCLUEES CORRECT ACAPI JIM08860
BASISI=BASISI+(ACAPT-ACAPI)/(1.-NCAP*FCAP*FRET*FTAX) JIMC8870
GO TO 710 JIM08880
C ESTIMATE FOR STEPPED UP BASIS (EXCEPT FOR REHAB) JIMC8890
602 BASISI=BASISI+ (ACAPT-ACAPI)/(1.-ACAPT/BASISI) JIMC8900
GO TO 710 JIMC8910
650 IF(NLOOP.GE.6)TST1=TST1-1. JIMC8920
660 TST1=TST1+1. JIMC8930
NLOOP=NLO0P+1 JIMC8940
665 IF(ISYND.EQ.1.AND.TST1.GT.0.)GO TO 710 JIMC8950
ACAPN=BPV*RRATE/(RRATE+1.-1./((1.+RRATE)**(NCAP-1))) JIMC8960
ACAPT=NCAP*ACAPN JIM08970
ACAPTM=ACAPT/MRT J1508980
ACAPS=O. JIC8990
ACAPV(1) =ACAPN JIM09000
DO 67 N=1,NCAP JIA09010
ACAPV(N)=ACAPN/(1.+RRATE) **(N-1) JIM09020
67 ACAPS=ACAPS+ACAPV(N) JIM09030
IF(ISYND.EQ.1)GO TO 710 JIM09040
C STEPPED UP EASIS ADDS CAP CONTRIB (TOTAL PHASED) TO MTG J1509050
C LESS LAND AND ANY ITEMS EXPENSED DURING DEVELOPMENT JIM09060
BASIST=MRT+ACAPT-LND-BCCST*(ICC-1) JIM09070
TB=BASISI-BASIST JIMC9080
BASISO=BASISI JI509090
BASISI=BASIST J1509100
TBR=TB/BASISI JI509110
IF (.00 1-AES (TBR)) 700,700,670 JIMC9120
670 TST1=TST1-1. JI509130
700 IF(TST1.EQ.0.)GO TO 555 J1509140
710 CONTINUE JIM09150
C CALCULATE ANNUAL CONTRIBUTION (CASH, BEFORE TAX) TO PULL J1509160
C INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN DOWN TO RRATE (DEV. DISC. RATE) J1509170
IF(BNPV-RELEQ)70,70,68 JIM09180
C GROSS AFTER TAX RETURNS USED J1509190
68 ANRPA= ((BNPV-RELEQ)*RRATE/(1.-(1.+RRATE)**(-NY)))/RYTAX JIM09200
69 GO TO 71 JI509210
70 ANRPA=0.0 JI509220
71 IF(BPV-RELEQ)75,75,73 JI509230
C RETURNS USED ARE NET AFTER TAX AND TAX FUND JIM09240
73 ARPA= ((BPV-RELEQ)*RRATE/(1.-(1.+RRATE)**(-NY)))/RYTAX JI1509250
GO TO 76 JI509260
75 ARPA=0.0 JIMC9270
76 CONTINUE JIM09280
C AVERAGE RATE ,DISCOUNTED JI509290
IF(RELEQ.EQ.0) GO TO 98 J1509300
AVDRN=BPV/RELEQ JIM09310
C INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN AFTER TAX FUND IS TAKEN FECM RETURNS JIM09320
C ONLY POSITIVE RETURNS ARE USED IN COMPUTATIONS JIM09330
R(1)=RRATE JIMC9340
XNPV(1)=BPV-RELEC JIM09350
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IF(XNPV(1))77,78,78 JIM09360
77 DR(1)=-0.1 JIM09370
GO TO 79 JIM09380
78 DR(1)=0.2 JIM09390
C CCNSTANTS ADDED TO AVOID ZERO DENOMINATORS JIM09400
79 DNPV(1)=-XNPV(1)+.000001 JIM09410
DO 86 I=2,20 31M09420
NI=I JIM09430
DR (I)= (-XNPV(I-1)*DR (I-1))/DNPV(I-1)+.000001 J1M09440
R (I) =R (I-1) +DR (I) JIM09450
IF(R(I).GE.10.)GC TO 87 J1M09460
80 XNPV(I)=O. J1M09470
NN=NY-1 JIM09480
DO 82 N=1,NN JIM09490
82 XNPV(I)=XNPV(I)+ARET(N)/(1.+R(I))**N JIM09500
84 XNPV(I)=XNPV(I)+ (ARET(NY)+GSALE)/((1.+R(I))**NY)-RELEQ JIM09510
DNPV(I)=XNPV(I)-XNPV (I-1)+.000001 JIM09520
IF(.005-ABS(DR(I))) 86,85,85 J1M09530
85 IF(.005-ABS(XNPV(I)/RELEQ))86,86,87 JIM09540
86 DPVDR (I) =DNPV (I) /DR (I) JIMC9550
87 RRIT=R (I) JIM09560
FXNPV=XNPV(I) JIMC9570
SRET=O. JIM09580
SRETN=O. JIMC9590
DO 95 N=1,NY JIM09600
SRETN=SRETN+ARETN (N) JIB09610
95 SRET=SRET+ARET (N) J1M09620
C PRESENT VALUE AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE MORTGAGE AMOUNT JIM09630
RPV=BPV/MRT JIM09640
RNPV=BNPV/MRT J1M09650
C AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE BEFORE TAX FUND IS WITHDRAWN FBCM RETURNS JI09660
C CONSISTENCY REQUIRES: 1) FOR DEVELOPER-HELD PRCJECT SET RELEQ FINITEJIM09670
C AND ACAPI=O OR THE SAME VALUE AS RELEQ, 2) FOR INVESTOR-HELD SET JIM09680
C RELEQ=PRES VALUE AND ACAPI=TOTAL CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS JIM09690
RTNAV= (SHETN+GSAL1-ACAPI)/(NY*ACAPI) JIM097C0
C AVERAGE RATE OF RETURN AFTER TAX FUND JIM09710
RTNAF=(SRET+GSALF-ACAPI)/(NY*ACAPI) J1M09720
98 GSALE=GSAL1 JIM09730
FDVPV=BPV-RELEQ JIM09740
FDVT=ACAPT-RELEQ JIM09750
FDPVM=FDVPV/MRT JIM09760
FDVTM=FDVT/MRT JIM09770
C INVESTMENT RESULTS JI159780
110 WRITE(IOUT,111)NP,NI,RRIT,FXNPV,BPV,RPV,BNPV,RNPV JIM09790
1,ANRPA,ARPA,BASISI,FDVPV,FDPVM JIM09800
111 FORMAT(//1X,'PAYBACK PERIOD ',12,2X,'ITER NUM ',12,2X,'RATE', JIM09810
11X,F6.4,2X,'RESID XNPV',F6.2,' PV AT RRATE= 'F10.2,8X,'PV/MRT= ' JIM09820
X,F6.4, JIMC9830
2/' ','PV (NO FUND)= 'F10.2,2X'PV/MRT (NO FUND)= I JI09840
3F6.4/' CONTRIE. TO RED RETN. TO RRATE; W/O TAX FUND= 'F10.2,5X JI09850
4,' W/TAX FUND= 'F10.2/' STEPPED-UP BASIS= 'F10.2,2X, JIM09860
5'PV OF DEVELOPER FEE='F10.2,' PV OF DEVELOPER FEE/MRT='F6.4) JIM09870
IF(GSALE)221,221,333 JI09880
221 WRITE(IOUT,222)NT,XARET,RFUIND,DTPV JI09890
222 FORMAT[L//' TAX FUND STARTED IN YR '12,5X,' RETURN NOT REQD FOR JIMC9900
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1FUND IN FIRST YEAR OF TAX FUND= 'F10.2/2X'TAX FUND INTEREST RATE= JIM09910
2 'F4.2' PV OF RETN NOT REQD 1ST YR= 'F12.2/) JIM09920
WRITE(IOUT,332) (N,TRET(N),N=NT,NY) JIMC9930
332 FORMAT(2X,'YR ACCUM VAL,TAX FND',5X,/4(2X,I2,3X,F10.2,5X)) JIM09940
C CASH FLOW SUMMARY JIM09950
333 IF(NYF-NY)555,334,555 JIM09960
334 WRITE(IOUT,2000) JIM09970
2000 FORMAT(//'1'1X,'CASH PLOW: (PROFIT=RPROF*IMPLIED EQUITY)'/ JIMC9980
1' ',2X,'YR AMORTIZATION DEPRECIATION TAXABLE INC. EXCESS DEPR.JIM09990
2 INCOME TAX AFTER TAX RETURN') JIM10000
WRITE(IOUT,2001) (N,AMORT(N),ADEPR(N),XTAX(N),XDEPR(N),ATAX(N), JIMlOOlO
1ARETN(N) ,N=1,NY) JIM10020
2001 FORMAT(2X,I2,6F14.2) JIM10030
WRITE(IOUT,2010) JIM10040
2010 FORMAT(/2X'RETURVS AND TAX FUND'/2X'YR AFTER TAX RET DISC PRES VALJIM10050
1 TAX SINKG FND TAX FUND W/INTEREST') JIM10060
WRITE (IOUT,201 1) (N, ARET (N) ,DPVF (N) ,N=1,NT) JIM10070
2011 FORMAT(2X,I2,2F14.2) JIM10080
WRITE(IOUT,2012)TFNDNT,TRET(NT) JIM10090
2012 FORMAT ('+',31X,2F14.2) JIM1o100
IF(NTP.GT.NY)GO TO 2014 31110110
WRITE(IOUT,2013) (N,ARETN(N),TRET(N),N=NTP,NY) JIM10120
2013 FORMAT(2X,I2,28X,2F14.2) JIM10130
2014 IF(NLOOP.EQ.1.AND.ISYND.EQ.2)GO TO 555 JIM10140
WRITE(IOUT,339) JIM10150
339 FORMAT(//2X'SYNDICATION PAYMENTS: '/4(2X,'PAYM.',4X,'DISC, PRES. JIM10160
1VAL.')) JIM10170
WRITE(IOUT,340) (N,ACAPV(N) ,N=1,NCAP) JIM10180
340 FORMAT (4 (2X,I2,10X,F12.2,l)) JIM10190
WRITE (IOUT,341) ACAPS JIM10200
341 FORMAT(2X'TOTAL PV OF CAP CONTRIB= 'F12.2) JIM10210
WRITE(IOUT,345)NCAP,ACAPNACAPT,ACAPTM,FDVT,FDVTM JIM10220
345 FORMAT(# '12'PAYMENTS OF'F10.2'=TOT CAP CONTRIB= 'F10.2,10X 'TOT CJIM10230
XAP CONTR/MRT= 'F6.4/ JIM102401' ','TOTAL DEV FEE=TOT CAP CONTRIB-RELEQ='F10.2,' TOT DEV FEE/MRTJIM10250
2='F6.4/) JIM10260
WRITE(IOUT,342)NLOOP JIM10270
342 FORMAT(' ','NO OF STEP UP LOOPS CALCULATED= '12) JIM10280
GO TO 555 JIM10290
444 WRITE (IOUT,445) JIM10300
445 FORMAT(//' LOUSY DEAL, RETURNS INSUFFICIENT TO PAY TAXES AND MORTGJIM10310
1AGE AT SALE, EVEN WHEN THEY ARE ALL CCMMITTED') JIM10320
555 CONTINUE JI10330
RETURN JIM10340
END JIM10350
JIM10360
JIM10370
JIM10380
SUBROUTINE COSTG(RDG,ADEPR,XDEPR,BASISO,TSALE,GANTX,CPTXPRFTX,ACAJIM10390
1PN,ATAX) JIM10400
C CCMPUTES PRESENT VALUE OF FEDERAL REVENUE LOSSES AND GAINS, JIM10410
C R E TAX ABATEMENT, INTEREST SUBSIDY JIM10420
COMMON BCSTC,TDEVRIFIN,RRETD,RMRT,RPROF,RRET,RIMTG,TMTG,RBFE, JIM10430
1NYRELEQ,MRT,PRFIT,TACST,CTRM,PSALE,BTRN,ABTBN,ARETN(60),RRTN(60),JI1110440
2RTNAV,RTNAFBNEV,AVDRN,ICSTGACAEM,CSTGM,ACAPI,ICSUB JIM10450
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C NET SAVING FOR DIRECT PAYMENT, NO DEPRECIATION, NO TAXABLE INCOME JIM11560
IF(CSTG.EQ.0.)CSTG=.00001 JIM11570
CDPSAV=CSTG-ACAPGS JIM11580
CDPM=CDESAV/MRT JIM11590
CDPR=CDPSAV/CSTG JIM11600
C SAVING ON DIRECT IEE FOR INCREMENT TO MATCH JIM11610
DDPSAV=CSTGM-CSTG-DCAPGS JIM11620
DDPM=DDPSAV/MRT JIM11630
DDPR=DDPSAV/CSTGM JIM11640
C AMOUNT AVAIL FOR SUBS FROM PROFIT JIM11650
C VALUE TO GOVERNMENT OF PROFIT (DIVIDEND) OVER PROJECT LIFE JIM11660
TPROFD=PRFIT*(1.-(1.+RDG)**(-(NY-NDEV)))/RDG JIM11670
TPRFDF=TPROFD/(1.+RDG)**NDEV JIM11680
C DISC VAL TO GOVT OF TAX ON DIVIDEND JIM11690
TPRDFT=TPRFDF*RYTAX JIM11700
C VALUE TO INVESTOR (BEFORE TAX) OF DIVIDEND OVER PROJECT LIFE JIM11710
VPROFD=PRFIT*(1.-(1.+RRATE)**(-(NY-NDEV)))/RRATE JIM11720
VPBFDF=VPROFD/(1.+RRATE)**NDEV JIM11730
C DISCOUNTED VALUE AFTER TAX JIM11740
DPVPRF=VPRFDF*(1.-RYTAX) JIM11750
JIM11760
C CHANGE IN CAP CONTRIB IN EXCH FOR DIVIDEND JIM11770
DCAPRF=DPVPRF*ACAPN/BPV JIM11780
C CHANGE IN GOVT COST TO EXCH DIV FOR CAP CCNTRIB DIRECTLY JIM11790
DCPGPF=DCAPRF*ACAPGS/ACAPN JIM11800
C CCST OF PAYMENT FROM ?.ORTG WITH ANNUAL SUBSIDY FOR MTG INCREASE JIM11810
AMFEE=ACAPGS*(1.+RDG)**NDEV JIM11820
CNFEE=AMFEE*RIMTG/(1.-1./(1.+RIMTG/NMTGP)**((NY-NDEV)*NMTGP)) JIM11830
CNFED=CNFEE*(1.-1./(1.+RDG/NMTGP)**((NY-NDEV)*NMTGP))/RDG JIM11840
CNFEDF=CNFED/(1.+RDG)**NDEV JIM11850
CNFDFR=CNFEDF/MRT JIM11860
C CHANGE IN G2VT COST TO EXCH DIV FCR CAP CONT VIA MORTG+SUBS JIM11870
DCPMPF=DCPGPF*CNFEDF/ACAPGS JIM11880
C NET SAVING FOR FEE PAYMENT THROUGH MORTGAGE JIM11890
CMFSAV=CSTG-CNFEDF JIM11900
IF (CSTG.EQ.0.) CSTG=.00001 JIMI1910
CMFR=CMFSAV/CSTG JIM11920
C COST TO GOVT W/ FULL REPL, GOVT GETS DIVIDEND JIM11930
C DIRECT PAYMENT JIM11940
CSTGDP=ACAPGS-TPRFDF JIM11950
C THRU MORTG JIM11960
CSTGMG=CNFEDF-TPRFDF JIM11970
C SAVING FOR FULL REPL, INCL RECOV OF DIVIDEND JIM11980
CDPPSV=CSTG-CSTGDP JIM11990
CDPPR=CDPPSV/CSTG JIM12000
CMGPSV=CSTG-CSTGMG JIM12010
CMGPR=CMGPSV/CSTG JIM12020
C GCVT REPL ALL BUT DIVIDEND AFTER TAX JIM12030
CSTPXD=ACAPGS-(1.-RYTAX)*TPRFDF-DCPGPF JIM12040
CSTPXM=CNFEDF-(1.RYTAX)*TPRFDF-DCPMPF JIM12050
C SAVING FOR REPL EXCEPT DIVIDEND AFTER TAX JIM12060
CPXDSV=CSTG-CSTPXD JIM12070
CPXDR=CPXESV/CSTG JIM12080
CPXMSV=CSTG-CSTPXM JIM12090
CPXMR=CPXMSV/CSTG JIM12100
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C GOVT REPL ALL BUT TAX FREE DIVIDEND JIM12110
RYTAXR=RYTAX JIM12120
IF(RYTAXR.EQ.0.)RYTAXR=.00001 JI12130
CSTGPD=ACAPGS-DCPGPF/RYTAXR JIM12140
CSTGEM=CNFEDF-DCPMPF/RYTAXR JIM12150
C SAVING FOR REPL ALL BUT TAX FREE DIVIDEND JIM12160
CPDSV=CSTG-CSTGPD JIM12170
CPDR=CPDSV/CSTG JIM12180
CPMSV=CSTG-CSTGFM JIM12190
CPMR=CPMSV/CSTG JIM12200
C COST OF PAYM FROM MORTG OF INCREM TO MATCH WITH ANN SUBS TO COVER MTGJIM12210
C INCREASE; REPAID OVER HOLDING PERIOD, NOT MORTGAGE TERM JIM12220
DMFEE=DCAPGS* (1. +RDG) **NDEV JIM12230
DCNFEE=DMFEE*RIMTG/(1.-1./(1.+RIMTG/NMTGP)**((NY-NDEV)*NMTGP)) JIM12240
DCNFED=DCNFEE*(1.-1./(1.+RDG/NMTGP)**((NY-NDEV)*NMTGP))/RDG JIM12250
DCNFDF=DCNFED/(1.+RDG)**NDEV J1M12260
DCNFR=DCNFDF/MRT JIM12270
C NET SAVING ON DIRECT FEE THRU MRTG FOR INCREMENT TO MATCH JIM12280
DMFSAV=CSTGM-CSTG-DCNFDF JIM12290
DMFM=DMFSAV/MRT JIM12300
DMFR=DMFSAV/CSTGM JIM12310
80 WRITE(IOUT,100)RDG JIM12320
100 FORMAT('1','COSTS TO GOVERNMENT--REVENUE LOSSES AND GAINS. DISCOUJIM12330
1NT RATE='F6.4,/2X,'YR TAX LOSS DISC VALUE') JIM12340
WRITE(IOUT,110) (N,ACTL(N),ACTLD(N),N=1,NDEV) JIM12350
110 FORMAT(2X,I2,2F14.2) JIM12360
WRITE (ICUT,120)TCTLD JIM12370
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